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ABSTRACT 
 
Only two Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries have ratified 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) Statute, and this number is unlikely to change 
dramatically in the near future. This research thus considers how international 
criminal justice (ICrimJ) can be advanced through the regionalisation of international 
criminal law (ICL), whilst also serving the interests of ASEAN Member States. The 
theoretical appeal, practical viability, and political acceptability of regional ICrimJ 
mechanisms are accordingly examined. Given that the establishment of the ICC has 
challenged the absolute sovereignty of States over the prosecution of international 
crimes, regional initiatives have added political allure as they not only better reflect 
ORFDOOHJDOQRUPVDQGSROLWLFDOFRQVLGHUDWLRQVEXWDOVRSODFHWKHVHOHFWLRQRIµUHJLRQDO
FULPHV¶ DQG HQIRUFement measures primarily in the hands of regional countries. In 
recognition of the 'ASEAN way' of making decisions, regional initiatives to further 
ICrimJ in Southeast Asia should be implemented gradually and driven internally 
through consultation and consensus. Moreover, to achieve the overarching ASEAN 
goal of maintaining regional peace and security, the modalities and practical effects of 
ICrimJ may require greater emphasis on deterrence and reconciliation, instead of 
punishment.  
 
The prospect and efficacy of a regional ICrimJ mechanism however also depends, 
inter alia, on the availability of institutional infrastructure and resources, and will 
understandably differ between regions. Nevertheless, some general conclusions about 
the value and attractiveness of a regional approach to ICrimJ can be drawn. Despite 
variations on what may constitute justice in different geographic areas, these 
generalisations are useful because they reveal the incentives and favourable conditions 
for efforts at the regional level. The research therefore proffers a basic framework to 
assess the costs and benefits of regional solutions against domestic or international 
methods of enforcing ICL, and determine which may best serve ICrimJ in each unique 
situation and circumstance. 
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INTRODUCTION  
THE POSSIBILITY OF A REGIONAL APPROACH TO  
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
 
More than 15 years have passed since the Rome Statue of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) was adopted in 1998, but countries in Asia still remain unenthusiastic 
about the ICC endeavour. Of the ten countries that constitute the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), only Cambodia (in 2002) and the Philippines (in 
2011) have ratified the Rome Statute.1 Currently, the prospects of the other ASEAN 
Member States (AMS) ratifying the Statute in the near future, either individually or 
collectively as a sub-regional group are remote. This is because regional 
considerations and attitudes towards the international system helmed by the ICC are 
unlikely to radically change. For example, it was announced in May 2013 that 
Indonesia would not accede to the Statute, despite earlier indications that it would.2 
Defence Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro argued that the ratification was not 
imperative as Indonesia already had domestic legal instruments that were adequate 
foundations for human rights protection in the country. The possibility that the ICC 
could be misused to interfere in internal political affairs was another factor cited by 
Indonesian politicians.3 Such views are compounded by the general lack of interest 
and focus on international criminal law (ICL) within the region.  
The main objective of this research is then to identify the most effective way to 
advance international criminal justice (ICrimJ) in Southeast Asia. Must ASEAN 
countries abide by the same ICrimJ standards accepted by 122 States from other 
regions of the world, or can those standards be made more flexible and reflective of 
local norms and conditions? The research thus examines whether ICrimJ can be 
further promoted and protected in Southeast Asia both by recognising theoretical 
variants in different regions, and through the regionalisation of ICL in terms of 
regional enforcement mechanisms or lists of crimes. It is noted that investigating, 
prosecuting and enforcing ICL has, broadly speaking, vacillated between national 
courts and international criminal courts. Prosecuting and punishing individuals who 
                                          
1
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 3; 37 ILM 999. 
2
 0DUJDUHWK$ULWRQDQJ³*RYWRIILFLDOO\UHMHFWV5RPH6WDWXWH´The Jakarta Post, 21 May 2013. 
3
 This includes the concern that the ratification of the Rome Statute could be used to affect or even 
block the bids of candidates in the 2014 Indonesian Presidential elections, in particular Gen (retired) 
Wiranto and Lt. Gen (retired) Prabowo Subianto who have been deemed by the National Commission 
on Human Rights to be responsible for serious human rights violations during the 1998 May riots. 
2 
 
have committed acts prohibited by treaty or customary law, such as war crimes, 
traditionally remained under the purview of their own States. Supranational courts 
only appeared after the Second World War (WWII), starting with the establishment of 
the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg.4  
The predilection for a universal system to deal with international crimes is 
XQGHUVWDQGDEOH,WLVHYLGHQFHGE\PRUHWKDQDFHQWXU\¶VZRUWKRIHIIRUW WRFUHDWHDQ
international court. Yet, under the principle of complementarity advanced by the ICC, 
the promotion and protection of ICrimJ has returned to the national level. States have 
primacy in investigating and prosecuting an individual accused of core international 
crimes, and the ICC can only exercise its jurisdiction if domestic courts are unable or 
unwilling genuinely to do so. Some commentators thus contend that the future of ICL 
may be domestic.5 Nevertheless, certain scholars have noted that the euphoria 
surrounding the development of ICrimJ has faded, the momentum for the international 
system has disappeared, and disillusionment has set in.6 This is partly due to the fact 
that the reluctance of a State to prosecute or extradite a suspect, compounded by 
regional reticence, has called into question the enforcement of ICrimJ in either 
domestic or internationalised criminal courts.  
In this regard, it is important to heed regional distinctions between countries 
that are member States of the ICC (black), those that have signed by not yet ratified 
the Rome Statute (light grey), and States that have not signed Rome Statute (dark 
grey).7 A possible explaQDWLRQ IRU WKHVHGLVFHUQDEOHJHRJUDSKLFDO µJDSV¶ LQ WHUPVRI
ratification is that while ICrimJ may be universally accepted as a concept, States 
prefer to enforce it according to their regional contexts and implement it differently in 
                                          
4
 This is generally regarded as the beginning of modern ICL. However, it is noted that the first reported 
international prosecution for war crimes occurred in 1474, when Peter von Hagenbach was tried by an 
ad hoc tribunal and found guilty of atrocities committed during the occupation of Breisach. See 
(GRDUGR *UHSSL ³7KH (YROXWLRQ RI ,QGLYLGXDO &ULPLQDO 5HVSRQVLELOLW\ XQGHU ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ´
International Review of the Red Cross 835 (1999): 531-553. 
5
 Given the limited financial and human resources of the ICC (or any other internationalised 
institution), State-level action under the principles of primacy and complementarity is recognised as a 
more effective and efficient way to further ICrimJ. Burke-White thus notes that enforcement of ICL is 
³HIIHFWLYHO\ PLJUDWLQJ IURP LQWHUQDWLRQDO WULEXQDOV WR QDWLRQDO FRXUWV´ :LOOLDP %XUNH-:KLWH ³$
&RPPXQLW\ RI &RXUWV 7RZDUGV D 6\VWHP RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &ULPLQDO /DZ´ Michigan Journal of 
International Law 24 (2002):1-101. 
6
 )ORULDQ -HVVEHUJHU DQG -XOLD *HQHXVV ³'RZQ WKH 'Uain or Down to Earth? International Criminal 
-XVWLFHXQGHU3UHVVXUH´Journal of International Criminal Justice 11 (2013): 501-503, at 501. 
7
 Data as at June 2014. 
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practice. This may be due to different regional underpinnings and objectives of ICL,8 
or because the ICC and its associated rules are felt to have not adequately 
accommodated constructs of justice that exist in different parts of the world.9 As such, 
the version of ICrimJ ensconced in the Rome Statute is unappealing, irrelevant, or 
worse illegitimate in these regions. 
 
Map 1.1 ± ICC Rome Statute Ratification Status 
 
 
That said, it is recognised from the international human rights debate that Asia 
is too diverse to claim that any homogeneous culture and uniformity of norms exists.10 
                                          
8
 This may be akin to the differing regional norms and priorities that exist in human rights. In this 
regard, there may be a Rawlsian notion of right and justice ZKHUH DOWKRXJK WKH µVRFLHW\RI SHRSOHV¶
VKRXOGEHDEOHWRDJUHHWKDWDOOWKHODZV³DUHUHDVRQDEOH´WKH\PD\GLIIHURQWKHUDQNLQJRIWKHODZV
Important for the present discussion is tKHSRLQWWKDW³ZHJHWGLIIHUHQWIRUPXODWLRQVRIWKHSULQFLSOHVRI
MXVWLFH´DVWKHVHLGHDVFDQEHLQWHUSUHWHGLQGLIIHUHQWZD\VJohn Rawls, 7KH/DZRI3HRSOHVZLWK³7KH
,GHDRI3XEOLF5HDVRQ5HYLVLWHG´ (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), at 14. 
9
 While there are claims that the ICC merely codified existing international law, it is noted that while 
there are international conventions on genocide and war crimes, crimes against humanity have not been 
set out in a comprehensive treaty. On 30 July 2013, the UN International Law Commission voted to add 
the elaboration of such a treaty to its long-term agenda. For a discussion, see Leila Sadat, ed., Forging a 
Convention for Crimes Against Humanity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).  
10
 Yamane points out that besides it geographical breath, Asia lacks any shared history (even in terms of 
colonial experience) and countries in the region have a host of political ideologies, cultural norms, 
religious practices, formal legal systems and informal conflict resolution practices, as well as varied 
levels of economic development. Similarly, Yasuaki notes that Asia is not a coherent unit and it is 
³FRPPRQSODFHWRWDONDERXWWKHGLYHUVLW\RI$VLDDQGWRGLYLGH$VLDLQWRIRXUUHJLRQV(DVW6RXWKHDVW
South aQG:HVW´6HH+LURNR<DPDQH³$VLDDQG+XPDQ5LJKWV´ LQ Karel Vasek and Philip Alston, 
eds., The International Dimensions of Human Rights (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982), at 651-670; 
and 2QXPD <DVXDNL ³In Quest of Intercivilizational Human Rights: Universal vs. Relative Human 
5LJKWV 9LHZHG IURP DQ $VLDQ 3HUVSHFWLYH´, Center For Asian Pacific Affairs Occasional Paper 2 
(March 1996), at 1-2. 
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For a regional approach for advancing ICrimJ and enforcing ICL to be considered, it 
may thus be more prudent to focus attention at the sub-regional level, rather than 
argue for a pan-Asian system. For the countries in Southeast Asia, it is indeed more 
realistic to explore the possibility of a sub-regional ICrimJ regime within the ASEAN 
construct.11 This would not only take advantage of existing institutional infrastructure, 
but more importantly also tap on the experience of Southeast Asian nations working 
together based on their consensual ethos and shared pragmatism. 
Southeast Asia is also worthy as a focused study on regionalising ICrimJ for 
several other reasons. Firstly, the Cambodian experience with the Khmer Rouge trials 
has not had a spill-over effect on the rest of Southeast Asia,12 and little attention has 
been paid to the development of ICL in the region both from within and outside 
ASEAN.13 Second, the countries in Southeast Asia have a range of various legal 
systems.14 The region therefore provides a good test case to evaluate the various ideas 
and assess if there are any inherent conflicts between systems. The cultural, religious 
and ethnic diversities across the region comprising of both developing and developed 
countries also provide similar advantages in overcoming related bias. 
 
Addressing a Gap in the Literature 
 
An enormous amount of literature exists on the development of ICL at both the 
universal and national levels, but there has been little research on the role that regional 
options can play in the promotion of ICrimJ.15 Although Burke-White conducted a 
preliminary exploration of the regionalisation of international criminal law 
enforcement,16 he and various scholars believed that the future of ICL enforcement 
                                          
11
 Although various other regions had synchronised positions or integrated policies on the ICC, there 
was no common SRVLWLRQIRU$VLD$KPHG=LDXGGLQ³$&RQWLQHQWLQ1HHGRIWKH,&&± International 
&ULPLQDO&RXUW&DPSDLJQVLQ$VLD´International Criminal Court Monitor 19 (2001), at 15.  
12
 For an assessment, see discussion on the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) 
in Chapters 1 and 4. 
13
 See also discussion on the Special Panels for Serious Crimes (SPSC) of East Timor in Chapter 1. 
14
 These include civil law (Vietnam); common law (Myanmar and Singapore); a pluralistic mix of 
common and civil law (Philippines and Thailand); a pluralistic mix of civil and religious law 
(Indonesia); a pluralistic mix of common and religious law (Brunei and Malaysia), and a hybrid of civil 
law and customs (Cambodia and Laos). 
15
 A distinction is drawn between the lack of regional ICL initiatives and existing regional mechanisms 
that tackle transnational criminal activities, such as the ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime. 
6HH&KDSWHUIRUDGLVFXVVLRQRQWKLVWUHDW\DQGWKHSRVVLELOLW\RI µUHJLRQDOFULPHV¶ZLWKLQ6RXWKeast 
Asia. 
16
 William Burke-:KLWH³5HJLRQDOLVDWLRQRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO&ULPLQDO/DZ(QIRUFHPHQW$3UHOLPLQDU\
([SORUDWLRQ´Texas International Law Journal 38 (2003): 729-761. 
5 
 
was largely fixed at the domestic level.17 While there have been some promising 
discussions about regionalising ICL in the context of specific regions,18 none fully 
explores the possibility of a regional mechanism or court with jurisdiction over core 
international crimes.19 As such, the regionalisation of ICL has received little attention, 
and the notion of promoting and protecting ICrimJ at the regional level has remained 
largely unexplored.  
It is however not as if the regional view of ICrimJ and ICL is either irrelevant 
or non-existent. It is worth noting that, based on a report of the Committee of Eminent 
African Jurists, the African Union (AU) had decided that the case against Hissène 
Habré fell within its competence, and called on Senegal to prosecute the former 
3UHVLGHQW RI &KDG IRU LQWHUQDWLRQDO FULPHV ³on behalf of Africa´20 Moreover, the 
allegations by African countries that the ICC unfairly targets their region, and the AU 
position against the ICC indictments of sitting Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and 
Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta, serve to highlight both regional divisions 
regarding ICrimJ and the difficulties in executing an arrest warrant without regional 
backing.21  
The research therefore also hopes to address this existing lacuna in the 
literature on the possibility of regional approaches to ICrimJ and ICL, which is 
especially surprising since initiatives in one region can serve as a template for or spur 
development in other regions.22 In addition, a regional approach will also allow States 
to overcome the need for unanimity that haunts international treaty law.23 Indeed, 
regionalisation has already emerged as the bridge in other highly divisive branches of 
                                          
17
 Burke-White, supra n.5; and Anne-Marie Slaughter and William Burke-:KLWH ³7KH )uture of 
,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZLV'RPHVWLF´Harvard International Law Journal 47 (2006): 327-352. 
18
 See Neil Boister and Alberto Costi, eds., Regionalising International Criminal Law in the Pacific 
(Wellington: New Zealand Association for Comparative Law, 2006). 
19
 While there have been discussion on regionalising efforts against transnational crime and 
implementing the ICC Rome Statute at the regional level, the provision of ICrimJ is less explored. See 
6KHQQLD6SLOODQH³3RVVLELOLWLHVDQG3LWIDOOV5HJLRQDOLVLQJ&ULPLQDO/DZLQWKH3DFLILF,VODQGV)RUXP´
in Boister, supra Q DQG 2O\PSLD %HNRX ³5HJLRQDOLVLQJ ,&& ,PSOHPHQWLQJ /HJLVODWLRQ $
Workable Solution for the Asia-3DFLILF5HJLRQ"´LQ%RLVWHUsupra n.18. 
20
 See Decision on the Hissène Habré Case and the African Union, Doc. Assembly/AU/3(VII), 
Assembly of the African Union, Seventh Ordinary Session, 1-2 July 2006, Gambia. 
21
 See discussions on the AU growing resistance towards the ICC, particularly in relation to these two 
cases, in Chapters 1 and 2. 
22
 For example, by allowing States to expand the list of crimes to address specific priorities in their 
regions, such as drug trafficking in the Caribbean, opens up the opportunity for an expanded list of 
crimes to later be adopted in other regions or at the international level. 
23
 This is most clearly illustrated by international trade negotiations, where States proceeded with 
bilateral, or regional agreements amongst willing partners to overcome international deadlock on a 
global trade deal. 
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international law like human rights, and presented effective solutions in addressing 
issues like peace and security.24 
 
Methodology 
 
It is important to adopt a methodology used to suit not only the types of questions 
asked but also the overall purpose of the research.25 With this in mind, the research 
employs a theoretical approach to discuss the regionalisation of international law. It 
will draw upon International Relations (IR) theories to provide the context in which 
public international law currently operates. Indeed, a State-centric perspective based 
on an IR analytical framework will help elucidate the development of the ICrimJ 
system and the current status of ICL, especially at the institutional level of the ICC. 
For example, it identifies important political and practical considerations, such as the 
SROLWLFDOUHDOLW\WKDWVRYHUHLJQ6WDWHVIDYRXUSHQDOL]LQJ³DOLPLWHGQXPEHURIDFWV´DQG
prefer to avoid the creation of a single authoritative international criminal code.26 In 
this regard, the research examine whether furthering ICrimJ through regional 
initiatives will help in the effective enforcement of ICL, whilst also serving the 
interests of sovereign States. Validating the theoretical appeal and utility of 
regionalism to self-interested States will be a crucial step to cross in the development 
of any regional ICrimJ initiative or mechanism. 
The research will also employ a doctrinal method to examine issues of law and 
practice, to ascertain the limits of the notion of regionalising international law in 
general, and the range of options available to ICrimJ in particular. The doctrinal 
research will involve unpacking and analysing the legal issues surrounding criminal 
justice and ICL gathered from both relevant primary material like case law, 
                                          
24
 See discussion in Chapter 3. 
25
 Kissam identifies six overlapping purposes of legal scholarship: (1) to provide legal analysis of cases 
and statutory provisions, or to explain, interpret and criticise these cases or laws; (2) to provide legal 
synthesis of disparate elements of laws into a coherent or useful legal standards or general rules; (3) to 
resolve doctrinal issues; (4) to produce teaching materials for students; (5) to understand the legal 
doctrine, including the explanation of causes, the analysis of consequences, and the interpretation of 
meaning; and (6) to critique legal doctrine and practice and argue for a better way of doing things. 
Philip Kissam, ³The Evaluation of Legal Scholarship´ Washington Law Review, 63 (1988): 221-256, at 
230-239. 
26
 Steven Ratner, Jason Abrams and James Bischoff, Accountability for Human rights Atrocities in 
International Law ± Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), at 
365. 
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international treaties and conventions,27 as well as secondary sources that serve to 
elaborate and clarify the intentions and principles of the primary material.28  
The research is however cognisant of the inherent drawbacks of exclusively 
doctrinal and library-based research, in particular of the criticism that it fails to 
consider the political, economic and social impact and influence on the legal 
process.29 A strict legal doctrinal methodology alone is unable to provide a sufficient 
framework to fully understand and address the complexity of practical issues that arise 
in the context of international law. Indeed, by only focusing on treaty instruments or 
strictly examining State practice and custom in a formalistic way, one risks missing 
the real and practical problems of securing State acceptance, thereby reducing the 
validity of the research. 
Although the development of ICrimJ and ICL cannot be explained within a 
vacuum and must be understood with a theoretical lens, the research also does not 
employ a socio-legal research method per se.30 Rather, it favours a distinct method 
that caters to the special nature of international law ± focusing on the observation of 
State practice and opinio juris. To develop and ground the concept of a regional 
system of criminal justice, the research also adopts an international law methodology 
by examining examples of the role of regionalisation in other branches of public 
international law. 
A focused case study will then be employed to address the limited practical 
applications and conclusions that can be derived from a strictly doctrinal research.31 
By adopting such a tool, the research is consciously trying to avoid overstating the 
viability of its options and stretching its conclusions, as well as to determine the 
mechanisms through which ICL can be realistically and best enforced amongst the 
AMS. As such, the research will also involve some interdisciplinary elements in terms 
                                          
27
 7KHSULQFLSDORUHYHQVROHDLPRIGRFWULQDOUHVHDUFKLVWR³GHVFULEHDERG\RIODZDQGKRZLWDSSOLHV´
,DQ'RELQVRQ DQG)UDQFLV -RKQ ³4XDOLWDWLYH /HJDO 5HVHDUFK´ LQ Mike McConville and Wing Hong 
Chui, eds., Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), at 19. 
28
 Doctrinal research is thus not research about the law, but research in ODZ3DXO&K\QRZHWK³/HJDO
5HVHDUFK´ LQ $QGUHZ .QLJKW DQG /HV 5XGGRFN HGV Advanced Research Methods in the Built 
Environment, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), at 30. 
29
 3XUHGRFWULQDODQDO\VLVKDVEHHQFULWLFLVHGDVDQ³LQWHOlectually rigid, inflexible and inward-ORRNLQJ´
ZD\WRXQGHUVWDQGODZDQGKRZWKHOHJDOV\VWHPRSHUDWHV'RXJODV:LFN³,QWHUGLVFLSOLQDULW\DQGWKH
'LVFLSOLQHRI/DZ´Journal of Law and Society 31 (2004):163-193, at 164. 
30
 For more on socio-legal research VHH 5H]D %DQDNDU DQG 0D[ 7UDYHUV ³/DZ 6RFLRORJ\ DQG
0HWKRG´ LQ 5H]D %DQDNDU DQG 0D[ 7UDYHUV HGV Theory and Method in Socio-legal Research 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005). 
31
 For details on case study research methodology, see Robert Yin, Case Study Research: Design and 
Methods, 4th ed. (London: Sage Publication, 2009).  
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of using IR theories to contextualize ICL. This will further allow the research to tease 
out how law and justice interact and work LQ µWKH UHDO ZRUOG¶ DV well as to better 
appreciate the opportunities that regional approaches may offer in different parts of 
the world. A major component of the research will therefore involve analysis of 
collective regional norms from Southeast Asia. As such, the research does not intend 
to employ quantitative empirical methods to superficially argue the formation of any 
regional customs.32 An inductive approach is instead favoured, where the theory and 
research questions will be examined and linked through a qualitative study.  
In sum, the research will be largely doctrinal in terms of the theoretical 
examination of ICrimJ. However, it will also involve an interdisciplinary element to 
firstly better understand the theoretical acceptability of regionalisation of ICrimJ 
amongst State actors, and then secondly identify opportunities that regional 
approaches may realistically offer within the international political context that ICL 
operates. 
 
Defining Regionalism and Regionalisation 
 
At this juncture, it may be prudent to first define regionalism and regionalisation, as 
well as understand how a region is identified. This not only provides some clarity on 
what the regionalisation of ICrimJ actually entails, but also the actors for such an 
endeavour. $µUHJLRQDOLVHG¶ZRUOGKDVDOZD\Vfeatured in human history.33 Ravenhill 
highlights that the notion of regionalism dates back several centuries,34 while Fawcett 
QRWHV WKDW UHJLRQV KDYH GRPLQDWHG WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO V\VWHP DV ³HPSLUHV VSKHUHV RI
influence, or just powerful states and their allLHV´35 As the frequency of regional 
cooperation increases, the notion of regionalism has become an ingrained feature of 
international relations and politics.36 For example, the independent countries of the 
                                          
32
 Quantitative empirical methodology incorporates the research practices in natural science, and is 
based on quantifying the collected and analysed data. For more on empirical legal scholarship, see 
7UDFH\*HRUJH³$Q(PSLULFDO6WXG\RI(PSLULFDO/HJDO6FKRODUVKLS7KH7RS/DZ6FKRROV´Indiana 
Law Journal 81 (2006):141-161. 
33
 See 0RUWHQ %¡nV 0DULDQQH 0DUFKDQG DQG 7LPRWK\ 6KDZ ³7KH :HDYH-world: The Regional 
intervening of Economies, ,GHDV DQG ,GHQWLWLHV´ LQ 7LPRWK\ 6KDZ DQG )UHGULN 6|GHUEDXP HGV
Theories of New Regionalism (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 
34
 -RKQ5DYHQKLOO ³5HJLRQDOLVP´ LQ-RKQ5DYHQKLOOHG Global Political Economy, 2nd ed. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), at 183.  
35
 /RXLVH )DZFHWW ³([SORULQJ 5HJLRQDO 'RPDLQV $ &RPSDUDWLYH +LVWRU\ RI 5HJLRQDOLVP´
International Affairs 80 (2004): 429-446, at 436. 
36
 )DZFHWWDVVHUWVWKDWUHJLRQDOLVPLVQRZZRUOGZLGHDQGFDQQRWEHGLVPLVVHGDVµDPHUHIDG¶2thers 
like Acharya, however, reject or downplay the importance of regions in world order. See ibid, at 438; 
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Americas began developing both regional identities and inter-state structures in the 
late nineteenth-century.37 After WWII, the principle of regional action and 
cooperation was then firmly established under the UN Charter, which allocated a role 
to regional organisations in the international legal order.38 The UN thus supplied 
regional bodies with endorsement and legitimacy, and accordingly demanded 
accountability under Chapter VIII.39 A counter-intuitive feature of globalisation has 
then been its ³GLVWLQFWO\ UHJLRQDO IODYRXU´,40 and the growing importance of regions 
has been reflected in both academic and policy debates.41 
In this regard, regions and regionalism do not exist in a vacuum,42 and a strong 
case exists for the region to be distinguished as a level of analysis from the 
international.43 Regionalism is therefore differentiated from universalist and 
unilateralist approaches, as well as the IR theories like neo-realism and neo-liberalism 
that serve to explain its occurrence. Rather, it represents activity by States that is less 
than global but more than that of any individual State,44 and may be permanent or 
temporary, institutionalised or not.45 A crucial point however is that there is a 
                                                                                                                         
$PLWDY$FKDU\D³7KH(PHUJLQJ5HJLRQDO$UFKLWHFWXUHRI:RUOG3ROLWLFV´World Politics 59 (2007): 
629-652, at 630; and Björn Hettne, András Inotai and Osvaldo Sunkel, eds., Globalism and the New 
Regionalism (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1999). 
37
 'LDQD 7XVVLH ³/DWLQ $PHULFD &RQWUDVWLQJ 0RWLYDWLRQV IRU 5HJLRQDO 3URMHFWV´ Review of 
International Studies 35 (2009): 169±188. 
38
 In Article 52 of the UN Charter, regional agencies were legitimised and offered a formal if somewhat 
undefined role in conflict resolution.  
39
 See Articles 52 and 53 of the UN Charter. 
40
 0DUN %HHVRQ ³5HWKLQNLQJ 5HJLRQDOLVP (XURSH DQG WKH (DVW $VLD LQ &RPSDUDWLYH +LVWRULFDO
PerspectiYH´Journal of European Public Policy, 12 (2005): 969-985, at 969. 
41
 Shaw and Soderbaum argue that regionalism is one of the dominating trends in current international 
studies, ZKLOH RWKHUV KDYH GHVFULEHG WKH QHHG WR FRQWHPSODWH UHJLRQDOLVP DV ³VR FRQVSLFXRXV´. See 
Timothy Shaw and Fredrik Soderbaum, eds., Theories of New Regionalism (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
0DFPLOODQ  DW  DQG 6KDXQ %UHVOLQ 5LFKDUG +LJJRWW DQG %HQ 5RVDPRQG ³5HJLRQV LQ
FRPSDUDWLYH SHUVSHFWLYH´ LQ 6KDXQ %UHVOLQ HW DO HGV New Regionalism in the Global Political 
Economy (London: Routledge, 2002), at 1. 
42
 While they are necessarily informed by geographical, political, economic, strategic and cultural 
concerns, these concepts also take place in an environment that is in turn informed by norms, trends, 
values and practices that relate to different regional and global settings. Fawcett, supra n.35, at 429. 
43
 See Peter Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2005); and Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
44
 1\H RSLQHV WKDW UHJLRQDO RUJDQLVDWLRQV DUH DUUDQJHPHQWV QRW ³JOREDOO\ LQFOXVLYH LQ WKHLU
PHPEHUVKLS´ZKLOH'RZQVDUJXHV WKDW UHJLRQDOLVPRFFXUVZKHUH WKH number of States falls short of 
XQLYHUVDOLVP 6HH -RVHSK 1\H ³5HJLRQDO ,QVWLWXWLRQV´ LQ &\ULO %ODFN DQG 5LFKDUG )DON HGV The 
Future of the International Legal Order: The Structure of the International Environment, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1972), at 430; and George Downs, ed., Collective Security Beyond the Cold 
War (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994). 
45
 Regionalism currently refers to a variety of things across a full spectrum of activities, and extensive 
scholarly research oQ UHJLRQDOLVP KDV ³\HW WR JHQHUDWH D ZLGHO\ DFFHSWHG GHILQLWLRQ RI LW´ Edward 
0DQVILHOGDQG+HOHQ0LOQHU³7KH1HZ:DYHRI5HJLRQDOLVP´International Organization 53 (1999): 
589±627, at 590. 
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³SROLWLFDOO\ GHILQHG OLPLW´ WR UHJLRQDOLVP46 This is clearly the case with ASEAN, 
which has thus far excluded East Timor from becoming a member despite the 
FRXQWU\¶VJHRJUDSKLFDOORFDWLRQ 
)RU WKH SXUSRVH RI WKLV UHVHDUFK µUHJLRQDOLVP¶ LV WKHUHIRUH DFFHSWHG DV the 
phenomenon of FRRSHUDWLRQDQGFRRUGLQDWLRQDPRQJ6WDWHV³ZLWKLQDJLYHQUHJLRQ´
VRDV WR³SXUVXHDQGSURPRWHFRPPRQJRDOV LQRQHRUPRUH LVVXHDUHDV´47 Fawcett 
notes that such interactions can range from advancing regional identity or awareness 
by consolidating regional groups and networks (soft regionalism), to formalising 
regional or sub-regional groupings through treaties and institutions (hard 
regionalism).48 7KLV GHILQLWLRQ FRXSOHG ZLWK )DZFHWW¶V FODULILFDWLRQ DSWO\ GHVFULEHV
the situation in Southeast Asia and the relationship between AMS, where the 
maintenance of regional peace and security has been the common aim. Although it 
may be a subtle distinction, the research focuses on voluntary regionalism (as opposed 
to coercive regionalism49) by States because no country is obligated to be part of 
ASEAN.50 Regionalism thus includes a broad range of policies or projects initiated at 
various levels and at different times by diverse regional actors, whereby the 
coordination itself further defines the region.51 Such policies may be any intentional 
cross-border activity, and may extend even as far as integration and ceding significant 
amounts of national decision-making to a supranational authority like the European 
Union (EU).52  
:KLOH VRPH VFKRODUV KDYH WKHQ VRXJKW WR GLVWLQJXLVK µUHJLRQDOLVP¶ DQG
µUHJLRQDOLVDWLRQ¶EDVHGRQZKHWKHUWKHUHJLRQDOSURJUDPPHLVD6WDWH-led or a driven 
                                          
46
 %M|UQ +HWWQH ³*OREDOL]DWLRQ DQG WKH 1HZ 5HJLRQDOLVP 7KH 6HFRQG *UHDW 7UDQVIRUPDWLRQ´ LQ
Hettne, supra n.36, at 9. 
47
 5LFKDUG )DON ³7KH 3RVW-:HVWSKDOLD (QLJPD´ LQ %M|UQ +HWWQH DQG %HUWLO 2G|HQ HGV Global 
Governance in the 21st Century: Alternative Perspectives on World Order, (Stockholm: Almkvist & 
Wiksell, 2002), at 177. 
48
 Fawcett, supra n.35, at 433.  
49
 The Co-Prosperity or Warsaw Pact type of regional arrangement are then seen as coercive 
regionalism. Ibid, at 429. 
50
 However, it is recognised that not everyone agrees with a narrow State-led definition of regionalism. 
6HH )UHGULN 6|GHUEDXP ³,QWURGXFWLRQ 7KHRULHV RI 1HZ 5HJLRQDOLVP´ LQ )UHGULN 6|GHUEDXP DQG
Timothy Shaw, eds., Theories of New Regionalism: a Palgrave Reader (New York, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2003). 
51
 Despite arguments that a successful regionalist project presupposes interactions with non-state actors, 
States remain the predominant actor in most regional arrangements, with most literature on regionalism 
still focusing on the more measurable institutional forms of interstate cooperation. See Fawcett, supra 
n.35, at 433. 
52
 5LFN)DZQµµµ5HJLRQV¶DQGWKHLUVWXG\ZKHUHIURPZKDWIRUDQGZKHUHWR"´, Review of International 
Studies 35 (2009): 5±34, at 13. 
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below the level of the State,53 Higgott warns of the problems of such a distinction, 
HVSHFLDOO\LQ(DVW$VLDZKHUH³WKHLQWHUSHQHWUDWLRQDQGEOXUULQJRISXEOLFDQGSULYDWH
SRZHU LV D JLYHQ RI WKH SROLWLFDO HFRQRPLHV RI WKH UHJLRQ´54 It is therefore more 
practical and useful to understand regionalisation as a process like globalisation, but 
manifesting discernible differences in terms of its impact.55 The significance of 
regionalisation as a route to global order has been acknowledged at the international 
level, particularly in the regional promotion of peace and security, or in relation to 
trade, aid and development policy.56 Moreover, if regionalism is understood as an 
ideology of cooperation or a policy of coordination, regionalisation is then broadly the 
SURFHVVRUVWUDWHJ\RI³GHYHORSLQJSRZHUDQGUHVSRQVLELOLW\DQGGHYROYLQJWKHPWRWKH
DSSURSULDWHUHJLRQDOOHYHO´57 5HJLRQDOLVDWLRQLVWKXVDSURFHVVWKDWPD\³ERWKSUHFHGH
DQGIORZIURPUHJLRQDOLVP´DQGRFFXUHYHQZLWKRXWUHJLRQDOLVP58 It may simply be a 
concentration of formal or informal State activity at a regional level, but could also 
serve as the basis of and lead to institutionalisation.59 In this regard, informal 
mechanisms would then be as valid an example of regionalisation as formal and 
institutionalised mechanisms like a permanent regional criminal court.60  
On that note, it is crucial to reiterate that no argument is being made to replace 
international or national processes with regional ICrimJ initiatives. It is recognised 
that regionalism is but one approach to deal with various global problems.61 A 
regional solution is thus envisioned as another option that should be considered, and 
its content will differ according to unique regional considerations and the nature of 
                                          
53
 See Ravenhill, supra QDWDQG$QGUHZ+XUUHOO³([SODLQLQJWKH5HVXUJHQFHRI5HJLRQDOLVP
iQ:RUOG3ROLWLFV´Review of International Studies 21 (1995): 331±58. 
54
 5LFKDUG+LJJRWW³De facto and de jure Regionalism: The Double Discourse of Regionalism in the 
$VLD3DFLILF´Global Society 11 (1997), at 166. 
55
 Some scholars view regionalism as an integral part of globalisation, while others see them as 
concepts reacting against each other. See Jefferey Sellers, Governing from Below: Urban Regions and 
the Global Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Frank Moulaert, Globalization 
and Integrated Area Development in European Cities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); and 
-DPHV 0LWWHOPDQ ³5HWKLQNLQJ WKH µ1HZ 5HJLRQDOLVP¶ LQ WKH &RQWH[W RI *OREDOLVDWLRQ´ LQ +HWWQH
supra n.36. 
56
 Hettne thus contends that regionalisation is about the ³SROLWLFDO DPELWLRQRI HVWDEOLVKLQJ WHUULWRULDO
FRQWURODQGUHJLRQDOFRKHUHQFHFXPLGHQWLW\´Hettne, supra n.46, at 17. 
57
 Fawcett, supra n.35, at 434; and %M|UQ +HWWQH ³3URORJXH WR WKH )LYH 9ROXPHV´ LQ +HWWQH supra 
n.36, at xix. 
58
 Fawcett, supra n.35, at 433. 
59
 For example, regionalisation may refer to regional responses to conflicts that spill over borders and 
draw in neighbouring countries, but has also been recognised to yield trading blocs and even formal 
institutions. 
60
 See Chapter 4 for a further discussion on the appropriate form(s) for a regional approach to ICrimJ. 
61
 See Hettne, supra n.57, at xvii. 
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each specific situation. The underlying fundamental questions however remain how a 
µUHJLRQ¶LVGHILQHGZK\WKH\H[LVWDQGWKHPDQQHULQZKLFKWKH\VKRXOGRSHUDWH 
 
Identifying Regions 
 
$UHJLRQLVDFRPSOH[FODVVLILFDWLRQWKDW³EULQJVWRJHWKHUERWKPDWHULDODQGµYLUWXDO¶
elHPHQWVDVZHOODVYHU\GLYHUJLQJVRFLDOSUDFWLFHVDQGGLVFRXUVHV´62 As such, there 
are also YDULRXVFRQFHSWXDOGHILQLWLRQVIRUDQGGLYHUJHQWXQGHUVWDQGLQJVRIµUHJLRQV¶
even amongst associated disciplines.63 )RU H[DPSOH HFRQRPLVWV LGHQWLI\ µUHJLRQV¶
through the existence of formal trading structures,64 while geographers generally 
question the idea of a borderless world and refer to it as a sub-state entity.65 For a 
political scientist, such sub-QDWLRQDO JURXSLQJV PD\ EH FRQVLGHUHG µVXE-UHJLRQV¶ D
term which can alternatively refer to linkages across the national boundaries of two or 
more States.66 Additional confusion over definition then arises from policy usage. 
This is clearly illustrated by the fact that not only does the EU have a supranational 
identit\ DV D µUHJLRQ¶ EXW LWV LQLWLDWLYHV DOVR FUHDWH FURVV-ERUGHU µUHJLRQDO¶
cooperation,67 DV ZHOO DV VXEQDWLRQDO µUHJLRQDO¶ HQWLWLHV ZLWKLQ H[LVWLQJ 6WDWHV68 
Besides KDYLQJ GLIIHUHQW FKDUDFWHULVWLFV WKH FRQFHSW RI D µUHJLRQ¶ UHPDLQV unclear 
because States can concurrently be members of various regional groupings, which 
may overlap but not coincide.69  
                                          
62
 $QVVL3DDVL³7KH5HVXUJHQFHRIWKHµ5HJLRQ¶DQGµ5HJLRQDO,GHQWLW\¶7KHRUHWLFDO3HUVSHFWLYHVDQG
Empirical Observations on Regional Dynamics in (XURSH´, Review of International Studies 35 (2009): 
121±146, at 131. 
63
 $JQHZQRWHVWKDW³SKLORVRSKLFDOFRQIXVLRQUHLJQVVXSUHPH´LQGHEDWHVDERXWUHJLRQV John Agnew, 
³5HJLRQV RQ WKH 0LQG 'RHV 1RW (TXDO 5HJLRQV RI WKH 0LQG´ Progress in Human Geography 23 
(1999): 91-96, at 93. 
64
 5DLPR9l\U\QHQ³5HJLRQDOLVP2OGDQG1HZ´International Studies Review 5 (2003): 25±51, at 26. 
65
 For example, VHH'DYLG1HZPDQ³%RUGHUVDQG%RUGHULQJ7RZDUGVDQ,QWHUGLVFLSOLQDU\'LDORJXH´
European Journal of Social Theory 9 (2006): 171±86. 
66
 In Europe, µVXE-UHJLRQ¶ KDV EHHQ XVHG WR GHVFULEH UHJLRQDO LQLWLDWLYHV DPRQJ 6WDWHV 6ee Martin 
Dangerfield, Subregional Economic Cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe: The Political 
Economy of CEFTA (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2000); and Andrew Cottey, ed., Subregional 
Cooperation in the New Europe: Building Security, Prosperity and Solidarity from the Barents to the 
Black Sea (Houndsmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999).  
67
 6HH-HQQLIHU<RGHU ³%ULGJLQJ WKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQDQG(DVWHUQ(XURSH: Cross-border Cooperation 
DQGWKH(XURUHJLRQV´Regional & Federal Studies 13 (2003): 90±106. 
68
 See $QVVL3DDVL³7KH5HVXUJHQFHRIWKHµ5HJLRQ¶DQGµ5HJLRQDO,GHQWLW\¶7KHRUHWLFDO3HUVSHFWLYHV
DQG (PSLULFDO 2EVHUYDWLRQV RQ 5HJLRQDO '\QDPLFV LQ (XURSH´, Review of International Studies 35 
(2009): 121±146. 
69
 For example, not all AMS are part of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). 
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With the end of the Cold War, more attention was given to understand how 
regions fit into and affect international order.70 The growing impact and importance of 
regionalism is also linked to economics and trade. However, its significance has 
climbed further EHFDXVH UHJLRQV SURYLGH D ³VLJQLILFDQW FRPSOHPHQWDU\ OD\HU RI
JRYHUQDQFH´.71 *LYHQWKDWLWFDQ³VKDSHZRUOGRUGHU´72 and has a strong connection to 
peace and security,73 regionalisation efforts may have a prominent part to play in the 
advancement of ICrimJ. Yet, there are also no definitive answers to what constitutes 
regions and how they affect and interact with the larger global system. Indeed, not 
RQO\GRHVDQµLGHDOUHJLRQ¶QRWH[LVWEXWregions are also ³QRWJLYHQRQFHDQGIRUDOOLW
LVEXLOWXSDQGFKDQJHV´74 It is thus important to adopt a degree of definitional and 
theoretical flexibility as regions may vary over time in terms of their composition and 
size, power and capabilities, as well as aspirations.75 Two basic questions arise from 
these points. Firstly, how much does geography matter in the making and functioning 
of regions? Secondly, does identity projection help clarify the study regions?  
Geography certainly helps differentiate regions from other multilateral 
groupings, and debates about its significance over social processes still point to the 
importance of geographic proximity.76 Geography must therefore not be dismissed as 
a starting point for identLILFDWLRQRI D µUHJLRQ¶ ZKLFKPD\GHQRWHQRPRUH WKDQ WKH
geographical reality of a cluster of countries, ranging from a few contiguous States to 
an entire continent. In fact, geographical markers are employed by many States and 
regional organisations.77 For example, the African Union (AU) has accused the ICC of 
                                          
70
 For a discussion on the rise of regionalism after the Cold War, see David Lake and Patrick Morgan, 
eds., Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World (University Park: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1997). 
71
 Fawcett, supra n.35, at 431. 
72
 %M|UQ+HWWQH³%H\RQGWKHµ1HZ¶5HJLRQDOLVP´New Political Economy 10 (2005): 543±71, at 543. 
73
 Without DQ³RYHUDUFKLQJDQd overriding global-OHYHOVHFXULW\G\QDPLF´DUHJLRQDOIRFXVKDVEHFRPH
PRUHVDOLHQW0XWKLDK$ODJDSSD³5HJLRQDOLVPDQG&RQIOLFW0DQDJHPHQW$)UDPHZRUNIRU$QDO\VLV´
Review of International Studies 21 (1995): 359±DW$OVR6HH-DPHV+HQW]³,QWUoduction: New 
5HJLRQDOLVPDQG WKH µ7KHRU\RI6HFXULW\6WXGLHV¶´ LQ -DPHV+HQW]DQG0DUWLQ%¡nV HGV New and 
Critical Security and Regionalism: Beyond the Nation State, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003). 
74
 Amin Maalouf, In the Name of Identity (London: Penguin, 2003), at 23. 
75
 Precision in defining the size and membership of a region can be very important. This may be due to 
demands for greater cohesion, commonality and cooperation that are found in smaller and tightly 
defined geographical areas. Alternatively, political considerations and selectivity could be the factor 
determining the inclusion or exclusion of certain States. Indeed, the history of regionalism reveals how 
UHJLRQVKDYHEHHQ³GHILQHGDQGUHGHILQHGLQVXFKVHOHFWLYHWHUPV´)DZFHWWsupra n.35, at 432. 
76
 See =ROHND 1GD\L ³µ7KHRULVLQJ WKH ULVH RI UHJLRQQHVV¶ E\ %MRUQ +HWWQH DQG )UHGULN 6RGHUEDXP´
Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies 33 (2006): 113±24. 
77
 Candidate States for regional organisations are typically required to be from a certain geographic 
DUHD$QQD YDQGHU9OHXWHQ DQG $QGUHD+RIIPDQ ³/HJLWLPDF\ 'HPRFUDF\ DQG5,2V:KHUH LV WKH
*DS"´LQ$QGUHD+RIIPDQDQG$QQDYDQGHU9OHXWHQHGVClosing or Widening the Gap? Legitimacy 
and Democracy in Regional Integration Organizations, (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing, 2007), at 6. 
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XQIDLUO\ WDUJHWLQJ WKH UHJLRQ DQG µKXQWLQJ¶ $IULFDQV +HQFH, geographical proximity 
should be an essential, though not necessarily the only, factor of a region.78 
That said, geographical proximity and contiguity reveal little about the 
definition of a region or the dynamics of regionalism.79 Fawn even contends that 
³>G@HSHQGLQJRQWKHFKDUDFWHULVWLFHPSKDVLVHGJHRJUDSK\FDQEHFRPHDQWLWKHWLFDO WR
UHJLRQ´DQGKLJKOLJKWVWKHH[LVWHQFHRIUHJLRQVEDVHGon historical, cultural, linguistic, 
economic or religious affiliations that are not geographically contiguous.80 Indeed, if 
geography and regional affiliation were hard-linked, East Timor should immediately 
be part of ASEAN because it shares a border with Indonesia and is well within the 
Indonesia archipelago. But is it not due to political reasons. Hence, a simple definition 
EDVHG RQ JHRJUDSK\ DORQH FDQQRW OHDG YHU\ IDU DQG D µUHJLRQ¶ PXVW LQFRUSRUDWH DQ
element of commonality and interaction. 
Identity has then provided far stronger bonds than geography,81 and it may be 
prudent to consider regions as entities also held together by common experience, 
custom and practice,82 whose members display some identifiable patterns of 
behaviour.83 Even the field of econoPLFUHJLRQDOLVPDFNQRZOHGJHWKDW³TXHVWLRQVRI
identity ± DUHQRZGHHPHG WREHVDOLHQW´84 All regions are therefore to some extent 
VXEMHFWLYHO\ GHILQHG DQG XQGHUVWRRG LQ WHUPV RI ZKDW $GOHU WHUPHG ³FRJQLWLYH
UHJLRQV´85 The making and functioning of a region is thus closely linked with its 
identity projection.86 In other words, a region may then exist only if its members 
define and promulgate to others a specific identity, perhaps through a shared history, 
                                          
78
 For example, Nye defines a region as a group of states linked by both geographical relationship and 
mutual interdependence, while $JQHZ FODLPV WKDW UHJLRQV DUH W\SLFDOO\ EDVHG RQ ³WKH LGHD RI DQ
homogenous block of space that has a persisting distinctiveness due to its physical and cultural 
FKDUDFWHULVWLFV´ 6HH Joseph Nye, International Regionalism (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968), at vii; 
Joseph Nye, Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization (New York: Little, 
Brown, 1971); and Agnew, supra n.63, at 92. 
79
 Andrew +XUUHOO³5HJLRQDOLVPLQ7KHRUHWLFDO3HUVSHFWLYH´LQ/RXLVH)DZFHWWDQG$QGUHZ+XUUHOO
eds., Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order  (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), at 38. 
80
 Fawn, supra n.52, at 17. 
81
 Hurrell, supra n.79, at 38. 
82
 (PDQXHO$GOHU³,PDJLQHG6HFXULW\&RPPXQLWLHV&RJQLWLYH5HJLRQV LQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO5HODWLRQV´
Millennium 26 (1997): 1-27. 
83
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language, culture or religion. Identity also has an undeniable role in regional 
processes,87 DQG WKH µ$6($1 ZD\¶ LV ZLGHO\ VHHQ WR IUDPH UHJLRQDO EHKDYLRXU DQG
options in Southeast Asia.88 AlWKRXJKLGHQWLWLHVDUHPDOOHDEOHDQGYDU\LQJDVRFLHW\¶V
conception of itself may be a source of systemic change, altering the shared identity of 
a group of nations is difficult. This is a crucial point that will be revisited in assessing 
the regionalisation of ICrimJ in Southeast Asia, particularly the discussion in Chapter 
4 on acceptable modalities and the pace for which change can realistically occur. 
In sum, regions and regionalism are ultimately still what States make of 
them.89 The capacity of a self-defined region to articulate its identity and interests to 
other actors not only highlights the positivist lens required to approach regionalism, 
but also becomes fundamental in identifying a region. *HQHUDOO\ WKH WHUP µUHJLRQ¶
may be loosely based on either an objective sense of region created by geographic 
features or explicit shared identifiers that various States may select besides geographic 
proximity. These include cultural, economic, linguistic, or political ties.90 In this 
regard, a region may but need not have an institutional form to be one. How well a 
group of States express their µUHJLRQQHVV¶91 or ³regional coherence within a particular 
JHRJUDSKLFDUHD´,92 DOVRVHUYHVDVDQLQGLFDWLRQRIKRZµUHDO¶DQGVXFFHVVIXODUHJLRQ
has become.93 For all intents and purposes, the countries of Southeast Asia have then 
drawn their regional boundary around the membership of ASEAN. 
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Research Structure of the Thesis 
 
7KHUHVHDUFKQRWHVWKDWZKLOHWDONRIPRUDOLW\DQGWKHµFRQVFLHQFHRIKXPDQLW\¶H[LVWV
and partly underpins support for ICL,94 the fact is that States are value-neutral entities 
that do not manifest or possess any teleological or ethical purpose.95 Instead, they are 
driven by self-preservation ± either as a zero-sum calculation in Realist political 
theory,96 or through cooperation in Liberal political theory.97 This would be true even 
in the English school of IR theory, where a certain set of rules/norms exist, based on 
shared interests,98 within the society of States.99 Hence, while some may argue that the 
development of ICL reflects an international community that resembles the neo-
Grotian notion of a society of States with common fundamental interests and values, 
the pluralist and statist hallmarks of the Vattellian archetype cannot be ignored. As 
5REHUWVRQ SRLQWV RXW ³LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ µUHIOHFWV ILUVW DQG IRUHPRVW WKH EDVLF VWDWH-
RULHQWHGFKDUDFWHURIZRUOGSROLWLFV¶EHFDXse it is a system created and controlled by 
VRYHUHLJQVWDWHVIRUWKHLUFRQYHQLHQFH´100 In this regard, two fundamental aspects of 
international law are worth noting. First, it is very much part of and a product of IR 
and politics. Indeed, Luban points out WKDW³,&-FDQQRWE\SDVVSROLWLFVDQGEHFRPHDQ
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RUGLQDU\ SDUW RI WKH UXOH RI ODZ´101 Second, self-interested sovereign States 
undeniably remain at the centre of its development. It is true that various international 
organisations and many non-State actors have not only emerged on the international 
plane, but also increased their influence over the last half-century.102 However, while 
they will undoubtedly also attempt to justify their breaches or create exceptions to 
their legal obligations, history has shown that States are not averse to violating 
international rules and conventions to advance their own interests.  
The attention of this research is therefore unsurprisingly firmly focused on 
States as the main actors in the development of international law generally and ICL in 
particular. Accordingly, the analytical framework of the research draws heavily from 
state-centric IR theories like neo-realism and neo-liberal interdependence theories. 
These two theoretical lenses are particularly pertinent in the context of Southeast Asia, 
where AMS unequivocally remain the predominant political force in the region, with 
self-interest as the key policy determinant. They are also consistently employed 
throughout the research to explain the past development of and future opportunities 
for ICrimJ, and will be examined further in Chapter 2.  
However, as an introduction, neo-realism views States as unitary actors co-
existing in an anarchic international system, which pursue their national interests 
generally defined in terms of maximising power and security. Totally mitigating 
anarchy through cooperation is deemed utopian because differing State interests will 
DFWDVDEUDNHRQVXFKLQLWLDWLYHVZKLFKFDQDWPRVWUHQGHURQO\³PRGHVWVHUYLFHV´103 
Regionalism of ICrimJ can nevertheless be viewed through a neo-realist lens, where 
regions are essentially understood as products of State activity that operate only and to 
the limits of what are determined by State interests.104 For example, Southeast Asian 
countries both created regional and joined international organisations as a natural 
response of weaker States trapped in a world dictated by the powerful. By extension, 
ASEAN was also an attempt to restrict the exercise of external hegemonic power, as 
well as to block the spread of communism within the founding member States. In this 
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regard, neo-realism explains that as DVµSRVLWLRQDO¶DFWRUV6WDWHVDUHPRWLYDWHGE\WKH
maintenance or enhancement of their position vis-a-vis other States, and will not 
sacrifice State sovereignty to enforce ICL unless doing so confers some relative 
advantage or to opposing it entails some relative costs. The question is how ASEAN 
countries can be best convinced to advance ICrimJ when institutions like the ICC are 
deemed to be incapable of addressing the anarchy in the international system. 
On the other hand, neo-liberalism believes that States are the most important 
collective (but not unitary) actors in international relations. Cooperation amongst 
States is possible and will increase because: (1) multiple interactions occur in the 
international system between the various actors, who draw lessons from their 
experiences; and (2) mutual interests grow with greater interaction, communication 
and interdependence.105 This matches the situation in Southeast Asia, where ASEAN 
States have not only negotiated FTAs as a regional bloc and jointly worked to address 
transnational issues and crimes, but also imbued ASEAN with a legal personality 
through the ratification of its Charter and undertaken to create an ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC) by 2015. From a neoliberal perspective, the consideration is then 
not whether ASEAN States should move closer together on ICrimJ issues, but whether 
it should be formalised or institutionalised within the regional framework that 
currently manages the complicated interactions and interdependencies between 
Southeast Asian countries. 
The research recognises that these two IR theories cannot be used concurrently 
to explain State behaviour and choices, and does not seek to determine which IR 
theory best explains international politics or to formulate a synthesis of these two 
opposing theories. Rather, the research shows that regardless of which of these two 
main IR theories are selected to understand international relations, the concept of 
regionalisation can be coherently explained and understood. This theoretical 
framework will importantly also be relevant and apply to the model of regional ICrimJ 
developed in this thesis for Southeast Asia. 
The research ultimately presents the case that furthering ICrimJ and enforcing 
ICL through regional initiatives can serve the interest of sovereign and equal States, 
especially given the strong positivist reality within Southeast Asia. It discusses the 
value propositions for these States, especially those deaf to the call of the ICC, to 
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advance ICrimJ and enforce ICL through regional initiatives. The research does not 
LQWHQG WR µSUHDFK WR WKH FRQYHUWHG¶ 5DWKHU LW VHHNV WR VSHDN WR 6WDWHV WKDW DUH QRW
convinced by arguments of morality and preventing impunity, in a language that they 
understand ± structured on international realpolitik and political calculations. In this 
vein, Chapter 1 recognises that ICL is culturally specific, not collectively arrived at, 
and not inherently universal or value-neutral. Given that regional actors have taken on 
LQFUHDVLQJO\ LPSRUWDQW UROHV DQG FRQWULEXWHG WR ³WKH FRQWHPSRUDU\ WXUQ WRZDUGV
PXOWLOD\HUHGJRYHUQDQFH´106 Chapter 1 contends that regional initiatives can also exist 
for ICrimJ. A regional mechanism is then envisaged as an additional alternative that 
may be more aligned to the political calculations of self-interested States and better 
able to balance the goals of ICrimJ according to the unique needs of each situation.107 
Moreover, as values and morals are functions of societies, for which 
differences of opinion and priorities exist over time and between regions of the world, 
Chapter 1 posits that regional initiatives may achieve greater legitimacy, support and 
compliance from both the concerned State(s) and regional neighbours. These 
differences, which are clearly manifested in the fields of collective security and 
international human rights law, are not absent in ICL.108 The logic of cooperation then 
points further towards regional enforcement of agreed standards or measures when 
regional initiatives additionally function as an effective monitor and honest broker 
between the conflicting groups. Although they are recognised as occupying the same 
space being discussed ± between the international and national, 
hybrid/internationalised courts are noted to typically be not only ad hoc but 
importantly also post hoc. As such, these judicial bodies are unable to halt or de-
escalate the perpetration of international crimes, let alone prevent them with 
enforceable legal action. The proposal is instead to gradually but eventually establish 
a permanent regional mechanism that can focus on more than just post-hoc justice, 
and include elements of avoidance, prevention and deterrence.109 Akhavan points out 
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that not only must ICrimJ be part of a broader set of tools to confront mass atrocities, 
EXW³WKHILUVWSULRULW\PXVWDOZD\VEHSUHYHQWLRQ´110 In this regard, the regionalisation 
of ICrimJ is a theoretically possible, practically viable and politically acceptable 
approach that can fill a existing gap in the international criminal justice system. 
The first section of Chapter 2 then briefly examines the continuously evolving 
system of ICrimJ to understand why regional arrangements have so far been 
overlooked. The general predilection for a universal approach in terms of coverage 
and application, as manifested in the pursuit of an international court, is patently 
understood.111 The fear and suspicion that surrounds regional initiatives, such as 
threats to international efforts and fragmentation of international law, are also noted. 
Nevertheless, the chapter recognises that the global character and importance of most 
issues are often over-exaggerated, and their relevance and effects typically only 
surface within specific regions. Almost every country has therefore addressed the 
challenges of globalisation in part through regional policy responses.112 Indeed, States 
are recognised to find it politically more viable to construct regional groupings based 
on a common culture, shared history, homogeneity of social systems and values, 
and/or convergence on political and security interests. More importantly, the chapter 
highlights the positivist reality that States are still loathe to relinquish their sovereign 
rights. While absolute sovereignty over the prosecution of core international crimes 
has been particularly challenged by the establishment of the ICC, the development and 
effective enforcement of ICL nevertheless still remain largely within the control of 
States. The idea of regional mechanisms for ICrimJ therefore has political currency 
and theoretical appeal to self-interested sovereign States.113 Not only will such 
initiatives place enforcement of ICL within each geographic area clearly in the hands 
of the regional countries, but they will crucially allow for and take into account 
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regional legal norms and political considerations. 
Given that regional mechanisms have featured significantly in the post-Cold 
War collective security agenda, the immediate question is whether regionalisation of 
ICrimJ can be understood from a collective security perspective. This is particularly 
pertinent since the UNSC decided to establish ad hoc international criminal tribunals, 
as a non-military measure authorised under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to address 
threats to international peace and security. Regarding the association between ICrimJ 
and human rights, it is acknowledged that ICL was developed to meet the immediate 
post-war requirement of delivering justice and punishing war criminals. An 
underlying aim is then to deter a set of crimes, which are in fact large-scale violations 
of the fundamental human rights. Focus will be given to collective security law and 
human rights law given the parallels between ICrimJ with the maintenance of 
international peace and security, as well as the protection of persons against massive 
human rights violations.114  
In this connection, Chapter 3 considers how regional initiatives in the fields of 
collective security law and human rights law may hold valuable insights and 
transferrable best practices for conceptualising and implementing the regionalisation 
of ICrimJ, particularly within the ASEAN regional construct. It will also examine the 
development of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights 
(AICHR) to glean lessons about the potential promises and pitfalls of implementing a 
regional ICrimJ approach in Southeast Asia. It must however be pointed out that the 
aim of Chapter 3 is not to base or justify the notion of ICrimJ on the norms behind 
collective security or human rights. Instead, it focuses on the level of the execution of 
substantive law. In this regard, collective security law and human rights law can 
proffer much to the discussion on regionalising ICrimJ because they are more mature 
in terms of theory and application. The reality of whether ICL can be enforced at the 
regional level turns on the advantages and disadvantages presented to States in their 
particular situation. The focused study on the ASEAN region thus situates the ideas 
discussed in this research. Chapter 3 broadly looks at whether the general concern of 
HURGLQJ 6WDWH VRYHUHLJQW\ DQG VSHFLILF UHJLRQDO IDFWRUV OLNH WKH ³$6($1 ZD\´ RI
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managing disputes without adversarial or litigious conflict are preventing ASEAN 
countries from ratifying the Rome Statute. This is particularly important since the 
objectives of the research are not purely academic, and it is hoped that some practical 
policy recommendations to further ICrimJ, strengthen ICL, and enable their 
institutions to gain greater acceptance by States and function more effectively will 
emerge. In terms of the possible relationship with the ICC, an inherent question is 
whether regional organisations like ASEAN may adopt different mandates or must 
operate in sync with it. A further issue that is discussed will be whether regional 
mechanisms require the authorisation or moral legitimacy of the Court to act. 
Based on a discussion of the goals of ICL, Chapter 4 then determines the 
form(s) of a regional mechanism that would be most effective and realistic within the 
context of Southeast Asia. In particular, it deliberates whether a strict and formalistic 
conception of ICrimJ will overlook the fact that States respond differently to various 
legal, political and economic pressures. While criminal prosecution and sanctions 
must remain as an important and integral part of any alternative ICrimJ mechanism, 
the chapter questions whether an over-emphasis on criminal trials may neglect the 
factors that foster the mass violence of international crimes, as well as those required 
to restore regional peace and security.115 Given that retributive justice and criminal 
trials may not always effectively sanction and deter atrocity, let alone protect and 
maintain peace and security,116 it also examines informal and non-penal modalities 
that would not only serve (non-Western) State interests but also reflect notions of 
justice from other regions of the world.  
Discussion about the plausibility of regionalising ICrimJ within the region 
must however unequivocally take into account ASEAN's history and trajectory. As the 
existing international framework focused on the ICC is unlikely to radically change 
regional attitudes in the near future, Southeast Asia arguably deserves an indigenous 
ASEAN-based mechanism to promote ICrimJ.117 Given recent developments within 
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the sub-regional organisation, especially the creation of the AICHR, this may not be 
as impossible as it may sound. Furthermore, AMS have already had much experience 
in collectively addressing issues of criminal justice, and the region has even emerged 
as a leader in responses to transnational crimes like trafficking in persons. Chapter 4 
will however also look at the practice of accommodation and seeking consensus in 
Southeast Asia, and considers the potential promises and pitfalls of a regional ICrimJ 
mechanism. A further question would be how it can operate without duplicating or 
conflicting with efforts at the international or national levels. 
Besides differing conceptions of and methods of achieving justice, different 
regions may also be plagued by different types of harmful criminal activity. As such, 
Chapter 5 will deliberate what AMS may deem as acts to be prohibited under ICL,118 
SDUWLFXODUO\ WKURXJKDPRUH WDUJHWHGURXWHDV µUHJLRQDOFULPHV¶119 The research does 
not however aim to provide a definition, legal or otherwise, for either an international 
or regional crime. Instead, it intends to theorise what raises a crime to the level that it 
may be considered by a regional community to be a regional crime, based on how the 
international community has determined an act to be an international crime. The 
requirements for regional crimes clearly cannot be simply derived from the cross-
border nature and effects of the conduct, or that cooperation between countries in 
Southeast Asia is required to tackle the problem. The chapter will therefore survey the 
concept of an international crime and posit how the notion of a regional crime can be 
best developed, bearing in mind that it must appeal to self-interested sovereign States. 
To be of greatest practical viability and political acceptability to self-interested States, 
it is proposed that the doctrinal standard for regional crimes closely mirrors that of 
international crimes derived from ILC deliberations, but is centred within a regional 
rather than a global setting. In this regard, emphasis falls on two key criteria: (1) 
regional community recognition; and (2) extreme seriousness within a regional 
context. Using these two criteria, the chapter will identify some acts, beyond the core 
international crimes, that may constitute and be labelled as regional crimes by the 
countries of Southeast Asia.  
                                          
118 There has been an informal proposal by the Netherlands for the inclusion of the crime of terrorism in 
the Rome Statute. Given the absence of a generally accepted definition of terrorism, the Netherlands 
proposed to use the same approach accepted for the crime of aggression, i.e. include the crime of 
terrorism in the list of crimes laid down in Article 5(1), of the Rome Statute, while at the same time 
postponing the exercise of jurisdiction over this crime until a definition and conditions for the exercise 
of jurisdiction is agreed upon. 
119
 %XUFKLOO QRWHV WKDW WKH FULPHV XQGHU WKH ,&& DUH FXUUHQWO\ ³QRW WKH PRVW SUHYDOHQW IRUPV RI
LQWHUQDWLRQDOFULPLQDODFWLYLW\´RIFRQFHUn to States. Burchill, supra n.111, at 46. 
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Apart from advancing ICrimJ in Southeast Asia, this research also hopes to 
develop some general conclusions about the theoretical viability and practical appeal 
of a regional approach. AMS are known to be vocal and fiercely protective of the 
notions of State sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of the 
neighbouring States. Hence, if an institutionalised regional initiative or less formal 
mechanism can be implemented in Southeast Asia, key lessons may be learnt for the 
development of ICrimJ in other regions. While it is then tempting to paint the 
possibility of regionalising ICrimJ with a broad brush, it is recognised that there is 
immense diversity both in terms of what justice means in different geographic areas, 
as well as the nature of the threats and types of crimes that plague various parts of the 
world. Indeed, problems like piracy may be particularly serious in one region but 
possibly non-existent in another. Separately, the political and strategic incentives for 
collective action by regional groupings of States to enforce ICL will also differ 
greatly. Specific conclusions about the prospect of regionalising ICrimJ in a 
geographic region can therefore be attained only from individualised examination.120  
Nevertheless, the research aims to show that ICrimJ can be further promoted 
and protected both by recognising theoretical variants in different regions, and through 
the regionalisation of ICL in terms of regional enforcement mechanisms or lists of 
crimes. The contribution of regionalism to the advancement of ICrimJ will therefore 
be in both normative and practical terms. Increased focus on regional solutions will 
not only have practical benefits in terms of raising awareness of ICrimJ issues, but 
will also provide significant normative developments for ICL by both requiring and 
providing a deeper grasp of different regional considerations and perspectives. 
Regional initiatives will thus support the advancement of ICrimJ and enforcement of 
ICL by ensuring that fundamental norms are recognised and upheld while allowing for 
diversity in approach.121  
It must be reiterated that the research does not assume or argue that ICrimJ in 
its current form is not viable and important. Rather, it considers how the existing 
international framework can accommodate other avenues that may be willing and able 
to enforce ICL with regularity. The research conceptualises complementary, 
                                          
120
 In this regard, the prospect of regionalising ICrimJ in Southeast Asia is examined in detail in this 
research. 
121 For a discussion, see Charles Jones, Global Justice: Defending Cosmopolitanism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), at  174-5. 
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legitimate and politically acceptable regional solutions to effectively redress and 
respond to future instances of heinous and egregious acts that constitute international 
and regional crimes. A suggested follow-up to this dissertation is an analysis of the 
appeal of a regional ICrimJ mechanism in other regions of the world. This is pertinent 
because the AU has decided to expand the mandate of the African Court of Human 
and 3HRSOHV¶ Rights (AfCHPR) to try international crimes, in light of the ICC 
indictment and prosecution of current Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta and Vice 
President William Ruto.122 
                                          
122
 See further discussion in Chapter 2. 
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CHAPTER 1 
REGIONALISING INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE ± EXPLORING 
THE ROAD BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC OPTIONS 
 
The architects of the modern ICrimJ system have done much to develop ICL and its 
institutions, with the creation of an independent permanent ICC being an especially 
important accomplishment. Yet, this achievement must not be seen as an end in itself, 
let alone the end of the road for the evolution of ICrimJ,1 especially since the present 
set of ICrimJ institutions will only be able to sporadically and selectively hold 
perpetrators of core international crimes individually accountable. Akhavan highlights 
that the inability to arrest and prosecute accused individuals has then not been a failure 
of ICrimJ but of political will.2 Although globalisation has led to an international 
environment that is less state-centric and more interdependent, claims about the 
decline of state sovereignty are somewhat exaggerated. While intergovernmental 
organisations and non-governmental actors have grown in influence, States 
undoubtedly remain the final arbiters on international affairs. Delmas-Marty thus 
FRQFOXGHV WKDW WKH ,&& UHPDLQV ³ZHDNHQHG E\ SROLFLHV WKDW UHPDLQ GRPLQDWHG E\ D
VRYHUHLJQ PRGHO´ UHVXOWLQJ LQ DPELJXLWLHV EHWZHHQ WKH &RXUW¶V OHJDO DQG SROLWLFDO
underpinnings.3 Although there is universal support for the denunciation and 
accountability of perpetrators of core international crimes, there is no universal 
application and enforcement of ICL. The modalities and objectives of ICrimJ 
currently therefore resemble a patchwork rather than a complete and absolute system. 
International, national and hybrid courts may also not always represent the best way to 
achieve the goals of ICrimJ, and should not be uncritically accepted as exclusive 
avenues to address international crimes. Thus, there may be benefits for States to 
adding another layer of location (between global and local justice) for mechanisms of 
accountability.  
                                          
1
 ,QGHHG ZKLOH WKH ³HXSKRULD´ VXUURXQGLQJ WKH ,&&¶V HVWDEOLVKPHQW ZDV XQGHUVWDQGDEOH LW VWLOO OHIW
RSHQ WKHTXHVWLRQRI ³WKHHIILFDF\RIPDQDJing massive atrocities in distant lands within the rarified 
FRQILQHVRILQWHUQDWLRQDOOHJDOSURFHVV´3D\DP$NKDYDQ³7KH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&ULPLQDO&RXUWLQ&RQWH[W
0HGLDWLQJWKH*OREDODQG/RFDOLQWKH$JHRI$FFRXQWDELOLW\´, American Journal of International Law 
97 (2003):712-721, at 712. 
2
 3D\DP $NKDYDQ ³7KH 5LVH DQG )DOO DQG 5LVH RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &ULPLQDO -XVWLFH´ Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 11 (2013): 527-536, at 530. 
3
 Mireille Delmas-0DUW\³$PELJXLWLHVDQG/DFXQDH7KH,QWHUQDWLRQDO &ULPLQDO&RXUW7HQ<HDUVRQ´
Journal of International Criminal Justice 11 (2013): 553-561, at 553. 
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Viewed with a state-centric lens, the principles behind ICrimJ and its 
enforcement can clearly be tied to conflict management and the maintenance of 
peace.4 Notably, there has already been an increasing shift towards regional efforts to 
prevent or address breaches of the peace, and to enforce some collective dictate to the 
belligerents.5 Several reasons for this exist. First, the Cold War that largely 
subordinated regional institutions and efforts to the direction and interests of the two 
superpowers has ended. As a result, some regions have been left with a power vacuum 
and presented with an opportunity to push a regional agenda.6 Second, given the 
changes to the geopolitical and security environment, regional conflicts less directly 
affect the interests of distant hegemons and are more likely to be addressed 
regionally.7 Besides adjustments to national strategic doctrines, domestic support 
within such States for humanitarian intervention in faraway places has also fallen. 
Hence, global powers have developed a preference not to get involved and allow 
conflicts, which are increasingly regional in nature, to be managed at the regional 
level.8  Third, failures or inaction by the international community, particularly at the 
UN, reveal the limitations of global efforts and prompted a search for alternatives 
within the affected regions.9  
It is also worth recalling that the post-WWII system embodied by the UN 
actually places an importance in regional approaches to the peaceful settlement of 
disputes.10 Article 33 of the UN Charter in fact requires States to, inter alia³UHVRUWWR
UHJLRQDO DJHQFLHV RU DUUDQJHPHQWV´ WR Uesolve their conflicts.  Article 52 then 
                                          
4
 &RQIOLFWPDQDJHPHQWKDVKLVWRULFDOO\EHHQXVHGWREXLOGFRPPXQLWLHV³FKDUDFWHULVHGE\
VKDUHGQRWLRQVRILQWHUVWDWHDQGGRPHVWLFMXVWLFH´-RVHSK/HSJROG ³5HJLRQDOLVPLQWKH3RVW-
&ROG:DU(UD´LQ3DXO'LHKODQG-RVHSK/HSJROGHGVRegional Conflict Management 
(Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2003), at 22. 
5
 For example, the AU and ECOWAS have played an increasing role in breaches of the peace in Africa, 
while the EU and NATO have intervened in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as conflicts in 
Afghanistan and the Congo.  
6
 The decreased external political and economic influence after the Cold War also led to a new cost-
benefit structure in regional relations. Etel Solingen, 5HJLRQDO2UGHUVDW&HQWXU\¶V'DZQ(New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1998), at 3. 
7
 'DYLG /DNH DQG 3DWULFN 0RUJDQ ³7KH 1HZ 5HJLRQDOLVP LQ 6HFXULW\ $IIDLUV´ LQ 'DYLG /DNH DQG
Patrick Morgan, eds., Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World (University Park: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), at 6. 
8
 (GZDUG .RORG]LHM ³0RGHOLQJ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 6HFXULW\´ LQ 5HVROYLQJ 5HJLRQDO &RQIOLFWV HG 5RJHU
Kanet (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998). 
9
 The develRSPHQW RI UHJLRQDO LQVWLWXWLRQV ³SRLVHG WR DGRSW FRQIOLFW PDQDJHPHQW UROHV´ KDV WKHQ
SDUDOOHOHGWKHVHDUFKIRUDOWHUQDWLYHVWR81HIIRUWV3DXO'LHKO³,QWURGXFWLRQ´LQ'LHKOsupra n.4 at 2. 
10
 Due to pressure from Latin American countries that wanted to retain aspects of the inter-American 
system, the UN Charter provides for the right of regional action to maintain peace and security. For 
GHWDLOV VHH ,QLV &ODXGH -U ³7KH 2$6 WKH 81 DQG WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV´ LQ 5LFKDUG )DON DQG 6DXO
Mendlovitz, eds., Regional Politics and World Order (San Francisco: W H Freeman and Co., 1973), at 
270-3. 
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UHFRJQLVHV WKDW WKHPDLQWHQDQFHRI LQWHUQDWLRQDO SHDFH DQG VHFXULW\ DUH ³DSSURSULDWH
IRU UHJLRQDO DFWLRQ´ DQGHQFRXUDJHV WKHPDQDJHPHQW DQGSDFLILF VHWWOHPHQWRI ORFDO
disputes through regional arrangements, while Article 53(1) even states that the UNSC 
PD\³XWLOLVHVXFKUHJLRQDODUUDQJHPHQWVRUDJHQFLHV´IRUHQIRUFHPHQWDFWLRQ11  
There has been a plethora of research and study on the substantive crimes, the 
formation and independence of various ICrimJ institutions, as well as the related 
impact on transitional and restorative justice.12 However, little scholarship has been 
undertaken in considering the regionalisation of ICrimJ, with only cursory and 
isolated analysis existing on regional options to the goals of protecting peoples against 
atrocities and ensuring international (and regional) peace and security.13 Chapter 1 
therefore aims to explore a principled middle ground between international and 
domestic mechanisms, and address the question of whether the regionalisation of 
ICrimJ is theoretically possible. It will examine how a regional approach may in 
certain situations not only better suit the theoretical objectives of ICrimJ, but in 
practice also achieve more consistent and effective enforcement of ICL. It further 
considers how well ICrimJ is being upheld in practice at the international and national 
levels, and if a regional approach may sometimes be superior. The underlying 
question is whether furthering ICrimJ and enforcing ICL through regional initiatives 
can serve the interest of sovereign and equal States, especially those not swayed by 
messages based on morality and preventing impunity. The next section thus first 
examines whether a regional approach will not only provide a viable alternative route 
for the consistent enforcement of ICL, but also serve the interests of States by 
affording the inclusiveness of local value systems and notions of justice, as well as 
sensitivity to practical needs and conditions on the ground. 
 
                                          
11
 Although the definition of a region is not provided by the UN Charter, it hints that shared interests 
primarily exist among States that are geographically close. This is similar to the basic understanding of 
UHJLRQV SURSRVHG LQ WKH ,QWURGXFWLRQ 7RP )DUHU ³7KH 5ROH RI 5HJLRQDO &ROOHFWLYH 6HFXULW\
$UUDQJHPHQWV´Collective Security in a Changing World, ed. Thomas Weiss (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 
1993), at 161-2. 
12
 For a broad discussion, see Robert Cryer et al., An Introduction to International Criminal Law and 
Procedure, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Antonio Cassese, International 
Criminal Law, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); and William Schabas and Nadia 
Bernaz, eds., Routledge Handbook of International Criminal Law (Oxon: Routledge, 2013). 
13
 For example, see William Burke-:KLWH ³5HJLRQDOLVDWLRQ RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &ULPLQDO /DZ
(QIRUFHPHQW$3UHOLPLQDU\([SORUDWLRQ´ Texas International Law Journal 38 (2003): 729-761; and 
0DWLDQJDL6LUOHDI³5HJLRQDO$SSURDFKWR7UDQVLWLRQDO-XVWLFH"([DPLQLQJWKH6SHFLDO&RXUWIRU6LHUUD
/HRQHDQGWKH7UXWK	5HFRQFLOLDWLRQ&RPPLVVLRQIRU/LEHULD´Florida Journal of International Law 
21 (2009): 209-284. 
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1.1 Regionalising ICrimJ ± Possible Acceptance by States 
 
The current ICrimJ system and criminal responsibility of individuals were born from 
the ashes of WWII.14 Cast by the international community as heinous in their nature, 
certain acts perpetrated during the war were not only considered crimes against the 
immediate victims, but also crimes against the whole of mankind.15  As various 
violations of human dignity were sanctioned as breaches of universal norms, the post-
WWII legal paradigm heralded an important break from the monopoly of national 
jurisdictions over the prosecution of core international crimes.16 Furthermore, 
individuals were also deemed responsible for these atrocities and could be held 
personally accountable.17 Criminal prosecutions under the nascent ICL were then 
envisaged to highlight the imperative of justice and law, as well as to underscore the 
culpability of the accused.18 These factors contributed to the creation of the 
International Military Tribunal (IMT)19 at Nuremberg and the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE)20 at Tokyo.  
                                          
14
 International rules of warfare by low-level combatants had however already been developed, under 
the Hague Conventions for the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes (1899) (1907), to 
proscribe war crimes and to protect civilians during times of war. Howard Ball, Prosecuting War 
Crimes and Genocide: The Twentieth-Century Experience (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 
1999), at 17. 
15
 Although arguments about the need to prosecute war criminals existed at least since WWI, the 
legalist approaFK RQO\ ³FDPH RI DJH´ ZLWK WKH 1XUHPEHUJ WULEXQDO *DU\ %DVV Stay the Hand of 
Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), at 
280. 
16
 The Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals represented the end of the state-centric international law that 
had been dominant since the 18th century. Prior to their creation, individuals were prosecuted by their 
own States in domestic courts or military court-martials for misconduct in international armed conflict. 
Steven Ratner, Jason Abrams and James Bischoff, Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in 
International Law ± Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), at 
5. 
17
 There is a general consensus that standards of individual criminal responsibility were further 
developed regarding the rejection of obedience to superior orders as a defence argument, and the 
accountability of senior and other state agents. On the history of collective criminality and individual 
responsibility for war crimes, see Elies van Sliedregt, The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2003), at 14-39. 
18
 This development is partly due to the fact that the notion of state criminality does not exist. The ICJ 
had confirmed that, as a matter of principle, international law does not recognise the criminal 
responsibility of the State. See Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), 
Judgment of 26 February 2007, General List No. 91, at paras.142-201. 
19
 In pursuance to the London Agreement of 8 August 1945, the governments of the US, France, UK 
DQG6RYLHW8QLRQHVWDEOLVKHGWKH,07³IRUWKHMXVt and prompt trial and punishment of the major war 
FULPLQDOV RI WKH (XURSHDQ $[LV´ 6HH $UWLFOH  RI WKH ,07 &KDUWHU DW
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtconst.asp.  
20
 The IMTFE was established thrRXJKDVSHFLDOSURFODPDWLRQE\WKH6XSUHPH$OOLHG&RPPDQGHU³IRU
WKHMXVWDQGSURPSWWULDODQGSXQLVKPHQWRIWKHPDMRUZDUFULPLQDOVLQWKH)DU(DVW´6HH$UWLFOHRI
the IMTFE Charter at http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/PTO/IMTFE/IMTFE-A5.html.  
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Employed to supersede the sancrosanct principles of state sovereignty and 
immunity, the rationale of ICrimJ for States has since been preservation of 
international peace and security, as well as punishment and deterrence of international 
crimes.21 When the UNSC adopted Resolution 1593 (2005) and invoked its power 
under Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute to refer the conflict in Sudan to the ICC,22 it 
was then because the international community felt that the gross human rights 
violations in Darfur demanded a response in the interests of both justice and peace.23 
Although preventing impunity has been often cited as another goal of ICrimJ, it is 
essentially a means of deterrence and part of the overall objective to prevent atrocities. 
Indeed, thH3UHDPEOHRIWKH5RPH6WDWXWHQRWRQO\UHFRJQLVHVWKDWDWURFLWLHV³WKUHDWHQ
the peace, security and well-EHLQJRIWKHZRUOG´EXWDOVRstates that the international 
FRPPXQLW\ ZDVGHWHUPLQHG³WRSXW DQ HQG WR LPSXQLW\ IRU WKHSHUSHWUDWRUVRI WKHVH
crimes and thus WRFRQWULEXWH WR WKHSUHYHQWLRQRIVXFKFULPHV´>(PSKDVLVDGGHG@24 
:KLOH*ROGVWRQHQRWHV WKDW WKHQHFHVVLW\RIGHQ\LQJ LPSXQLW\ WRZDUFULPLQDOV³KDV
QHYHUEHHQ JUHDWHU´ KH WKXV DFNQRZOHGJHV WKDW ³>X@OWLPDWHO\ WKHKLJKHVWSXUSRVHRI
international FULPLQDOODZLVWRHQVXUHWKDWWKHVHFULPHVQHYHUKDSSHQDJDLQ´25 
As a corollary, criminal prosecutions of individuals have since developed a 
                                          
21
 For example, it was determined in UNSC Resolution 827 (1993) that the situation in the former 
<XJRVODYLDFRQVWLWXWHG³DWKUHDWWRLQWHUQDWLRQDOSHDFHDQGVHFXULW\´DQGWKH,&7<ZDVHVWDEOLVKHG to 
SXWDQHQG WR WKHZLGHVSUHDGDQG IODJUDQWYLRODWLRQVRI LQWHUQDWLRQDO KXPDQLWDULDQ ODZ ,+/DQG³WR
EULQJWRMXVWLFHWKHSHUVRQVZKRDUHUHVSRQVLEOHIRUWKHP´7KH816&OLNHZLVHVWDWHGLQ5HVROXWLRQ
WKDWWKHVLWXDWLRQLQ5ZDQGDZDV³DWKUHDW WRLQWHUQDWLRQDOSHDFHDQGVHFXULW\´DQGHVWDEOLVKHG
the ICTR to put an end to the genocide and other systematic, widespread and flagrant IHL violations 
DQG ³WR EULQJ WR MXVWLFH WKH SHUVRQV ZKR DUH UHVSRQVLEOH IRU WKHP´ ,W ZDV DGGHG WKDW SURVHFXWLQJ
perpetrators would also contribute to the process of national reconciliation, the restoration and 
maintenance of peace, and ensure that such violations are halted and effectively redressed. See UN 
Security Council resolution 827 of 25 May 1993, UN Doc. S/Res/827 (1993); and UN Security Council 
resolution 955 of 8 November 1994, UN Doc. S/Res/955 (1994). 
22
 See UN Security Council resolution 1593 of 31 Mar 2005, UN Doc. S/Res/1593 (2005). For a 
GLVFXVVLRQ VHH 5REHUW &U\HU ³6XGDQ 5HVROXWLRQ  DQG ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &ULPLQDO -XVWLFH´ Leiden 
Journal of International Law 19 (2006):195-222. 
23
 The UNSC found that the situation in the Sudan constituted a threat to international peace and 
security and therefore met the criteria for its intervention under Chapter VII (Article 39) of the UN 
Charter. It also highlighted the belief that prosecuting the perpetrators of international crimes in Darfur 
ZDVLPSRUWDQWIRUWKHUHVWRUDWLRQRISHDFHDQGVWDELOLW\$81UHSRUWRQ'DUIXUQRWHGWKDWWKH,&&³ZDV
established with an eyHWRFULPHVOLNHO\WRWKUHDWHQSHDFHDQGVHFXULW\´DQGWKDWWKHLQYHVWLJDWLRQDQG
SURVHFXWLRQRIFULPHVSHUSHWUDWHGLQ'DUIXUZRXOG³EHFRQGXFLYHRUFRQWULEXWHWRSHDFHDQGVWDELOLW\´
both in Sudan and the region. See Report of the International Commission of lnquiry on Darfur to the 
United Nations Secretary-General: Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 
2004, 25 Jan 2005, at paras. 572 and 648.  
24
 See Preamble, ICC Statute. 
25
 Richard Goldstone, South-East Asia and International Criminal Law (Oslo: Torkel Opsahl Academic 
EPublisher, 2011), at 3 and 14. 
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stranglehold as the preferred mechanism for advancing ICrimJ.26 This is illustrated by 
numerous domestic prosecutions in the second half of the 20th century,27 and by the 
creation of both the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) under UNSC Chapter VII 
resolutions.28 With the establishment of the ICC and its principle of 
complementarity,29 this position has been entrenched even further as criminal trials are 
conducted by either the Court or national courts.30 The promotion of individual 
accountability for core international crimes through the trial process, with 
imprisonment as the predominant punishment for those found guilty, has accordingly 
gained substantial support from both States and legal scholars.31 Indeed, it was even 
UHPDUNHG WKDW DOPRVW HYHU\RQH KDG ³IDOOHQ XQGHU WKH VSHOO RI LQWHrnational criminal 
ODZ´DQGWKHUHZDVDEHOLHIWKDWWKHLQWHUHVWVRIMXVWLFHDQGRUGHUFRXOGEHUHFRQFLOHG
by a formal legal process.32 
)RUPDO WULDOV DQG SHQDO VHQWHQFHV KDYH KRZHYHU EHFRPH ³WKH SUHIHUUHG
PRGDOLWLHV WR SURPRWH MXVWLFH IRU DWURFLW\´33 primarily because the modern ICrimJ 
V\VWHPLVSUHPLVHGXSRQWKHµOLEHUDOOHJDOLVP¶34 belonging to Western criminal law.35 
                                          
26
 The structure and process of the public trial has since not only been a symbol of ICrimJ in an 
institutional sense, but also assumed to legitimise it. Mark Findlay and Ralph Henham, Transforming 
International Criminal Justice: Retributive and Restorative Justice in the Trial Process (Devon: Willan 
Publishing, 2005), at xix. 
27
 The Eichmann trial conducted by Israel in 1961 was an example of the continued desire to bring to 
justice Nazi perpetrators of genocide and crimes against humanity. 
28
 See UN Security Council resolution 827 of 25 May 1993, UN Doc. S/Res/827 (1993); and UN 
Security Council resolution 955 of 8 November 1994, UN Doc. S/Res/955 (1994). 
29
 Under its complementarity regime, the ICC will assume jurisdiction only when the State concerned is 
unable or unwilling genuinely to investigate or prosecute. However, it has been argued that the ICC 
then indirectly exerts pressures on domestic legal systems to copy its processes and punishments, lest 
indigenous modalities of justice and accountability mechanisms are deemed unacceptable. 
30
 Indeed, the Preamble of the ICC Statute intimates that criminal trials are the preferred mechanism to 
SXQLVKSHUSHWUDWRUVRIWKH³JUDYH´DQG³PRVWVHULRXVFULPHVRIFRQFHUQWRWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\´
that threaten international peace, security and well-being. See Preamble, ICC Statute.  
31
 Some arguments for prosecuting perpetrators of core international crimes include: (1) establishing 
individual responsibility; (2) dissipating the call for revenge by victims; (3) facilitating reconciliation; 
DQG  HVWDEOLVKLQJ D IXOO\ UHOLDEOH UHFRUG RI WKH DWURFLWLHV $QWRQLR &DVVHVH ³5HIOHFWLRQV RQ
,QWHUQDWLRQDO&ULPLQDO-XVWLFH´The Modern Law Review 61 (1998):1-10, at 6. 
32
 -DQ .ODEEHUV ³-XVW 5HYHQJH" 7KH 'HWHUUHQFH $UJXPHQW LQ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &ULPLQDO /DZ´, Finnish 
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It has also resulted in development of two distinct and not necessarily associated 
victim groups: (1) the actual targets of the atrocities who are directly affected; and (2) 
the indirectly affected international community whose peace and security has been 
threatened. This creates a situation where there may be inconsistent definitions and 
objectives of justice between stakeholders, as well as sharply divergent ideas about the 
best forum and method to administer it.36 It is further complicated by differing 
priorities for peace and justice that may exist in different regional circumstances. 
There will be a discussion in Chapter 4 about the dichotomy between the goals of 
retributive and restorative justice, and which may best serve the objectives of ICrimJ 
in different circumstances, particularly in the context of Southeast Asia.37 However, 
the research is not intended to be a critique of either Western philosophical traditions 
of legalism or liberalism. The point is to instead stress that the dominance of these 
modalities and rationales of justice has resulted in them being transplanted to other 
regions of the world, where indigenous justice mechanisms and goals have been 
gradually replaced.38  
In this vein, the normalisation of ICL and creation of ICrimJ institutions has 
also led domestic legal systems to mainly focus on core international crimes.39 As 
evident from the national efforts to implement ICC-related legislation, little 
consideration is then given to other crimes that may be relevant to different regions of 
the world.40 Although it has been internationalised and practiced around the world,41 
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 ,QGHHG ZKDW PD\ EH LPSRUWDQW IRU WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO FRPPXQLW\ LV WR HQVXUH ³OHJDO MXVWLFH´ Dnd 
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can constitute a regional crime, particularly in the context of Southeast Asia.  
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 Drumbl defines this process of universal, world-wide enforcement of a set of (primarily Western) 
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ICL is clearly not collectively arrived at or inherently universal.42 Neither is it value 
neutral,43 and Chuter even argues that the vocabulary and concepts of ICL are 
³FXOWXUDOO\ VSHFLILF FRQVWUXFWHG DQG PDQLSXODWHG E\ D YHU\ VPDOO QXPEHU RI
FRXQWULHV´44 An illustration of the culturally specific nature of modern ICL is that, 
while intoxication may provide for the exclusion of responsibility for a crime before 
the ICC,45 claims that such a defence is universally accepted is questionable.46 Since 
the consumption of alcohol is itself not permitted in many Islamic societies, 
SDUWLFXODUO\ LQ WKH$UDE UHJLRQ LWPD\HYHQFRQVWLWXWH³DQDJJUDYDWLQJ UDWKHU WKDQD
PLWLJDWLQJIDFWRU´47  
Regardless of whether this claim of cultural specificity is accepted, however, 
the danger and irony of not considering other regional norms, values, and legal 
precepts (including the purpose of justice, criminal liability and appropriate sanctions) 
must still be acknowledged.48 Accounting for such divergences would undoubtedly 
increase the legitimacy of the chosen process and acceptance of those most affected. 
By excluding them, ICL may not be as well-received in the non-Western developing 
parts of the world where it has been (and is most likely to be) employed.49 This could 
also lead to criticisms that ICL is another form of Western political and legal 
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imperialism,50 or worse a cultural backlash and regional resistance against the 
endeavour of ICrimJ.  
There are already allegations by African countries that the ICC unfairly targets 
their region,51 including the disquiet over the ICC indictment of sitting Sudanese 
President Omar Al-Bashir. Following UNSC Resolution 1593 (2005) referring the 
Sudan situation to the ICC, and the subsequent arrest warrant issued for President Al-
Bashir, the growing perception amongst African leaders is that the Court is no more 
than a tool of imperialism used only to try individuals from poor African nations 
and/or Africa is being sacrificed to legitimise the ICC.52 Further frustrated with the 
UNSC¶V IDLOXUHWRDFFHGHWRWKH$8¶VUHTXHVWWRVXVSHQGWKHSURFHVVHVLQLWLDWHG by the 
ICC against President Al-Bashir under Article 16 of the Rome Statute,53 African 
States have simply not cooperated with the ICC in respect to his arrest and 
surrender.54 This situation is now further compounded by the Kenyan requests for the 
suspension of ICC trials,55 particularly against current Kenyan President Uhuru 
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Kenyatta and Vice President William Ruto,56 and for the cases to be referred cases 
back to Kenyan courts.57  
These developments have led to a reassessment by the African region of its 
association with the Court,58 including the alternative of developing a regional 
initiative to address serious international crimes committed on the continent.59 It is 
therefore also significant that the AU decided in 2006 that the case against Hissène 
Habré60 fell within its competence,61  and had called on Senegal to prosecute the 
IRUPHU3UHVLGHQWRI&KDGIRU LQWHUQDWLRQDOFULPHV³RQEHKDOIRI$IULFD´62 Following 
years of reluctance by Senegal to prosecute Habré for international crimes, 
Belgium took the case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in February 2009. 
The Court issued its ruling in the case Questions relating to the Obligation to 
Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal) on 20 July 2012, and unanimously found 
³WKDW WKH 5HSXEOLF of Senegal must, without further delay, submit the case of Mr. 
Hissène Habré to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, if it does 
QRWH[WUDGLWHKLP´63 
                                                                                                                         
Court or Tribunal against any serving AU Head of State or Government or anybody acting or entitled to 
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On 24 July 2012, Senegal and the AU then agreed to establish a special court 
within the Senegalese justice system with only African judges appointed by the AU 
presiding over his trial and any appeals.64 A crucial observation is that Senegal 
preferred to place Habré at the disposal of a regional organisation to which it 
belonged, and had rejected plans for the former Chadian President to be prosecuted by 
a tribunal composed of Senegalese and international judges, akin to the hybrid tribunal 
in Cambodia,65 The agreement creating the Extraordinary African Chambers (EAC) 
was later signed on 22 August 2012,66 with the EAC Statute providing jurisdiction to 
SURVHFXWH ³SHUVRQ RU SHUVRQV´ PRVW UHVSRQVLEOH IRU WKH FULPHV RI JHQRFLGH FULPHV
against humanity, war crimes and torture,67 perpetrated in Chad between 7 June 1982 
and 1 December 1990.68 7KH($&¶VLnvestigating judges subsequently charged Habré 
with crimes against humanity, torture and war crimes, and placed him in pre-trial 
detention on 2 July 2013.  Given the ECOWAS Court of Justice decision of 5 
November 2013 that it did not have jurisdiction to rule on the legitimacy of the EAC 
as the latter was created by the treaty between the AU and Senegal,69 +DEUp¶V WULDO
should begin in 2015 after allowing sufficient time for the defence and trial judges to 
prepare themselves. 
The success of the EAC will not only bode well for the cause of ICrimJ on the 
African continent and demonstrate that indigenous regional courts can deliver a fair 
WULDODJDLQVWRQHRILWVRZQEXWZLOODOVRVWUHQJWKHQWKH$8¶VDUJXPHQWDQGUHVROYHIRU
international crimes committed in Africa to be tried regionally.70 Furthermore, 
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Court however found that it did not have jurisdiction to rule on the application, and further recognised 
that the EAC was established within the Senegalese judicial system in conformity to its 2010 decision. 
70
 +DEUp¶VWULDOZLOOWKHQEHWKHILUVWE\DQ$IULFDQFRXQWU\RIDIRUPHUKHDGRIVWDWHRIDQRWKHU$IULFDQ
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+DEUp¶VWULDOHPSKDVLVHVWKHYLDELOLW\DQGLPSRUWDQFHRID³WLHUHGDQGFRPSOHPHQWDU\
V\VWHP´RI,&ULP-71 In sum, the African experience reveals that the regionalisation of 
ICrimJ may better serve the interests of and be favoured by States, whilst proffering 
an alternative route for the consistent and effective enforcement of ICL. Although 
these points will be further elaborated upon in comparison to international and 
national solutions, the flexibility in approaches within regionalism and factors 
supporting the acceptance by States of a regional approach to ICrimJ are first outlined 
as a primer. 
Firstly, regional norms, values, views on individual liability and criminal sanctions 
can be injected into the accountability process, making it better attuned in terms of 
serving justice and winning local acceptance. Secondly, damaging neo-colonialist 
FULWLFLVPVDQGPLVSHUFHSWLRQVRI,&/DUHUHPRYHGE\PDNLQJLWµKRPH-JURZQ¶72 To 
increase legitimacy and acceptability, a sense of connection and ownership among the 
societies concerned is required to avoid an initiative being perceived as being imposed 
by external forces.73 Moreover, giving ownership of the ICrimJ project to regional 
members ensures that they each serve as a check-and-balance for the collective 
interests of securing regional peace and justice.74  
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Crimes: A Critical Study of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (Somerset: 
Transaction Publishers, 1996), at 13; and Hans Köchler, Global Justice or Global Revenge? - 
International Criminal Justice at the Crossroads (Verlag Wien: Springer, 2003), at 12. 
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 Burchill however recognises that any element of international or supranational authority will be open 
to criticism that it lacks legitimacy. In this regard, he notes that local communities and national 
governments even still see the European Union as a foreign force imposing its will with no regard for 
local concerns and circumstances, even though the regional integration project has been in existence for 
RYHU\HDUVROG5LFKDUG%XUFKLOO³'HDOLQJZLWK,QWHUQDWLRQDO&ULPHDWWKH5HJLRQDO/HYHO´LQ1HLO
Boister and Alberto Costi, eds, Regionalising International Criminal Law in the Pacific (Wellington: 
New Zealand Association for Comparative Law, 2006), at 47. 
74
 Benzing and Bergsmo note that regional initiatives can better IRVWHUD³VRXQGEDODQFH´EHWZHHQWKH 
differing general and particular interests, and will also appear less intrusive when collective action or 
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Thirdly, localising the ICrimJ process within the region reduces the theoretical 
and physical gap between the victims of the atrocities and those who are indirectly 
affected by the disruption of regional peace and stability. Burke-White notes that 
regional arrangements are better able to make full and effective use of local 
knowledge during investigations and prosecutions, thereby fostering a closer 
connection to the affected communities and individuals.75 This is in line with an 
increasingly important facet of ICrimJ to provide victims the chance to see their 
tormentors brought to justice.  
Fourthly, a regional approach will be better at understanding local dynamics 
and navigating the peace-justice divide that is different to every post-conflict 
situation,76 and thus probably more effective at achieving the twin goals of ICrimJ.77 
For example, given the delicate nature of the situation in Sudan, the AU contends that 
the pursuit of justice is best conducted in ways that support the broader political 
process and not jeopardise the prospects for reconciliation and peace. While the AU 
endorses criminal accountability for international crimes, it argues that the 
comprehensive efforts for long-lasting regional peace must not to be undermined by 
DQ ,&&SXVK IRUSURVHFXWLRQVZKLFK³PD\QRW EH LQ WKH LQWHUHVW RI WKH YLFWLPVDQG
MXVWLFH´ DV LWPD\ OHDG WR ³IXUWKHU VXIIHULQJ IRU WKHSHRSOHRI WKH6XGDQDQGJUHDWHU
destabilisation with far-UHDFKLQJFRQVHTXHQFHVIRUWKHFRXQWU\DQGWKHUHJLRQ´ 78 
Lastly, the regionalisation of ICrimJ offers the possibility of expanding the 
definitions of the universally accepted core crimes to better suit regional needs, as 
well as including other crimes that may be particularly relevant in the regional 
context. It would be a travesty if ICrimJ is held hostage to State consensus on what 
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6HFXULW\´ Third World Quarterly 15 (1994):277-295, at 283. 
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 See Report of the African Union High-Level Panel on Darfur (AUPD), AU Doc. No. 
PSC/AHG/2(CCVII), 29 October 2009, paras. 241-43; Decision of the Meeting of African States 
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can constitute a crime under ICL, and a shame if the different regional and local 
constituencies stop pushing the agenda against crimes that harm them most and begin 
WRFRDOHVFHDURXQGRQO\DOLPLWHGQXPEHURILQWHUQDWLRQDOO\DFFHSWHGµFRUHFULPHV¶79 
Regional initiatives will therefore allow States to overcome the need for unanimity 
that haunts international treaty law, and proceed on a more localised basis of countries 
that are interested, willing and able.80 Additionally, regional developments can then be 
an impetus and spur advances in ICrimJ for other regions and States.81 
At this juncture, it is useful to examine how regional arrangements currently fit 
into the wider institutional and normative structure of international system, and relate 
to the UN in particular. Despite the increasing presence of regional institutions within 
the international system and regional mechanisms covering various aspects of 
international law, their role and impact is not always obvious or consistent.82 The 
League of Nations was, for example, created in the belief that regional groupings of 
States would lead to competition and conflict.83 This belief in the need for a universal 
organisation and legal system continued into the creation of the UN, but political 
realities (including the existence of various regional organization like the Arab League 
and Organisation of American States) meant that the UN Charter had to consider how 
regional bodies would fit within the international system.84  
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International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission Finalized by Martti 
Koskenniemi, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/L.682 (2006), at 254; and Anghie, supra n.50, at 101. 
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 $UWLFOH  RI WKH /HDJXH¶V &RYHQDQt however recognized that all other international agreements, 
including regional-based instruments, were acceptable so long as they did not contradict the 
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 Burchill notes that there was an intense debate over a universal or possible regional approaches to 
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Under the UN Charter, the role of regional organisations is largely scoped out 
in Chapter VIII, which permits the maintenance of peace and security by such bodies 
as appropriate regional actions provided that they are consistent with UN principles 
and purposes.85 6WDWHVDUHHYHQH[SHFWHGWR³PDNHHYHU\HIIRUWWRDFKLHYHSDFLILF
settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional 
DJHQFLHV´EHfore approaching the UNSC.86 There is also an indirect reference to 
regional arrangements in Article 56, where the UN member States pledge to uphold 
the human rights purposes articulated in Article 55 through joint and separate action.87 
Article 103 however provides that obligations of the UN Charter will prevail in any 
conflict between the legal obligations of the Charter and any other international treaty. 
7KLVSURYLVLRQLVRIWHQVHHQDVD³VXSUHPDF\FODXVH´WKDWFRQILUPVWKHGRPLQDQW
position of the UN.88 That said, if viewed as an interpretation clause, Article 103 may 
not necessarily subordinate the regional to the universal, but seek to harmonise them 
and ensure consistency.89 Furthermore, some scholars posit that Article 103 only 
applies to defined legal obligations within the Charter, which differs from the 
formulation in Chapter VIII that generally refers to regional arrangements acting in a 
manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter.90 
The UN started to discuss the role of regional organizations with regards to the 
promotion and protection of human rights in the late1970s,91 and subsequently 
proposed efforts to strengthen exchanges between the UN and regional 
intergovernmental bodies dealing with human rights issues. It also invited 6WDWHV³LQ
DUHDVZKHUHUHJLRQDODUUDQJHPHQWVLQWKHILHOGRIKXPDQULJKWVGRQRW\HWH[LVW´WR
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consider establish such regional machinery.92 Perspectives regarding regional 
arrangements then evolved further with the end of the Cold War. In his 1992 Report, 
An Agenda for Peace, the UN Secretary-General indicated that greater involvement of 
regional arrangements in international relations would not only lighten the burden on 
the UN, but also ³FRQWULEXWHWRDGHHSHUVHQVHRISDUWLFLSDWLRQFRQVHQVXVDQG
democraWL]DWLRQLQLQWHUQDWLRQDODIIDLUV´93 Burchill argues that the normative 
implications of the latter point is that, instead of an appeal to uniformity, there is an 
increasing willingness to allow diverse regional views and voices to be expressed and 
recognised.94 The 2004 report of the UN Secretary-*HQHUDO¶VHigh-Level Panel on 
Threats, Challenges and Change recognised the role played by regional bodies in a 
variety of activities including human rights, peace-keeping, and environmental 
protection. It also acknRZOHGJHGWKDWUHJLRQDODUUDQJHPHQWVKDYH³JRQHIDUWKHUWKDQ
WKH8QLWHG1DWLRQVLQVHWWLQJQRUPDWLYHVWDQGDUGV´DQGDUHD³YLWDOSDUWRIWKH
PXOWLODWHUDOV\VWHP´WKDWGRes not contradict the efforts of the UN.95 This was soon 
followed by the Outcome Document of the 2005 UN World Summit, which supported 
a stronger relationship between the UN and regional organisations.96  This included 
the expansion of consultation and cooperation through formalised agreements, as well 
as the strengthening of cooperation in the economic, social and cultural fields.97 
The discussion on how regional arrangements fit into the broader international 
system will be deepened in Chapter 3, particularly in the areas of collective security 
and human rights protection. However, it would be suffice to say regionalism has 
increasingly been accepted not to contribute to fragmentation in the international 
system or a lowering of universal standards.98 If UHJLRQDODUUDQJHPHQWVDUH³SDUWRIWKH
V\VWHPDVDZKROHDQGQRWDVHSDUDWHV\VWHP´,99 it is then better to view 
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regionalisation of ICrimJ as a complementary way to ensure that universal goals 
continue to be upheld and ICL remains relevant in the diverse regions of the world.  
1.2 An Alternative to International and National Solutions 
 
The norms and practices of mainly Western liberal criminal law underpinning the 
current ICrimJ system however do not always achieve the twin, and sometimes 
conflicting, objectives of protecting and maintaining peace and security, as well as 
sanctioning and ultimately protecting peoples against atrocities.100 Whilst holding the 
perpetrators of international crimes individually accountable may be universally 
accepted,101 the present modalities of prosecuting them at the national and 
international levels should therefore not be deemed as the only avenues to advance 
ICrimJ. To best serve the intended functions of ICL in each unique situation, it is 
indeed crucial to relate the substantive goals of ICrimJ with considerations regarding 
where this process occurs and how this condemnation is to be operationalised. The 
research thus next examines how well ICrimJ is being upheld at the international and 
national levels, and suggests how a regional approach may sometimes be superior. At 
this point, it is critical to reiterate that no argument is being made to replace 
international judicial institutions or reduce the role of courts in the concerned 
country.102 The ICC, ad hoc criminal tribunals, hybrid courts and national judicial 
institutions have their strengths and should remain within the toolkit of the ICrimJ 
system.103 Allowing the territorial State to prosecute as many offenders for their 
crimes is undoubtedly not only practical, but probably also best in terms of helping 
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both the nation and individual victims recover from atrocities.104 A regional solution is 
thus merely envisioned as an additional alternative when impunity persists, lives and 
justice are threatened, or the conflict-riddled State does not have the adequate 
resources or infrastructure to deal with the individuals who are believed to bear the 
greatest responsibility for the egregious crimes. 
 
1.2.1 Compared to Upholding ICrimJ at the International Level 
A deontological rationale for prosecuting international crimes at the international level 
is that they are so evil that they affect all of mankind,105 and every State would want 
(or at least be entitled) to condemn the individual for the atrocities committed.106 A 
related practical explanation is then found at the establishment of the IMT after 
WWII: the Allies wanted to create a judicial body where they would collectively 
reserve the right to prosecute leading German political and military officials for 
atrocities that occurred in the territory of more than one State.107 
Alternatively, ensuring individual criminal responsibility established under 
,&/FDQEHVHHQDVDGXW\RI6WDWHVDQGWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\DVDZKROH³WR
DFKLHYH MXVWLFH IRU WKH YLFWLPV WKURXJK DFFRXQWDELOLW\ RI WKH RIIHQGHUV´108 
International response is then further legitimised if the domestic legal system is 
incapacitated in the wake of mass atrocity, or is inherently too politicised and biased, 
illegitimate and unreliable, or corrupt. In other words, if the State concerned is either 
unable or unwilling to conduct a genuine investigation and prosecution, the 
international community has the legitimacy (and some argue the duty) to intervene on 
behalf of the victims. Goldstone thus argues that if the international community 
LQGHHG FDUHV IRU YLFWLPV DQG WKHLU ³ULJKWIXO FODLPV IRU MXVWLFH´ LQWHUQDWLRQDO FULPHV
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should be credibly and efficiently investigated, and those found guilty to consequently 
be prosecuted and appropriately punished.109 
Under either justification, the delivery of ICrimJ at the international level is 
³OHJLWLPDWHG E\ WKH DVVXPHG moral right to inflict retriEXWLYH SXQLVKPHQW´110 
However, the rationale for such authority of international courts is unclear beyond 
FODLPV WKDW ³WKH VHOHFWHG SXQLVKPHQW LV D QHFHVVDU\ UHVSRQVH RQ WKH SDUW RI WKH
FLYLOLVHG ZRUOG´111 It is worth noting that by attributing atrocities thDW µVKRFN WKH
FRQVFLHQFH RI KXPDQLW\¶ WR LQGLYLGXDO SHUSHWUDWRUV WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO FRPPXQLW\ LV
also downplaying its role in creating the underlying circumstances or failing to stop 
them from occurring.112 In this regard, cynics claim the ICTY was a figleaf for the 
inaction by the major powers to stop the conflict in the former Yugoslavia,113 and 
argue that the tribunal was essentially a cost-effective alternative to military 
intervention.114 In Rwanda, despite having information about what was transpiring,115 
the international community similarly failed to take action that could have prevented 
or reduced the magnitude of the genocide, and only established the ICTR to prosecute 
and punish individuals after the fact.116 Therefore, before the international community 
can truly claim the moral legitimacy to punish individuals for perpetrating egregious 
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SUHSDUHGWRFRPPLWWRPLOLWDU\DFWLRQDQGVHWWOHGIRUWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIWKH,&7<´*ROGVWRQHsupra 
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international crimes, it may have to earn that right by first acting to stop the 
atrocities.117  
In this regard, a more often evoked justification for dispensing justice and 
inflicting punishment at the international level is that egregious crimes affect broadly 
GHILQHG µLQWHUQDWLRQDO LQWHUHVWV¶ SDUWLFXODUO\ SHDFH DQG VHFXULW\118 This may 
potentially be linked to the notion of collective security and the burgeoning notion of 
the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP),119 as well as post-war reconstruction and 
rehabilitation under jus post bellum.120 Nevertheless, the histories of the ICTY and 
ICTR illustrate that getting third-party States sufficiently interested and achieving 
some global consensus to act are both inherent drawbacks of intervention at the 
international level.121 The failure to prevent or stop the atrocities that occurred in the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda was clearly not because the international community 
had no knowledge of the atrocities. Rather, the inaction was largely due to a lack of 
political will. $V VXFK DOWKRXJK IDLOXUHV WR GHDO ZLWK FRQGXFW ³YHU\ ZRUWK\ RI
FHQVXUH´XQGHU,&/PD\LQDGYHUWHQWO\SURYLGHVRPHIRUPRIOHJLWLPDF\IRULW122 the 
eventual decision to act in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda was primarily driven 
by increasing public awareness through media (especially television) reports about 
what was going on. It not only led to the embarrassment of governments for their 
failure to react earlier, but more importantly also to the domestic political risks of 
further inaction.123 Even then, the collective response chosen by the international 
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community ± the innovative creation of the ICTY and ICTR under Chapter VII 
mandate ± was extremely limited in its reach aQG ³JUXGJLQJO\ XQGHUWDNHQ´ E\ WKH
UNSC.124 Scheffer highlights that the high operating costs of these two tribunals 
ZRXOGHYHQWXDOO\OHDGWR³WULEXQDOIDWLJXH´DQGWKH\KDYHVLQFHEHHQWDVNHGWRILQLVK
their work by 31 December 2014.125 
Hence, it must be recognised that political imperatives and context will 
determine the degree of support and the kind of cooperation that States are prepared to 
give in the name of ICrimJ. These would include the nature and cultural setting of the 
conflict, whether it is still ongoing, and who is in power. Although the key 
determinants will vary between States, and most likely between regions, it will 
essentially be evaluated by self-interested States in terms of costs and benefits to 
themselves.126 States that form the international community are thus unlikely to 
intervene in external conflicts (and sacrifice resources or possibly even lives) unless it 
is sufficiently in their interests.127 Such justifications for prosecution and punishment 
on the international stage however diminish consideration for the actual victims of the 
crimes.128 Moreover, it not only exacerbates the tension between the two goals of 
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(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), at 153-154. 
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ICrimJ, but also creates a critical disconnect between the delivery of justice and the 
affected communities.129  
It may therefore actually mean little to say that the sentences handed down by 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO FRXUWV DUH ³PDGH PRUH RQHURXV by its international stature, moral 
DXWKRULW\ DQG LPSDFW XSRQ ZRUOG RSLQLRQ´130 This argument is further weakened 
when, for example, compared to those prosecuted within Rwandan domestic courts, 
WKH GHWDLQHG OHDGHUV RI WKH 5ZDQGDQ JHQRFLGH IRU H[DPSOH ZHUH DIIRUGHG ³UHILQHG
MXGLFLDO WUHDWPHQW´ DW WKH ,&75 DQG FRXOG QRW EH JLYHQ WKH GHDWK SHQDOW\ WKDW KDG
existed in Rwandan domestic law.131 Indeed, Drumbl finds that the punishment and 
stigma inflicted by international courts is often more modest than the punishment 
inflicted by many national courts (for the same international crimes that are codified 
within domestic law), which is particularly problematic because the former tend to 
assert jurisdiction over the leaders and planners of atrocity who are ostensibly more 
deserving of harsher punishment.132  
Compared to international initiatives, a regional approach may then sometimes 
be more acceptable to self-interested sovereign States and more capable of achieving 
the goals of ICrimJ for several reasons.133 Firstly, regardless of whether egregious 
international crimes should be dealt with because their extreme evil affects all of 
humanity or that the international community has a duty to ensure justice for the 
victims, neighbouring regional States will clearly be more (directly and indirectly) 
affected and have interests more aligned with the victims than countries at the other 
end of the world.134 A more substantial investment of political effort would be thus 
logically expected from regional member. Compared to an international solution, 
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setting priorities on which crimes to investigate would also be considerably easier for 
one that is regionally based.135 In addition, the financial cost of regional enforcement 
would be substantially lower ± in part due to the physical proximity to any alleged 
international crime. 
Secondly, if the concerned State is either unwilling or unable to stop or tackle 
an egregious international crime that threatens (more possibly regional) peace and 
stability, legitimacy and incentives for action are arguably greater at the regional level 
than at the international level, given the direct and stronger effects suffered by 
neighbouring States.136 Governments will likely also be less reluctant to devote 
resources to a regional situation, including the additional option of regional peace 
support operations.137 Thirdly, given that it has more to lose from inaction and is thus 
more likely to intervene earlier, a regional community stands a better chance at 
subsequently claiming the moral high-ground to punish individuals for their crimes.138 
Fourthly, regions are less able to simply pin all the blame for atrocities on 
various individuals because the closely intertwined States are probably affected by the 
same myriad of political, social, cultural and economic issues. Increasingly 
interconnected neighbouring countries would have to address the underlying 
problems, at the very least, to prevent the harmful effects from recurring and spilling 
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over their borders.139 Lastly, a regional approach may then be better able to balance 
the twin goals of ICrimJ. This is due not only to the fact that neighbouring States can 
better understand and prioritise the needs of the situation, but also because the 
approach will be more politically attuned and culturally sensitive to the needs both 
sets of victims. An externalised solution will not provide regional strategic and 
security considerations, or local standards and values, as great a chance at being 
reflected in the process to hold accountable perpetrators of international crimes.140  
By providing a geographic nexus to the crimes being investigated, 
regionalising ICrimJ thus addresses some concerns regarding selectivity and bias that 
has been argued to exist at the international level,141 and also deals with the problem 
of disconnect from the situation and the victims. Most importantly, a regional 
approach may be more effective at securing the cooperation of the affected State.142 
Not only does it reduce concerns of exposure to external (particularly Western liberal) 
political influences and lessen the sovereignty costs for the State,143 regional pressures 
from neighbouring countries to comply are less likely to be ignored.144 Other regional 
States are then also less likely to harbour suspects, provide safe passage or refuse to 
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bring them to justice.145 These all implicitly bolster good governance and further the 
rule of law in the region. There is also the potential of further reducing possible 
conflicts between foreign and local interests if regional peacekeepers are deployed to 
intervene and restore regional peace and stability. Moreover, these troops could also 
be held accountable by the same regional mechanism for any egregious international 
crimes they may commit,146 thereby avoiding possible criticisms of one-sided and 
selective justice.147 In this regard, if it can be located within an existing regional 
mechanism, a regional approach may also be able to generate an even greater level of 
public acceptance and legitimacy on the ground.  
 
1.2.2 Compared to Upholding ICrimJ at the National Level 
The attention of ICrimJ at the international level is typically directed at individuals 
who are believed to bear the greatest responsibility, such as the masterminds, 
architects and leaders behind the atrocities. A practical reason behind this is that 
international judicial institutions have limited financial and human resources and are 
only able to prosecute a small fraction of international crimes.148 As such, national 
courts are often envisaged or identified as the primary forum for prosecuting 
individuals for violations of international law by both international treaties and 
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customary law.149 The task of holding the majority of (lower-level) offenders 
accountable in fact falls largely upon domestic legal systems. 
The underlying philosophical justifications for States to act are largely the 
same as those for an international response: their peace, security and other interests 
may have been affected; and they have a duty to ensure accountability and provide the 
victims with a sense of justice and closure. That said, the practical and moral stakes 
are much higher for the State concerned, as failure to address the atrocities leaves the 
wounds of the nation open to fester, and the responsibility to their citizens (victims 
and otherwise) are more concrete and immediate. Within the territorial State, national 
enforcement of ICL is therefore often preferred as justice is felt to be closer and more 
relevant to the victims, and also because it will leave a stronger lasting impact on the 
wider community seeking reconciliation.150 Furthermore, the availability of witnesses 
and access to evidence are less likely to pose a problem, and national prosecutions are 
more efficient and less expensive to conduct compared to international ones.151 
In many instances, there may also be international legal obligations for States 
to deal with perpetrators of international crimes.152 Domestic courts may then 
commence proceedings if the conduct has been criminalised under domestic law and a 
jurisdictional basis exists for them to do so.153 Besides the primary claim of 
territoriality, other bases for jurisdiction include the nationality principle, protective 
principle, and passive personality principle. The argument also exists that States can 
claim jurisdiction over core international crimes under the universality principle, as 
they are considered part of customary international law and entail various obligations 
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system of complementarity. See 3D\DP $NKDYDQ ³Whither National Courts? The RomH 6WDWXWH¶V
Missing Half - Towards an Express and Enforceable Obligation for the National Repression of 
,QWHUQDWLRQDO&ULPHV´Journal of International Criminal Justice 8 (2010): 1245-1266. 
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 National enforcement of ICL usually entails traditional criminal prosecution and punishment, but it 
is noted that in some cases in various jurisdictions other less formalised methods of accountability and 
less punitive measures may be preferred. See discussion in Chapter 4. 
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 There are however several reasons why domestic prosecutions may not occur including, inter alia, 
amnesties and the need to (at least temporarily) share power. See Stef Vandeginste and Chandra Lekha 
6ULUDP ³3RZHU 6KDULQJ DQG 7UDQVLWLRQDO -XVWLFH $ &ODVK RI 3DUDGLJPV"´ Global Governance 17 
(2011):489-505; and discussions of transitional justice issues below and in Chapter 4. 
152
 For example, various international conventions contain provisions regarding individual 
accountability for prohibited acts, which may oblige States to criminalise the conduct under domestic 
law, prosecute or extradite suspects to a State party willing to do so, or some combination of these. 
153
 The jurisdiction of national courts to adjudicate acts of another sovereign is however limited by 
domestic and international law rules on sovereign immunity and related doctrines. 
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for States to perform.154 These duties under ICL and customary international law are 
however quite limited and disjointed, and do not actually form a coherent criminal 
code for States to enforce. Moreover, third-party States (without a territorial or 
nationality connection to the offenses or offender) have seldom prosecuted such 
offenses and most are generally reluctant to exercise even limited degree of 
jurisdiction.155 Some unwillingness is due to the hesitation to prosecute offenses 
purely under universal jurisdiction or customary international law.156 However, States 
have usually chosen not to prosecute an individual or groups of offenders because of 
the additional financial costs of such an endeavour, the lack of (surplus) resources 
within their judicial systems, or geopolitical considerations.157 The fact is that the 
underlying tension remains between the twin normative goals of ICrimJ and the self-
interests of States. While the complementarity principle of the Rome Statute has 
provided indirect incentives for domestic enforcement of ICL,158 the ICC currently 
cannot even compel its own State Parties to act, especially when it is against their own 
national interest.159 The Rome Statute in fact does not even impose a direct duty for a 
State to prohibit the crimes under the Statute or oblige them to extradite or prosecute 
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 Few third-party States however have effective universal jurisdiction legislation and the political will 
to use it. Foreign criminal jurisdictions are also unlikely to be able to prosecute many cases. Bergsmo, 
supra n.79, at 2. 
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 Countries like Belgium and Spain had been notable exceptions. However, Belgium repealed its 
GRPHVWLF ³ODZ RI XQLYHUVDO MXULVGLFWLRQ´ LQ $XJXVW  DQG LQWURGXFHG D QHZ OHJLVODWLRQ RQ
extraterritorial jurisdiction similar to or more restrictive than that of most other European countries. 
Spain similarly amended its domestic laws in March 2014 to limit the use of universal jurisdiction. 
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 The prosecution of high-level perpetrators of core international crimes by States under universal 
juriVGLFWLRQLVIXUWKHUFRPSOLFDWHGE\WKH,&-GHFLVLRQLQWKH$UUHVW:DUUDQW&DVHWKDW³MXULVGLFWLRQGRHV
QRW LPSO\ DEVHQFH RI LPPXQLW\´ 7KH &RXUW KHOG WKDW %HOJLXP IDLOHG WR UHVSHFW WKH LPPXQLW\ IURP
criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability which the serving Foreign Minister of the Democratic 
People's Republic of the Congo enjoyed under international law. That said, the Court stated four 
circumstances when such immunities do not represent a bar to criminal proceedings, including before 
the ICC. See Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo 
v. Belgium), Judgment of 14 February 2002, at paras.59-61. 
157
 Action may then have to be taken at the international level, such as by the ICC through a referral of 
the situation from the UNSC, like in the cases of Sudan and Libya.  
158
 This is particularly true under the proposals for positive complementarity, where the ICC will 
cooperate with States and, under appropriate circumstances, promote and assist international criminal 
proceedings in domestic courts. For a discussion, see William Burke-:KLWH ³3URDFWLYH
Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and National Courts in the Rome System of 
,QWHUQDWLRQDO-XVWLFH´Harvard International Law Journal 49 (2008): 53-108; and Olympia Bekou, and 
$QQLND -RQHV ³&RPSOHPHQWDULW\ $IWHU .DPSDOD &DSDFLW\ %XLOGLQJ DQG WKH ,&&¶V /HJDO 7RROV´
Goettingen Journal of International Law (2010):791-811, at pp.802-803. 
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 The complementarity principle highlights that States have yet to renounce the sovereign model of 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ DQG ³GHPRQVWUDWHV WKH VXEVLGLDULW\ RI WKH ,&& YLV-a-vis domestic criminal 
jurisdictions. Delmas-Marty, supra n.3, at 554. 
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suspects.160 As such, the ICrimJ system is still caught in a Westphalian web where the 
goodwill and cooperation of sovereign States is paramount. 
If regular enforcement of ICL is allowed to remain primarily in State hands, 
the most critical and worrisome situation for ICrimJ occurs when core international 
crimes are perpetrated on behalf of or with the complicity of the State itself. Except 
for cases (but not all) where the former regime associated with the abuses has been 
overthrown, domestic institutions are unlikely to take serious action against agents of 
their own State in times both of war and peace, let alone political leaders and other 
high ranking government officials.161 For example, the token trials conducted after the 
First World War (WWI) by the Supreme Court of the German Reich (Reichsgericht) 
were tainted by the absence of will and bias of the judges in favour of their fellow 
Germans.162 The Reichsgericht only tried and convicted a few cases,163 for which most 
scholars believe that the sentences were too lenient for the crimes committed.164 
Moreover, most of those convicted subsequently received pardons within a few years. 
After WWI, Turkey similarly failed to prosecute its own citizens for suspected war 
crimes, including those linked with the Armenian massacres.165 
During the Cold War, when ,&ULP- KDG WR EH IRFXVHG RQ ³PRUH HIIHFWLYH
means of inter-6WDWHFRRSHUDWLRQLQWKHQDWLRQDOSURVHFXWLRQVRIFULPHV´166 there were 
also hardly any prosecutions by governments of their own agents accused of breaching 
ICL (such as the Genocide and Geneva Conventions). This was not because such 
violations did not occur. Rather, allegations of core international crimes would 
generally have been labeled and dismissed as propaganda attacks during this period. 
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 While Part 9 of the ICC Statute lists the various forms of cooperation that the Court can request of 
State Parties, the ICC cannot directly compel such cooperation and must rely on the Assembly of States 
or the UNSC. See Article 87(7), ICC Statute. 
161
 Due to the unavoidable bias resulting from the involvement of a State in a conflict, the President of 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Gustave Moynier, argued that a neutral judicial 
body would, in theory at least, offer a better chance of impartiality than the judiciary of the concerned 
State(s). See &KULVWRSKHU +DOO ³7KH )LUVW 3URSRVDO IRU D 3HUPDQHQW ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &ULPLQDO &RXUW´
International Review of the Red Cross 322 (1998): 57-74. 
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 For details, see Claud Mullins, 7KH/HLS]LJ7ULDOV$Q$FFRXQWRIWKH:DU&ULPLQDOV¶7ULDOVDQGD
Study of German Mentality (London: H.F. & G. Witherby, 1921). 
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 According to the American Historical Association, only twelve Germans (out of 1744 investigative 
cases initiated) were eventually tried at Leipzig. Six were convicted and six were acquitted. Two of the 
convicted defendants were later acquitted in a retrial. 
164
 )RU H[DPSOH VHH &ODXV .UHVV ³9HUVDLOOHV±Nuremberg±the Hague: Germany and International 
&ULPLQDO/DZ´International Lawyer 40 (2006):15-40, at 18-20. 
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 In late 1921, the Turks even convinced the British to release the 67 suspects who had been deported 
and held in Malta by the latter. For details, see William Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The 
Crime of Crimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
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 This included treaties on extradition and prosecution, as well as mutual legal assistance. Cryer, 
supra n.12, at 145. 
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As a result, conflicts (mostly civil and proxy wars) and atrocities flared up around the 
world ± often with the knowledge, consent, or even collusion of either superpower.167 
Given this atmosphere of superpower rivalry and obstructionism, WeUOHQRWHGWKDW³D
lack of political will prevented the use of penal sanctions against state-sponsored 
DWURFLWLHV´168 One exception was the US military court martial relating to the My Lai 
massacres. Even then, of the 26 men initially charged, only Second Lieutenant 
William Calley was eventually convicted of the murder of unarmed Vietnamese 
civilians. This event not only highlighted again the limitations of domestic 
prosecutions, but also the intervening and negating effects of national politics on 
ICrimJ.169 
On the other hand, Broomhall notes that States then are most willing to enforce 
,&/ ZKHQ LW LV LQ LWV RZQ LQWHUHVWV VXFK DV ³ZKHUH SULRU UHJLPHV µURJXH¶ RU
disfavoured elements of government, scapegoats, or non-State actors are under 
LQYHVWLJDWLRQ´170 At this other end of the spectrum, domestic institutions are typically 
the preferred forum amongst States to prosecute such cases.171 But impunity for 
international crimes is not the concern. Instead, real and fair ICrimJ may be incapable 
of being dispensed by the State because national accountability mechanisms may be 
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 +HQFH WKH ³UHDO WUDJHG\´RI WKHKDOW LQSURJUHVVSDUWLFXODUO\ WKH IDLOXUH WRFUHDWHDQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO
forum for ICrimJ, was that there existed no deterrence against or ability to prosecute the acts of 
genocide and crimes against humanity that occurred during the Cold War period. Eric Leonard, The 
Onset of Global Governance: International Relations and the International Criminal Court 
(Hampshire: Ashgate, 2005), at 28-29. 
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 Gerhard Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, 2nd ed. (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 
2009), at 3. 
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 On 31 March 1971, Calley was sentenced to life imprisonment and hard labor at Fort Leavenworth. 
One day later, US President Richard Nixon had him transferred from Leavenworth prison to house 
arrest at Fort Benning pending his appeal. On 20 August 1971, Calley's sentence was then reduced to 
20 years, and in 1974 President Nixon issued Calley a limited Presidential Pardon. For details, see 
Joseph Goldstein, Burke Marshall and Jack Schwartz, The My Lai Massacre and Its Cover-up: Beyond 
the Reach of Law? (New York: Free Press, 1976). 
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 Broomhall, supra n.103, at 162. 
171
 While some governments (Uganda, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Central African 
Republic) have referred their situations to the ICC, the preference for local trials is most recently seen 
in Libya. After the Gaddafi regime fell, the National Transitional Council clearly wanted domestic trials 
despite any credible legal infrastructure in Libya and arrest warrants being issued by the ICC. 
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manipulated, arbitrarily used, and abused as legitimised tools for political reprisals 
and vendettas.172  
That said, it is equally important to recognise that the pursuit of accountability 
may instead be a comparatively low priority for a transitional State173 trying to 
reconcile and rebuild itself after a national tragedy.174 It may even be intentionally 
limited because of the risk that it may cause societal instability or break the fragile 
peace that had been negotiated with the promise of amnesties.175 Separately, a post-
conflict State may also be unable to hold perpetrators of core international crimes 
accountable because it does not have the required financial and human capital, and its 
domestic administrative, legal and judicial infrastructure have been destroyed by 
war.176 Any demands placed on such national institutions, especially in the context of 
mass atrocities, would easily outstrip available resources and not result in the proper 
administration of ICrimJ.177  
In sum, attempting to hold individuals accountable through politicised and 
inadequate domestic mechanisms can clearly only have a negative and detrimental 
effect on ICrimJ. To prevent impunity, efforts at the national level must be both fair 
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 For example, the Iraqi Special Tribunal that prosecuted former President Saddam Hussein and his 
aides (for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide) has been viewed to be a kangaroo court. 
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discussed in Chapter 4. See also Carsten Stahn and Jann Kleffner, eds., Jus Post Bellum: Towards a 
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Lexicon, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
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and effective. However, it is highly possible that domestic systems in States afflicted 
by core international crimes will have biases regarding the guilt or innocence of an 
individual, and the chance of impartial and proper proceedings may be low at both 
ends of the spectrum. Even if these challenges can be managed, post-conflict societies 
may then lack the necessary infrastructure and properly trained personnel to pursue 
accountability under ICL, let alone the possibility that piercing the veil of impunity 
may be low on the national agenda compared to ensuring peace and reconciliation. 
The intervention of other States presents an option for upholding ICrimJ, but 
their responses are likely to be determined by political and other extra-legal 
considerations. Unless there is a strong basis for seeking jurisdiction, most third-party 
States will find situations in a faraway part of the world too onerous and costly to 
justify involvement.178 Conversely, the ability of a single neighbouring State to 
intervene is then likely to be curtailed by criticisms of political motivations by both 
the forum and other regional countries. Furthermore, the legitimacy of unilateral 
action may be challenged because the adjacent State will be viewed as having a selfish 
VWUDWHJLF LQWHUHVW DQG WKXV QRW DFFHSWHG DV DQ µKRQHVW EURNHU¶ LQ WKH PDWWHU 7KLV
perception is heightened in the case of regional hegemons and immediate 
neighbouring States.  
Compared to leaving ICrimJ solely in the hands of States, a regional approach 
may in some situations not only be more effective and efficient at preventing 
impunity, but also more acceptable to neighbouring countries ± particularly if the 
atrocities have been perpetrated by the State or when national accountability 
mechanisms may be abused for intimidation and revenge. As Moynier had pointed out 
nearly 140 years ago, due to the unavoidable bias resulting from the involvement of a 
State in a conflict, decisions regarding guilt or innocence should be taken out of the 
hands of the criminal courts of the countries involved.179 In this regard, a neutral 
regional institution will offer a better chance of impartiality than the domestic options 
available in the concerned State(s). Furthermore, regional political pressure could be 
used to isolate and force the hand of the reluctant State(s), as well as ensure that 
neighbouring States apprehend and prosecute or extradite suspects that have fled 
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 This may be due simply to the fact that a State is unlikely to choose to spend its limited (financial 
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179
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across the border into their territory. Joint collective action by all the regional 
countries then curtails criticisms by acting as a check-and-balance against self-
interested political motivations, and increases the legitimacy and credibility of the 
initiative and its outcomes.180 Last but not least, the onerous and costly exercise can be 
shared amongst the various regional neighbours, and would be amply justified by the 
maintenance of regional peace and economic stability.  
 
1.2.3 Internationalised or Hybrid Tribunals 
Given the problems faced at both the international and national levels, the option of 
hybrid tribunals181 has also been explored by the international community in 
conjunction with national governments in East Timor, Sierra Leone and Cambodia.182 
Although ad hoc international tribunals like the ICTY and ICTR would be less at risk 
of political interference, domestic bias and corruption, they are criticised for being too 
removed from both the affected countries and victims to achieve transitional justice 
and effect long-term social change.183 7KH VKLIW WRZDUGV ³LQWHUQDWLRQDOLVHG GRPHVWLF
WULEXQDOV´ OLNH WKH6SHFLDO3DQHOV IRU6HULRXV&ULPHV636&RI(DVW7LPRr, Special 
Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), and Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia (ECCC) also highlight the fact that it is expensive184 and not possible for all 
courts to be established in second or third countries.185  
                                          
180
 The strength, practicality and responsiveness of regional action is illustrated by ASEAN efforts to 
resolve the armed conflict in the disputed Thai-Cambodia border area, surrounding Preah Vihear 
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(London: Ashgate, 2006), at 29. 
183
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budget. Köchler, supra n.72, at 132. 
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The SPSC in East Timor was the first internationalised tribunal in Southeast 
Asia.186 +RZHYHULWRQO\PDQDJHGWRWU\DQGSXQLVKWKH³VPDOOILVK´IRUWKHYLROHQFH
committed in 1999,187 and was unable to prosecute many of those who bore the 
greatest responsibility for the serious violations of human rights because they were 
located in Indonesia.188 Moreover, while the hybrid model was supposed to have 
promoted local relevance by being located within the national system, the tribunal 
failed to engage an connect with the locals.189 
The ECCC was then the first hybrid court located within an AMS and 
therefore of greater relevance to this discussion. Although the atrocities committed in 
Cambodia during the Pol Pot era are well known and documented, efforts to bring to 
justice senior Khmer Rouge leaders were stifled for nearly 30 years due to both 
internal and external factors.190 With the arrest of Pol Pot in June 1997, interest in 
creating a criminal tribunal with jurisdiction to prosecute him and other surviving 
leaders rose rapidly,191 including amongst the international community.192 
Nevertheless, it still took another decade before the ECCC was finally operational in 
2007.193  
Commonly known as the Cambodia Tribunal, the ECCC is an example of a 
hybrid internationalised domestic tribunal set up by a national judicial system in 
collaboration with the UN to try egregious international crimes.194 It is essentially a 
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national Cambodian court that employs a unique approach of mirroring international 
investigating judges, prosecutors, defence lawyers and judges with Cambodian 
counterparts.195 The ECCC has a statutory mandate to prosecute senior leaders of 
Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most responsible for international crimes 
and serious violations of Cambodian law from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1976.196 It 
has the power to prosecute several offences under the 1956 Cambodian Penal Code, 
namely homicide, torture or religious persecution (Art.3), as well as international 
crimes like genocide (Art.4), crimes against humanity (Art.5), grave breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Art.6), destruction of cultural property 
during armed conflict (Art.7), and crimes against internationally protected persons 
(Art.8). The Court heard its first case in 2009, with the trial of former interrogation 
centre chief Kaing Guek Eav (alias Duch).197 
Cayley points out that the ECCC is not only the first hybrid court to use a 
primarily civil law framework,198 but also the first internationalised court to seat a 
majority of judges from the affected nation.199 It is clearly a product of political 
agendas and compromises,200 which some believing that the UN had conceded too 
PXFKLQWKHQDPHRI³SROLWLFVDQGH[SHGLHQF\´201 Although the UN Group of Experts 
had recommended an ad hoc international criminal tribunal for Cambodia as the 
&DPERGLDQ MXGLFLDU\ ZDV ³XQOLNHO\ WR PHHW PLQLPDO LQWHUQDWLRQDO VWDQGDUGV RI
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MXVWLFH´202 Cambodian Foreign Minister Hor Nam Hong unequivocally rejected such 
suggestions and indicated that Khmer Rouge leaders would be tried by Cambodian 
courts.203 McCargo argues that the Cambodian government viewed it as another 
opportunity to manipulate international aid donors and evade political 
conditionalities,204 as well as validate its own power and authority.205 Chigas similarly 
contends that the Cambodian government supported the establishment of a national 
court in order to secure international legitimacy and funding.206 In this regard, the 
objectives of the Cambodian government and international actors for the creation of 
the ECCC are divergent,207 with the former subsequently focused on limiting the 
number of individuals put on trial and ensuring control over the judgments. Not only 
has an adversarial dynamic been introduced at every level of the court through the 
pairing of local and foreign staff, but the majority of the judges in each chamber are 
also Cambodian.208 With a supermajority vote requiring the support of four out of five 
judges in the pre-trial or trial chamber, Cambodian judges can effectively prevent any 
undesirable decisions. 
Despite its institutional apparatus DQGDSSOLFDEOHODZFRQVLVWLQJRI³DEOHQGRI
WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO DQG WKHGRPHVWLF´209 as well as the fact that it is the subject of an 
international agreement between Cambodia and the UN,210 the ECCC essentially 
operates like a domestic court with procedures tKDW DUH ³LQ DFFRUGDQFH ZLWK
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&DPERGLDQODZ´211 Hence, Shahabuddeen contends that the court is domestic, and not 
an internationalised judicial instrument, as it does not take its character from 
controlling participation of the international community in its formation.212 Criticisms 
RIWKHµK\EULG¶(&&&WKDWKDYHHPHUJHGDUHWKXVPXFKOLNHWKRVHDJDLQVWSURVHFXWLQJ
international crimes at the national level, including political interference, bias and 
corruption, as well as inability to ensure standards of fairness and adequate protection 
of international human rights.213 As a corollary, the court also faces the challenges of 
limited capacity and resources, including difficulties in obtaining and sustaining 
sufficient funding.214 For political reasons, the Cambodian government may however 
not object if the voluntary contributions funding the ECCC operations now ceased as 
it would bring the trials to an end.215 
5HJDUGLQJFRQFHUQVRYHUSROLWLFDOLQWHUIHUHQFHDQGWKH(&&&¶VODFNRIMXGLFLDO
independence,216 Scully opines that they have proven to be legitimate by the 
controversy arising over future trials after Case 002.217 Three international ECCC 
judges have since resigned, with co-investigating judge Siegfried Blunk citing 
DWWHPSWHG JRYHUQPHQW LQWHUIHUHQFH LQ WKH FRXUW¶V SURFHHdings and reserve co-
investigating judge Laurent Kasper-Ansermet stating that he was prevented from 
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properly and freely carrying out his duties.218 In this vein, there have also been 
allegations of bias219 and corruption220. The ECCC is clearly not the perfect model of 
a court to investigate and prosecute senior Khmer Rouge leaders for atrocities 
committed during the Pol Pot era.221 Designed as a compromise to protect Cambodian 
sovereignty and ensure international support, it has now been recognised to epitomise 
³DOO WKH ZRUVW IHDWXUHV´ RI D K\EULG FRXUW222 including possibly not meeting 
international fair trial standards.  
Although the Court has arguably met with success in some areas,223 it is 
uncertain that it is improving the situation or attitudes towards ICrimJ in Cambodia,224 
let alone the wider ASEAN region. This is illustrated by the divergence between local 
expectations of the ECCC and international notions of justice, rights and fairness.225 
Even if it does eventually create a lasting change in Cambodian society, some scholars 
KDYHVWUHVVHGWKDWWKH(&&&VWLOO³PD\QRWQHFHVVDULO\EHWKHEHVWPRGHOIRUIXWXUHad 
hoc RUK\EULGFRXUWVWUXFWXUHV´226 While they are recognised as occupying the same 
space being discussed ± between the international and national, hybrid and 
internationalised courts are further noted to typically be not only ad hoc but more 
importantly also post hoc.227 Besides criticism that they are not meeting the post hoc 
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expectations placed on them,228 these judicial bodies are unable to de-escalate or halt 
the perpetration of international crimes, let alone prevent them with enforceable legal 
action.229 Moreover, they are not expected to be permanent fixtures with long-term 
plans and objectives.230 The UN Secretary-*HQHUDO LQIDFWVWDWHG³LW LVHVVHQWLDO WKDW 
from the moment any future international or hybrid tribunal is established, 
consideration be given, as a priority, to the ultimate exit strategy and intended legacy 
LQWKHFRXQWU\FRQFHUQHG´231 
In sum, the shortcomings of hybrid and internationalised tribunals are clear 
from the experiences of the both SPSC in East Timor and the ECCC in Cambodia. 
Moreover, such institutions will not have longer term presence and goals. As opposed 
to temporary hybrid tribunals that may not leave a legacy beyond a narrow 
prosecutorial function, the research proposes instead to establish a permanent regional 
mechanism that can focus on more than just post-hoc justice, and include elements of 
avoidance, prevention and deterrence. 
 
1.2.4 Advantages and Disadvantages of Regional Solutions 
 
Regional solutions to uphold ICL may however not necessarily be preferred by States. 
Considerations include the presence (or absence) of distinctive regional norms or 
credible mechanisms for dealing with international crimes. At this point, it is crucial 
to highlight the assumption that States are rational actors and will make strategic 
assessments about where and how to respond to breaches of ICL. The decisions will 
LQHYLWDEO\UHIOHFWHDFK6WDWH¶VSROLWLFDODJHQGDWKHLQFHQWLYHVDQGGLVLQFHQWLYHVSRVHd 
by action and inaction, as well as its relative power positions.232 Hence, it would be 
imprudent to insist that one (international, regional, or domestic) approach to ICrimJ 
is always superior to another, especially since they all have relative strengths and 
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weaknesses. For any regionalisation of ICrimJ to succeed, States must ultimately find 
that the benefits of regional action outweigh the costs of regional inaction. In this 
connection, both the benefits and liabilities of regionalising ICrimJ that were 
previously highlighted in relation to international, domestic and hybrid approaches to 
ICrimJ are then summarised for ease of reference. This list will be useful in 
identifying the considerations operating within each unique regional situation, and 
assessing how viable is the regionalisation of ICrimJ. 
Several generic advantages of a regional approach exist. Firstly, regional 
States are unlikely to avoid inaction as their national interests are inevitably impacted 
by a problem in their backyard. Adjacent countries may be more seriously and 
immediately affected by regional disorders, and thus more incentivised to get 
involved. Given that regional arrangements will also have a continuing presence in the 
region, apathy is an unlikely outcome. Scholars note that regional arrangements help 
ensure a lasting commitment to the issues and problems facing the region,233 as well 
as a degree of consistency and continuity in dealing with matters of regional 
importance.234 Separately, while it is easy to be appalled by atrocities committed in 
both war and peace, it may be realistically harder for faraway unaffected States to 
commit to resolving the problem. Relatedly, as regional bodies have a more limited 
sphere of responsibility and do not have to account for all issues around the world like 
an international organisation, issues and problems in the region are less likely to be 
marginalised.235 Secondly, it will be more practical and less (financially and 
logistically) onerous to prosecute a crime and enforce a sentence closer to the locus 
than in a distant location. The relatively smaller geographical area covered by a 
regional body not only facilitates an easier determination of jurisdiction, but also 
makes possible the more efficient allocation of resources and delegation of operational 
responsibilities.236 The proximity of regional arrangements to the perpetration of an 
international crime also ensures a quicker response, as well as a more cost-efficient 
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system and lower costs. For example, it reduces the cost of and distance travelled by 
legal teams and witnesses for investigations, collecting evidence, and the conduct of 
trials. Successful deterrence, efficient response and effective rehabilitation efforts will 
further involve, or benefit from, regional cooperation and a larger pool of resources. 
Indeed, Burchill notes that through the pooling of resources, a regional arrangement 
will be well placed to assist national jurisdictions in the prosecution of international 
crimes, providing support and expertise that may not be available at the domestic 
level.237The focus on regional solutions as opposed to domestic initiatives is therefore 
based not only on the possible inability or unwillingness of a State to take action, but 
also the recognition that international crimes often have cross-border implications. 
Thirdly, common strategic interests coupled with some degree of regional 
homogeneity typically generates greater consensus compared to international efforts, 
particularly in sensitive areas of international law that may create international legal 
obligations and undermine State sovereignty.238 For example, regional arrangements 
within the European Union for the protection of human rights have not only achieved 
higher levels of agreement than at the universal level, but also created more effective 
enforcement mechanisms.239 It is expected that socio-economic, political, and cultural 
commonalities among regional States make enforcement of ICL easier, due to 
increased collaborative experiences and reduced political objections preventing 
action.240 Indeed, the various regional developments on human rights all reflected a 
desire among groups of States to develop human rights instruments applicable to their 
particular circumstances, and were a direct response to the inability to reach consensus 
at the global level. Regional arrangements also allow for assertions of communal 
identity within the international system,241whereby existing institutionalised 
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mechanisms of cooperation may be co-opted and their resources used as member 
States believe they have direct interests in resolving a shared problem. 
Fourthly, regional initiatives allow States to approach and address the problem 
according to local practices and conditions.242 In this regard, a key reason for the 
establishment of the Caribbean Court of JustLFHZDVWR³>H@PSRZHUUHJLRQDOMXULVWVWR
give effect to regional standards and values as the laws of the region are interpreted 
DQG DSSOLHG´243 There is also no need to appease a global coalition or be bound to 
precedents from other regions. As a result, such efforts may generate greater 
legitimacy amongst the local populations. Scholars note that geographic proximity and 
a common experience provide regional arrangements with a deeper understanding of 
regional considerations and priorities.244 Compared to universal arrangements that 
may be viewed as external interference or the imposition of inappropriate foreign 
solutions, regional bodies therefore enjoy a higher degree of legitimacy and 
cooperation among regional countries. A key element of realising ICrimJ is indeed 
winning the support of the leaders and people on the ground, who have an inherent 
suspicion of foreign intervention. The concern expressed by the AU that the ICC is 
only prosecuting cases from Africa is a case in point.245 +HQFHµ$IULFDQ¶RUµ$VLDQ¶
solutions to regional conflicts may be requested and preferred over international ones, 
especially if they directly affect or undermine sensitive issues like State sovereignty 
and jurisdiction. )RU H[DPSOH$6($1¶VDFWLYH LQYROYHPHQW LQ WKHFRQIOLFWEHWween 
Vietnam and Cambodia illustrates both the interest of neighbouring States and the 
utility of regional awareness.246 
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Fifthly, limiting involvement to regional States reduces the reach of foreign 
powers and addresses the fear of neo-colonialist threats.247 In this regard, Schreuer 
argues that there will be a resurgence of group solidarity among regional States as a 
result of the desire to deal with problems locally and within a smaller group that better 
facilitates cooperation.248 Furthermore, regional mechanisms allow the ball to be put 
in the hands of smaller States, whose voices are often drowned out in the decision 
making processes at the global level. 
Sixthly, it may be easier to secure the support (or at least acquiescence) of 
other neighbouring countries. Regional governments and people will be more inclined 
to follow the directive of a regional system as it is seen to possess a better 
understanding of the problem, as well as the local situation and considerations.249 
Most likely also members of the relevant regional grouping, a greater level of 
compliance can also be compelled among these third-party States as they will 
certainly participate in the decision making process and have the opportunity to 
incorporate their views.250 While it is not impossible that they will not cooperate, 
under these circumstances, third-party States will be more inclined to support than 
VDERWDJH UHJLRQDO LQLWLDWLYHV $OWKRXJK µIUHH-ULGLQJ¶ DQG RWKHU FROOHFWLYH-action 
problems may occur,251 a regional approach has more potential for effective collective 
action because there will be fewer actors at the regional level. As a corollary, each 
contribution is more valuable essential and any free-riding is more easily and 
immediately detected. 
Regional approaches are however not perfect or without shortcomings, and 
there are several generic disadvantages of regionalism. Firstly, although regional 
homogeneity has some benefits for collective action, any inter-States rivalries and 
political cleavages can obviate that advantage. Intra-regional animosities should never 
be overlooked as they can prevent consensus and halt any planned efforts.252 
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Separately, if a regional hegemon exist, it may seek to advance its own agenda or even 
place itself above the law.253 This is illustrated by the actions of the US in the context 
of the Organization of American States (OAS).254 On the other hand, if there is no 
dominant State, regional initiatives may not be able to identify or agree on a country 
to lead. 
Secondly, regional homogeneity best addresses externalised threats and may 
be less relevant in situations deemed as internal or sovereign of neighbouring States. 
While State sovereignty is more permeable now, most countries are still reluctant to 
compromise the principle and intervene in the domestic affairs of another State. 
Hence, the likelihood of regional States (or organisations) taking action against the 
political or military leader(s) of a neighbouring countries may be low. Upholding ICL 
may require regional States to view ICrimJ as more important than traditional political 
considerations and alliances. However, the reality is that political leaders will be 
reluctant to either aid or take action against another regional government in an internal 
conflict. That said, if regional States have jointly established a mechanism to deal with 
international crimes, it would be equally hard for the regional organisation to allow 
impunity to prevail without suffering international criticism.255 
Thirdly, regional institutions may also be prevented from taking any action 
that may compromise the sovereignty of a member State, or be caught in between two 
or more conflicting members. Alternatively, regional bodies may be unable to be 
unbiased if a powerful State attempts to impose its will on the decision making 
process. A key requirement for successfully achieving ICrimJ is that both perpetrators 
and victims of egregious international crimes perceive the arbiters as neutral. Regional 
initiatives may have difficulty being considered as impartial as international solutions. 
Fourthly, regional groupings may not have the mandate to tackle ICrimJ issues 
and enforce ICL, let alone have the necessary infrastructure and processes in place. 
Most regional organisations are not established to perform such tasks, nor designed to 
undertake prosecutorial, judicial or penal functions. As such, they will probably lack 
not only the experience, but also the appropriate rules, procedures, and organisational 
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structure to effectively do the job. 
Last but not least, this problem may be compounded by a lack of human 
capital, knowledge, material resources and funds.256 Ill-equipped to constructively and 
effective contribute to regional goals, some regional institutions may be prevented 
from achieving their stated objectives.257 The aid of an international organisation 
possessing the requisite range of knowledge and capabilities may then be required to 
perform the tasks that the regional body is unable to do.258 Hence, the resolve and 
willingness of regional States to pursue ICrimJ is clearly only part of the equation. For 
a credible deterrence to exist, proposed regional solutions must also possess the ability 
and means to enforce ICL. Critical for the prospects for regionalising ICrimJ are thus 
the capabilities, or lack thereof, of the countries and institutions involved. Although a 
regional approach may be cheaper than an international solution, there will also be 
fewer contributing States to share the burden. Unless it comprises of developed and 
wealthy members, a small organisation may find the costs too onerous. 
Regional solutions may therefore not always be effective, let alone superior to 
international or domestic alternatives. The issue of whether ICrimJ is best served at 
the regional level must then be considered against the advantages and disadvantages 
presented to States in their specific milieu.259 
 
1.3 Conclusion 
 
It is acknowledged that regional initiatives are not perfect and no panacea for the 
political and practical difficulties of pursuing ICrimJ. Although increasingly availed 
upon for the maintenance of peace and security, there are disadvantages and 
disincentives to regional efforts, particularly when: a regional hegemon is involved; 
there are few commitments to regional norms; the political risks and financial costs 
are high; and the burden of action is only shared by a few States. In this regard, a 
regional solution is envisaged as an additional alternative to solutions at the national 
and international levels. It may be more aligned to the political calculations of self-
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interested States and better able to balance the twin aims of ICrimJ according to the 
unique needs of each situation. Such an approach will not only promote accountability 
and the rule of law, but will also serve State interests. As a corollary, regional 
initiatives may achieve greater legitimacy, support and compliance from the 
concerned State(s) as well as immediate neighbours.260 Regional mechanisms may 
serve a further preventative function as an effective monitor and honest broker 
between the conflicting groups. The efficacy of a regional solution however depends a 
lot on the region in question, the type of international crime(s) committed, the 
approach employed, and the capabilities of the States (or regional associations) 
undertaking such efforts. The suitability and best way to regionalise ICrimJ in 
Southeast Asia is then examined in detail in subsequent chapters. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE GROWING ALLURE OF REGIONAL ALTERNATIVES  
 
As noted in Chapter 1, while often obscured by ostensibly straightforward statements 
of support by States, ICrimJ comprises inherent political dimensions and 
considerations that greatly limit both the manner in which ICL is allowed to develop 
and the extent that it is transformed into State practice.1 This is illustrated by the 
political machinations by States that influenced the very purpose and viability of the 
criminal tribunals established after WWI.2 Most notable was the application of double 
standards, like limiting criminal prosecution to officials of defeated States and 
exempting the behaviour of the victors from legal scrutiny. The dominance of State 
considerations in ICrimJ was again evident after WWII. Although the Allies 
eventually decided to conduct judicial proceedings,3 it is evident that considerable 
subjectivity and political selectivity had been injected into the International Military 
Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
(IMTFE) at Tokyo.4 While they have since been confirmed as part of international 
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law,5 the Nuremberg Principles were therefore essentially based on rules devised by 
the States to try individuals from the losing side. During the Cold War, the tensions 
between the two superpowers and its spill-over effects then made it politically 
unfeasible and practically impossible to advance ICL beyond the national level.6 
Given that States clearly had and continue to have a large influence on how 
ICrimJ is framed and ICL is allowed to operate, a regional approach must appeal to 
and serve the needs of these self-interested sovereign entities. In this connection, the 
first section of this chapter briefly looks at the continuously evolving system of 
ICrimJ to rationalise why regional approaches have been overlooked during the 
twentieth century. It will assess the extent that States have shaped the modern ICrimJ 
system and its substantive crimes, and thereby avoided the establishment of an 
international judicial organ during much of that period. An underlying question is then 
whether a need existed for States to consider the regionalisation of ICrimJ as a 
response to the threat of a global institution with the jurisdiction to prosecute their 
citizens, in particular political leaders and high-ranking government officials. 
 The second section examines if the situation has changed with the dawn of the 
twenty-first century and the creation of a permanent international criminal court. The 
allure of regional alternative for ICrimJ mechanism will be considered against the 
backdrop of two contrasting issues: (1) the fundamental tension between the 
sovereignty of States and universal accountability for international crimes;7 and (2) 
the crusade over more than a century to create a permanent international criminal 
court. With the successful establishment of the ICC, does the development of ICL 
remain within the control of States? Or has the absolute sovereignty over the 
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prosecution of core international crimes that previously existed been challenged? 
Despite the principle of complementarity ensuring that national systems retain 
primacy, has the ever lurking shadow of the Court then led States to close ranks 
against it?8 
 7KH ILQDO VHFWLRQ WKXV GHOLEHUDWHV RQ WKH DSSHDO RI µUHJLRQDOLVP¶ IRU 6WDWHV
from various theoretical lenses. The underlying position of the research is that self-
interested sovereign States must not only agree to uphold ICrimJ but also recognise 
the benefits of a regional solution. Hence, the aim is to determine whether neo-liberal 
interdependence theories (like neo-liberal institutionalism) or neo-realist systemic 
theory would provide theoretical support for regionalisation activities and explain 
inter-State relations between ASEAN Member States (AMS), thereby aiding in the 
subsequent assessment on the feasibility of regionalising ICrimJ in Southeast Asia. 
 
2.1 State Sovereignty and the Avoidance of International Criminal Courts 
 
As previously highlighted, the modern ICrimJ system and its substantive crimes have 
been shaped by international realpolitik and enforced according to the self-interest of 
States. This is most evidently illustrated by the various occasions that States avoided 
creating and losing control to an international judicial institution. Around the turn of 
the twentieth century, States simply ignored the first proposal to establish an 
international court ± designed to prevent and address breaches of the 1864 Geneva 
Convention.9 Although 1899 and 1907 witnessed international initiatives to proscribe 
war crimes and protect civilians during war, the First and Second Hague Peace 
Conferences illustrated the problems of enforcement against sovereign and equal 
States.10 Legal and practical barriers against effective and regular implementation of 
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ICL by external parties then continued to be actively or otherwise erected by States, 
especially the global superpowers and regional hegemons.11  
State reluctance to relinquish power and control to an international criminal 
court, despite achieving agreement on the conceptual criminality of certain acts, 
would then become a recurring theme throughout much of the twentieth century. For 
instance, the League of Nations had tasked an Advisory Committee of Jurists to draw 
up plans for a court with international criminal jurisdiction in the wake of WWI. The 
Advisory Committee recommendations nonetheless failed to receive State support,12 
DQG LW ZDV ODWHU GHFODUHG ³XVHOHVV WR HVWDblish side by side with the Court of 
International Justice another Criminal Court, and that it is best to entrust criminal 
FDVHVWRWKHRUGLQDU\WULEXQDOVDVLVDWSUHVHQWWKHFXVWRPLQLQWHUQDWLRQDOSURFHGXUH´13 
The next opportunity to develop an international court was after the assassination of 
King Alexander I of Yugoslavia and French Foreign Minister Barthou on 9 October 
1934.14 Considered by the international community to be an act of terrorism, the 
League of Nations was spurred into action to tackle that threat.15 At the 1937 
International Conference on the Repression of Terrorism, thirty-six countries 
approved the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism (1937)16 
and Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court (1937)17 to 
prosecute individuals for terrorist acts. A lack of impetus and political will amongst 
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States would however lead to only a single ratification, preventing the conventions 
from entering into force and again ensuring that an international criminal court was 
not formed.18   
The reality of implementing and enforcing ICrimJ would also fail to match the 
rhetoric espoused by the international community after WWII. Indeed, it is clear that 
the Nuremberg and Tokyo military tribunals were not driven mainly, let alone solely, 
by the pursuit of ICrimJ.19 The decision to prosecute only vanquished enemy war 
criminals emphasised that political considerations20 and State interests would define 
the enforcement of ICL.21 The charges of aggressive war and systematic violence 
committed by the Nazi government against its own citizens would further highlight 
how victorious States moulded ICL to suit their agenda.22 Compared to the 
Nuremberg Tribunal, the IMTFE was worse in terms of the lack of due process and 
disregard for separation of powers between political-military and judicial authority.23 
Köchler thus contends that when judged against the basic standards of the rule of law, 
WKH,07)(³PDGHWKHSUREOHPVRIµYLFWRUV¶MXVWLFH¶PXFKPRUHIHOW´24 Regardless of 
the proclaimed intentions for prospective criminalisation,25 much of the immediate 
IMT and IMTFE outcomes were arguably geared towards one-sided retrospective 
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retribution.26 Realpolitik and the issue of state sovereignty would then continue to 
circumscribe the development of ICL. 
After WWII, the effective reach of the initiatives to build on the progress made 
by the IMT and IMTFE and codify ICrimJ would again be curtailed by States. For 
example, a draft resolution was presented at the first United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA) sHVVLRQLQFRQGHPQLQJµSHDFHWLPHJHQRFLGH¶DIWHUWKH IMT 
failure to do so,27 and declaring that genocide was a crime that could be committed 
both in war and peace.28 The Convention of the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide was subsequently adopted on 9 December 1948.29 It established a 
GHILQLWLRQ RI JHQRFLGH DQG FDOOHG IRU HQIRUFHPHQW ³E\ D FRPSHWHQW WULEXQDO RI WKH
State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal 
tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall 
KDYHDFFHSWHG LWV MXULVGLFWLRQ´30 However, States noticeably omitted to develop any 
international supervisory mechanism or institutional capacity to do so.31 Donnelly 
observes that the Genocide Convention has WKHQ³UHPDLQHGSXUHO\GHFODUDWRU\DQGRI
OLWWOHRUQRSUDFWLFDOHIIHFW´32  
In Resolution 260 (III) of 9 December 1948, the UNGA had also invited the 
International Law Commission (ILC) ³WR VWXG\ WKH GHVLUDELOLW\ DQG SRVVLELOLW\ RI
establishing an international judicial organ for the trial of persons charged with 
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 The selective enforcement of ICL however also meant that the Allies could make the political 
decision not to prosecute Japanese Emperor Hirohito. Regarding the IMTFE, scholars generally agree 
WKDW ³SROLWLFV HQWHUHG LQWR WKH LQGLFWPHQW SURFHVV DQG WKH UHOHDVH SROLFLHV IRU WKRVH LPSULVRQHG´ 6HH
Robert Cryer et al., An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), at 99. 
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 7KHWHUPJHQRFLGHZDVILUVWXVHGE\/HPNLQLQWRGHVFULEHWKH³GHVWUXFWLRQRIDQDWLRQRURIDn 
HWKQLF JURXS´ DQG ³WR VLJQLI\ D FRRUGLQDWHG SODQ RI GLIIHUHQW DFWLRQV DLPLQJ DW WKH GHVWUXFWLRQ RI
HVVHQWLDOIRXQGDWLRQVRIWKHOLIHRIQDWLRQDOJURXSVZLWKWKHDLPRIDQQLKLODWLQJWKHJURXSVWKHPVHOYHV´
Although the termed appeared in the drafting of WKH,07&KDUWHU WKHWHUPµFULPHVDJDLQVWKXPDQLW\¶
was eventually used to describe the persecution and mass murders committed by the Nazis. See 
Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation - Analysis of Government - 
Proposals for Redress, (Washington, D.C.:  Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944), at 79. 
28
 2Q  'HFHPEHU  81*$ UHVROXWLRQ  , DIILUPHG ³WKDW JHQRFLGH LV D FULPH XQGHU
LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ ZKLFK WKH FLYLOL]HG ZRUOG FRQGHPQV´ DQG PDQGDWHG WKH SUHSDUDWLRQ RI a draft 
convention on the crime of genocide. See General Assembly resolution 96 (I) of 11 December 1946 
(The Crime of Genocide). 
29
 After obtaining the requisite 20 ratifications, the Genocide Convention entered into force on 12 
January 1951. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 
December 1948. 
30
 See Article VI of the Genocide Convention.  
31
 An early draft of the Convention by the UN Secretariat included a model statute for a court, but this 
SURSRVDO³ZDVGURSSHGLQIDYour of a vaguer call for prosecution of the crime at either the national or 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOOHYHO´DVVWDWHGLQ$UWLFOH9,RIWKHILQDO&RQYHQWLRQSchiff, supra n.1, at 25. 
32
 Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, 2nd ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2003), at 150. 
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JHQRFLGH´ RU ³FHUWDLQ RWKHU FULPHV XQGHU LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ´33 While a draft statute 
was completed in 1951, it did not receive support from several leading countries.34 
Despite the strong drive by the international community after WWII to codify and 
institutionalize ICL goals and principles, the UNGA would soon shift its attention 
away from developing a draft code of offences35 and draft statute for an international 
court36. For example, a revised draft statute catering to the concerns of the major 
powers was presented in 1953,37 but the UNGA then set aside its review pending a 
definition of aggression for the draft code of crimes.38 By 1954, it would begin to 
postpone review of both items pending the definition of aggression by a new special 
committee.39 %DVVLRXQLFRQWHQGVWKDWWKHKLVWRU\RIWKHVHWZRWUDFWVUHYHDOHG³WKHODFN
RI SROLWLFDO ZLOO E\ WKH ZRUOG¶V PDMRU SRZHUV WR MRLQ WKHP LQ D FRRUGLQDWHG
HQGHDYRXU´40 :KLOH IXUWKHU SURJUHVV ZDV ³RVWHQVLEO\ SHQGLng the sensitive task of 
GHILQLQJWKHFULPHRIDJJUHVVLRQ´6FKDEDVVLPLODUO\RSLQHGWKDWLWZDVLQIDFW³ODUJHO\
GDPPHG´ E\ &ROG :DU SROLWLFDO WHQVLRQV41 During the second half of the twentieth 
century, States would therefore once again sidestep plans for an international court 
and avoid losing preeminent jurisdiction over international crimes.  
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 See General Assembly resolution 260 (Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide).  
34
 France was the only major power that supported the idea of a permanent international criminal court. 
The Soviet Union feared its sovereignty would be affected, while the US would not agree to the idea at 
the height of the Cold War and the UK regarded it as premature. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Statute 
of the International Criminal Court: A Documentary History (Ardsley: Transnational Publishers, 1998), 
at 13. 
35
 The UNGA had earlier instructed the International Law Commission (ILC) to formulate the 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOODZSULQFLSOHVUHFRJQLVHGLQWKH,07&KDUWHUDQGMXGJPHQWDQGSUHSDUH³DGUDIWFRGHRI
offences against the peace anGVHFXULW\RIPDQNLQG´6HH*HQHUDO$VVHPEO\UHVROXWLRQ,,RI
November 1947 (Formulation of the Principles Recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and 
in the Judgment of the Tribunal).    
36
 7KH,/&KDGDOVREHHQWDVNHG³WRVWXG\WKHGHVirability and possibility of establishing an international 
MXGLFLDO RUJDQ IRU WKH WULDO RI SHUVRQV FKDUJHG ZLWK JHQRFLGH´ RU ³FHUWDLQ RWKHU FULPHV XQGHU
LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ´ 6HH *HQHUDO $VVHPEO\ UHVROXWLRQ  RI  'HFHPEHU  3UHYHQWLRQ DQG
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide). 
37
 See Revised Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court (Annex to Report of the 1953 
Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction on its Session held from 27 July to 20 August 1953). 
Official Records of the General Assembly, Ninth Session, Supplement No. 12 (A/2645). 
38
 See General Assembly resolution 898 (IX) (International Criminal Jurisdiction).  
39
 See General Assembly resolution 897 (IX) (Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind) and General Assembly resolution 898 (IX) (International Criminal Jurisdiction). In 1957, 
after the report of the special committee was presented, the UNGA then decided to postpone 
FRQVLGHUDWLRQRIERWK LWHPV ³XQWLO VXFK WLPHDV WKH*HQHUDO$VVHPEO\ WDNHVXSDJDLQ WKHTuestion of 
GHILQLQJDJJUHVVLRQ´6HH*HQHUDO$VVHPEO\UHVROXWLRQ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Peace and Security of Mankind) and General Assembly resolution 1187 (XII) (International Criminal 
Jurisdiction). 
40
 Bassiouni, supra n.34, at 11. 
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 William Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 4th ed., 2011), at 9. 
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Given that States were able to shape the modern ICrimJ system and frustrate 
attempts to create a permanent international criminal court, they had successfully 
neutralised the threat of an external judicial body claiming jurisdiction and 
prosecuting their nationals for international crimes. Hence, there was no need for these 
unchallenged sovereign entities to consider the regionalisation of ICrimJ as an avenue 
to reassert national sovereignty or avoid their nationals being tried in international 
courts. The perspective of a self-interested State would have then undoubtedly 
changed with the creation of the ICC. 
 
2.2 The ICC and the Threat to State Sovereignty 
 
Arrested by the superpower rivalry of the Cold War, the evolution of the international 
system of ICrimJ would then only be revived with its end.42 The new environment 
permitted States to overcome the fear that international criminal courts would be used 
for political purposes by one ideological bloc against the other. After decades of near 
paralysis, the UNSC soon became involved in advancing ICrimJ through its 
enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.43 It not only authorised the 
use of force in cases of international conflicts, but also established two ad hoc 
international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda ± the first 
supranational tribunals to be created since the IMT and IMTFE nearly fifty years 
earlier.44 With the atrocities and genocide in these two places fresh on their mind, the 
international community arguably became persuaded that passivity in the face of 
serious breaches of ICL and the lack of accountability had produced a culture of 
impunity. On 9 December 1994, the UNGA then set up an ad hoc committee to 
review the major substantive and administrative issues arising out of a revised ILC 
draft statute for an international criminal court.45 
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 The Communist bloc collapsed in 1989 and preceded the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. 
43
 The end of the Cold War heralded the halt of the modicum of world order provided by the two 
superpowers in their respective spheres of influence. It resulted in fragmentation and uprisings in the 
global community, spurred on by fundamentalism and nationalism that had been previously suppressed. 
44
 The history of these Tribunals however also crucially illustrate the inherent links between 
international politics and the enforcement of ICL, and the continuing role played by State-based 
considerations in the development of ICrimJ. See discussion in Chapter 1. 
45
 7KH,/&PRGLILFDWLRQVWRWKHGUDIWVWDWXWHZHUHQRWDEO\DJDLQ³LQWHQGHGWRDQVZHUWKHSROLWLFDO
FRQFHUQVRIVRPHRIWKHZRUOG¶VPDMRUSRZHUV´,WZDVDOVRGHFRXSOHGIURPWKHRXWVWDQGLQJGUDIWFRGH
of crimes that was later submitted to the UNGA in 1996. Bassiouni, supra n.34, at 25. See also General 
Assembly resolution 49/53 (Establishment of an International Criminal Court). UN Doc. A/Res/49/53; 
and Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighth session, 6 May-26 July 
1996, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-first session, Supplement No.10 (A/51/10). 
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Reminiscent of the period just after WWII,46 this proffered the best chance in 
the latter half of the twentieth century for advocates to push the ICrimJ agenda for a 
permanent international judicial institution.47 Their efforts would also be bolstered by 
several other factors. Firstly, the processes of globalisation resulted in an international 
environment that was less state-centric and more interdependent.48 Secondly, there 
was a perceived change in the nature (and some argued decline) of state sovereignty.49 
Claims of non-intervention were believed to be no longer unquestionable and borders 
appeared to be more permeable under a stronger international human rights regime.50 
The authority of intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) was also thought to be on the 
rise.51 7KLUGO\ WHFKQRORJLFDO GHYHORSPHQWV LQ WKH JOREDO DJH DQG WKH µ&11 HIIHFW¶
also meant that international news and current events were broadcast globally, leading 
to increased understanding and awareness of atrocities and international crimes 
occurring around the world.52 
Two key stepping stones were therefore now in place to establish a permanent 
international criminal court: (1) a draft statute for an international criminal court, and 
a codified set of international criminal laws that was accepted as customary law;53 and 
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 &DVVHVHQRWHVWKHDWURFLWLHVLQWKHIRUPHU<XJRVODYLDDQG5ZDQGDUHNLQGOHG³WKHVHQVHRIRXWUDJHIHOW
at the closing stage of the SeFRQG:RUOG:DU´ZKLOH$NKDYDQDUJXHVWKH\³DVVXPHGDVLPLODUUROHLQ
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 The impetus for a permanent international criminal court arose from the call by Trinidad and Tobago 
in 1989 to restart discussions at the UN, so as to advance international prosecutions for drug offences. 
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 6FKRODUVQHYHUWKHOHVVVWUHVV WKDWJOREDOLVDWLRQGRHVQRW³VLPSO\SUHILJXUH WKHGHPLVHRI WKHQDWLon-
VWDWH RU HYHQ WKH HURVLRQ RI VWDWH SRZHU´ 'DYLG +HOG HW DO Global Transformations: Politics, 
Economics and Culture (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), at 436. 
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 Broomhall highlights that the end of the Cold War did not however alter the role of States in making 
decisions about international peace and security, or the enforcement of ICL. A replacement or 
realignment of state sovereignty was thus unrealistic in the near future. Bruce Broomhall, International 
Justice and the International Criminal Court ±Between Sovereignty and the Rule of Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003), at 5. 
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 %DUNLQEHOLHYHGWKDWKXPDQULJKWVQRUPVKDGEHJXQWRUHSODFH³WHUULWRULDOOHJLWLPDWLRQ´DVDGHILQLQJ
feature of sovereignty after the Cold War and interventions in States that violated human rights could 
EH PRUH HDVLO\ MXVWLILHG 7KLV KDV KRZHYHU VLQFH SURYHQ WR EH XQWUXH 6HH - 6DPXHO %DUNLQ ³7KH
(YROXWLRQRIWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQRI6RYHUHLJQW\DQGWKH(PHUJHQFHRI+XPDQ5LJKWV1RUPV´Millennium 
27 (1998):229-252, at 246 
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 See Leonard, supra Q DW  DQG <DOH )HUJXVRQ ³3RVWLQWHUQDWLRQDOLVP DQG WKH )XWXUH RI ,5
7KHRU\´ LQ +HLGL +REEV HG Pondering Postinternationalism: A Paradigm for the Twenty-First 
Century? (Albany: State University of New York, 2000). 
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 This has OHG WRDQHZ³OHJLWLPDWLRQHQYLURQPHQW´ZKHUH6WDWHVDUH LQFUHDVLQJO\SUHVVXUHGE\ WKHLU
citizens to account for their actions. Broomhall, supra n.49, at 5. 
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 The UN Secretary-*HQHUDO¶VUHSRUWRQWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIWKH,&7<VWDWHGWKDWWULEXQDOZRXOGonly 
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(2) a renewed political will amongst States to prevent impunity for international 
crimes coupled with a permissive international environment. The UNGA would soon 
HVWDEOLVK D 3UHSDUDWRU\ &RPPLWWHH 3UHS&RP WR SUHSDUH D ³ZLGHO\ DFFHSWDEOH
FRQVROLGDWHG WH[W RI D FRQYHQWLRQ IRU DQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO FULPLQDO FRXUW´ LQ 'HFHPEHU
1995.54 It considered about 500 additional proposals and amendments to the ILC draft 
statute received from States, many regarding the definition of crimes and criminal law 
principles and procedures.55 The UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on 
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court then began on 15 June 1998.56 Its 
final plenary session approved the ICC Statute,57 which entered into force on 1 July 
2002 after ratification by sixty States.  
While the negotiating process at the Conference may be said to illustrate the 
inability of powerful States to dictate the ICL rules and procedures, it must be 
recognised that the highly sensitive political issues had already been identified and 
considered. For example, Cassese notes that a cautious approach was taken on the 
VXEMHFW PDWWHU MXULVGLFWLRQ RI WKH ,&& ³WR IDFLOLWDWH DV UDSLG DQG DV ZLGHVSUHDG
DFFHSWDQFHRI WKH6WDWXWHDVSRVVLEOH´58 The ILC in the early stages anticipated that 
few States would agree to sign a treaty in which their own sovereignty would be 
subordinated to the jurisdiction of the ICC.59 The solution was then for the ICC to 
exercise its mandate on the basis of complementarity and involve the national courts 
of each State Party.60 Werle observes that substantive issues, particularly the 
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 The PrepCom later submitted its report on 28 October 1996, and recommended the production of a 
consolidated text of a convention, statute and annexed instruments by 1998. See UN General Assembly 
resolution 50/46 (Establishment of an International Criminal Court). UN Doc. A/Res/50/46; and UN 
General Assembly resolution 51/207 (Establishment of an International Criminal Court). 
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56
 Delegates from more than 160 States discussed and debated the 173-page PrepCom draft statute 
containing 116 Articles. See Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, Draft Statute for the International Criminal Court and Draft Final Act of 
the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International 
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57
 The ICC Statute was approved by a count of 120 nation-states in favour, 7 opposed, and 21 
abstentions. 
58
 Cassese, supra n.46, at 456. 
59
 As noted earlier, an underlying objectives of the ILC's watered-down 1994 Draft Statute was to 
address the political concerns of the major powers and ensure them that the Court's jurisdiction would 
not pre-empt their sovereignty. ,WZDV³SURWHFWLYHRI6WDWHV¶VRYHUHLJQW\´SDUWLFXODUO\ LQ WHUPVRI WKH
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 The complementarity principle ensured that the ICC would not supersede national processes of 
investigation and prosecution, and that its jurisdiction would remain compatible with the ability and 
willingness of States to try the perpetrators of international crimes. 
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definitions of crimes, were also less controversial during the Rome Conference also 
GXH WR WKHLU³HDUO\ OLPLWDWLRQ´ WRDVPDOOVHWRISUHFLVHO\GHILQHGFRUHFULPHVZKLFK
had clear and relatively high thresholds.61 By expressly defining and limiting the 
crimes within ICC jurisdiction in the Statute, it sought to assuage the concerns of 
States that the Court would be left to interpret general international law when 
prosecuting their citizens, particularly high-ranking government officials.62  
Another crucial point to note is that the ICC was created under international 
treaty law.63 As such, the Rome Statute was ultimately a multilateral treaty negotiated 
between States, with countries free to not sign up at all.64 For those that did, it 
included strong protections for state sovereignty. Firstly, as States were unwilling to 
permit past crimes to be prosecuted under any circumstances, the ICC has only been 
given jurisdiction with respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of the 
Rome Statute (Article 11).65 Secondly, while the crimes included in the ICC Statute 
may attract universal jurisdiction, States set strict preconditions to the exercise of 
jurisdiction (Article 12).66 Thirdly, besides setting high definitional thresholds for the 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC, States also managed to secure carve-outs in 
various provisions. For example, regarding non-international armed conflicts, the 
&RXUWZLOOQRWKDYHMXULVGLFWLRQRYHU³VLWXDWLRQVRILQWHUQDOGLVWXUEDQFHVDQGWHQVLRQV
such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of similar nature 
(Article 8(2)(d)).67 Moreover, nothing will affect the responsibility of a Government 
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WRHPSOR\DOOOHJLWLPDWHPHDQV³WRPDLQWDLQRUUH-establish law and order in the State 
or to defend the uQLW\DQGWHUULWRULDOLQWHJULW\RIWKH6WDWH´$UWLFOH68 Fourthly, to 
address concerns about a maverick ICC Prosecutor pursuing a personal agenda, States 
ensured that there are checks on the power to begin investigations proprio motu. 
These include complex admissibility requirements, including the need to inform all 
States with jurisdiction over the crimes concerned before proceeding, and to defer to 
genuine investigations by a State (Article 18).69 Fifthly, although the Rome Statute 
(Articles 86-102) lists the various forms of cooperation that the ICC can request of 
State Parties, the Court cannot compel such cooperation either in theory or practice, 
and must rely on the UNSC or ICC Assembly of States Parties.70 Last but not least, a 
critical dependence on State resources and cooperation in enforcement means that the 
ICC is unlikely to stray far from its mandate. 
It is clear that both the development and enforcement of ICL still remain 
within the control of States. Nevertheless, the absolute sovereignty over the 
prosecution of international crimes that previously existed has to an extent been 
challenged with the establishment of the ICC. Although the principle of 
complementarity allows States to assume jurisdiction over crimes committed within 
their territorial boundaries or by their nationals, the ICC can still intervene when it 
deems that national courts are unable and/or unwilling to prosecute suspected 
individuals (Articles 17(2) and 17(3)).71 7KH&RXUWRQO\KDVWR³VDWLVI\LWVHOI´WKDW LV
has jurisdictiRQ DQG PD\ ³RQ LWV RZQ PRWLRQ´ GHWHUPLQH WKH DGPLVVLELOLW\ RI D FDVH
(Article 19(1)).72 Furthermore, the Rome Statute not only declares the irrelevance of 
official capacity such as a Head of State or Government for the purposes of exemption 
from criminal responsibility or reduction of sentence, but also states that immunities 
or special procedural rules associated with such persons cannot bar the Court from 
exercising its jurisdiction (Article 27).73 The indictment and issuance of the arrest 
warrant for sitting Sudanese President Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir,74 who has been 
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in power since seizing control in a bloodless coup in 1989,75 was the first clear 
illustration of the challenge to State Sovereignty under the ICC regime.76  
In the name of regional peace and solidarity, neighbouring African countries 
have however collaborated to circumvent action by the ICC or simply refused to 
accept its indictments.77 At the Thirteenth Summit of Heads of States in 2009, the AU 
passed a resolution prohibiting its member countries from cooperating with the ICC 
arrest warrant against President Al-Bashir.78 At subsequent Summits, AU leaders have 
reiterated the decision to withhold cooperation and the call for a UNSC deferral of the 
prosecution.79 A similar response against the indictment was evoked amongst various 
other regional and sub-regional bodies.80 Regional resistance against the Court is then 
verified by the fact that President Al-Bashir is able to travel relatively freely within 
the African region without fear of arrest or prosecution, and even attends regional 
summits.81 For example, he attended the AU Summits in Nigeria (July 2013) and 
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African Journal of Legal Studies 4 (2011):5-50. 
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Ethiopia (October 2013 and January 2014), in line with the AU decision not to 
cooperate with the ICC.82 President Al-Bashir most recently also attended a Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) summit in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC) in February 2014.83 
This is in stark contrast to limits placed on his ability to travel outside the 
region.84 If a State felt that it had no option but to arrest him and transfer him to The 
Hague if he visited the country, it would pre-empt the situation and simply not invite 
him. This was evidenced both in relation to President Al-%DVKLU¶V DQQRXQFHPHQWRI
plans to attend the UN General Assembly meetings in 2013, and during the 2010 
inauguration of South African President Zuma. In the former case, there were 
diplomatic efforts by the US to convince him not to visit the US, including warnings 
that it could not guarantee he would not be arrested.85 In the latter case, the South 
African government likewise explained the situation to the Sudanese Ambassador in 
Pretoria and avoided a diplomatic incident.86 Other African countries (like Malawi, 
Djibouti, Chad, Kenya, Nigeria, and DRC) however simply failed to honour duties 
assumed by ratifying the ICC Treaty, and allowed President Al-Bashir to visit without 
executing the arrest warrant against him.  
The growing AU emphasis on the sovereignty of its member states and 
hostility against the ICC, while ostensibly directed at the Al-Bashir case,87 is likely 
also a reflection of the general concern that similar indictments may be laid against 
political and military leaders in other African countries.88 Even though national 
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www.sudantribune. com/spip.php?article31109. 
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systems retain primacy under the principle of complementarity, the ever lurking 
spectre of a permanent ICC has thus led some States to consider ways to legitimately 
prevent the ICC from exercising its jurisdiction. As States will not admit to a need for 
breaching international norms and laws, let alone allowing impunity for core 
international crimes,89 the regionalisation of ICrimJ has therefore gained political 
currency.90 From the point of view of States, besides the practical benefits discussed 
in Chapter 1, regional mechanism provide both a credible alternative and extra layer 
between States and the ICC.91 As noted earlier, they are more reflective of regional 
QRUPVDQGSROLWLFDOFRQVLGHUDWLRQVDQGFUXFLDOO\SXW6WDWHVILUPO\EDFNLQWKHGULYHU¶V
seat on ICrimJ issues in their own backyard.92 They will also allow States to target 
issues and crimes that may be pertinent but unique to their region.93 In this connection, 
it is noteworthy that an amendment to the Preamble of the ICC Statute regarding its 
complementarity has been suggested, which may facilitate AU efforts to create a 
regional court to prosecute alleged crimes committed on the continent.94 
At this juncture, it must be added that regionalising ICrimJ can also benefit the 
,&&¶V ZRUN DQG KHOS WKH &RXUW DFKLHYH LWV JRDOV RI SXQishing and deterring 
international crimes, by alleviating two systemic problems highlighted in Chapter 1. 
Firstly, the Court can only prosecute a small fraction of international crimes due to 
resource and practical constrains, and States are anticipated to bear most of the burden 
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in ensuring accountability.95 Secondly, the ICC lacks a police force or associated 
enforcement arm, and is unlikely to establish one due to high financial cost and other 
practical hurdles. Without State support, not only will the indictments and decisions 
issued by the ICC not be enforced, but a large proportion of crimes will ultimately 
also go unpunished. While the Rome Statute has raised the ICrimJ standards of 
individual accountability and provided indirect incentives (namely the avoidance of 
possible ICC action) for domestic enforcement of ICL, it currently cannot compel 
States to go against their own national interest. Even though all State Parties are 
obligated under the Rome Statute to support its work, the ICC can do little when a 
State Party fails to follow through on its obligations, except make a finding to that 
effect and refer the matter to the Assembly of States Parties.96 The fact that the 
discretion and decision to act ultimately remain under the control of the State exposes 
the inherent contradiction between the State-limiting objectives of ICL and State-
based enforcement mechanisms.97 Akhavan thus points out that the absence of an 
obligation for national prosecution is inconsistent with an effective system of 
complementarity,98 and the limited and disjointed obligations under treaty and 
customary international law inevitably present problems for enforcing ICL.99   
A strong argument for regional criminal courts or mechanisms is that they will 
then help narrow the impunity gap that may exist between the international and 
national levels. The strategy of the ICC to focus on persons who bear the most 
responsibility for crimes within its jurisdiction will leave an impunity gap unless all 
appropriate means for bringing other perpetrators to justice are used. Complementarity 
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LVHQYLVLRQHGWR³SOD\DSDUW´E\HQFRXUDJLQJDQGIDFLOLWDWLQJQDWLRQDOSURVHFXWLRQV100 
Under the ICC Statute, the principle of complementarity however currently applies to 
States and not regional bodies or organisations.101 Nevertheless, working with the 
regional community may amount to nothing more than an added, but potentially 
useful, layer in the complementarity scheme.102 For example, an intermediate regional 
initiative could help ICC determine whether a State is unwilling or unable to carry out 
the investigation or prosecution, and also address concerns about the impartiality of 
domestic courts.103 Furthermore, treaty-based regional approaches could help secure 
the commitment of neighbouring States towards ICrimJ and the enforcement of ICL, 
as well as the fulfilment of treaty obligations to prosecute or extradite suspected 
perpetrators of international crimes.104  
It is noteworthy that support for the ICC depends in large part on its image as a 
trusted and reputable institution. For the Court, creating and maintaining this image 
largely depends on the legal soundness and objectivity of its work. As powerful 
countries like the US, China and Russia sidestep ICC jurisdiction, some African 
countries like Sudan and Kenya are understandably viewing and painting themselves 
as victims of selectivity and bias.105 Regardless of the validity of such claims, non-
regional countries and even the UN had previously also not acted upon the ICC's 
decisions.106 For example, little effort had been made by the UN to enforce the 
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outstanding ICC arrest warrants for Sudanese leaders.107 In June 2014, the ICC 
prosecutor even criticised the UN Security Council for not taking action against the 
government of Sudan or pushing for the arrest of President Al-Bashir and others for 
international crimes committed in Darfur.108  
Given that realpolitik limits the efficacy of the ICC, the importance of regional 
considerations and support cannot be understated. This point is further highlighted by 
the Kenyan crusade that began in 2011 to get AU countries to support its bid to defer 
ICC trials against four individuals.109 During the AU Summit in May 2013, African 
leaders passed a resolution urging the ICC to refer the cases back to Kenyan courts, 
including those against President Uhuru Kenyatta and Vice President William Ruto.110 
At its Extraordinary Summit in October 2013, the AU then called for the ICC 
prosecution to be suspended until the Kenyan political leaders left office.111 While the 
African region has been largely supportive of the ICC and boasts 34 State Parties to 
the Rome Statute, this marks the turning point when the 54-nation AU first formally 
opposed the Court.112 After Kenya suggested amendments to the ICC Statute at the 
ASP conference in November 2013,113 the AU requested African State Parties to 
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ensure that the Kenyan request for deferral and proposals were considered by the ASP 
at its forthcoming sessions.114 These regional developments are particularly pertinent 
as the AU has consistently accused the ICC of specifically targeting Africans.115 
Although it is a charge that the Court vehemently denies, with the Kenyan parliament 
voting for the country to withdraw from the jurisdiction of the ICC,116 other African 
State Parties may also find reasons to do so too. 
$VSDUWRI$IULFD¶VUHDVVHVVPHQWRILWVDVVRFLDWLRQZLWKWKH,&&117 there have 
been suggestions of developing regional capabilities to address allegations and 
prosecute perpetrators of serious international crimes committed on the continent.118 
The fact that the AU had, based on a report of the Committee of Eminent African 
Jurists, decided that the case against Hissène Habré fell within its competence is 
perhaps telling of the intended direction of the regional organisation.119 Debate has 
then begun on whether the African Court of Human DQG3HRSOHV¶ Rights (AfCHPR)120 
VKRXOG LQFOXGH WKH µFRUH FULPHV¶RI WKH ,&& LQ LWV MXULVGLFWLRQ121 Other crimes have 
also been listed to tackle areas of concern to the continent, like piracy and trafficking 
in drugs.122 Murungu notes that a factor behind the push for jurisdiction over 
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humanity, war crimes and genocide. A ministerial meeting in May 2012 approved the draft protocol 
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LQWHUQDWLRQDOFULPHV LV³WKH LQGLFWPHQWDQGSURVHFXWLRQRI$IULFDQVWDWHRIILFLDOV´E\
the ICC or some European countries.123 Du Plessis highlights that while those drafting 
the protocol to expand tKH$IULFDQ&RXUW¶VMXULVGLFWLRQVWUHVVHGPRWLYDWLRQVRWKHUWKDQ
anti-ICC sentiment, it is revealing that it completely disregards the ICC and 
inexplicably ignores the potential overlap between the two judicial bodies.124 This 
may be an indication that the AU is positioning its members to withdraw from, if not 
then sidestep, the ICC. This view is supported by the AU decision in October 2013 to 
fast track the process of expanding the AfCHPR mandate to try international crimes, 
in light of the ICC indictment and prosecution of Kenyan President Kenyatta and 
Deputy President Ruto.125 
In this regard, the development of ICL has arguably reached a plateau at the 
international level with the ICC, as the promotion of regular compliance and effective 
enforcement are still greatly dependent on diplomatic considerations, as well as other 
political, economic and strategic calculations by States. In line with its strategy to 
limit the impunity gap by using all appropriate means to bring perpetrators of 
international crimes to justice,126 the Court will benefit from engaging with any 
regional initiatives that may develop. Recognising the value of partnerships with such 
regional mechanisms will help the ICC remain involved and relevant, especially if 
States face conflicting obligations to the Court and regional organisations.127 Indeed, 
the ICC can benefit by recognising diversity in regional focus, accommodating 
variations in approaches to crimes, and incorporating regional solutions into its work. 
This will be crucial in convincing State Parties to the Rome Statute not to eschew 
compliance or completely withdraw their support for the ICC. 
At the same time, it is acknowledged that there are concerns that the 
regionalisation of ICrimJ may have a negative impact on the ICC and the growth of 
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ICL, particularly if permanent regional courts are established.128 For example, 
Rauxloh claims the development of ICL would be undermined by regional criminal 
courts because they: (1) divert cases from the ICC, thereby reducing opportunities for 
the Court to adjudicate and create case law; (2) lead to different versions of ICL, 
where certain atrocities become the concern of specific regions rather than the 
international community as a whole; and (3) fragment ICL case law, and result in 
inconsistency and an incoherent set of standards and practices.129  These claims will 
be dealt with in turn, however it is important to firstly note that concerns about the 
potential negative impact of regional arrangements on international relations and law 
have existed since the first attempts at creating universal international institutions.130 
These fears are based on the belief that regional approaches will fragment the rules 
and principles of international law and result in differing applications and standards, 
thereby leading to an overall weakening of the universal system and potentially giving 
rise to conflict among different regional groups.131 Attempts to promote regional 
approaches to human rights protection, for example, were therefore not supported 
during the drafting of the UN Charter.1322Q5DX[ORK¶VILUVWclaim, associated concerns 
are that regional arrangements will then create jurisdictional overlaps and issues of 
finality with judgments.133 However, given that the ICC not only allows but helps 
national courts to hear cases, such fears and the objections that regional courts will 
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steal opportunities from the ICC are hard to justify. Then-Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-
Ocampo, in fact stated that ³WKH HIILFLHQF\ RI WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &ULPLQDO &RXUW
should not be measured by the number of cases that reach the court or by the content 
RILWVGHFLVLRQV´134 He further acknowledged that the absence of trials before the ICC, 
GXH WR WKHSURSHU DQG UHJXODU IXQFWLRQLQJRIRWKHU MXGLFLDO LQVWLWXWLRQV ³ZRXOGEH D
PDMRU VXFFHVV´135 Envisioned only as an alternative avenue, regional mechanisms 
should similarly not be seen as preventing national courts from exercising their right 
to hear cases and contribute to the development of ICL. In this connection, it is 
therefore critical to ensure that the various institutional arrangements in the 
international system are engaged with each other, interdependent and mutually 
supportive.136 
On 5DX[ORK¶V second claim, the issue is both a matter of substantive 
jurisprudence and a question of timing the pursuit of prosecutions and/or alternative 
means of justice.137 It could be argued that there should be different sets of crimes and 
punishments because of the vastly different circumstances faced in different regions of 
the world.138 Since the underlying objectives of criminal law139 may differ according 
to the varied political backgrounds, legal traditions and social customs of countries in 
different regions, it is hard to justify the existence of only one interpretation of 
substantive criminal law and procedure.140 This has added relevance with regards to 
international crimes as the pursuit of justice is also too often conflated with the quest 
for peace in conflict situations. Dissimilarities in focus and approach across systems 
should therefore not be seen to immediately imply injustice and impunity.141 Rather, 
the key measure should be that international crimes are adequately addressed and 
                                          
134
 ,&& 3UHVV 5HOHDVH ³(OHFWLRQ RI WKH 3URVHFXWRU 6WDWHPHQW E\ 0U 0RUHQR 2FDPSR´ ,&&-OTP-
20030502-10, Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC, New York, 22 April 2003.  
135
 Ibid.  
136
 William Burke-:KLWH³$&RPPXQLW\RI&RXUWV7RZDUGVD6\VWHPRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO&ULPLQDO/DZ´
Michigan Journal of International Law 24 (2002):1-101, at 75-6. 
137
 See discussion in Chapter 4 on the appropriate form(s) of a regional approach to upholding ICrimJ. 
138
 As contended in Chapter 1, by ignoring the potential benefits of regional variations in advancing 
ICrimJ, the development of ICL will unavoidably and unfortunately be restricted to one set of formal 
procedures and laws that are rooted in Western legal tradition. 
139
 See discussion in Chapter 4.  
140
 Greenawalt similarly argues that as long as domestic legal systems have different views on the 
nature and conVHTXHQFHVRIFULPLQDOLW\³WKHLQWURGXFWLRQRIDGLVWLQFWO\LQWHUQDWLRQDOFULPLQDOODZZLOO
LQHYLWDEO\SHUSHWXDWHRUIRVWHUXQHTXDOWUHDWPHQWRIRQHIRUPRUDQRWKHU´6HH$OH[DQGHU*UHHQDZDOW
³7KH3OXUDOLVPRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO&ULPLQDO/DZ´Indiana Law Journal 86 (2011):1063-1130. 
141
 Diverging views associated with a multiplicity of judicial institutions are commonly argued to 
undermine the law by allowing States to disregard unfavourable opinions and competing obligation, as 
well as permit exploitation by individuals to avoid conviction. William Burke-:KLWH³5HJLRQDOLVDWLRQ
RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &ULPLQDO /DZ (QIRUFHPHQW $ 3UHOLPLQDU\ ([SORUDWLRQ´ Texas International Law 
Journal 38 (2003): 729-761, at 756-7. 
93 
 
offenders are appropriately dealt with. It is not denied that the establishment of more 
international criminal courts and tribunals may result in further complexity and 
additional issues to tackle. Pocar however points out that unity of jurisdiction is not 
the priority in combating international crime, and concerns about substantive case law 
and divergent interpretations can be effectively managed by ensuring that regional 
courts take existing tribunals into account.142 Hence, it is less important whether 
ICrimJ is upheld under international, regional or national jurisdiction.143 The more 
crucial point is to coordinate and align the various levels of activity to ensure that the 
goals of ICrimJ are achieved in a consistent, efficient and effective way.  On 
5DX[ORK¶Vthird claim, it should be recalled that a primary aim of ICrimJ has been to 
punish individual perpetrators and deter others from committing egregious 
international crimes. It is not to ensure uniformity in ICL, let alone ensure that the 
ICC directs its development. As such, there should not be a debilitating concern that 
regional bodies may interpret ICL in a way that does not correspond with the ICC. 
More importantly, regional arrangements will not be undermining the development of 
ICrimJ if they are able to protect and maintain peace and security, as well as sanction 
and ultimately protect peoples against atrocities. Regarding the fear that differing 
regional interpretations and standards of justice will bring into question the objectivity 
and credibility of ICL, it could be said that any domestic or ad hoc international court 
could equally lead to a fragmentation of ICL.144 A better view may thus be that ICL is 
EHLQJVWUHQJWKHQHGE\DQGWUDQVIRUPHGLQWRD³SOXUDOLVWV\VWHP´145  
Experience has indeed demonstrated that universal and regional approaches to 
international law are compatible, and the increased attention and coverage strengthens 
the international system.146 For example, the regional arrangements established for the 
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promotion and protection of human rights clearly do not undermine the universal 
system,147 and have in fact all situated themselves within the universal system through 
an expressed commitment to the UDHR.148 Moreover, regional bodies have been able 
to foster agreement in Europe and the Americas to create institutionalised mechanisms 
to realise human rights norms ahead of the UN,149 as well as develop international 
human rights law in areas where substantive agreement has yet to be achieved at the 
universal level.150 Hence, it is clear that regional arrangements can effectively balance 
between adhering to universal norms and goals, and responding to the differing needs 
and practices in various parts of the world.151 It is then not inconceivable for the 
regionalisation of ICrimJ to similarly be viewed as a way to ensure that the ICL is 
appropriately enforced according to the situational needs of the regions concerned.152 
In sum, diversity within the international system does not entail conflict 
between universal and regional perspectives, or the fragmentation of international law. 
Greater attention on regional arrangements should instead be given to take into 
account unique regional conditions and considerations, thereby ensuring compatibility 
between universal and regional approaches. Given that ICrimJ is still in the nascent 
stages of development, the opportunity exists to allow regional mechanisms to be 
integrated into the system effectively and ensure that activities are coordinated with 
the ICC. This would assist in alleviating any lingering concerns about the 
fragmentation of ICL and inconsistency in its enforcement. 
 
                                                                                                                         
$UFKLWHFWXUHRI5HJLRQDOL]DWLRQ´LQ0LFKDHO3XJKDQG:DKHJXUX6LGKXHGVThe United Nations and 
Regional Security: Europe and Beyond. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003). 
147
 The 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action thus recognised that regional arrangements 
³SOD\ D IXQGDPHQWDO UROH LQ SURPRWLQJ DQGSURWHFWLQJKXPDQ ULJKWV´ DQG ³VKRuld reinforce universal 
KXPDQULJKWV VWDQGDUGVDVFRQWDLQHG LQ LQWHUQDWLRQDOKXPDQULJKWV LQVWUXPHQWVDQG WKHLUSURWHFWLRQ´ 
See UN World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 
A/CONF.157/23, 12 July 1993, at para 37.  
148
 For example, the European Convention on Human Rights explicitly states that the regional 
instrument is a step towards the collective enforcement of the rights stated in the UDHR.  
149
 6HH5LFKDUG%XUFKLOO³7KH5ROHRI'HPRFUDF\LQWKH3URWHFWLRQRI+XPDQ5Lghts ± Lessons from 
the European and Inter-$PHULFDQ+XPDQ5LJKWV6\VWHPV´LQ'DYLG)RUV\WKHDQG3DWULFH0F0DKRQ
eds., Human Rights and Diversity: Area Studies Revisited (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
2003); Enzo Cannizzaro, ed., The European Union as an Actor in International Relations (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 2002); and Martti Koskenniemi, ed., International Law Aspects of the 
European Union (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998). 
150
 For example, the only international legal instrument on minority rights, Framework Convention for 
the Protection of National Minorities, was adopted by the Council of Europe. See Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, ETS No 157, 1 February 1995. 
151
 See Weston, supra n.132, at 588. 
152
 )RU D GLVFXVVLRQ VHH 5LFKDUG %XUFKLOO ³,QWHUQDWLRQDO &ULPLQDO 7ULEXQDOV DW WKH 5HJLRQDO /HYHO
/HVVRQV IURP ,QWHUQDWLRQDO +XPDQ 5LJKWV /DZ´ New Zealand Yearbook of International Law 4 
(2007):25-44. 
95 
 
2.3 Theoretical Basis for Regionalism and Practical Acceptance by States 
 
Given that the modern ICrimJ system continues to be controlled by sovereign States, 
regionalisation efforts must appeal to these self-interested entities. This section thus 
examines the theoretical basis for regionalism from the perspective of both neo-liberal 
institutionalism and neo-realism, and highlights that State acceptance will exist 
regardless of which IR lens is used to explain the rationale for and viability of regional 
initiatives. This will then set the stage for the subsequent analysis of ASEAN and its 
member States, which hold firmly to the notions of state sovereignty and non-
intervention in the domestic affairs of another State. Identifying a suitable theoretical 
lens to understand inter-State relations will not only help in assessing the feasibility of 
regionalising ICrimJ in Southeast Asia, but also in ascertaining the most practical and 
acceptable mechanism(s) in this politically, economically and culturally diverse 
region.  
 
2.3.1 Neo-liberal Institutionalism 
 
Neo-liberal institutionalism is an international relations theory that analyses the 
factors behind the sources of and constraints on cooperation between States,153 and 
examines how cooperative behaviour results from functional benefits provided by 
institutions and associated rules.154 It argues that increasing levels of interdependence 
EHWZHHQ6WDWHVJHQHUDWHJUHDWHUµGHPDQG¶IRUFRRSHUDWLRQWRVROYHYDULRXVFROOHFWLYH
action problems.155 In this regard, institutions essentially proffer solutions to 
coordination problems by providing information that aids decision making and 
reduces transaction costs, as well as by making State commitments more credible by 
specifying what is expected, thereby also encouraging State compliance.156 
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From the perspective of neo-liberal institutionalism, regional initiatives depend 
on evolving inter-governmental bargains, and State support for such initiatives is then 
based on the following core suppositions. Firstly, increasing (economic, social, 
environmental, etc.) interdependence generates a growing need for cooperation. 
Regional cohesion thus emerges from how individual or issue-specific collaboration 
become part of a network, where each new initiative becomes embedded in a larger 
and more complex relationship between States.157 Secondly, States are the primary 
actors and will be incentivised to cooperate in their own interests for achieve absolute 
gain.158 In this connection, successful collaborative management of common problems 
like an international crime is argued to strengthen the individual States. Thirdly, 
institutions offer States benefits that cannot be unilaterally obtained. These include: 
(1) providing information for decision making and a framework for interactions; (2) 
facilitating transparency and monitoring; (3) reducing transaction and verification 
costs for consensus, especially among large numbers of States; and (4) making it 
easier to punish defections.159 To stabilise their relations and instil orderly processes 
regarding ICrimJ, States may therefore consider establishing or joining formal 
institutions, such as a regional court.  
Neo-liberal institutionalism posits that States will cooperate if it produces 
absolute (not exclusive relative) gains. As such, the more that regional collaboration 
serves State interests, the greater is its legitimacy and the support it receives.160 The 
political regionalism within Southeast Asia already reflects the need for and supports 
the focus on managing growing interdependence in all spheres of international 
relations from trade and economics to security and defence.161 The issue is therefore 
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not whether ASEAN States should move closer together on ICrimJ issues, but whether 
it should be formalised or institutionalised within the regional framework that 
currently manages the complicated interactions and interdependencies between 
Southeast Asian countries.162 That said, a point to note is that the existence, or 
alternatively absence, of formalised arrangements do not reflect the success of a 
regional approach or its acceptance by States.163 Indeed, there are formalised regional 
bodies, like the Organisation of American States (OAS), WKDW KDYH ³KLVWRULFDOO\
VXVWDLQHG WKHPVHOYHV WKURXJK WKHLU LQDFWLRQ´164 Africa has also created many such 
³EXUHDXFUDWLFDOO\ ODGHQHQWLWLHV´165 but they are generally considered ineffective due 
to a lack of resources. On the other hand, there are non-institutionalised but effective 
regional groupings that even have regular summits of Heads of State and ministers 
with annual agendas.166  
Separately, some regional institutions may have been created, despite official 
rhetoric otherwise, to reinforce state sovereignty rather than to modify or transcend 
it.167 This appears to be the case for ASEAN, both before and after the organisation 
became a legal personality through the ratification of its Charter.168 It explains the 
experience in Southeast Asia, where ASEAN States have not only negotiated FTAs as 
a regional bloc and jointly worked to address transnational issues and crimes, but also 
undertaken to create an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) by 2015. Neo-liberal 
institutionalism thus not only explains and justifies why regionalisation occurs, but 
may also a useful lens to gauge the possibility of regionalising ICrimJ in Southeast 
Asia. The question is then whether another perspective better matches the experience 
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of ASEAN and should be used to assess how ICrimJ can be advanced through 
regional arrangements. 
 
2.3.2 Neo-Realism 
 
Neo-UHDOLVWVXQGHUVWDQGDµUHJLRQ¶LQ WKHFRQWH[WRI WKHEURDGHULQWHUQDWLRQDOV\VWHP
and focuses on the dynamics of inter-State rivalry and international realpolitik.169 
States are understood as rational, self-seeking units that will cooperate for self-
interest, particularly in terms of their survival and security.170 These sovereign entities 
are primary actors in the anarchic international system due to the absence of a global 
government. Regions are then formed as a response to external threats and 
challenges,171 with little substantive distinction existing between regional political and 
economic initiatives.172 Although neo-realists acknowledge the growing degree of 
economic interdependence, sovereignty is paramount and it will always check and 
balance any cooperative project.173 Hence, possibilities for cooperation exist but are 
constrained by the exigencies of State power and interest,174 as well as the systemic 
factors that lead to bandwagoning by States and balance-of-power politics.175  
Several explanations for regional initiatives of both developing and developed 
countries are provided by neo-realism. Firstly, regional initiatives may emerge as a 
response to a hegemonic power or overwhelmingly dominant State. Such groups are 
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 7KH FRUH GLIIHUHQFH EHWZHHQ WUDGLWLRQDO UHDOLVP DQG QHRUHDOLVP LV WKH ODWWHU¶V HPSKDVLV RQ WKH
structure of the international system for explaining global politics. Also called structural realism, it 
DUJXHV WKDW WKH V\VWHP¶V VWUXFWXUH LV GHWHUPLQHG E\ WKH DEVHQFH RI RYHUDUFKLQJ DXWKRULW\ DQG WKH
distribution of power among States. 
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 Balance-of-power politics emerge from the confrontation between States, and is generally regarded 
as a primary tool for States to create equilibrium within the anarchic international system. 
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seen as a natural response of weaker States trapped in a world dictated by the 
powerful. Indeed, much of the regionalist activity through the Cold War years 
involved schemes for cooperation desLJQHG WR LPSURYH D UHJLRQ¶V SRVLWLRQ LQ WKH
international system, either by increasing its bargaining strengths or by attempting to 
seal off the region and reduce the scope for outside intervention.176 This decidedly 
applies to Southeast Asia.  
Secondly, regionalism may by extension arise as an attempt to restrict the 
exercise of external hegemonic power by creating regional institutions. In this regard, 
it is noteworthy that ASEAN was partly formed as a means to block the spread of 
communism within the founding member States. It is however also acknowledged that 
regional arrangements established by smaller States are likely to be contingent upon 
the policies and attitudes of the stronger State(s), which will ultimately favour 
initiatives that reinforced their own positions and oppose those that went against their 
interests. ASEAN has then sought to address this problem with the need for 
consensus, which has become an organisational norm.177 
Thirdly, regional cohesion may alternatively be the result of sustained 
convergence of material interests and incentives provided by working with the 
regional hegemon. There are indeed reasons and a tendency for weaker states to seek 
regional accommodation with a local hegemon in hopes of bandwagoning.178 Even 
when it may not be in their overall best interests, Gruber highlights that States may 
join the bandwagon to avoid being left behind.179 This is evidenced by the shared 
EHOLHIDPRQJVW WKH6RXWKHDVW$VLDQFRXQWULHV LQ WKHFRPPRQ$6($1VD\LQJ WKDW µD
rising tide will float all bRDWV¶ ,Q WKLV UHJDUG VRPH 6WDWHV PD\ EHOLHYH WKDW QRW
participating in certain regional initiatives is neither a rational choice nor a real option 
available to them. 
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 7KLUG:RUOGVWUXFWXUDOLVWVZHUHIRUH[DPSOH³LQWHUHVWHG LQUHJLRQDOLVPDVD WRRO LQ the struggle to 
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Lastly, hegemons on the other hand may promote commitment to regional 
bodies in order to direct or limit the freedom of action of both the organisation and its 
other member States.180 Regional initiatives are then tools to serve the interests of the 
most powerful State(s), which is typically instrumental in its creation and maintenance 
and sets its agenda.181 For example, Fawcett points out that European integration can 
be understood in the light of the geopolitical framework during the Cold War and the 
US hegemony that embedded European integration within a transatlantic security 
framework,182 and that all regional activity in the Americas is predicated on the 
dominant role of the US.183 Allison similarly contends that institution-building in 
Central Asia also has much to do with balancing or bandwagoning with the regional 
power(s).184 ECOWAS may then be possibly linked to support of Nigeria, while the 
OIC can largely be regarded as an initiative of Saudi Arabia. 
Neo-realism has often been criticised for grossly oversimplifying the nature of 
the international system and neglecting changes to the global system, in particular 
growing economic interdependence. Lipson however notes that while economic 
matters can be discussed according to absolute gains, other issues like security are best 
discussed in relative gains.185 In this vein, neo-realists counter that DV µSRVLWLRQDO¶
actors, States are motivated by the maintenance or enhancement of their position vis-
a-vis other States to ensure their survival,186 and not merely trying to maximise their 
absolute gains. As international bodies like the ICC are unable to address the anarchy 
in the system, they are merely tools of States in their competition with each other. 
6XSSRUWIRU,&ULP-ZLOOWKHUHIRUHQRWEHPRWLYDWHGE\WKHµFRQVFLHQFHRIKXPDQLW\¶RU
altruistic considerations, and the sacrifice of State sovereignty to enforce ICL would 
make little sense unless doing so confers some relative advantage or to opposing it 
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entails some relative costs.187 This partly explains the tortured development of ICL 
and a permanent international criminal court, as well as the continued desire of States 
³WROLPLWWKH&RXUW
VSRZHUVWRUHWDLQWKHLURZQIUHHGRPV´188  
Neo-realism can therefore both explain the presence of regionalism and justify 
its acceptance self-interested sovereign States, which probably best describes the 
Vattellian political realities in Southeast Asia. Although it may said that upholding 
ICrimJ reflects an international community that resembles the neo-Grotian notion of a 
society of States,189 the pluralist and statist hallmarks of the Vattellian archetype 
cannot be ignored. States will attempt to push others to abide by their position on the 
law, but will oppose or ignore legal norms and practices that they disfavour.190 As 
noted earlier in this chapter, such behaviour is evident when the enforcement of ICL 
challenges state sovereignty. A neo-realist lens may therefore be most likely to 
produce an accurate assessment of how ICrimJ can be best advanced through regional 
arrangements amongst ASEAN countries. 
In sum, the rationale for and viability of regional initiatives exists regardless of 
whether neo-liberal institutionalism or neo-realism is favoured. That said, given that 
AMS hold firmly to the notions of state sovereignty and non-intervention in the 
domestic affairs of another State, a neo-realist lens may help identify the most 
practical and acceptable mechanism(s) for regionalising ICrimJ in Southeast Asia. It is 
however worth noting that other theoretical lenses have also been used in the ASEAN 
context, particularly constructivism. For example, Acharya argues that AS($1¶V
security community iVD³VRFLDOFRQVWUXFW´ZKHUHnorms and collective identity are the 
main driving forces.191 )XQGDPHQWDO WR KLV DUJXPHQW LV WKH QRWLRQ RI µLQFUHPHQWDO
VRFLDOL]DWLRQ¶ ZKHUHE\ $6($1¶V QRUPV DQG LGHQWLW\ GHYHORS IURP D ORQJ-term 
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process of interaction and adjustment.192 That said, WKH µ$6($1ZD\¶193 of making 
decisions through consensus after extensive consultations is ultimately a practice of 
inter-State relations. Moreover, ASEAN norms like the primacy of sovereignty, non-
use of force, and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States are principles 
developed by AMS based on strict reciprocity. Hence, the state-centric IR theories of 
neo-realism and neo-liberalism still underpin $6($1¶VUHJLRQDOL]DWLRQ. Indeed, while 
Acharya argues that regionalism in Southeast Asia LV³LQGLJHQRXVO\FRQVWUXFWHGUDWKHU
WKDQH[RJHQRXVO\GHWHUPLQHG´194 he recognises that ASEAN States were also brought 
together by perceived common external threats. Acharya also admits that the norms 
and values adopted by AMS are not vastly different, and that the distinguishing factor 
LV³WKHSURFHVVWKURXJKZKLFKVXFKLQWHUDFWLRQVDUHFDUULHGRXW´ZKLFKFRQWUDVWVZLWK
WKH³DGYHUVDULDOSRVWXULQJ´DQG³OHJDOLVWLFGHFLVLRQ-PDNLQJSURFHGXUHV´RIWHQIRXQGLQ
other international and regional settings.195 As such, even if constructivism is accepted 
in the ASEAN context, it is not necessarily antagonistic to the neorealist and 
neoliberal  theories employed in this research. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
Geography is the necessary starting point IRU LGHQWLI\LQJ D µUHJLRQ¶ ZLWK VKDUHG
identity and interests amongst States as the basis for regionalism. However, the 
rationale for a regional initiative can then be explained by the considerations of self-
interested States based on neo-realist systemic or neo-liberal interdependence theories. 
The proposal of regionalising ICrimJ, broadly understood as the process or strategy of 
devolving the power and responsibility of enforcing ICL to the regional level, is 
therefore theoretically sound from all these perspectives and implicitly acceptable to 
States.  
Regardless of the theoretical lens used, it is nevertheless clear that for a 
regional ICrimJ initiative to succeed, States must find that the benefits of action 
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outweigh the costs of inaction. The hitherto absence of regional approaches for ICL 
must then not be confused with any misconceptions that they are not viable or 
beneficial; or that regional views on ICrimJ are irrelevant or non-existent. Firstly, 
States are generally reluctant to relinquish sovereignty and redistribute their power. 
They will readily do so only if such a move is both compatible with their own interests 
and bolstered by a permissive international environment. In this regard, the confluence 
of egregious atrocities, shared political will, and accommodating global circumstances 
led the international community to establish the ICC in 1998. The conditions that will 
be supportive of a regional ICrimJ approach in Southeast Asia will be discussed in 
Chapter 4. At this point, it is suffice to note that there remains an underlying tension 
between the Court and the interests of sovereign States, and the regionalisation of 
ICrimJ can thus be pertinent and advantageous for States wishing to retain control 
over the prosecutions of its citizens yet not wanting to appear supportive of impunity 
for international crimes by undermining the ICC. Secondly, it should not be forgotten 
that regional positions were present at the Rome Conference,196 and continue to be 
witnessed at the ICC Review Conference and Assembly of Member States (ASP) 
meetings. In this regard, the ICC may also benefit from the regionalisation of ICrimJ 
by recognising diversity within the international community, accommodating the 
variations in regional focus, and incorporating them into its work.  
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 For example, the Southern African Developmental Community (SADC) often spoke with a unified 
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CHAPTER 3 
LESSONS FROM OTHER BRANCHES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
The main drivers of the pursuit of ICrimJ by State actors have been protecting peoples 
against egregious human rights violations by the sanctioning and deterring of 
atrocities, as well as the preservation of international peace and security through 
collective action. Indeed, a large part of the international approach after WWII was 
the development of ICL to meet the immediate post-war need of delivering justice and 
punishing war criminals, as well as to deter the future commission of genocide, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity.1 The principles behind ICrimJ and its 
enforcement were separately also linked to international security cooperation heralded 
by conflict management.2 Hence, it may be said that enforcing ICrimJ can help ensure 
collective security3 and protect human rights norms, or even claimed that collective 
security law and human rights law are immediately applicable to ICL not just by way 
of analogy.4  
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 Peace operations reflect that the protection and promotion of human rights undoubtedly 
remain important to the international community. 1LJHO :KLWH ³3HDFH 2SHUDWLRQV´ LQ
Vincent Chetail, ed., Post Conflict Peacebuilding: A Lexicon, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), at 219. 
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 Doswald-Beck thus defines an international crime as a breach of international law that is 
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Publishers, 1993); George Downs, ed., Collective Security Beyond the Cold War (Michigan: University 
of Michigan Press, 1994); 0DUWWL.RVNHQQLHPL³7KH3ODFHRI/DZ LQ&ROOHFWLYH6HFXULW\´Michigan 
Journal of International Law 17 (1996): 455-490; and Thomas Weiss, Beyond UN Subcontracting: 
Task-Sharing with Regional Security Arrangements and Service-Providing NGOs (London: Macmillan 
Press Ltd, 1998).  
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 This argument that lessons from collective security and human rights law is relevant to ICrimJ and 
ICL is developed within this Chapter. At this juncture, it is worthy to note that that the Inter-American 
Commission of Human Rights in the Coard FDVH KLJKOLJKWHG WKH H[LVWHQFH RI ³DQ LQWHJUDO OLQNDJH
between the law of human rights and humanitarian law because they share a common nucleus of non-
derogable rights and a comPRQ SXUSRVH RI SURWHFWLQJ KXPDQ OLIH DQG GLJQLW\´ 7KH ,QWHU-American 
Court of Human Rights in the Velásquez Rodriguez v. Honduras case earlier also held that all States 
have certain fundamental obligations in the area of human rights. See Coard v. United States of 
America, Case 10.951, Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, OEA/ser.L/V/II.106, doc.3rev. 
(1999), para.39; and Velásquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
Judgment of 29 July 1988, Series C No. 4. 
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Acknowledging these points is important for the discussion on upholding 
ICrimJ in Southeast Asia through a regional construct for two reasons. Firstly, the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is best understood as a regional 
collective security organisation and confidence building mechanism that aids conflict 
avoidance and dispute management.5 As such, its mandate to maintain regional peace 
and security can arguably be extended to also cover ICrimJ-related issues. Secondly, 
the recent creation of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights 
(AICHR) offers direct and crucial lessons for the development of a ICrimJ mechanism 
or body within the region. The possibility of regionalising ICrimJ within Southeast 
Asia should therefore be assessed bearing in mind the rationale for ASEAN and its 
roles in maintaining regional peace through collective security and advancing human 
rights ± aspects of inter-State relations that increasingly overlap with ICrimJ issues.  
At this juncture, it is useful to recap how collective security law and human 
rights law may be linked to the upholding of ICrimJ and enforcement of ICL. A 
noteworthy development in the concept of collective security has been the linkage 
between threats to peace and stability and the commission of large-scale atrocities. 
Against the backdrop of the Rwandan tragedy and Kosovo dilemma, States recognised 
the importance of both the individual and collective responsibility of States to 
safeguard civilians from specific mass atrocity crimes, and endorsed the notion of a 
collective international responsibility to protect populations from avoidable calamity.6 
With the creation of the ICTY and ICTR, as a non-military measure authorised under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter to address threats to international peace and security,7 
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 It is important to distinguish the notion of collective security that is being discussed from collective 
defence arrangements. Collective security refers to an organisation/initiative established by a group of 
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 WKLV µ5WR3¶ GRFWULQH ZDV ILUVW implicitly applied in relation to the massacres in Libya. See In 
Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, UN Doc. A/59/2005, 21 
March 2005; and discussion later in this chapter. 
7
 UNSC resolutions 827 and 995 stated that the situations in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
threatened international peace and security. The latter added that prosecuting perpetrators would 
contribute to national reconciliation, and the restoration and maintenance of peace. See UN Security 
Council resolution 827 of 25 May 1993, S/Res/827 (1993); and UN Security Council resolution 955 of 
8 November 1994, S/Res/955 (1994).  
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the UNSC also unequivocally linked the notions of peace and justice.8 Ambiguity in 
the scope of collective security has however led to inconsistency in its application,9 
and the increase in the number of acts that are perceived by States to breach or threaten 
peace and security.10  
Collective security has then increasingly overlapped with ICrimJ issues 
concerning egregious international crimes and other gross violations of human rights 
previously caught by Article 2(7) of the UN Charter. This is partly due to the fact that 
situations once solely of domestic concern are now recognised and argued to have 
impact across national borders.11 For example, an intra-State conflict may now be 
considered as a direct threat to peace and security, not least by spreading to 
neighbouring countries or leading to massive refugee flows across national borders.12 
In 3URVHFXWRUY7DGLü (Jurisdiction), the ICTY supported this position and held that 
DQLQWHUQDODUPHGFRQIOLFWZRXOGFRQVWLWXWHDµWKUHDWWRWKHSHDFH¶EDVHGRQ³WKHVHWWOHG
practice of the Security Council and the common understanding of the United Nations 
PHPEHUVKLSLQJHQHUDO´13 Foreign intervention has then been increasingly justified on 
the basis that the humanitarian crisis within the State constituted a threat to 
                                          
8
 TKH REMHFWLYH EHKLQG FULPLQDO FRXUWV LQ WKH 81 V\VWHP LV WKXV ³LQ VXSSRUW RI WKH 81 6HFXULW\
&RXQFLO
V IXQFWLRQ RI SUHVHUYLQJ DQG PDLQWDLQLQJ LQWHUQDWLRQDO SHDFH DQG VHFXULW\´ Colin Warbrick, 
³7KH8QLWHG1DWLRQV6\VWHP$3ODFH IRU&ULPLQDO &RXUWV"´Transnational Law and Contemporary 
Problems 5 (1995): 237-261, at 260. 
9
 :KLOHWHUPVOLNHµEUHDFKRIWKHSHDFH¶DUHUHODWLYHO\FOHDUWKH\PD\EHDSSOLHGVHOHFWLYHO\
6HSDUDWHO\ WHUPV OLNH µWKUHDW WR WKH SHDFH¶ LV LQKHUHQWO\ DPELJXRXV DQG DOORZV IRU D
significant amount of discretion. Nigel White, Collective Security Law (Aldershot: Ashgate 
Publishing, 2003), at xi. 
10
 &ODXGHQRWHV WKDWFROOHFWLYH VHFXULW\KDVEHHQXVHG³IRUYLUWXDOO\ DQ\DQGDOOPXOWLODWHUDO
DFWLYLWLHV´ WKDW VWDWHVPHQ RU VFKRODUV UHJDUG DV FRQGXFLYH WR SHDFH DQG RUGHU´ ,QLV &ODXGH
Jnr., Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organisation, 4th 
ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1984), at 247. 
11
 -RKQ0XUSK\³)RUFHDQG$UPV´LQ&KULVWRSKHU-R\QHUHGThe United Nations and International 
Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997), at 98. 
12
 )RUH[DPSOHWKH816&FRQGHPQHG³WKHUHSUHVVLRQRIWKH,UDTLFLYLOLDQSRSXODWLRQZKLFKOHGWRD
massive flow of refugees towards and across international frontiers and to cross-border incursions 
ZKLFKWKUHDWHQLQWHUQDWLRQDOSHDFHDQGVHFXULW\LQWKHUHJLRQ´6HH816HFXULW\&RXQFLOUHVROXWLRQ
of 5 April 1991.  
13
 7KH ,&7<KLJKOLJKWHG WKDW WKHSUDFWLFHRI WKH816&ZDV³ULFKZLWKFDVHVRIFLYLO ZDURU LQWHUQDO
strife whiFK LW FODVVLILHG DV D µWKUHDW WR WKH SHDFH¶ DQG GHDOW ZLWK XQGHU &KDSWHU 9,, ZLWK WKH
HQFRXUDJHPHQWRUHYHQDWWKHEHKHVWRIWKH*HQHUDO$VVHPEO\´7KXVWKHUHLVDFRPPRQXQGHUVWDQGLQJ
DPRQJWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\WKDW³WKHµWKUHDWWRWKHSHDFH¶RIArticle 39 may include, as one of 
LWV VSHFLHV LQWHUQDO DUPHG FRQIOLFWV´ 6HH 3URVHFXWRU Y 7DGLü, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Appeals 
Chamber, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, 
para.30.  
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international peace and security.14 There have also been calls for the right of 
humanitarian intervention by regional actors in internal conflicts,15 based on 
protecting civilians from genocide and large-scale crimes against humanity.16 
Coupled with some relaxation of the principle of non-intervention, particularly 
amongst member States of some regional organisations, this then facilitated the 
emergence of the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (RtoP).17 Officially carried in 
the Outcome Document of the 2005 UN World Summit, the doctrine builds on the 
QRWLRQRIµVRYHUHLJQW\DVUHVSRQVLELOLW\¶, and modifies the act of intervention from a 
controversial right to a hierarchy of responsibilities by individual States and the 
international community.18 In line with the view that large-scale atrocities committed 
within the borders of a State can also constitute threats to international peace and 
security, the international community has begun to operationalise RtoP.19 Delmas-
Marty points out third states are thus ³QRW OLPLWHG WR UHDFWLYH PHDVXUHV QDPHO\ WKH
SURVHFXWLRQDQGSXQLVKPHQWRILQWHUQDWLRQDOFULPHV´DQGWKHUHLVDSUHYHQWLYHDVSHFW
in their involvement.20 In 2011, the doctrine was implicitly applied for the first time in 
                                          
14
 )RU H[DPSOH WKH 816& GHWHUPLQHG WKDW ³WKH KXPDQ WUDJHG\ FDXVHG E\ WKH FRQIOLFW LQ 6RPDOLD
further exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of humanitarian assistance, 
FRQVWLWXWHVD WKUHDWWRLQWHUQDWLRQDOSHDFHDQGVHFXULW\´6HH816HFXULW\&RXQFLOUHVROXWLRQRI
December 1992.  
15
 Some commentators argue that Article 53 of the UN Charter can be reinterpreted as permitting 
humanitarian or pro-democratic enforcement action by regional organisations without prior UNSC 
authorisation, especially since ex post facto approval may be sought. See Zsuzsanna Deen-Racsmány, 
³$ 5HGLstribution of Authority between the UN and Regional Organisations in the Field of the 
0DLQWHQDQFHRI3HDFH DQG6HFXULW\"´ Leiden Journal of International Law 13 (2000): 297-331; and 
Thomas Franck, Recourse to Force: State Action Against Threats and Armed Attacks (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), at 155.  
16
 6HH-HUHP\/HYLWW³+XPDQLWDULDQ,QWHUYHQWLRQE\5HJLRQDO$FWRUVLQ,QWHUQDO&RQIOLFWV7KH&DVHV
RI (&2:$6 LQ /LEHULD DQG 6LHUUD /HRQH´ 7HPSOH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO DQG &RPSDUDWLYH /DZ -RXUQDO 
(1998): 333-375. 
17
 The doctrine was adopted by the UNGA and affirmed by the UNSC. See 2005 World Summit 
Outcome, UN doc. A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005; and UN Security Council resolution 1674, 28 April 
2006, UN doc. S/Res/1674 (2006).  
18
 UN members accepted that States have the primary responsibility to prevent and protect their 
populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. The 
international community should however encourage and help States to exercise their responsibilities, 
and has the responsibility to use peaceful means, and if necessary Chapter VII measures, to protect 
populations from these crimes. See 2005 World Summit Outcome, UN doc. A/RES/60/1, 24 October 
2005, paras.138-139; and ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission 
on Intervention and State Sovereignty, para 2.14. 
19
 For example, recalling its reference on RtoP (Resolution 1674) reaffirming paragraphs 138 and 139 
of the 2005 World Summit Document, the UNSC passed Resolution 1706 authorising the deployment 
of peacekeepers in Darfur in 2006. UN Security Council resolution 1706 of 31 August 2006, UN doc. 
S/Res/1706 (2006). 
20
 Mireille Delmas-0DUW\³$PELJXLWLHVDQG/DFXQDH7KH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&ULPLQDO&RXUW7HQ<HDUVRQ´
Journal of International Criminal Justice 11 (2013): 553-561, at 556. 
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relation to the situation in Libya,21 in support of enforcement action authorised by the 
UNSC under Chapter VII.22 The linkage between the maintenance of peace under 
collective security and ICrimJ is underscored by the earlier adoption by the UNSC of 
resolution 1970, which referred the Libyan situation to the Prosecutor of the ICC.23  
The association between ICrimJ and human rights is even clearer. Prior to the 
UN Charter, there were few principles and rules governing the rights and obligations 
of individuals. This changed radically after WWII when alleviating human suffering 
and protecting peoples from violations of international humanitarian law and serious 
human rights crimes became a goal of the international community.24 Towards this 
end, ICL was advanced to meet the immediate post-war requirements of delivering 
justice and punishing individuals for acts that are essentially large-scale violations of 
the human rights.25 Since the establishment of the ICC, various commentators have 
understandably hoisted the Court as a mechanism to prevent and deter such crimes, as 
well as a means to protect and promote fundamental human rights.26 With aspects that 
resemble the structure of a human rights court,27 it can possibly be viewed as a 
collective enforcement model for achieving both the global enforcement and 
protection of human rights.28  
The preceding paragraphs illustrate the close association between ICrimJ and 
both collective security law and human rights law. That said, the research does not 
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 $OWKRXJKWKHWHUP³UHVSRQVLELOLW\WRSURWHFW´GLGQRWDFWXDOO\DSSHDULQHLWKHU816&UHVROXWLRQ
or 1973, a majority of countries had invoked the notion of RtoP in support of measures and action by 
the UNSC and international community to protect civilians and avoid a massacre in Benghazi.  
22
 The UNSC determined that the situation constituted a threat to international peace and security, and 
authorised ³DOO QHFHVVDU\ PHDVXUHV´ WR SURWHFW Fivilians and civilian populated areas under threat of 
attack and to enforce compliance with a no-fly zone. See UN Security Council resolution 1973 of 17 
March 2011. 
23
 See UN Security Council resolution 1970 of 26 February 2011. It was determined that sufficient 
evidence existed to believe that crimes against humanity were committed by the regime of Muammar 
Gaddafi. 
24
 Given the similarities between IHL and human rights law in terms of the form and the subjects of 
their rules, as well as their domain of application, %HQLVRQ DUJXHV WKDW ³KXPDQLWDULDQ ODZ LV EHVW
FRQFHLYHG RI DV D VXEVHW RI KXPDQ ULJKWV ODZ´ $XGUH\ %HQLVRQ ³:DU &ULPHV $ +XPDQ 5LJKWV
$SSURDFK WR D +XPDQLWDULDQ /DZ 3UREOHP DW WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &ULPLQDO &RXUW´ Georgetown Law 
Review 88 (1999):141-175, at 142 and 158. 
25
 ICL therefore forms one piece of the effort to achieve the global protection of human rights. Jamie 
Mayerfeld³Who Shall Be Judge?: The United States, the International Criminal Court, and the Global 
(QIRUFHPHQWRI+XPDQ5LJKWV´Human Rights Quarterly 25 (2003):93-129, at 98. 
26
 6HH*LXOLR*DOODURWWLDQG$ULN3UHLV ³7RZDUG8QLYHUVDO+XPDQ5LJKWVDQG WKH5XOHRI/DZ7KH
3HUPDQHQW ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &ULPLQDO &RXUW´ Australian Journal of International Affairs 53 (1999): 95-
111; and Evo Popoff ³,QFRQVLVWHQF\ DQG ,PSXQLW\ LQ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO +XPDQ 5LJKWV /DZ &DQ WKH
International Criminal Court Solve the Problems Raised by the Rwanda And Augusto Pinochet Cases´
George Washington International Law Review 33 (2000):363-395. 
27
 Benison, supra n.24, at 165-166. 
28 Mayerfeld, supra n.25, at 93 and 98. 
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seek to base or justify the notion of ICrimJ on the norms behind collective security or 
human rights. The truth is that they are like three peels of an orange ± associated yet 
distinct. While these three fields are interlinked and increasingly overlap, they have 
different underlying principles and motivations: retribution and punishment; peace 
and stability; and universal respect for the equal worth of all individuals and uniform 
protection of fundamental freedoms. Indeed, collective security does not seek to 
punish individual perpetrators for committing atrocities, while ICrimJ is not about the 
promotion of human equality and liberty.29 Human rights norms likewise do not 
directly concern themselves with the maintenance of global security, but do include a 
wide range of economic, social and cultural rights and freedoms not covered by 
collective security and criminal justice.  
Although human rights and ICrimJ increasingly resemble each other, it is 
nevertheless important to avoid conflating the two.30 ICrimJ typically comprises of 
strict and precise prohibitions, while human rights is usually characterised by 
generalised standards. Criminal law treaties often also contain a requirement to punish 
the perpetration of acts they are designed to prevent, unlike most human rights 
conventions.31 While international criminal institutions deal with the most serious 
violations of human rights, they should therefore not be viewed as human rights 
courts.32 Indeed, it must not be forgotten that as a response to criminalised acts of 
violence, ICrimJ has objectives and functions that linger on the goals of criminal law 
and punishment in international society, which are fundamentally distinct from both 
                                          
29
 It is thus unclear whether the ICC will make a difference to the promotion and protection of human 
ULJKWV 6WHYHQ 5DWQHU ³7KH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &ULPLQDO &RXUW DQG WKH /LPLWV RI *OREDO -XGLFLDOL]DWLRQ´, 
Texas International Law Journal 38 (2003):445-453, at 452-453. 
30
 7KHRYHUODS LV LQFUHDVHGE\ WKHQRWLRQRI WUDQVLWLRQDO MXVWLFHZKLFK)UHHPDQDQG'MXNLü
link to the broader domain of human rights. However, La Rosa and Philippe note that 
transitional justice also seeks to address serious violations of international human rights and 
humanitarian law enforcing the law through criminal prosecutions. See Mark Freeman and 
'UDåDQ'MXNLü³7KH5HOHYDQFHRIJus Post Bellum$3UDFWLRQHU¶V3HUVSHFWLYH´LQ&DUVWHQ 
Stahn and Jann Kleffner, eds., Jus Post Bellum: Towards a Law of Transition From Conflict 
to Peace (The Hague: TMC Asser, 2008), at 214; and Anne-Marie La Rosa and Xavier 
Philippe, ³7UDQVLWLRQDO-XVWLFH´LQ&KHWDLOsupra n.1, at 370-75. 
31
 For example, delegates to the ICCPR discussions specifically rejected the requirement for violators to 
be brought to the law by States. There was thus never an obligation to prosecute attendant to the duty to 
ensure the rights provided in the Covenant. See Commission on Human Rights, 6th Session, Supp. No. 
81'RF(&165DWDQG0LFKDHO6FKDUI³7KH/HWWHURIWKH/DZ7KH6FRSHRIWKH
,QWHUQDWLRQDO/HJDO2EOLJDWLRQWR3URVHFXWH+XPDQ5LJKWV&ULPHV´Law and Contemporary Problems 
59 (1996):41-61, at 49-50. 
32
 Kirsch stresses that the ICC is therefore a criminal court limited to acts prohibited in customary and 
conventional international law. Philippe Kirsch, "The Role of the International Criminal Court in 
Enforcing International Criminal Law", American University International Law Review 22 (2007): 539-
547, at 543. 
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collective security and human rights. Claims that ICrimJ is merely a subset of the 
human rights movement inherently fail to recognise the criminal justice objectives and 
penal underpinnings for individual criminal liability.33 
Chapter 3 therefore does not seek to find similarities of the underlying 
rationales of these three interrelated areas, let alone at the normative level where 
universal appeal and acceptance exist. Rather, its focus is identifying lessons at the 
level of the execution of substantive law. There are two reasons for distinguishing the 
values behind the notions of collective security, human rights and ICrimJ from the 
instruments and practices that are created to realise those values. Firstly, the 
implementation stage is where one finds selectivity, division in terms of opinions and 
priorities, as well as legitimate variations in practice and across different cultures and 
societies. Many instances then bear the hallmarks of regional preferences and 
sentiments. As collective security law and human rights law are more mature fields of 
theory and application, they can proffer much to the discussion on regionalising 
ICrimJ in terms of best practices and lessons learned.  
Secondly, the distinction between normative concept and substantive law helps 
to clarify the place of jus cogens in this research. Chapter 5 will discuss the possibility 
of regional jus cogens being an indicator of seriousness for regional crimes. However, 
the concept of jus cogens does not and is not intended to serve as a bridge between 
different branches of international law. ³$FFHSWHGDQGUHFRJQLVHGE\WKHLQWHUQDWLRQDO
community of States as a whole as a norm from ZKLFKQRGHURJDWLRQLVSHUPLWWHG´34 
jus cogens norms are intrinsically vague and general. They do not normally attach 
themselves to specific treaty pronouncements, even within conventions that are 
deemed peremptory, unless such regulations are broad or defined imprecisely. While 
jus cogens clearly has relevance in the normative aspirations of treaties associated 
with collective security, human rights and ICrimJ, much less can be said about the 
universality of individual parts within treaties that constitute collective security law, 
international human rights law, and ICL. Few specific rights have thus attained the 
status of jus cogens, and even then uniform interpretation and implementation of these 
rights is near impossible given the political, economic and cultural diversity between 
regional groupings of States. For example, despite the existence of an International 
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 These include deterrence; incapacitation and denunciation; rehabilitation and re-education; post-
FRQIOLFWUHFRQFLOLDWLRQDQGHVWDEOLVKLQJWKHµWUXWK¶. See discussion in Chapter 4. 
34
 Article 53, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969). 
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Bill of Rights,35 political realities dictate that cultural relativism cannot be avoided in 
application and enforcement of international human rights law.36 
The chapter therefore proceeds to consider how regional initiatives in the 
fields of collective security law and human rights law may hold valuable insights and 
practical lessons for conceptualising and implementing the regionalisation of ICrimJ 
within the context of an ASEAN regional framework. In particular, the chapter will 
examine the development of the AICHR to glean lessons about the potential promises 
and pitfalls of implementing a regional ICrimJ approach in Southeast Asia. In terms of 
the possible relationship with the ICC, an inherent question is whether regional 
organisations like ASEAN may adopt different mandates or must operate in sync with 
the Court.37 A further issue will be whether regional mechanisms require the 
authorisation or moral legitimacy of the ICC to act.38 Should regional bodies, acting 
on the consensus of member States, be curbed from independently ensuring regional 
peace and security, deterring atrocities, or addressing international crimes within their 
spheres of influence?39 
 
                                          
35
 The International Bill of Rights comprises the UDHR, ICESCR and ICCPR with its two optional 
SURWRFROV 6HH 2IILFH RI WKH +LJK &RPPLVVLRQHU IRU +XPDQ 5LJKWV ³)DFW 6KHHW 1R 5HY 7KH
International %LOORI+XPDQ5LJKWV´ 
36
 Although human rights are universal in concept/substance and exist for all humanity everywhere in 
the world, human rights law allows for diversification and has been be variably implemented, both in 
terms of degree and content. Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, 2nd ed. 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), at 94. 
37
 Besides the principles of competence allocation between global and regional organisations, the 
provisions of their constituent instruments also determine their limits, and regulate the issues of 
primacy between them and their conflicting jurisdictions. Alexander Orakhelashvili, Collective Security 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), at 142 and 147. 
38
 While the independence of regional organisations may be argued from the fact that Chapter VIII and 
Article 103 of the UN Charter do not bind international organisations, Blokker points out that Article 
53 provides that enforcement action cannot be undertaken by regional arrangements or by regional 
agencies without UNSC authorisation. 1LHOV %ORNNHU ³,V WKH $XWKRUL]DWLRQ $XWKRUL]HG"3RZHUV DQG
Practice of the UN Security Council to Authorize the Use of Force by 'Coalitions of the Able and 
:LOOLQJ´European Journal of International Law 11 (2000): 541-568, at 551. 
39
 An effective international system for the maintenance of peace and security may potentially only be 
possible through an interplay at the various levels. Christoph 6FKUHXHU³5HJLRQDOLVPY8QLYHUVDOLVP´
European Journal of International Law 6 (1995), 477-499, at 498. 
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3.1 ASEAN and Collective Security 
 
ASEAN recently celebrated its forty-fifth anniversary in 2012,40 and is best 
understood as a tool for conflict avoidance and dispute management.41 The 
organisation is primarily focused on confidence building and ensuring transparency 
between member States,42 with State sovereignty and the principle of non-interference 
serving as its fundamental norms.43 The ASEAN Declaration of 8 August 1967 states 
WKDW D NH\ DLP DQG SXUSRVH RI WKH RUJDQL]DWLRQ LV ³WR SURPRWH UHJLRQDO SHDce and 
stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship 
DPRQJFRXQWULHVRIWKHUHJLRQ´44 The 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) 
added that this would be achieved, inter alia, through the defining ASEAN norm of 
³non-LQWHUIHUHQFH LQ WKH LQWHUQDO DIIDLUV RI RQH DQRWKHU´45 These cardinal ASEAN 
documents then reveal both an opening for the promotion of ICrimJ and a major 
potential challenge to the regional enforcement of ICL, which is certain to undermine 
State sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention.46 
$VVWDELOLW\LVSDUDPRXQWIRUWKHFRXQWULHVRI6RXWKHDVW$VLD$6($1¶VPRVW
important contributions have been and continue to be reducing intra-regional 
                                          
40
 ASEAN is an organisation created to ensure stability among a heterogeneous grouping of weak 
postcolonial states in Southeast Asia. It is a rare example of a Cold War-LQVSLUHG LQGLJHQRXV µ7KLUG
:RUOG¶ RUJDQLVDWLRQ WKDW has survived beyond 1989. See 'DYLG -RQHV DQG 0LFKDHO 6PLWK ³Making 
Process, Not Progress: $6($1DQG WKH(YROYLQJ(DVW$VLDQ5HJLRQDO2UGHU´ International Security 
32 (2007):148±DWDQG6DPXHO6KDUSH³$Q$6($1ZD\WRVHFXULW\FRRSHUDWLRQLQ6RXtheast 
$VLD"´The Pacific Review 16 (2003): 231-250, at 231. 
41
 The regional organisation was established in 1967 by five countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) as a mechanism to promote regional peace and stability, and to 
build intra-regional confidence. Five other States in the region were later admitted: Brunei (1984), 
Vietnam (1995), Laos and Myanmar (1997), and Cambodia (1999). 
42
 ASEAN was created to serve three mutually reinforcing security functions: (1) mitigate tensions 
between its members by building political and economic connections; (2) contribute to political 
stability and alleviate the domestic social conditions nurturing communist insurgency through 
economic development; and (3) manage the regional security environment, without external 
intervention, thereby reducing their vulnerability to the machinations of the great powers. Rajaratnam 
thus stated that ASEAN was born out of the common fear of inter-State conflict and the communist 
WKUHDW ³UDWKHU WKDQ LGHDOLVWLF FRQYLFWLRQV DERXW UHJLRQDOLVP´ 6HH 6KDXQ 1DULQH ³$6($1 DQG WKH
0DQDJHPHQW RI 5HJLRQDO 6HFXULW\´ Pacific Affairs 71 (1998):195-214, at 196; and S. Rajaratnam, 
³$6($1 7KH :D\ $KHDG´ in Kernial Singh Sandhu and Sharon Siddique, eds., ASEAN Reader 
(Singapore: ISEAS, 1992), at xxvi. 
43
 $VWKH\ZHUHDOOIRUPHUFRORQLHVZLWKWKHH[FHSWLRQRI7KDLODQG$6($1PHPEHUVWDWHVDUH³YHU\
NHHQ RQ SUHVHUYLQJ WKHLU VRYHUHLJQW\´ 6HH $QQD YDQ GHU 9OHXWHQ ³&RQWUDVWLQJ &DVHV ([SODLQLQJ
Interventions by SADC and AS($1´Closing or Widening the Gap? Legitimacy and Democracy in 
Regional Integration Organizations, eds. Andrea Hoffman and Anna van der Vleuten (Hampshire: 
Ashgate Publishing, 2007), at 164. 
44
 See ASEAN Declaration, 8 August 1967.  
45
 See Article 2(c), 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. 
46
 :KLOHWKH$6($1'HFODUDWLRQDQG7$&DUHUHIOHFWLYHRI³LQWHUQDWLRQDOLVWDQGSRVWFRORQLDOYDOXHVRI
WKHSRVWZDUHUD´6KDUSHQRWHVWKDWWKHQRQ-negotiable inviolability of state sovereignty, encapsulated in 
the ASEAN principle of non-intervention, is still most critical to member States. See Jones, supra n.40, 
at 154; and Sharpe, supra n.40, at 247. 
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tensions,47 DV ZHOO DV IDFLOLWDWLQJ µFRPPXQLW\-EXLOGLQJ¶ Dmongst member States.48 
While the end of the Cold War heralded a shift in focus towards regional economic 
development, the organisation remains an association of States predicated on the 
maintenance of regional security and order through collective security.49 The norms 
and procedures of ASEAN ± created to prevent, manage and resolve intra-regional 
conflict, as well as to govern the bilateral and multilateral arrangements of member 
States against common internal and external threats ± are crucial elements of inter-
State relations in Southeast Asia.50 
At this juncture, it is important to recognise that ASEAN is no longer simply a 
series of regularised ministerial and bureaucratic consultations. In December 2005, the 
leaders of the ten member States reached an agreement at the 11th ASEAN Summit to 
draft a Charter for the Association.51 Recognising the importance of having an 
appropriate institutional framework for the organisation, the ASEAN Charter seeks to 
codify all ASEAN norms, rules, and values. More importantly, it also confers a legal 
SHUVRQDOLW\WR$6($1DQGZLOOµGHWHUPLQHWKHIXQFWLRQVGHYHORSDUHDVRIFRPSHWHQFH
of key ASEAN bodies and their relationship with one another in the overall ASEAN 
VWUXFWXUH¶52 A high-level task force was subsequently set up to draft the ASEAN 
Charter, which was signed on 20 November 2007 and entered into force on 15 
December 2008. It is particularly noteworthy that comprehensive political and 
security cooperation within ASEAN which has been increasingly linked to the notion 
of ICrimJ through the inclusion of post-conflict peace-building goals.53 Hence, an 
opportunity exists to develop ICL within the ASEAN collective security framework. 
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 /HLIHUDSWO\GHVFULEHVLWVSURFHVVHVDVKDYLQJ³DQHYLGHQWGLPHQVLRQRIEDODQFHRISRZHU´ZLWKLQ³DQ
instLWXWLRQDOIUDPHZRUNRIPXOWLODWHUDOFRQVWUDLQW´0LFKDHO/HLIHU³7UXWKDERXWWKH%DODQFHRI3RZHU´
in Kin Wah Chin and Leo Suryadinata, eds., Michael Leifer Selected Works on Southeast Asia, 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), at 153. 
48
 Acharya contends that the ultimate goal of ASEAN is the creation of D ³pluralistic security 
communit\´ in Southeast Asia, which McCoubrey and Morris contend also stems from distinctive 
UHJLRQDOSROLWLFDODQGFXOWXUDOWUDGLWLRQV$PLWDY$FKDU\D³5HJLRQal Military-Security Cooperation in 
WKH 7KLUG :RUOG $ &RQFHSWXDO $QDO\VLV RI WKH 5HOHYDQFH DQG /LPLWDWLRQV RI $6($1´ Journal of 
Peace Research 29 (1992):7-21, at 12; Hilaire McCoubrey and Justin Morris, Regional Peacekeeping 
in the post-Cold War Era (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000), at 160. 
49
 The focus on regional confidence building and preventive diplomacy continued in the post-Cold war 
period with the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1993. It has since become the 
most prominent multilateral security arrangement in the region. +LUR.DWVXPDWD³ASEAN and human 
rights: resisting Western pressure or emulating the West?´The Pacific Review 22 (2009): 619±637, at 
629. 
50
 Acharya, supra n.48, at 17. 
51
 See 2005 Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Charter, 12 December 
2005. 
52
 Ibid. 
53
 See Annex 1, 2004 Vientiane Action Programme, 29 November 2004. 
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The next section thus gathers lessons for the regionalisation of ICrimJ within 
Southeast Asia from the promotion of regional peace and security through collective 
security. In particular, it addresses whether a regional organisation, acting on the 
consensus of member States, should be curbed from independently ensuring regional 
peace and security, deterring atrocities, or addressing international crimes within their 
spheres of influence. 
 
3.1.1 Lessons from the Regional Exercise of Collective Security 
 
Although collective security is primarily associated with the UN system,54 the number 
of regional organisations engaged in the maintenance of peace and security has grown 
dramatically since the 1990s.55 After the Cold War, regional organisations not only increased the scope 
of their cooperation with the UN beyond peacekeeping operations,56 but also significantly improved 
their abilities to perform a collective security role and EHFDPH³K\SHUDFWLYHLQUHJLRQDOFRQIOLFWV´57  
These developments were partly due to the transformation of existing inter-
State alliances and establishment of new institutions with collective security 
mandates,58 as well as the broadening definitions of intra-State conflicts and threats to 
the peace and security of the region.59 Another factor was the increased demand for 
peace support action that UN infrastructure, resources and experience could not cater 
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 Collective security is commonly associated with the UN as it is the main actor in this field, and also 
because it hDVEHHQDUJXHGE\VFKRODUV OLNH.HOVHQ WREH³WKHPDLQSXUSRVH´RI WKH816HH Kelsen, 
supra n.3, at 783. 
55
 See Orakhelashvili, supra n.37, at 64-88. 
56
 Regional peacekeeping dates back to 1961, when Arab League Security Forces were stationed in 
Kuwait. Hussein Hassouna, The League of Arab States and Regional Disputes: A Study of Middle East 
Conflicts (New York: Oceania Publishers, 1975). 
57
 Ademola Abass, Regional Organisations and the Development of Collective Security (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2004), at 141. There was also a significant increase in references to regional organisations 
in UNSC resolutions after the Cold War ended in 1991, which illustrated both their increased presence 
and clout in maintaining international peace and security. Renata Sonnenfeld, Resolutions of the United 
Nations Security Council (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1988), at 103. 
58
 Some organisations also crafted new mandates expressly providing for collective security actions. 
For example, ECOWAS reinvented itself in 1990 as a collective security organisation and set the pace 
for the development of regional collective security systems. 6HH$GHPROD$EDVV³7KH,PSOHPHQWDWLRQ
of ECOWAS New Protocol and Security Council Resolution 1270 in Sierra Leone: New 
Developments in Regional ,QWHUYHQWLRQ´ University of Miami International and Comparative Law 
Review 10 (2002): 177-216. 
59
 African regional organisations have, in particular, revised their views on the matter, and by extension 
the doctrine of non-intervention, largely because they recognise that regional peace, stability and 
security cannot be obtained without addressing the intra-State conflicts in member States. 
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for.60 The belief that regional organisations might alleviate the pressure felt by the UN 
was clearly stated in a position paper by the UN Secretary-General in 1995,61 and their 
crucial role in maintaining peace and security was reiterated in a report by the UN 
Secretary-General in 2006.62 The UNSC subsequently passed Resolution 1631 
emphasising that cooperation with regional and sub-regional organisations are useful, 
and their contributions complemented the work of the UN in maintaining peace and 
security.63  
From the regional point of view, besides the greater and more immediate 
impact of a breakdown in regional and domestic stability, further justifications have 
been provided for assuming greater power and authority in maintaining localised 
peace and security in the post-Cold War world.64 One common explanation for 
assuming responsibility in securing regional peace is the failure of the UNSC to 
discharge its duty.65 A related (but subtly different) basis is the notorious selectivity of 
the UN system,66 exacerbated by the political machinations within the UNSC in 
determining Chapter VII action,67 which leaves situations unresolved and forces 
affected States to respond. For all these reasons, regional organisations have then been 
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 Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
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 UN General Assembly, A Regional-Global Security Partnership: Challenges and Opportunities, 28 
July 2006, UN doc. A/61/204±S/2006/590.  
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 UN Security Council resolution 1631, 17 October 2005, UN doc. S/Res/1631 (2005).  
64
 The trend towards regionalisation in the post-Cold War era has been caused by various regional 
desires, interests and experiences. Examples include the desire for 'African solutions for African 
problems', ASEAN's overarching concerns about Southeast Asian security, and the OAS experience 
with democratisation and preventive diplomacy. Orakhelashvili, supra n.37, at 101. 
65
 Various regional organisations have assumed responsibility and acted in the defence of regional 
collective interests, such as NATO in Kosovo and the AU in Sudan and Somalia. Abass notes that 
there have also been sub-regional actions without UNSC authority, like the ECOWAS interventions in 
the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone. $GHPROD $EDVV ³7KH 1HZ &ROOHFWLYH 6HFXULW\
0HFKDQLVPRI(&2:$6,QQRYDWLRQVDQG3UREOHPV´Journal of Conflict and Security Law 5 
(2000): 211-59. 
66
 The UN cannot address every conflict in the world because of its various limitations, and will be 
selective regarding which conflicts deserve its attention. See 2VFDU6FKDFKWHU³7KH81/HJDO2UGHU
$Q 2YHUYLHZ´ LQ Christopher Joyner, ed., The United Nations and International Law, (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), at 16; and Koskenniemi, supra n.3, at 460-462. 
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 The uneven and selective nature of Chapter VII action by the UN has been highlighted by various 
scholars. )RUH[DPSOHVHH(OLKX/DXWHUSDFKW³)RUHZRUG´LQ0DUc Weller, ed., Regional Peacekeeping 
and International Enforcement: The Liberian Crisis, (Cambridge: CUP, 1994), at ix; and Koskenniemi, 
supra n.3, at 460-462. 
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increasingly portrayed as natural alternatives and guarantors of collective security and 
stability.68  
At this juncture, it is noted that the preservation of localised peace and security by 
regional collective security mechanisms is technically not antagonistic to the UN 
Charter.69 The (albeit subordinated) role of regional organisations is even stated in 
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, which acknowledges the maintenance of peace and 
security by such bodies as appropriate regional actions provided that they are 
consistent with UN principles and purposes.70 6WDWHV DUH HYHQ H[SHFWHG WR ³PDNH
every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional 
DUUDQJHPHQWV RU E\ VXFK UHJLRQDO DJHQFLHV´ EHIRUH DSSURDFKLQJ WKH 816&71 The 
µUHJLRQDOLVDWLRQRIFROOHFWLYHVHFXULW\¶WKXVUHIHUVWRDQGLVZLWQHVVHGLQWKHGHYROXWLRQ
of UN authority and power to regional organisations in accordance with Chapter VIII 
of the UN Charter.72  
Nevertheless, the push by regional organisations for greater autonomy in terms of collective 
security remains controversial because it challenges the pre-eminence of global solutions,73 and throws 
into question the validity of regional options. While Chapter VIII lies at the heart of all 
regional actions within the UN framework, some scholars posit that collective security 
efforts by regional organisations neither depends on nor revolves around it.74 
Intervention by a regional organisation may even be possible within the context of the 
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 Some regional organisations have even codified a right of intervention in their spheres of influence 
and may now intervene (without being specifically invited) in the inter-state and/or intra-state conflicts 
of their member States. For example, Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act confers the organisation 
with the right to intervene, while Article 11(2) of the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security 
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 Art 52(1), UN Charter.  
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 Art 52(2), UN Charter. 
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Sidhu, eds., The United Nations and Regional Security: Europe and Beyond (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2003), at 31. 
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and S NeiO0DF)DUODQHDQG7KRPDV:HLVV³5HJLRQDO2UJDQLVDWLRQVDQG5HJLRQDO6HFXULW\´Security 
Studies 2 (1992):6-37. 
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 While the ideal form of collective security encompasses every State, it does not mean that 
µQRQ-XQLYHUVDO¶ RU µFORVHG¶ UHJLRQDO RUJDQLVDWLRQV Fannot deal with local threats to, or 
breaches of, the peace. Abass argues that GHFHQWUDOLVHGFROOHFWLYHVHFXULW\PD\WKXVEH³Dnecessary 
GHYHORSPHQW´LQWKHSRVW-Cold War international order. Abass, supra n.57, at 181. 
117 
 
UN Charter if State consent is obtained,75 or there is an emergency situation 
emanating from a consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested violations of basic 
human rights.76 It is noteworthy that collective security is then not a concept created by the UN, 
and States had participated in and employed such systems before the UN was founded.77 In this vein, 
Abass contends that the primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security was conferred 
E\6WDWHVWRWKH816&ZKLFKLQFDUU\LQJRXWWKLVGXW\³DFWVRQWKHLUEHKDOI´78 If the UNSC fails to 
intervene or authorise a regional action, regional organisations may possibly act based on their 
constitutive documents.79Regional organisations are nevertheless unambiguously 
forbidden from taking enforcement action without UNSC authorisation.80 In response 
to Abass, Orakhelashvili points out that the AU legal framework does not affect the 
obligations under the UN Charter and should not be seen as an assertion of a right by 
the regional organisation to use force against States without UNSC authorisation.81 
Moreover, read in its entirety, the ECOWAS Protocol accepts that any enforcement 
action must then be premised on the necessity of obtaining UNSC authorisation.82 
Indeed, Ress notes that Article 53 of the UN Charter does not provide for other 
³OHJDOO\ SRVVLEOH HQIRUFHPHQW PHDVXUHV´ DSDUW IURP WKH SRZHU RI WKH 816& EXW
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 However, the invitation or consent by the government may only be considered as justification for 
military intervention when the government retains effective control over the country. Christian Walter, 
³6HFXULW\ &RXQFLO &RQWURO RYHU 5HJLRQDO $FWLRQ´ Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 1 
(1997): 129-163, at 154. 
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Abass, supra n.57, at 140. 
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Protocol similarly codifies the right of humanitarian intervention and the use of force to restore 
democratic governments. See Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union; and Article 
7(1)(e) of the AU Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council; Abass, 
supra n.65; Abass, supra n.58, at 178; and Abass, supra n.57, at 160. 
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 See Art 53(1), UN Charter. Allain notes that Articles 42 and 51 of the UN Charter are predicated on 
the control oI WKH816&DQG UHJLRQDODJHQFLHVDQGDUUDQJHPHQWV ³GRQRWHVFDSH WKDW FRQWURO´ -HDQ
$OODLQ³7KH7UXH&KDOOHQJHWRWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV6\VWHPRIWKH8VHRI)RUFH7KH)DLOXUHVRI.RVRYR
DQG ,UDT DQG WKH (PHUJHQFH RI WKH $IULFDQ 8QLRQ´ Max Planck United Nations Yearbook 8 
(2004):237-289, at 248-249. 
81
 Orakhelashvili, supra n.37, at 270. 
82
 Ibid, at 271. 
118 
 
LQVWHDG EURDGHQV ³WKH PRGDOLWLHV IRU WKH H[HFXWLRQ´ DYDLODEOH WR WKH 816& E\
including regional organisations.83 It is noteworthy that the NATO Treaty 
DFNQRZOHGJHV³WKHSULPDU\UHVSRQVLELOLW\RIWKH6HFXULW\&Runcil for the maintenance 
RILQWHUQDWLRQDOSHDFHDQGVHFXULW\´84 while OAS members also pledge not to resort to 
the threat or the use of force in any way inconsistent with UN Charter provisions.85 
The subordinate role of regional arrangements is further emphasised by Article 54 of 
the UN Charter, which requires the UNSC to at all times be kept fully informed of 
activities undertaken or in contemplation by regional organisations for the 
maintenance of peace and security.86 McCoubrey and Morris therefore stress that 
UHJLRQDORUJDQLVDWLRQVKDYHDQ³XQHTXLYRFDOO\VXERUGLQDWHUROH´XQGHU&KDSWHU9,,,RI
the UN Charter, and UHPDLQDV³GHOHJDWHVUDWKHUWKDQ81-DOWHUQDWLYHV´87 
On that note, it is important to understand that the collective security system 
encased in the UN Charter provides for the pacific settlement of situations that 
endanger peace and security (Chapter VI), as well as action with respect to threats to 
the peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression (Chapter VII).88 Actionable 
collective security can then be classified into three groups of activities: (1) conflict 
prevention through deterrence, diplomacy, or mechanisms for pacific settlement; (2) 
peace-building and peacekeeping;89 or (3) enforcement of a collective mandate to the 
belligerents.90 Collective security is however often conflated with the maintenance or 
restoration of peace and security through the use of military action (Articles 42 and 
53). It should be recognised that enforcement action, which typically refers to reactive military measures 
to restore and keep the peace, is just one facet of collective security. Indeed, collective security consists of 
both proactive and reactive dimensions, and need not include the use of force to ensure or preserve peace 
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90
 -RVHSK/HSJROG³5HJLRQDOLVPLQWKH3RVW-&ROG:DU(UD´LQ'LHKOsupra n.5, at 10. 
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and security. While collective security does encompass a military response, it is not interchangeable with 
enforcement action.91  
This distinction is crucial for our discussion on ICrimJ mechanisms for two reasons. Firstly, 
ICrimJ institutions or arrangements that are designed to help maintain or restore of 
local peace and security are undoubtedly non-military measures concordant with UN 
Charter objectives. This is illustrated by the UNSC decision to establish ad hoc 
international criminal tribunals under Article 41 of the UN Charter to deal with intra-
State ethnic conflicts.92 Secondly, by distinguishing non-military measures from muscular 
enforcement actions under decentralised collective security, the debate on the legal concerns and 
validity of self-authorised military interventions by regional organisations can be avoided.93 Indeed, 
Gray points out that debate on the legality of independent regional action has 
essentially centred on the compatibility of military measures with the UN Charter and 
with general international law.94  
The key question is then whether the regionalisation of ICrimJ will entail the use of force to 
prevent, halt and punish international crimes. As applying non-military measures to ensure peace and 
stability is not the domaine réservé of universal institutions, independent regional responses, including 
establishing ad hoc regional criminal tribunals, become less problematic and less likely to be 
denounced as unlawful. It is noteworthy that the AU has decided that the case against 
Hissène Habré fell within its competence based on a report of the Committee of 
Eminent African Jurists.95 The AU preference to obviate international prosecutions 
and enforce ICL regionally is further made clear by the decision to expand the 
mandate of the African Court of Human DQG 3HRSOHV¶ Rights (AfCHPR) to try 
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 Many differences exist between decentralised collective security and decentralised enforcement 
action, which are of practical significance and have serious legal implications. Abass, supra n.57, at 
112 and 157. 
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international crimes.96 Problems may however be created if the AfCHPR completely 
disregards the ICC and the potential overlaps between the two judicial bodies are 
ignored. Such difficulties will be further magnified if the international and regional 
initiatives have distinct mandates with different aims, and States are then faced with 
conflicting legal obligations to various political and judicial institutions. Hence, it 
would be imprudent for any proposed regional ICrimJ mechanism to adopt a mandate 
that is vastly different from the ICC. Based on the experience of collective security,97 
a lesson for the Court is that the parameters of the relationship with the regional 
organisation need to be well defined and well coordinated. In terms of the distribution 
of powers and responsibilities between the UN and regional organisations for the 
maintenance of peace and security, principles like µVXEVLGLDULW\¶µEXUGHQ-VKDULQJ¶DQG
µEXUGHQ-VKLIWLQJ¶KDYHEHHQFRPPRQO\XVHG98 Under such a framework, a reshaping 
of legal understanding is not required as UHJLRQDO DFWLRQ LV WKHQ ³QR more than a 
reactivation of an important potential which was inherent in the UN system ab 
initio´99 Although this may be taken to signal a hierarchy amongst multilateral 
organisations that are universal and regional, it need not be the case regarding 
jurisdiction over international crimes. Under the ne bis in idem regime of the ICC,100 
convictions and acquittals by the ICC preclude an individual being tried by another 
court for the same international crime (Article 20(2)), while individuals tried by 
another court for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes will similarly not 
be tried by the ICC with respect to the same conduct (Article 20(3)).101 It is then 
crucial to note WKDWWHUPXVHGLV³DQRWKHUFRXUW´DQGWKHUHDUHQRIXUWKHUUHIHUHQFHVWR
indicate that regional courts are excluded. Indeed, Article 17(1)(c) simply states that 
the ICC shall determine that a case is inadmissible where the individual concerned 
³KDVDOUHDG\EHHQWULHGIRUFRQGXFWZKLFKLVWKHVXEMHFWRIWKHFRPSODLQW´DQGDWULDO
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by the ICC is not permitted under Article 20(3).102 This not only opens the door for 
the participation of regional courts, but also paves the way for an equal relationship 
between the ICC and a regional counterpart based on a congruent and cooperative 
division of work.103  
In sum, certain minimum common positions on ICL, such as on the definition 
of international crimes, must be adopted to ensure that international and regional 
approaches for ICL are mutually complementary and that the total effort of the 
international community for upholding ICrimJ is optimised. While it is clear that 
regional organisations like ASEAN will depend on the authorisation of the UN to 
undertake enforcement actions within the context of collective security, it should 
however not be limited in terms of adopting non-military measures to prevent, halt and 
punish international crimes.  
If regional ICrimJ solutions are then to be considered within the framework of actionable 
collective security by ASEAN, they will probably be most synonymous with non-enforcement 
peacekeeping efforts.104 Firstly, both sets of action require the (perceived) impartiality of external 
parties and acquiescence of the receiving State(s).105 Indeed, it must be remembered that 
witnesses to and evidence of an international crime are difficult to secure if 
prosecutors are denied access by the State concerned, let alone custody of the alleged 
perpetrator(s).106 Such permission and support from the State concerned is akin to the 
fundamental consent for foreign peacekeepers to be deployed within its borders. 
Secondly, both undertakings promote transitional justice, leading to post-conflict reconciliation, 
reconstruction and rehabilitation of the affected societies.107 Thirdly, these measures actually require 
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regional organisations and member States to contribute materially and financially to resolve a situation 
that threatens local peace and security. More importantly, they require the doctrine of non-intervention 
to be set aside (or waived beforehand in a multilateral treaty).108 The ability of third-party 
States to intervene in the face of large-scale human rights abuse and atrocities may 
then possibly serve as a credible deterrent to international crimes.109 Given their 
similarities within the ASEAN collective security structure, the next section therefore examines 
the practical benefits, barriers and hazards of regional peacekeeping operations for any useful insights 
for developing regional approaches to upholding ICrimJ.110  
 
3.1.1.1 Regional Peacekeeping Operations 
The experience of regional peace support efforts indicate that regional organisations 
do not only play a resource role, but also offer much in terms of confidence building 
amongst member States and the maintenance of regional stability.111 Moreover, 
EHVLGHVWKHDGYDQWDJHRISUR[LPLW\WKH\KDYHIDPLOLDULW\DQGµORFDONQRZOHGJH¶DERXW
the conflict and its underlying issues and problems, which are critical to the success of 
any peace support process and operation.112 In this connection, other advantages of a 
localised solution include better placement to detect early signs of conflict and react 
quicker,113 DVZHOODVDYHUWLQJµSDUDFKXWLQJ¶PHWKRGVDQGPRGHOVIURPRWKHUSDUWVRI
the world that would be inappropriate for local conditions.114 Last but not least, 
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regional organisations are more likely to remain focused and committed to the long-
term tasks of post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation.  
In this vein, ASEAN and its member States have intervened or been called 
upon to do so in various regional crises. For example, during the collapse of peace and 
security in East Timor, Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas stated that ASEAN 
FRXQWULHVZHUH³XQLTXHO\SODFHG´WRVHUYHLQWKHSURSRVHGLQWHUQDWLRQDOSHDFHNHeping 
IRUFH³DVWKH\PRUHWKDQDQ\RWKHUFRXQWULHVXQGHUVWRRGWKHUHJLRQDOFKDUDFWHULVWLFV
GLPHQVLRQV DQG VHQVLWLYLWLHV RI WKH SUREOHP´115 In 2003, ASEAN departed from its 
non-intervention principle following the detention of Aung San Suu Kyi under house 
arrest by the military junta in Myanmar.116 It even implicitly threatened that 
0\DQPDU¶V PHPEHUVKLS FRXOG EH VXVSHQGHG XQGHU WKH $6($1 &KDUWHU WKDW ZDV
being developed.117 
The appeal of a regional approach is undeniable in the combined presence of 
sustained political will backed by familiarity with the problem coupled with suitable 
lasting solutions, credible organisational infrastructure and appropriate mandates,118 as 
well as adequate funding and resources. It is however recognised that such an ideal 
confluence of robust capabilities does not always exist in reality. Moreover, the 
structure, mandate and constitutional framework of various regional bodies will differ, 
as will their organisational character, ethos and goals.119 Differences will then be 
further exacerbated in practice by their disparate material capacities and operational 
capabilities.120 Undoubtedly, not all regional organisations will have the adequate 
financial resources, or the necessary manpower and expertise, to address the myriad of 
potential problems both quickly and for a sustained period. Not only may regional 
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organisations lack the capacity for sustained operations and need international 
assistance, but some problems may also not be resolvable at the regional level and 
require the greater authority of the international community.121 These are all issues 
that may prove identical and relevant for the regionalisation of ICrimJ. 
On the other hand, while a well-resourced and well-run regional organisation 
may effectively respond to international (or regional) crimes, it is questionable how 
much a regional initiative can remain impartial and not take sides in a particular 
dispute, let alone prop up the government concerned.122 This is especially a concern in 
Southeast ASEAN, where the interpersonal relationships between political leaders are 
important. Separately, problems can arise when autonomous localised arrangements 
ZLWK XQEULGOHG SRZHUV ³FODLP LQWHUQDWLRQDO OHJLWLPDF\ DQG DSSURYDO IRU IRUFHIXO
DFWLRQVWKDWZHUHQRWLQIDFWHQYLVDJHG´E\WKHLQWHUQDWional community.123 That said, 
the unlikelihood of complete abdication and unconditional devolution by States of 
either collective security or ICrimJ function to self-authorising regional organisations 
should assuage the fear and peril of subverting the existence of international 
organisations like the UN and ICC.124 
Separately, as there may be multiple responses to an international (or regional) 
crime, better cooperation and coordination will also be needed.125 If regional solutions 
are to be accepted as alternative routes for ICL, burden sharing in the practice of ICL, as well 
as integration/coordination of actors under clear achievable goals may prove a prudent approach 
for the regionalisation of ICrimJ. Instead of being an independent solution for 
maintaining or restoring stability, regional alternatives are better understood as an 
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extension of, yet not technically subordinate to,126 the capabilities of the international 
community.127 In this regard, given that regional regimes have played a significant 
role in upholding and protecting human rights, this interrelated field of international 
law can undoubtedly offer further lessons for the regionalisation of ICrimJ.  
 
3.2 Advancing Human Rights in Southeast Asia 
 
In response to the 1993 United Nations World Conference on Human Rights in 
Vienna,128 the ASEAN Foreign Ministers issued a Joint Communique at the 26th 
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting declaring support for the Vienna Declaration and 
3URJUDPPH RI $FWLRQ DQG DJUHHG WKDW ³$6($1 VKRXOG DOVR FRQVLGHU WKH
establishment of an DSSURSULDWH UHJLRQDO PHFKDQLVP RQ KXPDQ ULJKWV´129 Scholars 
generally consider this to be the official start of the ASEAN process towards a 
regional human rights body.130 Major developments on an ASEAN human rights body 
then coincided with the creation of the ASEAN Charter. The Eminent Persons Group 
(EPG) tasked with drafting the Charter acknowledged the value of a regional human 
rights mechanism, and its recommendations were endorsed by the ASEAN Heads of 
State/Government.131 The ASEAN Charter, with an Article mandating the creation of 
an ASEAN human rights body, was adopted at the 13th ASEAN Summit in November 
2007. The AICHR was subsequently established, and its Terms of Reference (TOR) 
was then adopted later at the 42nd ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in 2009.132 
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The TOR has since been criticised for only giving the AICHR an advisory role 
to member States with no enforcement powers.133 Nevertheless, Kelsall points out that 
the AICHR has the potential to not only define the parameters of discussions, but also 
to issue statements and findings that may prove to be important triggers for further 
discussion on human rights and catalysts for reform.134 It may then also serve as a 
forum for civil society groups and human rights advocates to lobby and voice their 
concerns. Such an evolutionary approach is probably the most effective path to 
develop human rights norms and standards in Southeast Asia. The fact that all ten 
ASEAN governments committed to integrate human rights into their shared agenda, 
and agreed to create a human rigKWVERG\ZLWK³RYHUDUFKLQJ´SRZHUV WRSURWHFWDQG
promote human rights within the region is indeed already remarkable. It could be 
prudent to adopt a similar approach for the regionalisation of ICrimJ. 
That said, it is noteworthy that while Article 2(i) of the ASEAN Charter 
FUHDWHVDELQGLQJREOLJDWLRQIRUPHPEHU6WDWHVWR³UHVSHFWIRUIXQGDPHQWDOIUHHGRPV
the promotion and protection of human rights, and the promotion and protection of 
VRFLDO MXVWLFH´ DQG $UWLFOH  VWLSXODWHV WKDW ³$6($1 VKDOO HVWDEOLVK an ASEAN 
KXPDQ ULJKWV ERG\ $UWLFOH H VWLOO VWUHVVHV WKH ³QRQ-interference in the internal 
DIIDLUV RI $6($1 0HPEHU 6WDWHV´135 Important for our discussion is also the 
acknowledgement that Southeast Asian countries were incentivised to establish their 
own regional human rights mechanism suited to local contexts and sensitivities. 
Although the Southeast Asian countries reaffirmed their support for the 1948 UDHR, 
it is noteworthy that the ASEAN leaders had met prior to the Vienna conference to 
discuss their doubts and concerns about the universality of human rights norms and 
standards.136  Of specific concern was the priority placed by the universalist camp on 
civil and political rights over economic and social rights, in particular that the pursuit 
of personal IUHHGRPV ZDV RI JUHDWHU LPSRUWDQFH WKDQ VRFLHW\¶V VWDELOLW\ DQG
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prosperity.137 7KLV VSDUNHG RII WKH µ$VLDQ YDOXHV¶ GHEDWH ZKLFK ZDV SURPRWHG E\
political figures from the region to deflect international criticism and pressure on 
democracy and human rights practices.138 It centred on the contention that social 
harmony took priority over individual rights in Asia.139 As human rights were seen to 
be culturally specific,140 the argument was that its language and regional 
implementation must be tailored to suit local contexts and sensitivities.141 
From the ASEAN human rights journey, it is clear that cardinal ASEAN 
norms like sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of member States 
remain strong.142 A practical lesson for the regionalisation of ICrimJ in Southeast Asia 
is then that small incremental gains, especially in shifting normative positions, must 
not be trivialised or dismissed as irrelevant. It is also instructive that ASEAN leaders 
met before the Vienna conference to formulate a common regional position, which 
rejected the universalist position. Building on the discussion in the previous section, 
an inherent question is then whether ASEAN must operate in sync with the ICC or 
may adopt its own mandate. A crucial lesson to glean from the implementation of 
human rights will then be how to ensure that the regional initiative complements 
rather than duplicates, or worse goes against, international efforts within the region. 
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3.2.1  Lessons from the Regional Implementation of Human Rights 
 
Arguments that human values and rights vary because of culture have existed since 
the inception of universal human rights.143 Anthropologists and non-Western 
governments have argued that cultural relativism144 legitimises variations in human 
rights between different regions and countries.145  That said, it is important to 
distinguish between the nature of human rights and international human rights law.146 
Whether human rights are morally universal or relative, it is ultimately due to concrete 
obligations in conventions, treaties or customary international law that they have 
binding force. Hence, it would be wrong to jump to the conclusion that there is or 
must be uniformity of human rights laws amongst States. Despite the expanding 
network and scope of human rights conventions, coupled with the greater acceptance 
of the jus cogens status of some rights, the reality is that human rights norms are 
broad, vague and imprecisely defined. Uniform interpretation and implementation of 
human rights treaties is near impossible, let alone universal acceptance. 
It must also be appreciated that the international human rights legal framework 
is concerned with and has developed rules that balance human rights interests with 
requirements of society. Being an international approach, it is attuned to developments 
in international law and international society in general,147 and interpreted according 
to the current standards and circumstances of each individual State and region.  States 
are thus often able to freely interpret their concrete obligations due to the flexibility 
and ambiguity found within much of human rights law. This point is illustrated by the 
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International Law: Legal and Policy Issues, ed. Theodor Meron (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 70. 
147
 5REHUW 0F&RUTXRGDOH ³6HOI 'HWHUPLQDWLRQ $ +XPDQ 5LJKWV $SSURDFK´ International 
Comparative Law Quarterly 43 (1994):857-885, at 871. 
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crime of genocide, which is not just part of customary international law,148 but also 
covered by the first major human rights treaty. Under the 1948 Convention of the 
Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, the definition of genocide149  is not only 
limiting because it refers to a restricted list (Art.II) that excludes political, economic 
or social groups,150 but also ambiguous as there are difficulties defining terms even 
ZLWKLQ WKH OLVWHG JURXSV OLNH µHWKQLFDO¶151 Furthermore, the exact scope of the 
prohibitions remains unclear since the intent requirement is difficult to prove and 
satisfy.152 $OWKRXJKµLQWHQWWRGHVWUR\¶GRHVQRWPHDQWKHFRPSOHWHDQQLKLODWLRQRIthe 
group, there is also no settled view as to how large a number it has to be.153  
Given the flexibility and ambiguity found within much of human rights law, 
while universality of human rights operates at a high level of abstraction, uniformity is 
seldom achieved at the level of interpretation, let alone enforcement. This relativity is 
compounded by the wide range of defensible implementations of those obligations, 
and the fact that implementation and enforcement of particular rights are dependent on 
                                          
148
 In the Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
&DVH WKH ,&- UXOHG WKDW ³SULQFLSOHV XQGHUO\LQJ WKH >JHQRFLGH@ &RQYHQWLRQ DUH SULQFLSOHV ZKLFK DUH
recognised by civilized nations as binding on states, even without conventional obligatioQV´7KH,&-
has also recognised them as erga omnes and suggested that prohibitions on the international crime of 
genocide form jus cogens. See ICJ Rep. 1951, p.15, at p.23. 
149
 Under the Convention, genocide is defined as the commission of one of several acts listed (a) 
WKURXJKH³ZLWKDQLQWHQWWRGHVWUR\LQZKROHRULQSDUWDQDWLRQDOHWKQLFDOUDFLDORUUHOLJLRXVJURXS´
(Art II), and is a crime regardless of whether it is committed in times of peace or war (Art I). See 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948).   
150
 Several countries argued against the inclusion of such groups when the Genocide Convention was 
being drafted in 1948 because they were deemed to be too vague, as well as temporary and unstable. 
Some were concerned that the inclusion of political groups would allow the UN to interfere in the 
internal affairs of sovereign States. See Ervin Staub, The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and 
Other Group Violence. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), at p.8. 
151
 7KH ,&75 VWDWHG WKDW ³WKH FRQFHSWV RI QDWLRQDO HWKQLFDO UDFLDO DQG UHOLJLRXV JURXSV KDYH EHHQ
researched extensively and that, at present, there are no generally and internationally accepted precise 
GHILQLWLRQVWKHUHRI´ZKLOHWKH,&7<KHOGWKDW³WRDWWHPSWWRGHILQHDQDWLRQDOHWKQLFDORUUDFLDOJURXS
WRGD\ XVLQJ REMHFWLYH DQG VFLHQWLILFDOO\ LUUHSURDFKDEOH FULWHULD ZRXOG EH D SHULORXV H[HUFLVH´ See 
Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment and Sentence, 6 December 1999, at 
para.55; Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-I, Judgment and Sentence, 27 January 2000, at 
para,161; and 3URVHFXWRUY-HOLVLü, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, 14 December 1999, at para.70. 
152
 Despite wider definitions in other human rights instruments, state practice supports the proposition 
WKDW WKH&RQYHQWLRQ¶V OLPLWLQJDQGDPELJXRXVGHILQLWLRQ LVFXVWRPSee Steven Ratner, Jason Abrams 
and James Bischoff, Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law, 3rd ed. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), at 42-44. 
153
 The 1985 Genocide Study only notes that it implied a reasonably significant number relative to the 
whole group, or a significant section of a group such as its leadership. ICTY case law elaborates that for 
JHQRFLGH WR H[LVW WKH SHUSHWUDWRUV PXVW VHHN WR GHVWUR\ DOO RU SDUW RI ³D SDUWLFXODU NLQG RI KXPDQ
JURXS´ 6HH Revised and Updated Report on the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide prepared by Mr B Whitaker, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub2/1985/6, 2 July 1985, at para.29; 
Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33, Trial Chamber, Judgement, 2 August 2001, at para.550; and 
Prosecutor v. Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24/1-T, Trial Chamber, Judgement, 31 July 2003, at para.521. 
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sovereign States.154 It is evidenced by the way the universal human rights concept has 
been expanded and expressed in strikingly different structures, content and levels of 
development in the various regional systems.155 The Americas, Europe, and Africa 
each has a human rights regime for its region,156 with differing priorities (evidenced 
most clearly by the North-South divide), as well as distinct mechanisms and terms of 
references (including various margins of appreciation) ± in order to ensure the 
acceptance and compliance of State Parties. 
Regional human rights mechanisms are however not without their detractors, 
and various arguments were made against their establishment during the nascent 
stages of the international human rights regime. First, it was opined that human rights 
should be defined in global instruments and implemented by international institutions 
as they are universal in nature and belong to everyone. Second, concern existed that 
the development of regional arrangements may cause fragmentation and divert focus 
away from international instruments.157 In this vein, there was fear that regional 
bodies would duplicate existing international efforts, or might create policies and 
procedures that contradict those of the UN thereby adversely affecting its work. The 
risk was that such human rights mechanism would insulate the region from external 
influences and promote indifference towards the standards and institutions of the 
international system. Separately, competition or conflict between different regional or 
sub-regional institutions could also erupt.158 
                                          
154
 Even though several rights in the International Human Rights Covenants involve specifications at 
the level of form, uniform implementation is impossible. For example, Article 10(2)(b) of the ICCPR 
requires the segregation of juvenile defendants. In some cultures, however, the very notion of a juvenile 
criminal defendant (or a penitentiary system) does not exist. Donnelly, supra n.36, at 97. 
155
 Regional human rights systems generally involve a few States that are in close geographic 
proximity, and consist of: (1) a list or lists of internationally-guaranteed human rights; (2) permanent 
institutions; and (3) compliance or enforcement procedures. Dinah SheltRQ³7KH3URPLVHRI5HJLRQDO
+XPDQ5LJKWV6\VWHPV´LQ5LFKDUG3LHUUH&ODXGHDQG%XUQV:HVWRQHGVHuman Rights in the World 
Community ± Issues and Action, 3rd ed. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), at 355. 
156
 Besides these major regional human rights systems, there is also a dormant Arab system and a 
nascent ASEAN mechanism. While some parts of the Arab Charter of Human Rights are inconsistent 
with international standards and it is unclear that the Arab Committee of Human Rights is sufficiently 
independent, the adopting of the Charter in 2004 and creation of the Committee in 2009 are themselves 
important steps forward. 
157
 Before the ICCPR and ICESCR were adopted in 1966, regionalising human rights was unpopular at 
WKH81DVWKHUHZDV³D tendency to regard it as the expression of a breakaway movement, calling the 
XQLYHUVDOLW\ RI KXPDQ ULJKWV LQWR TXHVWLRQ´ .DUHO 9DVDN The International Dimensions of Human 
Rights, Vol.2 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982), at 451. See brief discussion in Chapter 2 on the 
concern of the fragmentation of international law. 
158
 6HH ³5HJLRQDO 3URPRWLRQ DQG 3URWHFWLRQ RI +XPDQ 5LJKWV´ Twenty-Eighth Report of the 
Commission to Study the Organization of Peace (1980), at 15. 
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Over the decades since the UN human rights system was created, reticence 
against regional regimes has however receded partly due to problems achieving 
political consensus at the international level and the successful models in Europe and 
the Americas.159 Furthermore, it has been shown that fears about regional systems are 
largely unfounded, and that regional divergence of views is not necessarily bad nor 
does it portend the demise of the universality of human rights.160 On the contrary, both 
international and regional approaches have proven useful and complementary in 
promoting and protecting human rights because legitimate positive law gives rise to 
universal duties and obligations.161 As regional systems have elements of uniformity 
and diversity in their origins, they provide a credible framework to think universally in 
terms of normative concepts but act locally in terms of implementation and 
enforcement.162 Indeed, regional codes reinforce global human rights norms while 
addressing the particular problems in each region and accommodating the cultural, 
economic and political homogeneity of individual regions.163  
Regional arrangements also add in important ways to the knowledge derived 
from the UN and related conventions regarding possible avenues toward the 
protection and promotion of human rights.164 For example, while the international 
system elucidated the minimum normative standard, regional mechanisms then took 
into account unique differences both between and within regions and went further by 
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 In 1977, the UN General Assembly acknowOHGJHG ³WKH LPSRUWDQFH RI HQFRXUDJLQJ UHJLRQDO
FRRSHUDWLRQ IRU WKH SURPRWLRQ DQG SURWHFWLRQ RI KXPDQ ULJKWV DQG IUHHGRPV´ DQG UHTXHVWHG WKH
Secretary-*HQHUDOWRRUJDQLVH³VHPLQDUVIRUWKHSXUSRVHRIGLVFXVVLQJWKHXVHIXOQHVVDQGDGYLVDELOLW\RI
the establLVKPHQWRIUHJLRQDOFRPPLVVLRQ´LQUHJLRQVZKHUHQRQHH[LVWHGSee UN General Assembly 
resolution 32/127, Regional Arrangements for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, UN 
Doc.A/RES/32/127, 16 December 1977. 
160
 Shelton points out that regional systems have added new rights in a feedback process of mutual 
LQVSLUDWLRQEXW³LQQRFDVHKDVDULJKWEHHQOLPLWHGRUZLWKGUDZQE\DODWHULQVWUXPHQW´Shelton, supra 
n.155, at 360. 
161
 An EU report even asserts that regional human rights protection mechanisms ³FRQVWLWXWH WKHPDLQ
SLOODUV RI WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO V\VWHP IRU WKH SURPRWLRQ DQG SURWHFWLRQ RI KXPDQ ULJKWV´ 3ROLF\
Department Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, The Role of Regional Human 
Rights Mechanisms (Brussels: European Parliament, 2010), at 5.   
162
 Regional systems have several advantages: (1) agreement on issues is more likely as States within 
regions may be relatively homogenous; (2) neighbouring States are more likely to comply with the 
agreed rights to avoid political repercussions; (3) fewer States are involved and achieving consensus is 
in theory more likely; and (4) regional systems are by definition more accessible as they are located in 
the same geographical area as the States concerned. 5KRQD6PLWK³5HJLRQDO6\VWHPV$Q2YHUYLHZ´
in Rhona Smith and Christien van den Anker, eds., Human Rights (London: Hodder Arnold, 2005), at 
307. 
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 'RQQHOO\FRQWHQGVWKDW³XQLYHUVDOKXPDQULJKWVGRQRWUHTXLUHLGHQWLFDOKXPDQULJKWVSUDFWLFHV´DQG
WKDW ³VXEVWDQWLDO VHFRQG-order variations, by country, region, or other grouping, are fully compatible 
ZLWKWKHUHODWLYHXQLYHUVDOLW\RILQWHUQDWLRQDOO\UHFRJQLVHGKXPDQULJKWV´'RQQHOO\supra n.36, at 49. 
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 Henry Steiner and Philip Alston, International Human Rights in Context, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), at 779. 
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refining some of the rights and/or adding further rights.165 It is noteworthy that the 
UNGA actively encouraged regional mechanisms, and even appealed to States in 
DUHDVZLWKRXWVXFKDUUDQJHPHQWVWRFUHDWH³ZLWKLQWKHLUUHVSHFWLYHUHJLons of suitable 
UHJLRQDO PDFKLQHU\ IRU WKH SURPRWLRQ DQG SURWHFWLRQ RI KXPDQ ULJKWV´166 The UN 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has also emphasised 
the importance of regional mechanisms.167 A key reason has been that the transfer of 
expert knowledge, exchange of experience, and sharing of best practices between UN 
and regional organisations can bring tangible benefits to both sets of entities.168 
Furthermore, cooperation with regional mechanisms can be crucial to following up on 
UN recommendations and decisions.169 Regional arrangements thus advance the 
protection and promotion of human rights by increasing both awareness of the issues 
within the region through the embedding of local context, as well as State willingness 
to implement proposals if regional findings and reports support the suggestions 
contained in UN mission reports.  
The ostensible dichotomy between universalism and relativism in human 
rights would therefore have been satisfactorily reconciled and resolved on a functional 
basis. Indeed, regional mechanisms reflect the norms set out in international 
declarations and conventions, and cross-reference with normative instruments and 
jurisprudence of other systems.170 This indicates that analogous concerns about the 
regionalisation of ICrimJ can be tackled. Given similarities in both their underlying 
universality and practical challenges, the regional approach to international human 
rights law clearly proffers a judicious archetype for the regionalisation of ICrimJ. 
Despite the theoretical universality and consensus at the conceptual level regarding 
ICrimJ, it is conceivable that there could be different justifiable interpretations by 
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 $Q(8UHSRUWQRWHVWKDW³UHJLRQDOKXPDQULJKWVVWDQGDUGVFRPSOHPHQWLQWHUQDWLRQDORQHVE\SXWWLQJ
WKHP LQ D ORFDO FRQWH[W´ DQG DQ HIIHFWLYH UHJLRQDO PHFKDQLVP LV FUXFLDO IRU FRPSUHKHQVLYH KXPDQ
rights promotion and protection. See The Role of Regional Human Rights Mechanisms, supra n.161, at 
6.   
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 See UNGA resolution 32/127, supra n.159.  
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 OHCHR has not only provided assistance for existing regional systems to improve their protection 
mechanisms, but also supported initiatives to establish systems in regions where none exist. 
168
 Similarly, inter-regional collaboration can lead to benefits for the international system and regional 
regimes, as the cooperation and exchange of information may further develop regional protection of 
human rights. 
169
 Cooperation between UN treaty bodies and regional mechanisms however often remains at a case-
by-case and technical level. Increased cooperation and better coordination on a regular and institutional 
basis would lower the risk of thematic overlaps, and alleviate pressure from limited capacities and 
overstretched resources. 
170
 Shelton notes that virtually all the legal instruments creating the various regional systems refer to the 
UN Charter and UDHR, and provide a measure of uniformity and reinforcement of the universal 
character of the UDHR. Shelton, supra n.155, at 359. 
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States on international crimes,171 or at least variations in regional priorities and 
focus.172  
Since cultural relativism and regional regimes have not led to the demise of the 
universality of human rights, but in fact play a role in advancing the international 
system, regional regimes may also be a useful way to approach the promotion of 
ICrimJ norms and varied enforcement of ICL. For example, due to the difficulties in 
developing a universally accepted system of human rights, a major way forward has 
then been to accept some degree of relativism through regional machinery that contain 
different guarantees and emphases, while working in tandem with the international 
system. Such regional initiatives include: (1) full-time regional human rights courts; 
(2) complaint mechanisms for judicial and quasi-judicial redress; and (3) systems and 
procedures facilitating on-site visits to study the human rights situations.173 Similar 
mechanisms may prove applicable in different regional settings for promoting ICrimJ 
and enforcing ICL.174 
Two cautionary lessons can however also be gleaned from the experience of 
regional human rights mechanisms. Firstly, while they can positively influence and 
mutually reinforce the message of other regional institutions, divergent jurisprudence 
may dilute the human rights protection and risk creating conflicting State obligations. 
That said, this may be more a problem if institutional proliferation and divergence 
exists within a region, rather than at the international level or between different 
regions. Secondly, care must be taken for regional bodies not to become victims of 
their own success, particularly in terms of increasing caseloads without commensurate 
expansion of resources.175 A possible solution is then to emphasise regional protection 
and enforcement mechanisms within the international agenda ± whereby 
institutionalised collaboration is encouraged between the universal and regional 
mechanisms, and cooperation concurrently strengthened at the inter-regional level. 
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 Domestic courts are thus as much creators as they are enforcers of international law. Anthea 
5REHUWV ³&RPSDUDWLYH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ" 7KH 5ROH RI 1DWLRQDO &RXrts in Creating and Enforcing 
,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ´,QWHUQDWLRQDODQG&RPSDUDWLYH/DZ4XDUWHUO\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 Institutional procedures and powers would also differ between regions. The scope, authority and 
procedures of regional human rights systems may in fact then diverge more than the conceptual rights 
being protected. 
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 Shelton, supra n.155, at 363-4. 
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 See discussion in Chapter 4 on possible regional ICrimJ mechanisms for Southeast Asia. 
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 For example, the European Court of Human Rights has a huge backlog of cases. While there has 
been some success in reducing the backlog of cases that are clearly inadmissible from over 100,000 in 
September 2011 to 38,200 in October 2013, the total number of pending cases still remains high at 
111,350. Registrar of the Court, Reform of the Court: Filtering of cases successful in reducing backlog, 
Press Release, ECHR 312 (2013), 24 October 2013. 
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This could facilitate exchanges with the international systems and improves 
coordination amongst regional systems, and lessens unnecessary duplication of efforts 
and potential conflicts. Encouraging collaboration between international and regional 
mechanisms could also make support available for capacity building initiatives and 
help develop common functional and procedural aspects of regional systems. 
In sum, regional regimes have played a significant role in upholding and 
protecting human rights, and there are obvious lessons for the regionalisation of 
ICrimJ. Besides specific advantages and disadvantages of regional action, it is also 
clearly important to consider how the operational relationship for enforcing ICL is 
structured between the international, regional, and domestic levels. The allocation of 
authority and jurisdiction in a system comprising of an international court, regional 
mechanisms, and sovereign States must be clear to avoid inefficiencies and 
duplication of efforts.176 Various practical issues must be considered, including the 
previously highlighted issues of the complementarity regime of the ICC, double 
jeopardy, and exhaustion (or illusory nature/unavailability) of local remedies. In this 
regard, an elastic concept like subsidiarity may prove useful in terms of the 
distribution of duties and powers between the ICC and regional mechanisms,177 as it 
FDQOHJLWLPLVH³ERWKthe expansion and restriction of authority by linking governance 
WRWKHLVVXHRIFRPSHWHQFLHV´178 Two different forms of decentralised control in such 
a tiered system of responsibilities may then be adopted. The first is burden-sharing, 
which revolves around the exchange of resources among authorities to develop a 
³FRRSHUDWLYHDQGFRPSOHPHQWDU\GLYLVLRQRIODERXU´EHWZHHQYDULRXVVWDNHKROGHUVWR
realise shared objectives.179 2Q WKH RWKHU KDQG EXUGHQ VKLIWLQJ LV DQ ³DEURJDWLRQ RI
JOREDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\´WKDWGHvolves responsibility without considering the capacity of 
the affected region or States to respond effectively.180 As surmised in the earlier 
discussion on collective security, burden-sharing may offer a prudent approach for the 
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 There should also be clarity in the process of obtaining State consent, and who can make a report or 
referral (affected States, any State, regional organisation, UN Security Council, or individuals).  
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 Subsidiarity implies the allocation of power LQ ³D WLHUHG JRYHUQDQFH V\VWHP´ WKDW favours 
decentralised control. It connotes the exchange of resources between parties to achieve shared 
goals and the delegation of authority to act by a superior organ to an inferior one. See O'Brien, 
supra n.98, at 57. 
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 .QLJKWDGGV WKDW LW JLYHV WKRVHDIIHFWHG ³DYRLFH LQEXLOGLQJ WKRVHDUUDQJHPHQWV WKDWFRQWURO WKHLU
GDLO\OLYHV´WKXVHQVXULQJ that they are not alienated from the initiatives meant to aid them. W. Andy 
.QLJKW³7RZDUGVD6XEVLGLDULW\0RGHOIRU3HDFHPDNLQJDQG3UHYHQWLYH'LSORPDF\0DNLQJ&KDSWHU
9,,,RIWKH81&KDUWHU2SHUDWLRQDO´Third World Quarterly 17 (1996):31-52, at 49. 
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 O'Brien, supra n.98, at 58. 
180
 Ibid, at 59. 
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regionalisation of ICrimJ, as well as to consolidate and strengthen cooperation on ICL 
between international, regional and State actors. 
 
3.3 Conclusion 
 
While the norms of ICrimJ are relatively clear and there is theoretical universality and 
consensus concerning ICrimJ at the conceptual level, there remains an element of 
choice regarding the possible approaches to advance ICL and the mechanisms to 
enforce it. In this vein, regional cultural differences offer a defensible base for 
differing interpretations and hierarchies of ICL at the substantive level. Such regional 
divergence on substantive law and enforcement may not be bad or harmful to the 
universality of the normative concept. Rather, it can help advance the international 
system through the reinforcement of universal duties and obligations. 
Regional initiatives on ICrimJ amongst a group of States that are in close 
geographic proximity may include: (1) a list or lists of internationally and regionally 
prohibited act; (2) permanent institutions or mechanisms mandated for ICL; and (3) 
enforcement or compliance procedures. As the political and strategic considerations 
for States to enforce ICL will differ greatly from one part of the world to another, it is 
however unwise to assert that there is only one best way to regionalise ICrimJ and 
pre-determine the exact relationship between regional mechanisms with the ICC and 
domestic courts. Indeed, the situational context will affect both normative and 
institutional choices and only general observations and recommendations are possible.  
Firstly, while it is clear that regional organisations will depend on UN 
authorisation to undertake military action to arrest and bring to justice perpetrators of 
international crimes,181 they are not limited in terms of adopting non-kinetic measures 
to deter, stop and punish such individuals. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the possibility of a 
compatible and cooperative relationship between the ICC and a regional court is not 
closed off by the ICC Rome Statute. 
Secondly, any efforts to regionalise ICrimJ should be based on institutional 
solutions that are realistic in their individual contexts. The chosen regional mechanism 
must ultimately be effective and operational, and it may therefore be prudent to use 
                                          
181
 Such authorisation could be akin to UN Security Council resolution 2098, which authorised UN 
SHDFHNHHSHUVWR³VXSSRUWDQGZRUNZLWKWKH*RYHUQPHQWRIWKH'5&WRDUUHVWDQGEULQJWRMXVWLFHWKRVH
responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity in the country, including through cooperation 
ZLWK 6WDWHV RI WKH UHJLRQ DQG WKH ,&&´ 6HH 6HFXULW\ &RXQFLO UHVROXWLRQ   81 'RF
S/Res/2098(2013). 
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regional structures that are already present. That said, regional institutions should only 
be used if they are credible and can maintain both impartiality and support of regional 
States, as well as have the necessary infrastructure, resources and capacity. If none are 
present, the creation of an ad hoc regional institution with international support and 
participation may be a solution.182  
Thirdly, as there may be multiple responses to an international crime, a clear 
distribution of authority and coordination between international, regional and national 
legal mechanisms must be established. This should include explicit procedures 
regarding jurisdiction and cooperation. In this regard, an element of subsidiarity can exist 
within the process of regionalising ICrimJ to be accepted as an alternative route for ICL. 
Emphasising regional enforcement within the international agenda through burden 
sharing will then prove a sensible approach to avoid conflicts and duplication of efforts.  
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 If existing regional organisations are unable to do the job, international support and participation for 
an ad hoc institution may be needed to provide much needed resources and experience, and possibly to 
overcome any political deadlock between regional States. 
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CHAPTER 4 
A REGIONAL MECHANISM FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA 
 
States have been and continue to be inherently unwilling to cede their sovereignty. In 
this regard, Chapter 2 notes that States had little incentive throughout the twentieth 
century to consider the regionalisation of ICrimJ as there was no threat posed by an 
international judicial organ that could prosecute their own citizens, particularly high-
ranking government officials. The situation has however changed with the creation of 
the ICC, and States now have a reason to seek regional alternatives to prevent the ICC 
from exercising its jurisdiction. This objective of this chapter is to then determine the 
form(s) of a regional mechanism that would be most effective and realistic within the 
context of Southeast Asia. The region arguably deserves an indigenous ASEAN-based 
mechanism to promote ICrimJ. Given recent developments within the sub-regional 
organisation, especially the creation of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on 
Human Rights (AICHR), this may not be as impossible as it may sound.1 Furthermore, 
ASEAN Member States (AMS) have already had much experience in collectively 
addressing issues of criminal justice, and the region has even emerged as a leader in 
responses to transnational crimes like trafficking in persons.2  
Yet, it is recognised that discussion about the plausibility of regionalising 
ICrimJ within Southeast Asia must unequivocally take into account ASEAN's history, 
geography, and trajectory.3 In the interest of maintaining regional peace in a less 
certain post-Cold War paradigm, AMS have become less uncomfortable about 
highlighting politically contentious issues, and begun to approach the sacrosanct 
principle of non-interference in a more pragmatic, open and flexible way.4 That said, 
the notion of state sovereignty and institutional considerations still weigh heavily on 
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 During the EU-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in 2003, WKH ,&& ZDV QRWHG WR EH D ³SRVLWLYH
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 Great strides have been made towards the ASEAN goal of ending impunity for traffickers and 
securing justice for victims of this crime. See ASEAN, Progress Report on Criminal Justice Responses 
to Trafficking in Persons in the ASEAN Region (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2011). 
3
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4
 6HH+LUR.DWVXPDWD³:K\LV$6($1'LSORPDF\&KDQJLQJ")URP³1RQLQWHUIHUHQFH´WR³2SHQDQG
)UDQN 'LVFXVVLRQV´´ Asian Survey  44 (2004): 237± DQG 7LPR .LYLPlNL ³3RZHU ,QWHUHVW RU
&XOWXUH,VWKHUHD3DUDGLJPWKDW([SODLQV$6($1¶V3ROLWLFDO5ROH%HVW"´Pacific Review 21 (2008): 
431±50. 
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how ASEAN decisions are made.5 It is in this context that, despite the principle of 
complementarity only allowing the ICC to have jurisdiction when a State is proven to 
be unwilling or unable to investigate an alleged international crime,6 States are uneasy 
WKDWGHWHUPLQDWLRQRI WKHLU³XQZLOOLQJQHVV´DQG³LQDELOLW\´ UHVWVFRPSOHWHO\ZLWK WKH
Court.7 The idea of a regional initiative for ICrimJ thus has further political currency 
amongst the Southeast Asian countries that are not signatories to the Rome Statute.8 
Given that absolute sovereignty over the prosecution of core international crimes that 
previously existed has been eroded with the establishment of the ICC, such 
mechanisms are not only more reflective of regional norms and legal practices, but 
will also allow the AMS to collectively reassert their national sovereignty on ICrimJ 
issues in the region.9 
It must also be acknowledged that the ASEAN practices of accommodation 
and seeking consensus mean that the institution and its member States will probably 
try to avoid formal and adversarial forms of adjudication. The 'ASEAN way' of 
dealing with problems and difficult situations is based on the Javanese cultural 
practice of making decisions through consultation and consensus, thereby permitting 
AMS to retain sovereign control throughout the process.10 This approach takes into 
account that Southeast Asian nations are not homogenous in terms of language, 
religion, ethnic composition, cultural practices, political and legal systems, or 
economic development. It is also a recognition of the complex inter-State 
relationships, with varying degrees of shared (colonial) history and comfort with each 
other. If differences of opinion are too great and consensus on a difficult issue cannot 
be reached, the matter is shelved and no organisational position is adopted. This also 
means that ASEAN will normally adopt a position based on the lowest common 
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 This is partly because ASEAN and its initiatives depend largely on the material and financial support 
of AMS. 
6
 See the Preamble, Article 1 and Articles 17-19, ICC Statute. 
7
 Allowing the ICC to investigate and prosecute individuals without the consent of their States then 
PDNHVFRPSOHPHQWDULW\³WKHODUJHVWVWXPEOLQJEORFNIRU$VLDQVWDWHV¶SDUWLFLSDWLRQLQWKH,&&´$PULWD
.DSXU ³$VLDQ 9DOXH Y 7KH 3DSHU 7LJHU 'LVPDQWOLQJ WKH 7KUHDW WR $VLDQ 9DOXHV 3RVHG E\ WKH
,QWHUQDWLRQDO &ULPLQDO &RXUW´ Journal of International Criminal Justice 11 (2013): 1059-1090, at 
1059. 
8
 Of the 10 countries that constitute the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), only 
Cambodia (in 2002) and the Philippines (in 2011) have ratified the Rome Statute. 
9
 It is however recognised that Southeast Asia is unlikely to be a focus of the Court in the near future. 
10
 The ASEAN style of decision making focuses on building consensus through a process of extensive 
consultations. See Amitav Acharya³&ROOHFWLYH,GHQWLW\DQG&RQIOLFW0DQDJHPHQWLQ6RXWKHDVW$VLD´, 
in Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), at 211-121; and Mely Caballero-Anthony, Regional Security in Southeast Asia: Beyond 
the ASEAN Way (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), at 72-76. 
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denominator that all member States can unanimously agree on. The practical effect of 
both these two sets of decision making approaches is that the organisation remains 
unified.11  
7KHµ$6($1ZD\
 LVDOVRFKDUDFWHULVHGE\ WKHDYRLGDQFHRI WKHXVHRI IRUFH
through informal and non-official means.12 Weatherbee highlights that there is 
however no formal approach to collective security within ASEAN.13 Indeed, no 
collective security treaty exists,14 and the organisation has always avoided going down 
that path.15 The ASEAN Charter, which entered into force on 15 December 2008, 
codifies all ASEAN norms, rules, and values,16 DQGZLOOKHOS³GHWHUmine the functions, 
develop areas of competence of key ASEAN bodies and their relationship with one 
DQRWKHU LQ WKH RYHUDOO $6($1 VWUXFWXUH´17 Hence, while political and security 
cooperation within ASEAN now also includes elements of post-conflict peace-
building,18  no enforcement mechanisms are in place to deal with breaches of the 
principles and goals relating to regional security.19 The informal approach entails (and 
arguably strengthens) the close interpersonal links at the levels of government leaders 
                                          
11
 A former ASEAN Secretary-General said tKDW LI WKHUH ZDV VRPHWKLQJ $6($1 FDQQRW UHVROYH ³LW
PD\SXW WKHSUREOHPXQGHU WKHFDUSHW´1DULQH WKXVQRWHV WKDW$06ZLOO³DJUHH WRGLVDJUHHJR WKHLU
VHSDUDWHZD\VDQGPDLQWDLQWKHLOOXVLRQRI$6($1XQLW\´6HH4XRWHLQ$PLWDY$FKDU\D³&XOWXUH
SeFXULW\0XOWLODWHUDOLVP7KHµ$6($1:D\¶DQG5HJLRQDO2UGHU´Contemporary Security Policy 19 
(1998): 55-DWDQG6KDXQ1DULQH³$6($1DQGWKH0DQDJHPHQWRI5HJLRQDO6HFXULW\´Pacific 
Affairs 71 (1998):195-214, at 195. 
12
 By addressing dangerously contentious issues through informal modes of dispute avoidance and 
resolution, AMS can avoid adopting formal positions and using confrontational references. Hilaire 
McCoubrey and Justin Morris, Regional Peacekeeping in the post-Cold War Era (The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 2000), at 160. 
13
 See Donald WeatherbeH³ASEAN Regionalism: The Salient 'LPHQVLRQ´, in Karl Jackson a n d  M 
Hadi Sosastro, eds., ASEAN Security and Economic Development (Berkeley: University of California, 
1984). 
14
 $6($1¶V IRXQGLQJ GRFXPHnt, the Bangkok Declaration, is devoid of any reference to either 
collective security or collective defence. McCoubrey and Morris argue that this is due to an aversion to 
WKH³SRVVLEO\WKUHDWHQLQJRUGHVWDELOLVLQJGLVFXVVLRQRIµVHFXULW\¶FRQFHSWV´DQGDrecognition different 
and broader concepts of security in the region. McCoubrey, supra n.12, at 161-162. 
15
 Instead of formal or legally-binding security alliances, ASEAN adopts the practice of consultation 
and consensus to deal with defence issues. This continues to be true even with the creation of the 
$6($1'HIHQFH0LQLVWHUV0HHWLQJ$'00LQ6HH'DYLG-RQHVDQG0LFKDHO6PLWK³0DNLQJ
3URFHVV1RW3URJUHVV$6($1DQG WKH(YROYLQJ(DVW$VLDQ5HJLRQDO2UGHU´ International Security 
32 (2007):148±184, at 155. 
16
 Most crucially, it reiterates respect for ASEAN principles like sovereignty and non-interference in the 
internal affairs of member States. See Article 2, ASEAN Charter. 
17
 See 2005 Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Charter, 12 December 
2005. 
18
 See Annex 1, 2004 Vientiane Action Programme, 29 November 2004. 
19
 The norms and values of ASEAN do not differ much in terms of content, but what distinguishes it is 
the way they are implemented and enforced. Acharya notes that the uniqueness of ASEAN lies 
SULPDULO\ LQ ³WKH SURFHVV WKURXJK ZKLFK VXFK LQWHUDFWLRQV DUH FDUULHG RXW´ $PLWDY $FKDU\D ³,GHDV
,GHQWLW\ DQG ,QVWLWXWLRQ %XLOGLQJ IURP WKH µ$6($1 :D\¶ WR WKH µ$VLD-3DFLILF :D\"¶´ The Pacific 
Review 10 (1997): 319-346, at 329. 
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and senior officials,20 while unofficial mechanisms to obliquely address contentious 
issues include low-level confidence building measures ± like non-binding dialogue 
sessions, non-FRQIURQWDWLRQDO µZRUNVKRSV¶ DQG µWUDFN WZR¶ ELODWHUDOPXOWLODWHUDO
forums. 
The orientation and role of ASEAN thus differs dramatically from other, 
especially western, regional groupings in its lack of emphasis on formal rules, legal 
obligations and enforcement mechanisms.21 This is largely a function of the fact that 
decision-making and problem-solving among AMS are based on personal relations 
instead of institutional frameworks.22 ,Q WKLV UHJDUG 7KLR KLJKOLJKWV WKDW $6($1¶V
policy of constructive engagement not only seeks to induce change through peer 
SUHVVXUHEXWDOVRWULHV³QRWWR embarrass the object of engagement through isolation or 
FRQGHPQDWLRQ´23 For example, conflict prevention and resolution in Southeast Asia 
are achieved through closed-door discussions and discrete political intervention at the 
sidelines of meetings, which specifically avoid the need for governments to adopt 
public positions or go through legalistic procedures that may limit their policy 
options.24 This is a crucial point to note for those arguing that hard law must be 
paramount in upholding ICrimJ.  
 Acceptance and progress amongst AMS are indeed more likely to be attained 
through informal processes of consultation and dialogue, as well as mediation between 
affected parties. Jørgensen-Dahl argues WKDW$6($1KDVVHUYHG³a useful purpose by 
providing a framework within which the parties could discuss their differences in a 
µQHXWUDO¶DWPRVSKHUH´25 The multilateral framework enables Parties to a conflict to 
remain in contact, when normal bilateral channels or communication have been 
severed or no longer function properly. The informal, consensus-driven, trust-
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 3DWKPDQDWKDQQRWHV WKDW $06 UHO\RQ ³GLVFXVVLRQ DQG DFFRPPRGDWLRQ DW KLJKSROLWLFDO OHYHOV´ WR
settle their disputes. Murugesu Pathmanathan, The Pacific Settlement of Disputes in Regional 
Organisations: A Comparative Perspective of the OAS, OAU and ASEAN (Kuala Lumpur: University 
of Malaya, 1978), at 20. 
21
 %XVVHFRQWHQGVWKDWWKH³VRFLDOSUDFWLFHDQGSROLWLFDOLQWHUDFWLRQ´DPRQJVW$06QRWRQO\IRVWHUHGD
VKDUHG UHJLRQDO LGHQWLW\ EXW DOVR FUHDWHG D GLVWLQFWLYH ³SROLWLFDO FXOWXUH´ 1LNRODV %XVVH
³&RQVWUXFWLYLVPDQG6RXWKHDVW$VLDQ6HFXULW\´Pacific Review 12 (1999): 39-60, at 59. 
22
 Thio Li-DQQ³,PSOHPHQWLQJ+XPDQ5LJKWVLQ$6($1&RXQWULHV3URPLVHVWR.HHSDQG0LOHVWR*R
Before I Sleep", Yale Human Rights & Development Journal 2 (1999):1-86, at 78-79. 
23
 Ibid, at 45. 
24
 $FKDU\D RSLQHV WKDW $6($1 SURFHVVHV FRQWUDVWV ZLWK WKH ³DGYHUVDULDO SRVWXULQJ´ DQG ³OHJDOLVWLF
decision-PDNLQJ SURFHGXUHV´ RIWHQ IRXQG LQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO QHJRWLDWLRQV 6HH $FKDU\D supra n.19, at 
329; and Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 
2001), at 64. 
25
 By steadily increasing the scope and range of ASEAN activities, Jørgensen-Dahl adds that it also 
made member States more aware of each other's problems, and therefore better facilitated comprises. 
Arnfinn Jørgensen-'DKO³7KH6LJQLILFDQFHRI$6($1´World Review 19 (1980): 55-59, at 56-57. 
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building formula adopted by ASEAN has thus not only proven to be highly effective 
in managing thorny issues,26 but also forged a sense of collective solidarity amongst 
the countries of Southeast Asia. AMS may therefore hesitate to ratify the ICC Statute 
if they risk being required to arrest and surrender another ASEAN leader for whom 
arrest warrants have been issued,27 as it would greatly reduce their ability to maintain 
diplomatic engagement and deliver political solutions. 
The ASEAN norms can similarly be expected to affect the creation of any 
regional ICrimJ mechanism. Like the humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HADR) 
and peace support projects by ASEAN,28 ICrimJ initiatives in Southeast Asia will 
have to take into account regional political and practical realities, as well as personal 
dynamics amongst State leaders. As a corollary, they have to prioritise the intended 
functions of ICL (such as punishment, deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and 
post-conflict reconciliation) according to State and regional interests. Furthermore, 
any effort to regionalise ICrimJ must not only be deemed fair and just, but must also 
reconcile moral and legal canons with concerns about the (actual or perceived) 
imposition of foreign norms and values.29 Constructing an appropriate regional ICrimJ 
mechanism in Southeast Asia must therefore be done from the highly cautious and 
restrictive perspective of ASEAN and its member States. This is particularly true if 
any enforcement capabilities by the regional community are envisaged. 
Before embarking on an assessment of alternative forms for an ASEAN 
regional mechanism for ICrimJ, it may be worthwhile to recall some of the key issues 
of concern amongst non-party states towards the ICC. Firstly, there is apprehension 
that political and military leaders could be exposed to politically motivated 
accusations. The fact that the ICC cannot try an individual for a crime that occurred 
before the Rome Statute enters into force does ameliorate the fear that members of the 
current and recent ruling elite will be tried for their past actions.30 However, it greatly 
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 ASEAN's dispute resolution mechanisms, such as the ASEAN High Council and TAC, have hardly 
ever been utilised. McCoubrey, supra n.12, at 160. 
27
 Article 59(1), ICC Statute. 
28
 AMS adopted an ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response in 2005, 
and created the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management in 
2011. 
29
 µ3DUDFKXWLQJ¶ IRUHLJQ FRQFHSWV DQG VWUXFWXUHV into Southeast Asia risks establishing institutions, 
DJUHHPHQWV DQG SURFHVVHV WKDW DUH LUUHOHYDQW WR $06 1LFROD %DNHU DQG /HRQDUG 6HEDVWLDQ ³7KH
SUREOHP ZLWK SDUDFKXWLQJ 6WUDWHJLF VWXGLHV DQG VHFXULW\ LQ WKH $VLD3DFLILF 5HJLRQ´ Journal of 
Strategic Studies 18 (1995): 15-31. 
30
 The Court may exercise jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after a State becomes 
Party to the ICC Statute. See Article 11(2), ICC Statute.  
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increases the burden of accountability for defence officials and military planners 
responding to both intra-state and inter-state conflict situations. Countries with 
significant defence interests and influential military institutions may therefore push 
strongly against ICC membership.31 $V WKH ,&& LV ³PRVW OLNHO\ WRSURVHFXWH FULPHV
DVVRFLDWHGZLWKFLYLOZDUV´32 the costs of ratification are notably also higher for States 
where separatist elements or internal tensions between political, ethnic or religious 
factions still exist. While Article 14 of the ICC Statute allows State Parties to refer a 
situation that occurred in its territory to the Prosecutor,33 they are unable to direct the 
focus only on non-government or opposing factions.34 In this regard, it may be 
politically prudent to avoid ICC involvement and domestically prosecute previous 
governments or non-state actors for their roles in alleged crimes.35 
Secondly, this concern was bolstered by pressure from the US to reject the 
,&&:LWKWKHSDVVLQJRIWKH$PHULFDQ6HUYLFHPHPEHUV¶3URWHFWLRQ$FW$63$WKDW
advocated the withholding of military assistance to countries that ratify Rome Statute, 
many allies were forced to weigh the intangible value of ICC membership against 
substantial and concrete US military and financial aid.36 $V SDUW RI LWV ³LQWHJUDWHG
DSSURDFK´WR,&ULP-37 WKH2EDPD$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ³UHVSHFWV the right of every country 
to MRLQ WKH ,&&´38 and has stated its own intention to cooperate with the ICC.39 
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 For example, fearing that border clashes could result in its military personnel being brought to trial at 
the instigation of Myanmar, the Thai defence ministry prevented the ratification of the Rome Statute by 
7KDLODQG 6HH ;LQKXD 1HZV $JHQF\  -XQH  ³7KDL 'HIHQVH 0LQLVWU\ DJDLQVW HQWU\ LQWR
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International Organization 64 (2010): 225-256, at 238. 
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 See Articles 14, 13(a) and 12(2)(a), ICC Statute. 
34
 0F*UHDOQRWHV WKDWD6WDWH³FDQQRW UHIHUDVLWXDWLon within its borders without its own actions also 
SRWHQWLDOO\EHLQJLQYHVWLJDWHG´0F*UHDOsupra n.3, at 1102. 
35
 For example, after the killing of civilian opposition protestors in 2010 by Thai security forces, 
former-Thai PM Abhisit Vejjajiva was indicted for murder in December 2013. Given that the 
government was then led by Yingluck Shinawatra, the sister of previous-PM Thanksin Shinawatra 
whom he deposed, Abhisit has described the allegations against him as politically motivated.  
36
 A correlation was found between States likely to ratify the ICC Statute, and those likely to sign an 
agreement with the US preventing military personnel and subcontractors from arrest and surrender to 
the ICC. Simmons, supra n.32, at 245. 
37
 Harold Koh, ³7KH&KDOOHQJHVDQG)XWXUHRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO-XVWLFH´Panel Discussion at NYU Center 
For Global Affairs, 27 October 2010, at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/150497.htm. 
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 6HH 6WHSKHQ 5DSS ³Where Can tKH 9LFWLPV RI $WURFLWLHV )LQG -XVWLFH" ´  0D\  DW
http://www.state.gov/j/gcj/us_releases/remarks/2011/165257.htm.  
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 This includes SXUVXLQJDSROLF\RIµSRVLWLYHHQJDJHPHQW¶ZLWKWKH,&&VXFKDVSDUWLFLSDWLQJDV
an observer at the ICC Assembly of States Parties; and (2) engaging with ICC State Parties on issues of 
FRQFHUQDQG³VXSSRUWLQJ WKH ,&&¶VSURVHFXWLRQRI WKRVHFDVHV WKDWDGYDQFH86LQWHUHVWVDQGYDOXHV´
See US White House, National Security Strategy , May 2010, at 48. 
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Although the US has ceased its harsh rhetoric and hostility towards the Court,40 and 
arguably supported its work in the DRC,41 two major issues remain. First, the US 
does not intenG WR UDWLI\ WKH 5RPH 6WDWXWH LQ WKH ³IRUHVHHDEOH IXWXUH´42 US 
Ambassador at Large for War Crimes, Stephen Rapp, cited concerns that US officials 
would be unfairly prosecuted and the strong domestic court system in the US as 
reasons preventing ratification.43 In March 2011, the US also rejected 
UHFRPPHQGDWLRQVLQWKH81+XPDQ5LJKWV&RXQFLO¶V8QLYHUVDO3HULRGLF5HYLHZWKDW
it ratify the Rome Statute.44 Second, even though the US expanded its War Crimes 
Rewards Programme (WCRP)45 to include any foreign national accused of genocide, 
war crimes or crimes against humanity by any international (including mixed or 
hybrid) criminal tribunal,46 there are no proposed legislation or plans for changes to 
US statutes and practices that are hostile to the ICC.47 While the US Congress has 
repealed legislation punishing other States for refusing to sign bilateral immunity 
agreements (BIAs), there are no known efforts to rescind any existing ones.48  Unless 
these positions change, some countries may still never accept or fully support the 
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 See Stephen Rapp, ³6SHHFK WR$VVHPEO\RI6WDWHV3DUWLHV´1RYHPEHUDW http://www.icc-
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Jurist, 28 January 2010, at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2010/01/us-war-crimes-ambassador-
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 Ibid.  
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 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review±United 
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and replies presented by the State under review, UN Doc. A/HRC/16/11/Add.1, 8 March 2011.  
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ICC.49 In this connection, it is important to note that peace and security in Southeast 
Asia is underpinned by continued US interest and presence in the region, as a 
counterweight to the increasing assertiveness and growing strength of China both 
militarily and economically.50 As long as the US remains disinclined to accept ICC 
jurisdiction over its troops advising on or performing military operations, AMS will 
have an added disincentive to not ratify the Rome Statute.51 
Instead of an outright rejection of the ICC or scepticism over its 
effectiveness,52 another position adopted by non-PHPEHU6WDWHVKDVEHHQWRµZDLW-and-
VHH¶ 7KLV LV VRPHWLPHV WKH UHVXOW RI D WKLUG VHW RI FRQVLGHUDWLRQV VXUURXQGLQJ WKH
practical difficulties in implementing ICrimJ based on extra-regional standards that 
are vastly different from the local realities.53 These include the need for constitutional 
amendments, or changes to the judicial system and domestic laws,54 as well as to 
incorporate the core international crimes ensconced in the Rome Statute.55 Hence, 
Indonesia indicated a need to reform its judicial system before it would consider 
ratifying the Rome Statute, adding that there was no impetus to act when nations like 
the US, China, Russia, and India had yet to do so.56 Similarly, other ASEAN countries 
have noted that a review of current criminal codes and sentencing regimes was also 
required, particularly in jurisdictions where capital punishment still exists because the 
most severe punishment permitted under the Rome Statute is life imprisonment. 
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administration. 
50
 The US and China are not party to the ICC and their positions are unlikely to change in the near 
future. 
51
 Although it ratified the Rome Statute in 2011, the Philippines (along with Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, 
Singapore and Thailand) had also signed bilateral immunity agreements (BIA) with the US. These 
³$UWLFOH´DJUHHPHQWVVWLOOSUHYHQWFXUUHQWIRUPHU86officials, military personnel, and citizens from 
being transferred to the ICC. 
52
 The view that it is either irrelevant or inappropriate to deal with regional matters may explain the lack 
of enthusiasm for the ICC within the Asia-3DFLILF6WHYHQ)UHHODQG³International Criminal Justice in 
the Asia-3DFLILF 5HJLRQ 7KH 5ROH RI WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &ULPLQDO &RXUW 7UHDW\ 5HJLPH´ Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 11 (2013):1029-1057, at 1035.   
53
 Nothing however suggests that AMS are reluctant to ratify the ICC Statute because of the substantive 
FULPHV FRYHUHG E\ WKH FRXUW RU ³GLVFUHSDQFLHV EHWZHHQ WKH WH[W DQG FXVWRPDU\ LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ
REOLJDWLRQV´.DSXUsupra n.7, at 1070. 
54
 There are also resource-related issues regarding the drafting of appropriate implementing legislation 
and enforcement within domestic criminal systems. Freeland, supra n.52, at 1051. 
55
 This is an issue for developing States with laws yet aligned to international standards. See Ahmed 
=LDXGGLQDQG;D\QDUL&KDQWKDOD³6WUHQJWKHQLQJWhe Process of Signing, Ratifying, Implementing and 
0RQLWRULQJ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/HJDO,QVWUXPHQWVLQWKH/DR3'5´&RQVXOWDQF\WR$VVLVW LQ WKH(QKDQFLQJ
Capacity of the Government of the Lao PDR in its Preparations for Accession to the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court (2005), at  
http://www.er.uqam.ca/nobel/cedimbb/files/Laos_ICC_ConsultancyReport20June05.pdf. 
56
 6HH -DNDUWD 3RVW  1RYHPEHU  ³5, GHIHUV VLJQLQJ ,&& 6WDWXWH´ DW
http://m.thejakartapost.com/news/ 2002/11/30/ri-defers-signing-icc-statute.html. 
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Although the ICC Statute states that it is non-prejudicial to national application of 
penalties prescribed by their national laws,57 the difficulty arises from the effect it can 
have on domestic trials and sentencing regimes, which may face legal and 
constitutional challenges if there is a lack of sentencing parity.58 
In assessing the dominant reservations withholding non-party Southeast Asian 
states from endorsing the ICC, Toon however discerns that while there may be some 
considerations relating to American influence and practical difficulties in 
implementation, the primary driving force was the shared obsession amongst the 
region grouping with preservation of state sovereignty and regime sustenance.59 Kapur 
similarly contends that legal and political trends in Southeast Asia suggest that the 
threat perception of the ICC is more important than its efficacy in determining 
acceptance of the Court among AMS.60 The fact remains that an underlying tension 
remains between the normative interest of ICrimJ in preventing impunity and the 
(political and practical) self-interests of States.61 Before the countries in Southeast 
Asia can seriously consider a regional court, commission, or treaty focused on ICL, 
their stakeholders must be gradually convinced that upholding ICrimJ has practical 
benefits,62 or be faced with some form of moral shock (such as another genocide in the 
region). It is worth recalling that the past Khmer Rouge massacres now hardly spark 
any interest within ASEAN about international crimes, while the Cambodian Tribunal 
itself has not necessarily improved the situation or attitudes towards ICrimJ in 
Cambodia, let alone in the region.63 The imposition of foreign systems and universal 
norms of justice has even been negatively seen by some CaPERGLDQV ³DV DQ
H[SUHVVLRQRIFRQWHPSWIRUWKHLURZQWUDGLWLRQV´64  
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 Article 80, ICC Statute. 
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 This may be viewed as a backdoor to force non-abolitionist States to amend their penal regimes. 
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 Valeriane Toon³International Criminal Court: Reservations of Non-6WDWH3DUWLHVLQ6RXWKHDVW$VLD´
Contemporary Southeast Asia 26 (2004): 218±32, at 225. 
60
 Kapur, supra n.7, at 1090. 
61
 7KHGHFLVLRQWRUDWLI\WKH,&&6WDWXWHWKXV³UHPDLQVRQHWKDWHDFKVWDWHPXVWFRQVLGHUDVSDUWRILWV
RZQVRYHUHLJQULJKWV´)UHHODQGsupra n.52, at 1056. 
62
 Some argue the dearth of support in Asia is simply due to the lack of political will. Toon, supra n.59, 
at 225. 
63
 This is partly due to the difference between local expectations of the ECCC and international notions 
of justice, rights and fairness. Moreover, the ECCC has been recognised to epitomise all the worst 
features of an internationalised criminal court, and generally rejected as a model for replication. See 
discussion in Chapter 1. 
64
 ,DQ+DUULV³2QVODXJKWRQ%HLQJV$7KHUDYDGD%XGGKLVW3HUVSHFWLYHRQ$FFRXQWDELOLW\IRU&ULPHV
&RPPLWWHG LQ WKH 'HPRFUDWLF .DPSXFKHD 3HULRG´ LQ -D\D 5amji and Beth Van Schaack, eds., 
Bringing the Khmer Rouge to Justice: Prosecuting Mass Violence Before the Cambodian Courts (New 
York: Edwin Mellen Press, 2005), at 80. 
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It is thus crucial to acknowledge local conditions, indigenous value systems, as 
well as the validity of regional conceptions of justice and mechanisms of 
accountability. Indeed, Singapore stated during the 1998 UN Diplomatic Conference 
of Plenipotentiaries that while some acts were so universally abhorred that their 
SHUSHWUDWRUVVKRXOGQRWHVFDSHSXQLVKPHQW³DFFRXQWPXVWEHWDNHQRIWKHGLYHUVLW\RI
regional interests, different stages of GHYHORSPHQWDQGVRFLDODQGFXOWXUDOWUDGLWLRQV´65 
This point has more recently been reiterated by ICC Assembly of States Parties (ASP), 
ZKLFKKLJKOLJKWHGWKHQHHGWRWDNHLQWRDFFRXQW WKHGLIIHUHQW³FXOWXUDOWUDGLWLRQVDQG
VHQVLWLYLWLHV´RIYLFWLPVDQGZLtnesses.66   
To both serve the interests of ICrimJ and ensure that States will abide by it, the 
hierarchy of functions of ICL determined by a region must then also coincide with the 
regional approach that is adopted (formal trials, non-penal methods, or some 
combination of both). The chapter thus proceeds by considering whether the present 
ICrimJ system encapsulates any universally accepted penological principles or a 
hierarchical structure in terms of the intended purposes of ICL that must be adopted in 
the regionalisation of ICrimJ. Given that ICL is predominantly based on Western legal 
precepts of retributive justice and punishment, the chapter also deliberates whether a 
strict and formalistic conception of ICrimJ will overlook the fact that States respond 
differently to various legal, political and economic pressures. The underlying question 
is then if an over-emphasis on criminal trials will not only mask the political 
undercurrents that foster the mass violence of core international crimes, but also 
unwittingly overlook the extra-legal elements required for the restoration of peace and 
security. It cannot be overstated that much also depends on the context and availability 
of necessary resources. Simply transferring solutions from one context to another is no 
guarantee of success,67 while blindly imposing externally developed models or ready-
made solutions will certainly lead to disaster.68 Retributive justice and criminal trials 
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 Statement by Lionel Yee (Singapore), UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, 16 June 1998. See UN doc. A/CONF.183/13 
(Vol.II), at 82. 
66
 See ASP resolution, ICC-ASP/9/Res.3, 10 December 2010, at para.46. 
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 .OHIIQHUVWUHVVHVWKDWWKHUHLVQRµRQHVL]HILWVDOO¶UHFLSHIRUDchieving peace in societies 
embroiled in inter-State or intra-6WDWHFRQIOLFWV-DQQ.OHIIQHU³,QWURGXFWLRQ´LQ&DUVWHQ
Stahn and Jann Kleffner, eds., Jus Post Bellum: Towards a Law of Transition From Conflict 
to Peace (The Hague: TMC Asser, 2008), at 2. 
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 Given the absence of a panacea for dealing with massive and systemic abuse, Freeman and 'MXNLü
remind us that each society must then choose its own most appropriate path. Mark Freeman and 
'UDåDQ'MXNLü³7KH5HOHYDQFHRIJus Post Bellum$3UDFWLRQHU¶V3HUVSHFWLYH´LQ&DUVWHQ
147 
 
may thus not always effectively sanction and deter atrocity, let alone promote peace 
and security.69  
 
4.1 The Appropriate Form(s) for a Regional Approach 
 
As previously discussed, the modern ICrimJ system circumscribes State sovereignty 
and immunity by establishing direct individual criminal liability. This is broadly 
justified on the twin ICrimJ goals of preserving international peace and stability, as 
well as protecting people against atrocities.70 Its legitimacy is, however, derived from 
the ability to serve the normative goal of providing justice expected by the 
international community and victims of international crimes. In this regard, ICrimJ 
mechanisms must reconcile moral and legal canons with political and practical 
realities, while at all times also be considered fair and just. The functions of ICL may 
thus be prioritised both normatively and practically according to State and regional 
interests,71 and be based on retributive justice, restorative justice, or a mixture of the 
two.72 As ,&ULP- PXVW XOWLPDWHO\ ³VHHN WR HVWDEOLVK D ORQJ-lasting and sustainable 
SHDFH´73 a strict policy of criminal accountability may not always be the best option 
and necessarily sacrosanct.74 Indeed, given the concern of the affected State and its 
                                                                                                                         
Stahn and Jann Kleffner, eds., Jus Post Bellum: Towards a Law of Transition From Conflict 
to Peace (The Hague: TMC Asser, 2008), at 218-9. 
69
 Clark contends that institutions like the ICC should not be over-relied upon to deliver peace or 
justice, and criminal trials must be part of a larger strategy combining retributive and restorative 
HOHPHQWV -DQLQH &ODUN ³3HDFH -XVWLFH DQG WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &ULPLQDO &RXUW /LPLWDWLRQV DQG
3RVVLELOLWLHV´Journal of International Criminal Justice 9 (2011): 521-545, at 522. 
70
 See discussion in Chapter 1. 
71
 These may include punishment, deterrence, incapacitation and denunciation, rehabilitation and re-
education, post-FRQIOLFW UHFRQFLOLDWLRQ DQG µWUXWK¶ ILQGLQJ DQG DGGUHVVLQJ WKH QHHGV RI YLFWLPV DQG
affected communities. 
72
 The retributive approach is focused on what should be done to the offender, and justice is achieved 
by taming vengeance and placing the powers of blame and punishment in the hands of a court guided 
by the rule of law. On the other hand, the restorative approach is focused on the victim, and justice is 
done by repairing the harm done. Findlay and Henham thus note that while formal legal processes focus 
on the theoretical drivers of justice, less formal ICJ paradigms are based on the actual expectations of 
transitional States and their victim communities. Mark Findlay and Ralph Henham, Transforming 
International Criminal Justice: Retributive and Restorative Justice in the Trial Process (Devon: Willan 
Publishing, 2005), at xv. 
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 Mireille Delmas-0DUW\³$PELJXLWLHVDQG/DFXQDH7KH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&ULPLQDO&RXUW7HQ<HDUVRQ´
Journal of International Criminal Justice 11 (2013): 553-561, at 557. 
74
 Indeed, it is implied in Article 16 of the Rome Statute that situations exist where the demands of 
peace need or justify the (at least temporary) deferral of an investigation or prosecution by the ICC. 
6HYHUDOVFKRODUVKDYHQRWHGWKDWLWVSXUSRVHZDVWRDOORZWKH816&³WRVHWDVLGHWKHGHPDQGVRIMXVWLFH
at a time when it considered the demands of peace to be overriding; if the suspension of legal 
proceedings against a leader will allow a peace treaty to be concluded, precedence should be given to 
SHDFH´ 5REHUW &U\HU HW DO An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure, 2nd ed. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), at 170. 
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regional neighbours that such action may rupture any nascent and fragile peace, other 
extra-legal options should also be considered to achieve the twin goals of ICrimJ.75 On 
the other hand, criminal prosecution and sanctions may be a crucial facet of a regional 
ICrimJ mechanism, particularly if States are seeking regional avenues to prevent the 
ICC from exercising its jurisdiction. The next two sections therefore examine the 
rationale for criminal prosecutions and penal sanctions, and discern whether less 
formal approaches to accountability and non-penal methods can effectively serve both 
the interests of ICrimJ and the States that will enforce it.76  
 
4.1.1 The Rationale for Criminal Prosecutions and Penal Sanctions 
Criminal prosecutions and penal sanctions are presently the main accountability 
mechanisms for upholding ICrimJ and enforcing ICL. In this regard, retribution and 
deterrence have presented the international community with the most readily 
acceptable justifications to generate a response to international crimes.77 Retribution 
has been a prime rationale for individual criminal liability for core international 
crimes since WWII.78 It seeks to rectify the moral balance by punishing the 
perpetrator, but only to the extent that is proportionate to the gravity of the offence.79 
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 This is particularly pertinent since the ICC Prosecutor recognises that the interests of justice do not 
³HPEUDFHDOOLVVXHVUHODWHGWRSHDFHDQGVHFXULW\´DQGVWUHVVHVWKDW³WKHEURDGHUPDWWHURILQWHUQDWLRQDO
peace and security is not the responsibility of the Prosecutor; it falls within the mandate of other 
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QRORQJHUEUHDNWKHODZ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basis for punishments. See 3URVHFXWRUY(UGHPRYLü, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Trial Chamber, Sentencing 
Judgment, 29 November 1996, at para.62; 3URVHFXWRU Y )XUXQGåLMD, Case No.: IT-95-17/1-T, 
Judgement, 10 December 1998, para. 288; Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-39-S, Sentence, 
5 February 1999, para.20; and Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-S, Judgement and 
Sentence, 4 September 1998, para.28. 
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 The 1942 Declaration of St. James's Palace stated that the amongst the principal war aims of the 
VLJQDWRULHV ZDV ³WKH SXQLshment through the channel of organized justice of those guilty and 
UHVSRQVLEOH IRU WKHVH FULPHV´ $YDLODEOH DW http://www.coe.int/t/e/cultural_co-
operation/education/BulletinSpecialAvril2009_EN.pdf. 
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 In the 7RGRURYLücase, the ICTY stated that retribution must reflect a fair and balanced approach to 
punishment, and that the penalty imposed must be proportionate to the wrongdoing. Prosecutor v. 
7RGRURYLü, Case No. IT-95-9/1-S, Trial Chamber, Sentencing Judgment, 31 July 2001, at para. 29. 
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Retribution is therefore distinguished from revenge or vengeance (lex talionis),80 and 
instead based on the principles of justice and punishing persons have violated 
fundamental values held by the international community.81 Deterrence has also been 
increasingly identified as a major function of ICL.82 Punishment is then justified as a 
means of preventing future atrocities by dissuading the perpetrator (specific 
deterrence)83 or others (general deterrence)84 from subsequently committing similar 
core international crimes. The purpose is not to inflict punishment as it is deserved, 
but because of its utilitarian effect of reducing recidivism and repeated threats to 
international peace and stability.85  
Although these two penal underpinnings associated with ICL processes may be 
easily transposed to a regional context, it is significant that its objective(s) are seldom 
clear or explicitly stated within the modern ICrimJ system. For example, the Statutes 
of the ICTY and ICTR do not provide any further indication about the rationale 
behind bringing to justice the perpetrators of international crimes.86 The ICC Statute 
similarly does not explicate the purpose(s) of punishing offenders under ICL beyond 
the broad call of ICrimJ to end impunity for crimes that threaten the peace and 
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 This was clarified in the Aleksovski case, where the ICTY held that retribution is not the fulfilment of 
DGHVLUHIRUUHYHQJHEXWDQH[SUHVVLRQRI³WKHRXWUDJHRIWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\´Prosecutor v. 
Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Appeal Judgement, 24 March 2000, at para.185. 
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.XSUHãNLüet al., Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 14 January 2000, at para.848. 
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tempted in the future to perpetrate such atrocities by showing them that the international community 
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7RGRURYLü, supra n.79, at para. 30; and Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgement 
and Sentence, 6 December 1999, at para.456. 
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 The ICTY in the 1LNROLü case however recognised the critique of utilitarian deterrence theories and 
presented an argument of deterrence based on awareness of obligations and respect for the rule of law, 
rather than the fear of the consequences of breaking the law. It added that the accused individuals were 
QRW³VLPSO\DQLQVWUXPHQWWRDFKLHYLQJWKHJRDORIWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIWKHUXOHRIODZ´1LNROLü, supra 
n.81, at paras.89-90. 
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RU
GHWHUUHQFH UHSUREDWLRQ UHWULEXWLRQ RU 
MXVW GHVHUWV
 DV ZHOO DV FROOHFWLYH UHFRQFLOLDWLRQ´ LW GLG QRW
define them or suggest a hierarchy of importance. (UGHPRYLü, supra n.77, at para.58. 
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security of the world, thereby contributing to their prevention. Van Zyl Smit 
highlights that the inability to elaborate and develop penal justifications in the ICC 
Statute then reflects the difficulties in achieving international consensus on ICrimJ.87 
As such, not only are there no strict penological guidelines for a regional criminal 
court to replicate,88 but the current system does also not encapsulate a hierarchy 
regarding the intended goals of ICL to be adopted in the regionalisation of ICrimJ.89 
This is important because restorative justice may then be just as legitimate an 
approach as retributive justice, and both formal processes and informal mechanisms 
become equally acceptable forms for addressing international crimes.90 
At this juncture, it is crucial to recognise that besides inconsistency in 
prioritising retribution and deterrence,91 these two rationales for punishing 
perpetrators of international crimes are also plagued by problems. For example, the 
retributive intent of ICL is often undermined by selective prosecution and 
punishment.92 The problem is exacerbated by inconsistencies in the punishment meted 
out to offenders both within and between ICrimJ institutions at the international and 
national levels.93 Approaching ICrimJ from a purely retributive angle further raises 
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 Dirk YDQ=\O6PLW³3XQLVKPHQWDQG+XPDQ5LJKWVLQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO&ULPLQDO-XVWLFH´Human Rights 
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)DOODQG5LVHRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO&ULPLQDO-XVWLFH´Journal of International Criminal Justice 11 (2013): 
527-536, at 532. 
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 The sheer scale and number of perpetrators involved in mass atrocities will overwhelm any legal 
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Gary Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2000), at 298. 
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terms. Mark Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment and International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), at 15. 
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other concerns,94 including a fixation on punishment that not only fails to consider 
costs or other extraneous factors,95 but can be redundant96 or morally unjustified97. 
The rationale of protecting society through incapacitation98 may therefore also prove 
inappropriate,99 as the ICTY noted in the Kunarac case: 
 
³8QOHVVLWFan be shown that a particular convicted person has the propensity 
to commit violations of international humanitarian law ... it may not be fair and 
UHDVRQDEOH WR XVH SURWHFWLRQ RI VRFLHW\ RU µSUHYHQWLYH GHWHQWLRQ¶ LQ
GHWHUPLQLQJSXQLVKPHQW´100 
 
Deterrence is also problematic as little evidence exists to indicate that the 
threat of punishment deters individuals from perpetrating international crimes.101 
Claims of its effectiveness are further weakened by the argument that mass atrocities 
are typically committed based on long-standing ideologies of hate and other complex 
motivations that are not easily captured by the cost-benefit analysis of rational 
calculation.102 Indeed, the creation of the ICTY did not stop the atrocities from 
continuing in the former Yugoslavia between 1993 and 1995. Moreover, even if 
deterrence does work in theory, the current weak and indeterminate enforcement of 
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ICL in practice greatly reduces its efficacy.103 It has long been posited that behaviour 
LVDIIHFWHGE\WKHSHUFHLYHGULVNRIµJHWWLQJFDXJKW¶UDWKHUWKDQWKHSHUFHLYHGVHYHULW\
of the punishment.104 Although the chances of being held accountable for core 
international crimes have increased, it is still relatively small given that the ICrimJ 
system must rely on State cooperation to apprehend and bring the suspect(s) to trial.105 
That said, in discerning the form(s) that would serve the interests of ICL and 
the States that will enforce it, formal trials and penal sanctions cannot be discounted 
as potentially vital accountability mechanisms within a regional ICrimJ framework.106 
For the reasons cited above and also to avoid the fear of possible political 
manipulation, retribution should just not be the sole penological principle 
underpinning a regional ICrimJ mechanism. This is underscored by the insight that 
deterrence may actually be more effective in a regional context as neighbouring States 
not only have a larger vested interest to act and cooperate, but can also apply greater 
political and other pressures. It is also noteworthy that the UNSC unequivocally 
linked the notions of peace and justice with the creation of the ICTY and ICTR under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter,107 as well as through its powers to both refer a 
VLWXDWLRQ WR WKH ,&&DQGGHIHU WKH&RXUW¶V DFWLYLW\ LQFHUWDLQFLUFXPVWDQFHV108 From 
the perspective of States, post-conflict reconciliation and determining WKH µWUXWK¶are 
thus functions of ICL that can also provide strong pillars for a regional ICrim 
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mechanism.109 Ascertaining the truth and producing an unbiased record of events not 
only acknowledge the suffering of victims, but also prevent the denial of crimes 
committed and falsification of history. %HVLGHV IDFLOLWDWLQJ µVRFLDO KHDOLQJ¶ DQG D
lasting peace, they further re-establish the rule of law and provide a sense of justice.110 
This ideal of restoring and maintaining peace through criminal proceedings was 
elaborated by the ICTY Trial Chamber in the 1LNROLü case: 
 
³7KURXJKSXEOLFSURFHHGLQJVWKHWUXWKDERXWWKHSRVVLEOHFRPPLVVLRQRIZDU
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide was to be determined, thereby 
establishing an accurate, accessible historical record. The Security Council 
hoped such a historical record would prevent a cycle of revenge killings and 
IXWXUHDFWVRIDJJUHVVLRQ´111  
 
Strict criminal prosecutions and punishment nevertheless do not always 
effectively achieve the twin goals of protecting and maintaining global peace and 
security, as well as sanctioning and deterring atrocity.112 There are also possible 
disconnects between correctional modalities and their proclaimed functions, as well as 
little hard evidence of a link between criminal prosecutions and societal 
reconciliation.113 Moreover, formal trials are not unequivocally accepted as an 
appropriate forum to reconcile different perceptions of truth and write history.114  
Less formal approaches to accountability and non-penal methods may 
sometimes then be more effective in furthering ICrimJ and State interests. In this 
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connection, it is germane that other functions of ILC like denunciation, re-education 
and rehabilitation exist, and may be applicable for efforts to regionalise ICrimJ. 
Denunciation is the public declaration of the abhorrence of the conduct and 
stigmatisation of the perpetrator,115 while re-education allows offenders to recognise 
their individual responsibility and guilt, as well as to denounce their criminal 
conduct.116 Rehabilitation is generally subsidiary to retribution, deterrence, and 
denunciation,117 but has occasionally been considered for low-level offenders.118 
These µVRIWHU SXQLVKPHQWV¶ highlight that both retributive justice and restorative 
justice can be equally valid goals of ICrimJ,119 and indicate that informal mechanisms 
may also deal with international crimes effectively. The next section therefore 
considers whether less formal institutions of punishment or extra-legal mechanisms of 
accountability could serve as regional ICrimJ initiatives.  
 
4.1.2 Alternative Approaches to Achieve Justice and Accountability  
The predominant focus in ICrimJ has been retributive justice and criminal trials, and 
not restorative justice and alternative mechanisms of atonement.120 This perhaps 
reflects the political allure of the predictability and closure that exist in the 
prosecutorial process. Certainty of outcome exists in that a judicial decision of guilt or 
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innocence (or in some cases a politically predetermined verdict) brings an end to the 
case, having presumably served the interests of justice and alleviated the suffering of 
victims.121 However, as noted earlier, individual trials do not provide a sufficient 
SODWIRUPWRGHWHUPLQHWKHµWUXWK¶EHKLQGV\VWHPLFYLROHQFHPXFKOHVVIRVWHUSHDFHDQG
reconciliation among enemies in a divided society.122 Moreover, the trial process and 
procedure is not victim centred.123 This is however slowly changing as victims may 
QRZ SDUWLFLSDWH LQ ,&& SURFHHGLQJV WR VKDUH WKHLU ³YLHZV DQG FRQFHUQV´ DQG VHHN
reparations,124 particularly in the prosecution and punishment of the leaders and 
masterminds behind core international crimes.125 With the conviction of Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo for war crimes under Article 8(2)(e)(vii),126 the Court handed down its 
first sentencing decision127 and decision on reparations for victims.128 
In considering the regionalisation of ICrimJ, it is nevertheless appreciated that 
there is still a need to tackle transitional justice issues, including sustaining peace in 
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the post-conflict phase,129 national reconstruction and societal reintegration.130 As 
retributive justice and criminal trials address only one aspect of mass atrocities,131 a 
comprehensive response that restores peace and stability may entail a paradigm shift 
away from simply VXEPLWWLQJ WKHRIIHQGHU WR D µMXVW¶ UHVSRQVH.132 Depending on the 
context and nature of the crime(s), restorative justice and non-penal forms of regional 
accountability could be more appropriate.133 Indeed, such mechanisms are said to 
more effectively fulfil the functions of trials in strained and divergent societies, whilst 
creating fewer problems.134 Less formal institutions of punishment and extra-legal 
mechanisms of accountability may thus prove suitable as regional ICrimJ initiatives. 
Hence, amnesties and truth commissions should be examined to determine 
whether they can be appropriate and responsive regional mechanisms to further 
ICrimJ. Amnesties are often negotiated (or offered) as part of a peace agreement or 
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the transition between regimes.135 They prevent prosecution under law and absolve 
otherwise criminal acts in order to end hostilities, restore peace or facilitate the 
transfer of power. Amnesties have even been supported by the international 
community,136 and may be even better received by neighbouring countries in the 
affected region if they help stop the conflict and its negative cross-border effects, 
including the flow of combatant and refugees. While sometimes a pragmatic means to 
avoid further atrocities and critical to post-conflict reconciliation and reintegration 
processes,137 amnesties could however conflict with international law.138 However, 
regardless of whether a State has breached international treaty or customary law by 
granting them,139 national amnesties do not deprive other States or an international 
court of the universal jurisdiction to prosecute individuals accused of core 
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Human Rights Accountability (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Mark Freeman, 
Necessary Evils: Amnesties and the Search for Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); 
Lousie Mallinder, Amnesty, Human Rights and Political Transitions (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008); 
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 0LFKDHO 6FKDUI ³7KH $PQHVW\ ([FHSWLRQ WR WKH -XULVGLFWLRQ RI WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO
&ULPLQDO &RXUW´ Cornell International Law Journal 32 (1999):507-527; and William Burke-White, 
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Legislation´Harvard International Law Journal 42 (2001):467-533, at 482.  
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 In the Kallon and Kamara case, the SCSL held that while an international norm that a State cannot 
grant amnesty for core international crimes is developing, it has yet to crystallize. Prosecutor v. Kallon 
and Kamara, Case Nos. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E) and SCSL-2004-16-AR72(E), Appeals Chamber, 
Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty, 13 March 2004, at para.82. 
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international crimes.140 Indeed, cases barred from domestic prosecutions by amnesties 
do not fall within the list of inadmissible situations covered by the ICC Statute,141 and 
clearly can be brought before the Court (or States Parties) if jurisdictional 
requirements are met.142 Unconditional amnesties that had been traded for peace or a 
regime change in a political settlement are thus prevented from advancing impunity. 
Individualised and conditioned amnesties tied to the process of genuine national 
invHVWLJDWRU\ RU µWUXWK¶ FRPPLVVLRQV DUH KRZHYHU QRW YLHZHG LQ WKH VDPH
unfavourable light.143 These processes could then possibly be supervised by regional 
commissions of inquiry for even greater legitimacy and credibility.144 
In this regard, truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs)145 are another 
SRWHQWLDO VROXWLRQ WKDW FDQ EH UHSOLFDWHG DW D UHJLRQDO OHYHO WR HQVXUH ³MXVWLFH LV QRW
HQWLUHO\VDFULILFHGWRWKHFDXVHRISHDFH´146 They proffer an attractive modality for a 
regional mechanism that may achieve both peace and justice more effectively than 
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 For example, while amnesty granted in the Lomé Agreement precludes domestic prosecutions in 
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a temporary body; (4) officially sanctioned or empowered by the concerned State; and (5) work directly 
and broadly with the affected population to gather information on their experiences. See Priscilla 
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$&RPSDUDWLYH6WXG\´Human Rights Quarterly 
16 (1994)597-655, at 604; and Priscilla Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the 
Challenge of Truth Commissions 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2011), at 11-12. 
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 Dugard,  supra n.138, at 1015. 
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trials,147 especially in communities where societal cohesion is important.148 A regional 
TRC could not only record and reflect history more comprehensively given its remit 
to contextualise the atrocities,149 but also strengthen the rule of law by educating 
regional societies about the wrongfulness of the acts and deterring future 
misconduct.150 While being less offender-oriented and more focused on helping 
victims and their families,151 they can also contribute significantly to accountability 
and justice by either working in tandem with prosecutions or standing in their place 
when criminal trials are not feasible.152 That said, they must not be deemed a panacea 
given their inability to directly punish malefactors,153 and certainly not a general 
substitute for criminal prosecutions of international crimes.154 A regional TRC can be 
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 Landsman believes that TRCs provide most of the benefits ascribed to the prosecutorial approach, 
including identifying past crimes, facilitating social criticism of such acts and reinforcing respect for 
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Unity: Political Theory and the Idea of a Truth and 5HFRQFLOLDWLRQ&RPPLVVLRQ´University of Toronto 
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judicial approach may otherwise be infeasible. Steven Ratner and Jason Abrams, Accountability For 
Human Rights Atrocities in International Law: Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), at 239. 
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 Such efforts could include, identifying victims, officially acknowledging their suffering, providing 
them with opportunities to confront the past and move on, and establishing a basis for reparations.   
152 TRCs can be an effective complement or precursor to criminal trials. They may compel perpetrators 
to incriminate themselves; morally condemn the perpetrators of abuses; and prepare the ground for 
prosecutions or other sanctions. Hayner notes that most TRCs do not interfere with or duplicate any 
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(2011), supra n.145, at 13. 
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Lynn Berat and YRVVL6KDLQ³5HWULEXWLRQRU7UXWK-telling in South Africa? Legacies of the Transitional 
3KDVH´Law and Social Inquiry 20 (1995):163-189, at 188. 
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 Bassioni argues that there can be no impunity for jus cogens crimes and prosecution is essential, 
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that it may be hard to object if States with finite resources decide to prosecute selectively. Bassiouni, 
supra n.107, at 20; Landsman, supra n.147, at 92; and Broomhall, supra n.112, at 98. 
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considered if the social and political environments permit,155 and it can be tailored to 
suit that unique context.156 In essence, it must not end up being abused by States to 
implicitly promote impunity by becoming a political façade and simply excusing past 
abuses. A regional TRC must be able to conduct genuine and effective investigations, 
acknowledge the harm done, provide a platform for survivors to bear witness, and 
offer an avenue for redress and reconciliation. 
In sum, conditional amnesties and TRCs have been seen as effective conduits 
IRU DQ LQFUHDVLQJO\ µWUXWK-IRFXVHG¶ DQG UHFRQFLOLDWRU\ SDUDGLJP DQG PD\ EH XVHIXO
tools for a regional ICrimJ mechanism. Although they are more responsive to the 
spill-over effects and contextual complexities of international crimes, non-penal 
measures are nonetheless not always appropriate. Such alternative forms of 
accountability do not offer a good determination of an offender¶V FXOSDELOLW\ RU DQ
accurate reflection of the seriousness of the crime, and are no substitute for criminal 
trials. While they are of significant practical value as alternatives to prosecution for 
lower-level offenders,157  these processes clearly must work in tandem with criminal 
trials ± where perpetrators not granted conditional amnesties are then prosecuted.158  
Moreover, criminal accountability and punishment remain the best way to handle 
higher-level perpetrators of core crimes. This is particularly true when it is recalled 
that the global community of States not only seeks to punish and deter such offenders, 
but often also to symbolically (and politically) paint their actions as nothing less than 
sheer evil. 
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likely to spark a backlash than that of lower-level war criminals. Bass, supra n.92, at 301. 
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 Ratner argues that judicialisation is acceptable if it does not divert limited resources from equally 
important approaches like diplomacy, negotiation, and sanctions. 6WHYHQ 5DWQHU ³7KH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO
CrimLQDO &RXUW DQG WKH /LPLWV RI *OREDO -XGLFLDOL]DWLRQ´ Texas International Law Journal 38 
(2003):445-453, at 445. 
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4.2 The Appropriate Form(s) For An ASEAN Regional Mechanism  
 
Bearing in mind that interpersonal relationships between ASEAN leaders affect 
the political and practical realities in the region, the main functions and focus of 
ICrimJ amongst the interdependent countries of Southeast Asia are better 
framed as deterrence and reconciliation, rather than punishment. In this vein, it 
is recalled that the clear-cut closure that exists in the prosecutorial process does not 
translate into reconciliation among enemies in a divided society, let alone bring about 
national reconstruction and societal reintegration. It is also noted that non-penal 
options and alternative processes are not only legitimate and valid, but have been 
mainstreamed in the ICrimJ system. Amnesties and truth commissions could therefore 
be more appropriate amongst AMS and face less opposition when the conflict has 
cross-border elements and/or effects. Indeed, after winning independence, even the 
East Timorese government acknowledged the benefits of post-conflict 
reconciliation with Indonesia over legal proceedings under a criminal tribunal.159 
Restorative justice and non-penal forms of regional accountability may then be more 
acceptable in the informal and face-conscious ASEAN context. 
That said, this does not in any way imply that criminal prosecution and 
sanctions are inappropriate modalities for Southeast Asia. Even though restorative 
justice is a viable alternative to prosecution for masses of lower-level offenders, 
criminal accountability and punishment may be the better approach for higher-level 
perpetrators of international/regional crimes. In such cases, it is difficult to ignore the 
appeal of the predictability and certainty of outcome that exists in a judicial decision. 
Besides the rationale for criminal prosecutions and penal sanctions, formal trials must 
also remain an integral part of the regional ICrimJ process if ASEAN countries 
envision a credible regional alternative to the ICC, especially one that can justifiably 
claim jurisdiction over an international crime.160 An impetus, albeit not 
overwhelming, therefore exists for AMS to create a regional criminal court. Four 
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 To investigate and document the human rights violations and make recommendations for legal 
proceedings, East Timor established the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation 
(CAVR) in 2002. Released in January 2005, its report detailed the human rights abuses that 
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responsible. That same year, however, the governments of East Timor and Indonesia 
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establish the conclusive truth and promote reconciliation and friendship, which recommended 
amnesties for perpetrators of serious crimes. 
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 See deliberation in Chapter 3, including brief discussion on the ne bis in idem regime of the ICC. 
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possible pathways have been identified by Burke-White: (1) creation of regional 
international criminal courts; (2) ICC sitting regionally; (3) jurisdictional preference to 
be granted to States within the region in which the crime occurred; and (4) creation of 
specialised domestic courts with regional judges.161 Some of these pathways are 
briefly touched upon later in relation to their practical viability in Southeast Asia. 
However, irrespective of which model is used, proper procedures will be required to 
ensure that defendant rights to a fair trial are safeguarded and participating survivors 
have a meaningful experience without undue administrative problems.162 This may 
provide the ICC with an opportunity to engage ASEAN and influence the 
development of regional ICrimJ norms and procedures.163  
As previously highlighted, Kenya had suggested, inter alia, an amendment to 
the Preamble of the ICC Statute with regards to its complementarity,164 in line with 
the work of the AU to create a regional criminal court to prosecute alleged crimes 
committed on the continent.165 A decision on amendments to the ICC Statute could 
not be taken at the ICC ASP meeting in November 2013 due to the requirement under 
Article 121(2) of the Statute, which states that three months notice is required.166 It is 
however noteworthy that the ASP allowed amendments to the rules of procedure: 
dealing with pre-recorded testimony (Rule 68); allowing a change in the place of 
proceedings (Rule 100); permitting suspects to be away from trial and represented by 
lawyers (Rule 134).167 The amendment to Rule 100 is significant for this discussion 
EHFDXVH WKH&RXUW LVQRZFOHDUO\DOORZHG WRVLW LQDQRWKHU6WDWH³WRKHDU WKHFDVH LQ
whole or LQSDUW´168 Given that the ASP adopted by consensus the rules amendments, 
it may also accept some changes proposed by Kenya to the ICC Statute and 
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ASP resolution, ICC-ASP/12/Res.3, 27 November 2013.  
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Preamble.169 In the meantime, the AU will continue the process of expanding the 
AfCHPR mandate to try international crimes,170 potentially disregarding the ICC and 
ignoring possible overlaps between the two judicial bodies.171 It is therefore vital for 
the ICC to accommodate and engage such initiatives to avoid being shut out from the 
regional process. 
Taking a leaf from the evolutionary stages (none, promotional, 
implementation, enforcement, strong enforcement) of human rights regimes espoused 
by Donnelly,172 it is however clear that ASEAN is not even at the declaratory or 
promotional phase for ICrimJ.173 Regardless of any defensible legal arguments, 
ASEAN is thus unlikely, in the near future, to create a judicial organ with strong 
enforcement regimes capable of issuing authoritative and binding judgments against 
member States or their nationals who commit serious crimes, like egregious violation 
of human rights.174 Although it represents the ultimate form of formal criminal justice, 
the necessary preconditions and adversarial culture do not yet exist for the creation of 
a regional criminal court in Southeast Asia.175 Given that only two out of the ten 
ASEAN countries have signed and ratified the Rome Statute, it is also improbable that 
the ICC can sit regionally in Southeast Asia soon, or that there can even be a hybrid 
criminal court comprising of both regional judges and ICC judges.176  
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As such, even if the countries of Southeast Asia saw a pressing need to create 
an additional layer between the ICC and themselves, it is probably premature to 
envision the creation of a permanent regional court, or specialised domestic courts 
with a ready bench of regional judges. For political and resourcing reasons, ASEAN is 
unlikely to undertake any immediate or great degree of institutional change and 
development.177 Maintaining a permanent legal infrastructure will not only be 
extremely onerous for the developing countries in the region, but also difficult in 
terms of applying consistent procedures and standards for arrests, detentions and 
investigations across all ten AMS. Hence, it would be pointless to immediately insist 
on a permanent regional judicial organ if ASEAN presently does not have the 
bandwidth or necessary funding to do the work. The most likely collective response 
involving a formal judicial institution will probably be on an ad hoc basis.178 
As countries will still have to carry out the sentences of a regionally 
constituted court, there will also be a difficult process of ensuring that all domestic 
laws, criminal codes and sentencing regimes are sufficiently modified to incorporate 
all the international (and regional) crimes that the AMS can find consensus on. Given 
this fact and the way that ASEAN operates, jurisdictional preference will then most 
probably be granted to States in which the crimes occurred. It should be noted that in 
East Timor, while the Special Panels for Serious Crimes (SPSC) of the Dili District 
Court179 had convicted various individuals,180 there was immense practical and 
logistical problems due to the complete lack of cooperation by Indonesia.181 
Furthermore, no individual AMS was willing to get involved. The reality is that, to 
maintain regional peace and security, trade-offs may be needed when attempting to 
prevent impunity for international (and regional) crimes. The question will therefore 
be how an ASEAN mechanism on ICrimJ can operate in reality, while complementing 
rather than duplicating, or worse working counter to, efforts at the international and 
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 Katsumata believes that, despite their impressive reform plans, AMS have taken few concrete 
measures to implHPHQWWKHP³VLPSO\EHFDXVHWKH\DUHDWKHDUWGLVLQFOLQHGWRGRVR´+LUR.DWVXPDWD
³$6($1DQGKXPDQULJKWVUHVLVWLQJ:HVWHUQSUHVVXUHRUHPXODWLQJWKH:HVW"´The Pacific Review 22 
(2009): 619±637, at 629. 
178
 Peace support ooperations in Southeast Asia would similarly be based on ad hoc foundations that 
UHVWXSRQELODWHUDORUPXOWLODWHUDO³FRDOLWLRQVRIWKHZLOOLQJ´McCoubrey, supra n.12, at 58. 
179
 Established under UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) Regulation 
No.2000/15, the panels had exclusive jurisdiction over serious criminal offences. See UNTAET Reg. 
No.2000/15 of 5 July 2000. 
180
 See paragraph 26, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission of Support in East 
Timor, UN doc. S/2004/333 (2004). 
181
 See Suzannah Linton, ³3URVHFXWLQJ$WURFLWLHVDW WKH'LVWULFW&RXUWRI'LOL´Melbourne Journal of 
International Law 2 (2001): 414-458. 
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national levels.  
Given the 'ASEAN way' of making decisions through consultation and 
consensus, which typically results in the lowest common denominator that all AMS 
can unanimously accept, a regional solution in Southeast Asia logically needs to begin 
with a relatively low level of commitment, such as the affirmation of global ICL 
norms and practices. This approach not only acknowledges that the ASEAN 
Secretariat has limited resources, but also that AMS remain hesitant about adopting 
binding obligations. In its institutional capacity, ASEAN may then gradually consider 
coordinating the promotion of ICL-related conventions and instruments, as well as 
incorporating regional norms and practices.182 This will ensure that the regional 
mechanism will complement rather than conflict with international efforts. Such 
internally initiated promotional activities are less likely to upset the regional status 
quo, and thus more likely to be accepted and adopted by AMS compared to external 
pressure or insistence to ratify the ICC Statute.  
The next step could be to create a consultative mechanism to discuss ICL 
within an ASEAN context, and develop cross-cultural consensus on goals and 
approaches.183 Subsequently, regional monitoring procedures and commissions of 
inquiry can then be considered and implemented. Chesterman highlights that 
monitoring on a multitude of issues already takes place in many different forms within 
the ASEAN community, including implementation status reports by States, 
evaluations by the ASEAN Secretariat, and discussions at an ASEAN ministerial 
meeting.184 Such regional monitoring serves various purposes.185 Firstly, it ensures 
that AMS fulfil their regionally agreed obligations, ranging from strict treaty 
compliance to formal implementation in domestic legislation. Secondly, it fleshes out 
the exact content of the obligation, thereby providing the basis for a binding 
agreement in the future. Thirdly, it aids the implementation process in the longer term 
by determining the assistance required for State compliance. Last but not least, it 
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 One possible solution is for ASEAN countries to internally develop a regional treaty on ICrimJ that 
is not only realistic and achievable, but most importantly endorsed by member States. 
183
 Despite their non-ratification of the ICC Statute, continued engagement of AMS by the Court may 
WKHQKHOS³SURPRWHWKHLQWHUQDOL]DWLRQRIQRUPV´FRQVLVWHQWZLWKLWVDLPV.DSXUsupra n.7, at 1059. 
184
 Chesterman notes that there has been a clear increase in the willingness of all AMS to monitor their 
mutual obligations. This is partly due to the general increase in comfort towards international 
obligations, and the need to confront specific collective action pUREOHPV6LPRQ&KHVWHUPDQ³7DNLQJ
WKH$6($1&RPPXQLW\6HULRXVO\´Straits Times, 3 August 2013. 
185
 6HH6LPRQ &KHVWHUPDQ ³,QWURGXFWLRQ DQG&KDSWHU2QH )URP&RPPXQLW\ WR&RPSOLDQFH"´ The 
Evolution of Monitoring Obligations in ASEAN (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
Forthcoming. 
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serves a symbolic purpose, indicating that an issue is considered important by the 
regional community of States in Southeast Asia. 
 Ultimately, regional monitoring of ICL commitments should entail greater 
respect for ICrimJ in Southeast Asia, as well as encourage acceptance and promote 
implementation at the domestic level. It is possible that situations could also be 
referred to a regional monitoring group or commission of inquiry created by ASEAN 
to investigate crimes that occur within member States. As outlined in Chapter 1, 
regional oversight and pressure will have greater influence on the concerned State(s), 
and may then deter outcomes like those in the Indonesian domestic trials for crimes 
against humanity committed in 1999 under its Ad Hoc Human Rights Tribunal for 
East Timor,186 where concrete evidence of violations compiled by the Serious Crimes 
Unit of the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) was disregarded.187 
While jurisdiction for criminal prosecutions will likely be assumed by the affected 
State(s), the regional mechanism may potentially also be able to oversee truth and 
reconciliation functions, as well as issues like amnesties and collective reparations188. 
They not only serve as recognition of the crimes committed and the suffering of the 
victims, but also acknowledge a wider victim group, including those not involved in 
formal criminal proceedings. Such regional monitoring and non-judicial mechanisms 
may eventually lead to the acceptance for and establishment of a regional judicial 
organ able to issue authoritative and binding judgments against AMS or their nationals 
who commit serious regional crimes. This regional court could potentially also 
consider situations put forward by the AICHR. Victim participation schemes can 
possibly also be jointly designed and incorporated into both formal judicial and 
informal accountability processes.189 The realisation of a regional criminal court in 
Southeast Asia will then rely on a high level of political acquiescence, as well as the 
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 6X]DQQDK /LQWRQ ³8QUDYHOOLQJ WKH )LUVW 7KUHH 7ULDOV DW ,QGRQHVLD¶V $G +RF &RXUW IRU +XPDQ
5LJKWV9LRODWLRQVLQ(DVW7LPRU´Leiden Journal of International Law 17 (2004):303-361. 
187
 At least 10 Indonesian security personnel were acquitted by the Indonesian tribunal despite the 
evidence. As such, some suspect that the domestic trial was an attempt to ensure that the Indonesian 
military personnel could not be subjected to future hearings initiated by the international community. 
Toon, supra n.59, at 223.  
188
 A Trust Fund for Victims, akin to that created by the ICC Statute, could be considered. This may 
provide the ICC with another opportunity to engage ASEAN and influence the development of ICrimJ 
norms. 
189
 Victim participation may do more harm than good if it is not properly managed. Christine van den 
:\QJDHUW³9LFWLPVEHIRUH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&ULPLQDO&RXUWV6RPH9LHZVDQG&RQFHUQVRIDQ,&&7ULDO
-XGJH´Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 44 (2011): 475-496, at 494-496. 
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availability of resources and institutional infrastructure.190 
 
4.3 Conclusion 
 
In developing a regional option, it should be noted that ICL is predominantly based on 
Western legal precepts of retributive justice and punishment, and a stringent and 
formalistic conception of ICrimJ overlooks the fact that States respond differently to 
various legal, political and economic pressures.191 A conscious effort must therefore 
be taken not to ignore restorative and indigenous conceptions of justice,192 or 
alternative mechanisms of accountability like TRCs and conditional amnesties.193 
Indeed, it is better to adopt the principle fiat iustitia ne pereat mundus (let justice be 
done, lest the world perish), than to strictly follow the maxim fiat iustitia et pereat 
mundus (let justice be done, though the world perish). Yet, this does not imply that 
criminal prosecution and sanctions are inappropriate modalities for holding 
individuals responsible for core international crimes. The reality is that maintaining 
international peace and preventing impunity are complex tasks, and it is inadvisable to 
simply dismiss any available option. Despite their contextual limitations, criminal 
trials must also remain an important and indispensible tool for the ICrimJ,194 
especially if States hope to develop both a credible regional alternative and extra layer 
to avoid ICC scrutiny. The corollary is that engagement of regional mechanisms by 
the ICC, as well as greater transparency and consistency in the articulation and 
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 In terms of relationship and interaction with the ICC, much will depend on the direction set by the 
AU push for the AfCHPR to prosecute international crimes on the continent.   
191
 Bass argues that not only is crucial flexibility lost when politics is linked to law, but a moralistic 
LQVLVWHQFH RQ SXQLVKPHQW PD\ DOVR PDNH LW LPSRVVLEOH WR QHJRWLDWH ZLWK ³EORRGVWDLQHG OHDGHUV ZKR
KRZHYHU UHSXOVLYH PLJKW HQG D ZDU´0RUHRYHU'UXPEO QRWHV WKDW DQ XQ\LHOGLQJ IRFXVRQ FULPLQDO
prosecutions may consolidate belligerent group identities, prolong conflict, and undermine peace and 
reconciliation in dualist post-conflict societies. Bass, supra n.92, at 285; and Drumbl, supra n.134, at 
1308. 
192
 Carlowitz notes that most international legal experts not only possess little understanding of local 
languages, structures, and legal systems, but also tend to ignore indigenous norms and values. Mani 
FRQWHQGVWKDWµDOLHQOHJDOV\VWHPV¶DUHWKXVGHVLJQHGDQGLPSRVHGRQWKHUHFLSLHQWFRXQWU\ZLWKOLWWOHRU
no domestic FRQVXOWDWLRQ/HRSROGYRQ&DUORZLW]³&URVVLQJWKH%RXQGDU\IURPWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDOWRWKH
'RPHVWLF/HJDO5HDOP810,./DZPDNLQJDQG3URSHUW\5LJKWVLQ.RVRYR´, Global Governance 10 
(2004):307- DW  DQG 5DPD 0DQL ³&RQIOLFW 5HVROXWLRQ -XVWLFH DQG Whe Law: Rebuilding the 
5XOH RI /DZ LQ WKH $IWHUPDWK RI &RPSOH[ 3ROLWLFDO (PHUJHQFLHV´ International Peacekeeping 5 
(1998):1-25, at 7.  
193
 See Lessa and Payne, supra n.138; Freeman, supra n.138; and Mallinder, supra n.138. 
194
 Trial justice also serves an important symbolic role. By investigating the crime and prosecuting 
high-level offenders, the international community makes clear that it condemns the illegal actions and 
is determined to punish the guilty. 
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application of complementarity, would guide States to comply with the minimum 
standards set by the Court. 
7KH QRWLRQ RI UHJLRQDOLVLQJ ,&ULP- SUHVHQWV DQ RSSRUWXQLW\ WR µWKLQN RXWVLGH
WKHER[¶DQGPDke ICL increasingly responsive and relevant to specific needs on the 
ground. The techniques and processes to adopt in different regions may then be 
allowed to vary depending on existing legal values and norms, available resources and 
institutional infrastructure, as well as political considerations. The best conception of a 
regional solution for Southeast Asia is then a flexible and nuanced one, comprising of 
a blend of retributive and restorative justice, beginning as informal mechanisms that 
can develop into formal processes and perhaps even a permanent regional criminal 
court.195 Separately, such regional initiatives will allow States to address serious 
crimes that are perhaps more pressing in their region ± without the onerous and 
sometime debilitating need to achieve a global accord. In this connection, the next 
FKDSWHUZLOOGHOLEHUDWHKRZDµUHJLRQDOFULPH¶PD\EHFRQVWLWXWHGDQG what could be 
such a crime in Southeast Asia. 
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 Weinstein and Stover argue that justice is most efIHFWLYH ZKHQ LW ³ZRUNV LQ FRQVRUW ZLWK RWKHU
processes of social reconstruction and reflects the needs and wishes of those most affected by 
YLROHQFH´+DUYH\:HLQVWHLQDQG(ULF6WRYHU³,QWURGXFWLRQ&RQIOLFW-XVWLFHDQG5HFODPDWLRQ´ in Eric 
Stover and Harvey Weinstein, eds., My Neighbor, My Enemy: Justice and Community in the Aftermath 
of Mass Atrocity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), at 11. 
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CHAPTER 5 
(67$%/,6+,1*µ5(*,21$/&5,0(6¶,16287+($67$6,$ 
 
The regionalisation of ICrimJ has been presented as an avenue for different parts of 
the world to adopt different techniques and processes based on local legal norms and 
values, political considerations of peace and stability, as well as available resources. 
In the previous chapter, the appropriate form(s) for a regional ICrimJ mechanism in 
Southeast Asia was discussed. This chapter will then proceed to deliberate what 
µUHJLRQDOFULPHV¶PD\IDOOZLWKLQWKHMXULVGLFWLRQRIVXFKDPHFKDQLVP5HSUHVHQWLQJ
the most serious crimes of concern to the regional community, the requirements for 
regional crimes clearly cannot be simply derived from the cross-border nature and 
effects of the conduct, or that cooperation between countries in Southeast Asia is 
required to tackle the probleP,QWKHVDPHYHLQQRWDOOWUDQVQDWLRQDOµWUHDW\FULPHV¶
between ASEAN member States (AMS) should equated with core international 
crimes, just because extraterritorial jurisdiction, extradition, and other collaborative 
efforts or mutual assistance between States are necessary to deter and prosecute the 
criminal elements.  
Rather, the emphasis for the formulation of regional crimes must be focused on the 
fact that they will ultimately be determined by regional countries. Based on the 
insights gained from the concept of an international crime, it is recognised that the 
opinio juris of the global community of States ultimately determines what is 
considered an international crime. It is therefore logical and prudent to develop the 
notion of regional crimes in Southeast Asia from the perspective of ASEAN 
countries.1 In this regard, the ILC discussions on what acts are deemed international 
crimes may prove illuminating because they not only chronicle the changing legal 
considerations since WWII,2 but also reflect the differing political attitudes of States 
and vicissitudes of international realpolitik.3 
                                          
1
 Some AMS are known to enter reservations that will significantly affect the applicability of 
international treaties. For example, Brunei and Malaysia subject their international obligations to 
Islamic and domestic law, 
2
 This includes both the illuminating ILC discussions on the Draft Code of Offences (and later Crimes) 
against the Peace and Security of Mankind, as well as on State responsibility. 
3
 While it may be criticised, the conservative ILC approach to factor the comments and possible support 
from States is most reflective of their recognition and acceptance of various acts as international crimes. 
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Since the international community had already accepted several other acts as 
international crimes before the crystallisation of the ICC regime, regional crimes may 
not be limited to the crimes recognised by the Court. It is possible that additional 
UHJLRQDOFULPHVFDQDOVREHFXOOHGIURPH[LVWLQJµWUHDW\FULPHV¶ZLWKVSHFLILF
relevance in Southeast Asia. In this regard, the chapter considers whether a regional 
mechanism should be limited to coordinating the promotion and protection of ICL-
related international treaties that all ten AMS have ratified. Alternatively, it could be 
mandated to incorporate regional conventions and instruments.4  It is noteworthy that 
although all AMS have ratified or acceded to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, only 
seven have signed the 1948 Genocide Convention.5 Nevertheless, given their 
international acceptance and established position as substantive law, it will be 
unnecessary to deliberate the validity and inclusion of genocide, crimes against 
KXPDQLW\DQGZDUFULPHVZLWKLQDQ$6($1,&ULP-PHFKDQLVP*LYHQ$6($1¶V
role as a collective security organisation, there may also be regional interest in the 
definition of the crime of aggression adopted by the ICC.6 The first two sections of the 
chapter will thus survey the concept of an international crime and posit how the notion 
of a regional crime can be best developed, bearing in mind that it must appeal to self-
interested sovereign States. Using the proposed criteria, the chapter then proposes 
some acts that may constitute and be labelled as regional crimes by the countries of 
Southeast Asia. 
 
5.1 Surveying the Concept of an International Crime 
 
Just after WWII, Schwarzenberger highlighted that the corpus of ICL still did not exist 
and there was no overarching supranational mechanism to enforce it.7 ICL has since 
developed as a branch of public international law, with attention most recently being 
IRFXVHG RQ WKH µFRUH FULPHV¶ WKDW IDOO ZLWKLQ WKH MXUisdiction of the ICC and entail 
individual criminal responsibility for their violations. The ICC Statute has not only 
                                          
4
 Boister points out that ICL is clearly subdivided into international crimes stricto sensu ³FRUHFULPHV´
DQGFULPHVRI LQWHUQDWLRQDOFRQFHUQ³WUHDW\FULPHV´1HLO%RLVWHU³µ7UDQVQDWLRQDO&ULPLQDO/DZ¶"´
European Journal of International Law 14 (2003):953-976. 
5
 The three countries that have not are Brunei, Indonesia, and Thailand. 
6
 7KH ,&& KDV VLQFH GHILQHG WKH ³FULPH RI DJJUHVVLRQ´ DV WKH SODQQLQJ SUHSDUDWLRQ LQLWLDWLRQ RU
execution of an act of using armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or 
political independence of another State. 
7
 *HRUJ6FKZDU]HQEHUJHU³7KH-XGJPHQWRI1XUHPEHUJ´Tulane Law Review 21 (1947): 329-361 at 
349. 
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offered more exhaustive definitions of some international crimes, but also served to 
codify various aspects of ICL. By dealing with ICL in a more coherent manner, the 
ICC has further provided an implicit doctrinal basis for the international 
criminalisation process.  
/LPLWLQJ FULPHV XQGHU WKH UXEULF RI ,&/ WR WKH FXUUHQW IRXU µFRUH FULPHV¶
would however give an incomplete and distorted view of what constitutes an 
international crime. This is because the concept of an international crime has existed 
long before the crystallisation of the ICC regime,8 and several other acts had already 
been widely accepted by States as international crimes.9 For example, piracy is an 
international crime that had been recognised as early as the seventeenth century.10 All 
States have since been empowered to capture on the high seas and prosecute pirates, 
who are deemed hostes humani generis (enemies of humanity).11 Considered a relic of 
legal history for much of the 20th century,12 maritime piracy has been brought to the 
fore again with the recent attacks and threats to international shipping, particularly off 
the Somali coast.13 This development illustrates that it would be rash to discard older 
conceptions of international crimes and only focus on those that were the proverbial 
µIODYRXURIWKHGD\¶ 
Another well-established example of an international crime that has become 
part of customary international law and attained jus cogens status is the prohibition 
                                          
8
 It is worth recalling that the ILC had proposed that ICC jurisdiction be ³OLPLWHG Wo crimes of an 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOFKDUDFWHUGHILQHGLQVSHFLILHGLQWHUQDWLRQDOWUHDWLHVLQIRUFH´ Furthermore, the Final Act of 
5RPH&RQIHUHQFHDOVRUHFRPPHQGHG5HVROXWLRQ(IRUDUHYLHZFRQIHUHQFHWR³FRQVLGHUWKHFULPHVRI
terrorism and drug crimes with a view to arriving at an acceptable definition and their inclusion in the 
OLVW RI FULPHV ZLWKLQ WKH MXULVGLFWLRQ RI WKH &RXUW´ 6HH 'RFXPHQW $&1/ SDUDV E-(c), in 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1992, vol. II (Part Two), at 58,; commentaries on 
Article 20, in particular paras 18(a)-(b), in Document A/CN.4/L.491/Rev.2/Add.1, at 27-28; and 
A/CONF.183/10 (Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court) of 17 July 1998. 
9
 Bassiouni argues that sufficient legal basis existed to conclude that the following international crimes 
were even part of jus cogens: (1) aggression; (2) genocide; (3) crimes against humanity; (4) war crimes; 
(5) piracy; (6) slavery and slave-UHODWHGSUDFWLFHVDQG WRUWXUH0&KHULI%DVVLRXQL³,QWHUQDWLRQDO
Crimes: Jus Cogens DQG2EOLJDWLRQ(UJD2PQHV´Law and Contemporary Problems 59 (1996):63-74. 
10
 An example of a 17th century discussion of the ignominious act of piracy can be found in De Iure 
Praedae by Hugo Grotius. Hugo Grotius, De Iure Praedae Commentarius [Commentary on the Law of 
Prize and Booty] , trans. Gwladys Williams and Walter Zeydel (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950). 
11
 This is in order for States to safeguard their shared interest to fight a common danger to the freedom 
of the high seas, as well as the damage to or loss of private property.  
12
 This was partly reflected by the ILC decision to omit piracy, an international crime under customary 
international law, from the draft Code of Crimes (discussed in detail below) as it was doubtful that the 
offence would still constitute a threat to the peace and security of mankind. See Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission, 1984, vol. II (Part Two), para.65(c)(vi), at 17. 
13
 The relevance of maritime piracy in Southeast Asia is discussed later in this chapter.  
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against slavery and slave-related practices.14 Indeed, about 300 international 
agreements were estimated to have been implemented to suppress slavery between 
1815 and 1957,15 and the ICJ even identified protection from slavery as an obligation 
erga omnes arising from the principles and rules concerning basic human rights.16 
Like piracy, slavery in its contemporary forms may differ from historical practices, 
but remains no less relevant or important to the international community.17 
An international crime that then developed in the post-WWII era is apartheid.18 
The 1973 Apartheid Convention19 not only declares that apartheid is a crime against 
humanity,20 but also states that inhuman acts resulting from such policies and 
pracWLFHVRIUDFLDOVHJUHJDWLRQDQGGLVFULPLQDWLRQZHUH³FULPHVYLRODWLQJWKHSULQFLSOHV
RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ´ DQG FRQVWLWXWHV ³D VHULRXV WKUHDW WR LQWHUQDWLRQDO SHDFH DQG
VHFXULW\´21 Moreover, it adds that international criminal responsibility will apply to 
individuals.22 Bassiouni and Derby thus argue that the Apartheid Convention clearly 
GHILQHVDSDUWKHLGDVDQLQWHUQDWLRQDOFULPHDQG³DOWKRXJKYDULRXVVWDWHVPD\IHHOWKH
harmful effects of the crime, it is to be punished in the name of or on behalf of the 
wRUOGFRPPXQLW\´23 With the inclusion of apartheid as a crime within the ICC Statute 
(Articles 7(1)(j) and (2)(h)), claims that a customary rule on apartheid exists have 
been strengthened.24  
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 0 &KHULI %DVVLRXQL ³(QVODYHPHQW DV DQ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &ULPH´ New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics 23 (1991):445-517. 
15
 Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Abolishing Slavery and its Contemporary 
Forms, UN Doc. HR/PUB/02/4, 2002. 
16
 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co, Ltd (Belgium v. Spain) (Second Phase), Judgment of 5 
February 1971: ICJ Rep 1970, at 32.  
17
 The 1926 Slavery Convention was the first to define slavery, criminalise the proscribed conduct 
(Article 6), and establish a duty to prosecute violations (Articles 2, 3, and 6). The 1956 Supplementary 
Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to 
Slavery further obliged States parties to also abolish institutions and practices collectively identified as 
³VHUYLOH VWDWXV´ +RZHYHU VODYHU\ LQ LWV FRQWHPSRUDU\ IRUPV UHPDLQHG SUHYDOHQW Gue in part to the 
evolution of slavery-like practices whilst the concept has stayed relatively static.  
18
 The crime of apartheid sprang from the UN opposition to the discriminatory racial policies of the 
South African Government (1948-1990), on the basis that they were contrary to Articles 55 and 56 of 
the UN Charter. It was annually condemned by the UNGA (1952-1990) and UNSC (after 1960). 
19
 Officially known as the Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, it 
was adopted by the UNGA on 30 November 1973 and came into force on 18 July 1976. 
20
 In 1966, the UNGA already characterised apartheid as a crime against humanity, a label that was also 
endorsed by the UNSC in 1984. See UN General Assembly Resolution 2202 (XXI) of 16 December 
1966; and UN Security Council Resolution 556 of 23 October 1984, UN Doc. S/Res/556 (1984). 
21
 See Article 1, Apartheid Convention.  
22
 See Article 3, Apartheid Convention.  
23
 0 &KHULI %DVVLRXQL DQG 'DQLHO 'HUE\ ³)LQDO 5HSRUW RQ WKH (VWDEOLVKPHQW RI DQ ,QWernational 
Criminal Court for the Implementation of the Apartheid Convention and Other Relevant International 
,QVWUXPHQWV´Hofstra Law Review 9 (1981):523-592, at 533. 
24
 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), at 
107. 
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Based on these examples from three different past centuries, two points are 
patently obvious. First, the notion of an international crime must necessarily be larger 
WKDQMXVWWKHµFRUHFULPHV¶6HH)LJXUH6HFRQGLQWHUQDWLRQDOFULPHVKDYHEHHQDQG
continue to be defined by States according to the needs of their time, with effective 
enforcement only possible when an overriding mutual interest exists and realpolitik 
does not get in the way.25 Given the politically driven and disjointed fashion in which 
the category of internationally prohibited acts developed over the centuries, there has 
been an insufficient body of international rules to elucidate the objective and 
subjective criteria for international crimes.26 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
Consequently, there has been an unsurprising plethora of definitions and 
differing lists of international crimes. For example, Trainin considers an international 
FULPH WR EH ³DQ LQIULQJHPHQW RI WKH FRQQHFWLRQ EHWZHHQ 6WDWHV DQG SHRSOHV D
FRQQHFWLRQZKLFKFRQVWLWXWHVWKHEDVLVRIUHODWLRQVEHWZHHQQDWLRQVDQGFRXQWULHV´27 
Separately, Pella notes that ³DFWLRQV RU QRQ-actions which violate the elementary 
principles considered as absolutely necessary for the maintenance of universal order 
DQGRI LQWHUQDWLRQDOSHDFH´ZHUH LQWHUQDWLRQDO LQIUDFWLRQV28 while Scelle argues that 
³DQ\DFWLRQZKLFKGLVWXUEHGLQWHrnational public order was a crime under international 
ODZ´29 These arguments support and highlight the underlying link between 
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 Indeed, Goldstone notes that the ad hoc LQWHUQDWLRQDOFULPLQDOWULEXQDOVRIWKHV³RZHGWKHLUYHU\
H[LVWHQFH WR SROLWLFDO GHFLVLRQV´ DQG WKDW RWKHU KXPDQLWDULDQ FULVHV WKDW HVFDSHG VFUXWLQ\ ³ZHUH
overlooked not necessarily because the atrocities were less heinous, but because of the crass political 
UHDOLWLHV RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO UHODWLRQV´ 5LFKDUG *ROGVWRQH South-East Asia and International Criminal 
Law (Oslo: Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, 2011), at 8. 
26
 The lack of any supranational judicial institution also meant that domestic legal systems were left to 
shape much of the substantive and procedural elements of ICL. Gideon Boas, James Bischoff, and 
Natalie Reid, Elements of Crimes under International Law ± International Criminal Law Practitioner 
Library Series Vol.II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), at 8. 
27
 Aron Trainin, Hitlerite Responsibility under Criminal Law (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1945), at 32. 
28
 Vespasien V. Pella, The Criminality of Wars of Aggression and the Organization of International 
Repressive Measures, Report of the 1925 Inter-Parliamentary Union, XXIII Conference, Washington 
and Ottawa, 1-13 October 1925, at 103. 
29
 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1949, vol. I, at 188.  
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international crimes and the ICrimJ goal of maintaining peace and security.30  
0RUHUHFHQWO\VRPHVFKRODUVKDYHXVHGµLQWHUQDWLRQDOFULPHV¶WRVLPSO\UHIHU
WRWKHµFRUHFULPHV¶WKDWDUHZLWKLQWKHMXULVGLFWLRQRILQWHUQDWLRQDOFRXUWVRUWULEXQDOV
under general international law.31 Yet, another set of scholars contend that the laying 
down of various classes of crimes to be punished in the Statutes of international courts 
DQG WULEXQDOV ZHUH ³VLPSO\ D VSHFLILFDWLRQ RI WKH MXULVGLFWLRQDO DXWKRULW\ RI WKH
UHOHYDQWFRXUW´DQG³GLGQRWSXUSRUW WRKDYHDJHQHUDOUHDFK´32 Similarly, Bassiouni 
recognises that there are some international crimes that have achieved jus cogens 
status, and argues that it is more important that they are effectively criminally 
prosecuted than the type of legal forum before which they are adjudicated.33 He 
QRQHWKHOHVV OLVWV ³WZHQW\-five categories of international crimHV´34 Separately, Van 
den Wyngaert identifies eighteen categories of international crimes based on 
international and European conventions since WWII.35 In sum, there has been no 
µHXUHNDPRPHQW¶LQ,&/ZKHUHDVLQJOHGHILQLWLYHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIZKDWYLRODWions of 
international law are international crimes was found.  
Yet, it is clear that not all transnational criminal activities should be elevated to 
WKHVWDWXVRILQWHUQDWLRQDOFULPHVOHWDORQHEHGHHPHGRQSDUZLWKWKHµFRUHFULPHV¶
simply because they attained global effect or reach.36 If they represent the most 
serious crimes of concern to the international community, the requirements for 
international crimes must necessarily be set at a higher threshold. International crimes 
should thus not arise simply due to the different nationalities of the perpetrators and 
victims, the cross-border nature and effects of the conduct, or the fact that the 
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 A later subsection on peremptory norms will briefly discuss whether common interests and values 
deemed as G¶RUGUHSXEOLF by a society constitute an indicia (or criteria) for international crimes, and 
whether a notion of regional jus cogens can then be a term of reference for regional crimes. 
31
 For example, see Robert Cryer et al., An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure, 
2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), at 4. 
32
 Antonio Cassese et al., International Criminal Law ± Cases and Commentary (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), at 115. 
33
 0&KHULI%DVVLRXQL³,QWHUQDWLRQDO&ULPLQDO-XVWLFHLQ+LVWRULFDO3HUVSHFWLYH7KH7HQVLRQ%HWZHHQ
6WDWHV¶ ,QWHUHVWV DQG WKH 3XUVXLW RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO -XVWLFH´ LQ $QWRQLR &DVVHVH HG The Oxford 
Companion to International Criminal Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), at 131. See also 
Bassiouni, supra n.9. 
34
 Bassiouni identified his twenty-five international crimes out of 274 international conventions based 
on ten penal characteristics. See M &KHULI %DVVLRXQL ³7KH 6RXUFHV DQG &RQWHQW RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO
&ULPLQDO/DZ$7KHRUHWLFDO)UDPHZRUN´ LQ0&KHULI%DVVLRXQL HG International Criminal Law - 
Crimes, 2nd ed. (New York: Transnational Publishers, 1999), at 32-33 and 47.  
35
 See Christine Van den Wyngaert, ed., International Criminal Law ± A Collection of International 
and European Instruments (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005). 
36
 Boister thus argues that ICL was subdivided into international criminal law stricto sensu (the so-
called core crimes) and crimes of international concern (the so-called treaty crimes). Boister, supra n.4. 
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activities cannot be tackled without cooperation between States.37 Neither should they 
arise because aspects of domestic criminal law are internationalised, like 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, extradition and other forms of cooperation between States 
to fight and prosecute criminal activity. This is because international crimes involve a 
discernible shift in their formation from the international level to the national level, 
DQGWKHQ³EDFNDJDLQ´WRWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDO38 A return to the international level, after 
the international treaty and domestic legislation stages, does not occur in the case of 
transnational and other treaty crimes.39  
In essence, only international crimes attract individual criminal responsibility 
without intermediation of domestic law.40 It is thus important to separate international 
crimes from transnational treaty crimes that have penal implications. (See Figure 2)  
 
 
Figure 2 
 
Indeed, while Yarnold listed twenty-two international crimes recognised by the 
international community, she was able to draw a distinction between those that were 
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 Although ³FRRSHUDWLYHUHODWLRQVEHWZHHQQDWLRQVDWWKHSROLWLFDODQGOHJDOOHYHO´ZHUHUHTXLUHGLQWKH
fight against these globally organised crimes, Rotman recognises that they are only ordinary 
transnational crimes. 6HH(GJDUGR5RWPDQ³7KH*OREDOL]DWLRQRI&ULPLQDO9LROHQFH´ Cornell Journal 
of Law and Public Policy 10 (2000): 1-43 at 38. 
38
 5RHORI+DYHPDQ³7KH&RQWH[WRIWKH/DZ´LQ5RHORI+DYHPDQOlga Kavran and Julian Nicholls, 
eds., Supranational Criminal Law: a System Sui Generis, (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2003), at 25. 
39
 While international treaties concerning transnational crime and other internationalised aspects of 
domestic criminal law might provide for cooperation between States on their enforcement, including 
the principle of aut dedere aut judicare, these would not be substantive components of the prohibited 
act but purely procedural rules, For a discussion on the principle of aut dedere aut judicare and some 
conventions establishing a duty to extradite or prosecute, see M Cherif Bassiouni and Edward Wise, 
Aut Dedere Aut Judicare ± The Duty to Extradite or Prosecute in International Law (Dordrecht: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995). 
40
 Cassese thus argued that international crimes were premised on the notion that international legal 
SUHVFULSWLRQVZHUH³FDSDEOHRILPSRVLQJREOLJDWLRQVGLUHFWO\RQLQGLYLGXDOVZLWKRXWWKHLQWHUPHGLDU\RI
WKHVWDWHZLHOGLQJDXWKRULW\RYHUVXFKLQGLYLGXDOV´&DVVHse, supra n.24, at 3. 
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EDVHG RQ  ³DQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO HOHPHQW´ QDPHO\ WKUHDWV WR Seace and conduct that 
shocked the conscience of humanityDQG³DWUDQVQDWLRQDOHOHPHQWRUDQHOHPHQWRI
LQWHUQDWLRQDO QHFHVVLW\´ ZKLFK ZHUH SROLF\-motivated considerations to protect the 
interests of individual States.41 
On that note, the key to understanding what constitutes an international crime 
SHUKDSVOLHVDWWKHKHDUWRIWKHSKUDVH³PRVWVHULRXVFULPHVRIFRQFHUQWRWKH
LQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\´42 In this sense, States may not only have a universal 
interest in suppressing international crimes and punishing those who were responsible 
for them, but possibly also the jurisdiction to prosecute and punish those who 
committed such crimes.43 Cassese similarly argues that international crimes are then 
international rules entailing the personal liability of the individual concerned, and 
results from the cumulative presence of four elements: (1) they consist of violations of 
international customary rules; (2) these rules protect values considered important by 
the whole international community and were consequently binding all States and 
individuals; (3) universal interest in repressing these crimes exists; and (4) individuals 
are barred from claiming immunity from prosecution. Under this more selective but 
still fairly wide definition, he identifies internationaOFULPHVDVWKHIRXUµFRUHFULPHV¶
torture, and some extreme forms of international terrorism.44 However, due to their 
impact at the transnational level, international terrorism and piracy were subsequently 
DOVRDGGHGDV³UHOHYDQWFULPHV´ZLWKLQWKLVGHILQition.45 This indicates that insisting on 
DµVLOYHUEXOOHW¶IL[HGOHJDOLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRUGHILQLWLYHOLVWRILQWHUQDWLRQDOFULPHVPD\
be unproductive, particularly when States are not only left to define international 
crimes but also remain the de facto guardians against it. 
That does not however mean that a doctrinal standard is irrelevant. Indeed, 
Yarnold highlights that only with such a standard can the international community 
GHFLGH³ZKLFKFRQGXFWWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFULPLQDOODZV\VWHPVKRXOGVHHNWRSURKibit in 
WKHIXWXUH´46  The point is then that understanding international crimes must be done 
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 %DUEDUD <DUQROG ³'RFWULQDO %DVLV IRU WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &ULPLQDOL]DWLRQ 3URFHVV´ Temple 
International and Comparative Law Journal 8 (1994): 85-115 at 113. 
42
 Paragraph 4, Preamble of the Rome Statute of the ICC. 
43
 A following subsection will briefly discuss the concepts of obligations erga omnes and universal 
jurisdiction, and consider if they may be indicators of seriousness for international crimes and relevant 
for regional crimes. 
44
 Cassese, supra n.24, at 21. 
45
 Cassese, supra n.32, at 113-115. 
46
 %DUEDUD<DUQROG³7KH'RFWULQDO%DVLV IRU WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO&ULPLQDOL]DWLRQ3URFHVV´ LQ0&KHULI
Bassiouni, ed., International Criminal Law - Crimes, 2nd ed. (New York: Transnational Publishers, 
1999), at 127. 
177 
 
from the perspective of States. In this regard, the various ILC discussions on the 
matter prove most illuminating. For example, the ILC not only had to take into 
account the comments from States in developing the draft Code of Offences against 
the Peace and Security of Mankind,47 but also had its hands tied in terms of the 
progress that it could make.48 When the draft Code was again debated in 1984, it was 
expanded beyond the offences in the 1954 draft Code49 to cover other offences that 
reflected the international reality of the day.50 The renamed draft Code of Crimes 
against the Peace and Security of Mankind51 that was adopted by the ILC in 1991 thus 
included several new offences.52 However, in response to the strong opposition, 
criticisms or reservations of various States,53 the Special Rapporteur omitted six of the 
12 crimes from the 13th report.54  
Due to the need to win acceptance by States, focus was then re-directed on the 
remaining crimes: aggression; genocide; systematic or mass violations of human 
rights; exceptionally serious war crimes; international terrorism; and illicit traffic in 
narcotic drugs.55 These six crimes were left in the 1995 draft Code based on two key 
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 For example, see the 1954 report of Special Rapporteur Jean Spiropoulos. Document A/CN.4/85, in 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1954, vol. II, at 112.  
48
 The ILC was only invited by the UNGA in resolution 36/106 of 10 December 1981 to resume its 
work on the draft Code and to review it, after a considerable hiatus for much of the Cold War. See 
UNGA resolution 36/106 (Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind).  
49
 See Document A/2693, para.54, in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1954, vol. II, at 
151-2. 
50
 7KLVZDVEDVHGRQWKHVHFRQGUHSRUWE\6SHFLDO5DSSRUWHXU7KLDPZKLFKQRWHGWKDW³WKHFRQFHSWRI
an international crime has acquired a greater degree of autonomy and covers all offences which 
seriously disturb international public ordHU´ %HVLGHV RIIHQFH LQ WKH HDUOLHU GUDIW &RGH RWKHU DFWV
considered were: colonialism; apartheid; serious damage to the human environment; economic 
aggression; the use of atomic weapons; and mercenarism. See Document A/CN.4/377, in Yearbook of 
the International Law Commission, 1984, vol. II (Part One), at 89; and Yearbook of the International 
Law Commission, 1984, vol. II (Part Two), at 17.  
51
 ,QWKH,/&UHFRPPHQGHGWKDWWKH(QJOLVKWLWOHEHDPHQGHGWR³'UDIW&RGHRI&ULPHVDJDLQVW
the Peace and SecXULW\RI0DQNLQG´ a recommendation that was endorsed by the UNGA in resolution 
42/151 of 7 December 1987. See Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1987, vol. II (Part 
Two), para.65, at 13; and UNGA resolution 42/151 (Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind).  
52
 See Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1991, vol. II (Part Two), at 95-97.   
53
 A more restricted list than that adopted on first reading of the 1991 draft Code was wanted by the 
majority of States. MoreoverWKHFRQYHUJHQFHRI³VHYHUDOSROLWLFDOZLOOV´SURYHGGLIILFXOWWRDFKLHYHRQ
PDQ\ GUDIW DUWLFOHV DQG WKH 6SHFLDO 5DSSRUWHXU ZDV ³IRUFHG WR UHGXFH WKH OLVW SURSRVHG RQ ILUVW
UHDGLQJ´6HH'RFXPHQW$&1SDUDVDQGLQYearbook of the International Law Commission, 
1995, vol. II (Part One), at 35. 
54
 These were: (1) the threat of aggression; (2) intervention; (3) colonial domination; (4) apartheid; (5) 
the recruitment, use, financing and training of mercenaries; and (6) wilful and severe damage to the 
environment. See Document A/CN.4/466, in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1995, vol. 
II (Part One), at 33.  
55
 See Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1995, vol. II (Part Two), paras.38 and 39, at 16. 
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criteria:56 (1) extreme seriousness; and (2) international community recognition.57 This 
not only signalled an emphasis on crimes that were well established in international 
law but more importantly also widely accepted by States.58 At the end of the ILC 
debate on the draft Code in 1995, the Special Rapporteur nevertheless QRWHG WKDW³D
consensus had clearly developed in favour of including at least four of them ± those 
RQDJJUHVVLRQJHQRFLGHZDUFULPHVDQGFULPHVDJDLQVWKXPDQLW\´59 The final text of 
20 draft articles constituting the Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind was later adopted by the ILC with the following statement highlighting the 
need for State acceptance and support: 
 
³:LWK D YLHZ WR UHDFKLQJ FRQVHQVXV WKH &RPPLVVLRQ has considerably 
reduced the scope of the Code... in response to the interest of adoption of the 
&RGHDQGRIREWDLQLQJVXSSRUWE\*RYHUQPHQWV´60 
 
In terms of its subsequent influence, it is noteworthy that when the UNGA expressed 
its appreciation to the ILC for completing the draft Code,61 the relevance of its work 
was highlighted to States participating in the ICC PrepCom.62 It was however again 
decided that, in order to achieve acceptance by States, the Court's jurisdiction would 
EHOLPLWHGWRWKHIRXUµFRUHFULPHV¶WKDW are unquestionably part of customary 
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 The Special Rapporteur opined that for an internationally wrongful act to become a crime under the 
Code, it must be extremely serious and the international community must decide that it is to be 
included. This was because extreme seriousness alone was too subjective a criterion and left room for 
considerable uncertainty, and other technical and political factors had to be taken into account in the 
drafting and adoption of a Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind. See Document 
A/CN.4/466, para.4, in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1995, vol. II (Part One), at 35. 
57
 7KLV FULWHULRQ RI WDNLQJ LQWR DFFRXQW WKH YLHZV RI WKH ³LQWHUQDWLRQDO FRPPXQLW\ DV D ZKROH´ ZDV
considered to be theoretically justified because of its consistency with the closely related notions of jus 
cogens and of international crimes as defined in Article 19 of the draft on State responsibility. See 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1995, vol. II (Part Two), para.56, at 19.  
58
 The ILC was influenced by the ICTY Statute that affirmed various components of IHL as customary 
international law, as well as the report by the UN Secretary-General of 3 May 1993 that stated the 
ICTY ZRXOGRQO\³DSSO\UXOHVRILQWHUQDWLRQDOKXPDQLWDULDQODZZKLFKDUHEH\RQGDQ\GRXEWSDUWRI
customary law so that the problem of adherence of some but not all States to specific conventions does 
QRWDULVH´See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 
808 (1993), UN Doc. S/25704 (1993), at para.34. 
59
 The Special Rapporteur also noted that further consideration would be needed to determine if the 
³FRQWURYHUVLDOFULPHV´RILQWHUQDWLRQDOWHUURULVPDQGLOOLFLWWUDIILFLQQDUFRWLFGUXJVVKRXOGEHUHWDLQHG
See Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1995, vol. II (Part Two), paras.130, 135 and 139, 
at 31-32. 
60
 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1996, vol. II (Part Two), paras.45-46.  
61
 See UNGA resolution 51/160 of 16 December 1996 (Report of the ILC on the work of its 48th 
session).  
62
 In resolution 50/46 of 11 December 1995, the UNGA decided to establish the PrepCom to discuss 
further the major substantive and administrative issues arising out of the ILC draft statute. See UNGA 
resolution 50/46 of 11 December 1995 (Establishment of an International Criminal Court).  
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international law and recognised by all States.63 This simply restated the reality, as 
captured throughout the ILC deliberations, that international crimes are only what the 
international community of States acknowledges them to be and is willing to enforce 
based on shared interests. This is also a vital point for any deliberations on identifying 
crimes within a regional context. 
 In sum, the Rome Statute does not address the full range of international 
criPLQDODFWLYLW\DQGWKHMXULVGLFWLRQRIWKH,&&LVFXUUHQWO\OLPLWHGWRWKHIRXUµFRUH
FULPHV¶WKDWDUHRIJUHDWHVWXQLYHUVDOFRQFHUQWRWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\
However, these crimes should not be representative of either the entire ICrimJ system 
or all criminal activities that States seek to collectively combat.64 ,QGHHG³WUHDW\
FULPHV´ZLWKLQWHUQDWLRQDORUWUDQVQDWLRQDOHIIHFWVDUHPRUHSUHYDOHQWDQGRIZLGHU
concern to States, and addressing them through regional arrangements may offer 
several advantages. Firstly, regional concerns about a particular crime can more easily 
be translated into a treaty between regional States and more effectively enforced by a 
regional institution or collective action. Secondly, the regional institutional machinery 
or collection mechanism to deal with criminal activity of regional concerns will be 
better able to adapt to the changing regional environment and evolving concerns of the 
6WDWHSDUWLHV,QWKLVFRQQHFWLRQWKHUHLVYDOXHLQH[DPLQLQJWKHQRWLRQRIDµUHJLRQDO 
FULPH¶ 
 
5.2 Constructing the Concept of a Regional Crime 
 
%DVHG RQ WKH IRUHJRLQJ GLVFXVVLRQ ZKLFK RSLQHV WKDW µFRUH FULPHV¶ DUH D VXEVHW RI
µLQWHUQDWLRQDO FULPHV¶ DQG GLVWLQJXLVKHV ERWK IURP RWKHU µWUHDW\ FULPHV¶ RI
international concern, the next part of this Chapter constructs the concept of a regional 
crime. The goal is to advance ICrimJ, while recognising different regional notions of 
justice and lessening sovereignty costs, thereby increasing the likelihood of winning 
State approval. To be of greatest practical viability and political acceptability to self-
interested States, particularly those with a strong entrenched notion of state 
sovereignty and non-interference in Southeast Asia, the doctrinal standard for regional 
crimes should closely mirror that of international crimes derived from ILC 
deliberations as it most accurately reflects existing opinio juris. Focus is however then 
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 See Document A/CONF.183/9 (Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court) of 17 July 1998.  
64
 Boister, supra n.4, at 975. 
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centred within a regional instead of a global setting,65 with emphasis falling on two 
key criteria: (1) regional community recRJQLWLRQDQGµH[WUHPHVHULRXVQHVV¶ZLWKLQ
a regional context. 
,Q WKLV UHJDUG UHJLRQDO FULPHV DUH ORJLFDOO\ D VXEVHW RI WUDQVQDWLRQDO µWUHDW\
FULPHV¶ SDUWLFXODUO\ UHOHYDQW RU VXEVFULEHG WR ZLWKLQ D VSHFLILF UHJLRQ EXW DOVR
necessarily include international crimes that are part of customary international law 
and cloaked by the opinio juris of the international community as a whole.66 (See 
Figure 3.) This acknowledges that the status of an act as an international crime is not 
diminished if a State, or even entire region, refuses to recognise it.67 
 
Figure 3 
 
At this juncture, it is pertinent to underscore that like international crimes, regional 
crimes are envisaged to be ultimately committed by and thus solely ascribed to 
individuals.68 If the doctrinal underpinnings of individual criminal responsibility and 
current State practice regarding international crimes are accepted as an appropriate 
guide, those accused of committing regional crimes should also be prevented from 
seeking the protection of State sovereignty and claiming immunity as agents of the 
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 This opens up the possibility for a regional crime to evolve into an international crime if adequate 
global recognition was attained. 
66
 There can be no persistent objectors to the prohibition of an act considered an international crime 
under customary international law. Any regional jus cogens would then be understood as a set of 
µKLJKHUODZV¶WKDWare jointly considered acceptable by a group of regional States to serve shared social 
and political goals. See later discussion on obligations erga omnes partes and regional jus cogens. 
67
 AMS would be unable to challenge the universal applicability of peremptory norms relating to 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOFULPHV$PULWD.DSXU³$VLDQ9DOXHY7KH3DSHU7LJHU'LVPDQWOLQJWKH7KUHDWWR$VLDQ
9DOXHV 3RVHG E\ WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &ULPLQDO &RXUW´ Journal of International Criminal Justice 11 
(2013): 1059-1090, at 1069. 
68
 The notion of individual responsibility for international crimes was developed by the ILC based on 
the judgment of the Nuremberg 7ULEXQDOWKDWFULPHVDJDLQVWLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ³DUHFRPPLWWHGE\PHQ
not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions 
RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ EH HQIRUFHG´ 6HH 'RFXPHQW $ DW para.52(c), in Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission, 1951, vol. II, at 134.  
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State. Furthermore, these individuals need not be the physical perpetrators of the 
conduct. As with international crimes, the masterminds and architects of the atrocities 
are likely to be considered most responsible for such violations.69 It is noteworthy 
that, as part of their completion strategies, UNSC resolution 1534 (2004) called on the 
ICTY and ICTR to concentrate on the most senior leaders suspected of being most 
responsible for crimes within their jurisdictions.70 While this ensured that impunity 
was prevented at the highest levels, it also reflected the practical constraints, political 
pressures, and financial limitations in addressing international crimes. These crucial 
considerations must be recalled when theorising about effectively enforcing ICL at the 
regional level. 
 
5.2.1 Regional Community Recognition 
The development of ICrimJ and concept of an international crime are tightly bound to 
State support. Given the consensual character of positivist international law, a 
necessary precondition to elevate an act to the level of an international crime will be 
the recognition and acceptance by the global community.71 The ILC had in fact 
identified this as a major aspect of the definition of international crimes.72 It is 
significant the ILC elaborated that for an internationally wrongful act to be recognised 
DVDQ³LQWHUQDWLRQDOFULPH´LWPXVWEHDFFHSWHG³E\DOOWKHHVVHQWLDOFRPSRQHQWVRIWKH
LQWHUQDWLRQDO FRPPXQLW\´ DQG QRW RQO\ E\ VRPH SDUWLFXODU JURXS RI 6WDWHV73 This 
bolsters the argument for recognising a category of regional crimes, which would 
resemble international crimes in doctrinal terms within a regional context but was not 
accepted as such by the entire international community. Such an approach to ICL may 
WKHQEHGHHPHGDVDIRUPRI³UHVSHFWIRUUHJLRQDOOHJDOWUDGLWLRQV´74  
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 6RPH FRPPHQWDWRUV QRWHG WKDW WKLV DSSURDFK ZDV ³FOHDUO\ UHIOHFWHG LQ WKH FKDUJLQJ HOHPHQWV´ IRU
international crimes, which hardly required the individual to personally commit the physical act. See 
Boas, supra n.26, at 372. 
70
 On 6 April 2004, Rule 28(A) of the ICTY RPE was thus amended and required that the accused was 
³WKHPRVWVHQLRUOHDGHUV VXVSHFWHGRIEHLQJUHVSRQVLEOH´6HH816HFXULW\&RXQFLOUHVROXWLRQRI
26 March 2004, UN Doc. S/Res/1534 (2004); and Rule 28(A), ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence.  
71
 In preparing the 1994 Draft Statute for an ICC, the Working Group for example concluded that the 
jurisdiction of the Court should refer only to the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole. See commentaries on Part 3 (Jurisdiction of the Court), in particular Article 20 
(Jurisdiction of the Court in respect of specified crimes), in A/CN.4/L.491/Rev.2/Add.1.  
72
 7KH,/&QRWHGWKDWLQRUGHUWREHµREMHFWLYHO\¶FRQVLGHUHGDVDQµLQWHUQDWLRQDOFULPH¶DOEHLWUHIHUULQJ
WRµFULPHV¶RIWKH6WDWHDQLQWHUQDWLRQDOO\ZURQJIXODFWPXVWEHµVXEMHFWLYHO\¶UHFRJQLVHG DVDµFULPH¶
by the international community as a whole. See Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1976, 
vol. II (Part Two), para.61, at 119.  
73
 See Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1976, vol. II (Part Two), para 61, at 119.  
74
 Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration (Phase Two: Maritime Delimitation), 119 ILR, at 448. 
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The formation of local/regional customs75 requires the particular act by one 
State to be accepted by another State(s) as an expression of a legal obligation or 
right.76 In this regard, while consensus amongst the international community is 
required in the case of an international crime, a regional crime only requires the 
positive acceptance of two (or more) parties.77 As a corollary, so long as it does not 
contravene an existing jus cogens QRUP FRQFHUQV DERXW WKH OHJDO EDVLV RI µUHJLRQDO
FULPHV¶OLNHnullum crimen sine lege challenges, can be addressed in the statute of a 
regional court or remedied with codification in a regional instrument.78 This not only 
acknowledges the fact that States currently decide which conduct should be prohibited 
and how violations should be punished, but also allows for differing State and regional 
interests to be accommodated. It is noteworthy that treaty-based hybrid courts showed 
how conduct pertinent to a situation, like the recruitment and use in armed conflict of 
child soldiers, could be used to better interpret and expand on existing international 
crimes.79 
The primary condition for the existence of a regional crime in Southeast Asia 
should then be the recognition and acceptance by the regional community of AMS. 
The ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime serves as an instructive starting 
point.80 Signed on 20 December 1997, the AMS identified a shared concern about the 
pernicious effects of several speciILF WUDQVQDWLRQDO FULPHV RQ ³UHJLRQDO VWDELOLW\ DQG
GHYHORSPHQW´ DV ZHOO DV ³WKH ZHOIDUH RI WKH UHJLRQ
V SHRSOHV´ 7KH\ DUH 
terrorism; (2) illicit drug trafficking; (3) arms smuggling; (4) money laundering; (5) 
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 In the Asylum Case, the ICJ discussed the Colombian claim of a local/regional custom peculiar to the 
Latin American States, and held that different local and regional customs must be taken into account 
when deciding on the position of international law. It was then accepted in the El Salvador/Honduras 
FDVH WKDW D ³WULODWHUDO ORFDO FXVWRP RI WKH QDWXUH RI D FRQYHQWLRQ´ FRXOG HVWDEOLVK D FRQGRPLQLXP
arrangement between three successor States. See Colombian-Peruvian Asylum Case, Judgment of 20 
November 1950: ICJ Rep 1950, 266; and Case Concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier 
Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening), Judgment of 11 September 1992: ICJ Rep 
1992, at 597-600. 
76
 In the Case Concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory, WKH,&-KHOGWKDWWKHUHZDV³QRUHDVRQZK\
long continued practice between two states accepted by them as regulating their relations should not 
form the basis of mutual rights and obliJDWLRQV EHWZHHQ WZR VWDWHV´ See Case Concerning Right of 
Passage Over the Indian Territory (Merits), Judgment of 12 April 1960: ICJ Rep 1960, at 39. 
77
 The standard required to prove the existence of a local/regional customs would however be higher 
than when a legal obligation or right is alleged under customary international law. See Asylum Case, 
supra n.75.  
78
 $OWKRXJK WKLV PD\ EH FULWLFLVHG DV DQ µDQ\WKLQJ JRHV¶ DSSURDFK LW LV DFWXDOO\ UHIOHFWLYH RI KRZ
international treaties are in reality established and more importantly enforced between States. 
79
 )RU D GLVFXVVLRQ RQ WKH 6&6/ DQG WKH FULPH RI FKLOG UHFUXLWPHQW VHH $OLVRQ 6PLWK ³&KLOG
5HFUXLWPHQW DQG WKH 6SHFLDO &RXUW IRU 6LHUUD /HRQH´ Journal of International Criminal Justice 2 
(2004):1141-1153. 
80
 See ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime, Manila, 20 December 1997.  
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traffic in persons; and (6) piracy. To combat these crimes, the AMS also stressed the 
need for clear and effective regional modalities, especially regarding information 
exchange and policy coordination.81 Such strengthening and coordination of 
cooperation amongst AMS, like that against the illicit drug trade, are further 
indications of it being a focus of the ASEAN community.82 Additional regional 
emphasis on specific crimes can also be deduced from the adoption or proposed 
establishment of treaty instruments like the ASEAN Convention on Counter-
Terrorism (ACCT) and the ASEAN Convention on Trafficking in Persons (ACTIP). 
In sum, the emphasis and efforts by AMS to tackle these illegal acts help discern a 
regional crime through community recognition, and perhaps also by highlighting how 
µVHULRXV¶DWhreat the regional community deems they pose.  
5.2.2 7KH7HVWRIµ6HULRXVQHVV¶ 
µ6HULRXVQHVV¶KDVEHHQLGHQWLILHGRQVHYHUDORFFDVLRQVDVDQHVVHQWLDOHOHPHQWRID
crime against the peace and security of mankind for the purposes of the draft Code.83 
It was even suggested that acts belonging to the category of offences against the peace 
DQGVHFXULW\RIPDQNLQGZHUHDOO³PDUNHGE\WKHVDPHGHJUHHRIH[WUHPH
VHULRXVQHVV´84 0HDVXUHGREMHFWLYHO\VHULRXVQHVVFRXOGEHEDVHGRQ³WUDQVJUHVVLRQV
against rights, physical persons or property´85 Accordingly, it has been used as a 
jurisdictional requirement for the prosecution of international crimes by international 
criminal tribunals,86 and an element in the definition for various offences.87 
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 There have since been efforts at the level of the ASEAN Chief of National Police (ASEANAPOL) to 
harmonise and synergise cooperation among regional sectoral bodies combating various transnational 
crimes. 
82
 For example, the ASEAN Senior Officials on Drug Matters (ASOD) are working on bolstering 
regional framework and mainstreaming drug concerns in other relevant ASEAN Bodies, with the goal 
of achieving ASEAN Drug Free 2015.  
83
 For example, in the 1983 debate on the first report of its newly appointed Special Rapporteur for the 
GUDIW&RGH'RXGRX7KLDPWKH,/&ZDVRIWKHRSLQLRQWKDWWKHVFRSHRIWKHGUDIW&RGH³VKRXOGFRYHU
RQO\ WKH PRVW VHULRXV LQWHUQDWLRQDO RIIHQFHV´ 6HH Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 
1983, vol. II (Part Two), para.69(a). Also see First Report on the Draft Code of Offences Against the 
Peace and Security of Mankind, Document A/CN.4/364; Third Report on the Draft Code of Offences 
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Document A/CN.4/387, para.38; and Thirteenth Report on 
the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Document A/CN.4/466, para.4. 
84
 See Third Report on the Draft Code, supra n.83, para.38. 
85
 Ibid, para.49. 
86
 The ICTY,&75DQG6&6/MXULVGLFWLRQVDUHOLPLWHGWR³VHULRXV´YLRODWLRQVRI,+/ZKLOH WKH,&&
MXULVGLFWLRQ LV OLPLWHG WR WKH ³PRVW VHULRXV FULPHV RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO FRQFHUQ´ 6HH $UWLFOH  ,&7<
Statute; Article 1, ICTR Statute; Article 1, SCSL Statute; and Article 1, ICC Statute. 
87
 )RUH[DPSOHFULPHVVXFKDVLQKXPDQHWUHDWPHQWDQGFUXHOWUHDWPHQWUHTXLUHWKHSHUSHWUDWRU¶VDFWRU
omission to cause serious mental or physical suffering or injury, or to constitute a serious attack on 
human dignity.  See Prosecutor v. 0XFLü et al., Case No.: IT-96-21-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 20 
February 2001, at paras.424 and 426. 
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As de facto representatives of the international community, States may 
surmount the doctrine of sovereignty and exercise universal jurisdiction,88 in order to 
defend common fundamental interests through criminal process.89 The presence of 
universal jurisdiction per se, which exists in two forms reflecting its use based on 
either customary international law or treaty law,90 is however an unreliable indicium 
of seriousness. In its permissive form, States are allowed (but not bound) under 
customary international law to exercise jurisdiction over specific crimes.91 Its 
mandatory form is only (undisputedly) manifested in a separate duty that arises inter 
partes through a treaty.92 Universal jurisdiction therefore does not in itself oblige 
States to investigate an international crime, extradite suspects, or prosecute 
individuals.93 Its unsuitability as an indicator of the seriousness of an act is bolstered 
by the fact that States are generally reluctant to employ the concept as it is laden with 
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 )UDQFNDUJXHV WKDW IXQGDPHQWDO UXOHVRI WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\DQGRWKHU µDVVRFLDWLYH¶QRUPV
are preconditions to the recognition of sovereignty. Hence, protection of these rules and shared interests 
justifies any infringement of State sovereignty. See Thomas Franck, Fairness in the International Legal 
System (The Hague: Academy for International Law, 1993), at 57-61. 
89
 Broomhall opines that the rationales underlying ICL also supports universal jurisdiction, especially 
since the alternatives are insufficient or inadequate to bring the perpetrators to justice. Ratner, Abrams 
and Bischoff similarly contend that only States and rest of the internationaOFRPPXQLW\FDQ³HQVXUHWKDW
WKH\DUHSURSHUO\SXQLVKHGRURWKHUZLVHDVVHVVHGIRUWKHLUDEXVHV´6HH%UXFH%URRPKDOOInternational 
Justice and the International Criminal Court ±Between Sovereignty and the Rule of Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003), at 107; and Steven Ratner, Jason Abrams and James Bischoff, 
Accountability for Human rights Atrocities in International Law ± Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy, 3rd 
ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), at 370. 
90
 Some commentators however completely reject the notion of universal jurisdiction. For example, see 
$OIUHG5XELQ³$FWLR3RSXODULV-XV&RJHQVDQG2IIHQFHV(UJD2PQHV´New England Law Review 35 
(2001):265-280. 
91
 For example, Scharf contends that customary international law does not lead to mandatory universal 
MXULVGLFWLRQRYHU LQWHUQDWLRQDOFULPHV6HH0LFKDHO6FKDUI ³7KH/HWWHURI WKH/DZ7KH6FRSHRI WKH
,QWHUQDWLRQDO/HJDO2EOLJDWLRQWR3URVHFXWH+XPDQ5LJKWV&ULPHV´Law and Contemporary Problems 
59 (1996):41-61. 
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 Suppression conventions specifying a regime of universal jurisdiction will define the crime and 
obligate States to fulfil their aut dedere, aut judicare obligation. Bassiouni thus notes that State practice 
VKRZV³WKHGXW\ WRSURVHFXWHRUH[WUDGLWH LVPRUH LQFKRDWH WKDQHVWDEOLVKHd, other than when it arises 
RXW RI VSHFLILF WUHDW\ REOLJDWLRQV´ 6HH 0 &KHULI %DVVLRXQL HG International Criminal Law, 2nd ed. 
(Ardsley: Transnational Publishers, 1998), at 13. 
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 $QLQGLYLGXDODFFXVHGRIDWUHDW\FULPHZLOOWKXVQRWKDYHDQ\³LQWHUQDWLRQDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\´DQGKDV
to be prosecuted under domestic law. Broomhall, supra n.89, at 13. 
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a host of practical and political difficulties,94 not least that its exercise is controversial 
DQG³PD\VKRZDODFNRILQWHUQDWLRQDOFRXUWHV\´95 
$VDVXEMHFWLYHFRQFHSWWKDWDIIHFWV³WKHYHU\IRXQGDWLRQVRIKXPDQVRFLHW\´
seriousness may then be deduced from: (1) the character of the act; (2) the extent of 
its effects; or (3) the intention of the perpetrator.96 Jurisprudence from various 
international tribunals confirms that seriousness limits the scope of crimes, 
particularly acts enumerated as crimes against humanity.97 In addition, the ICC Statute 
requires the Court to be satisfied that each case is of sufficient gravity to justify 
further action.98 Specific to an individual case, the gravity threshold is read as 
UHTXLULQJWKHFRQGXFWWREH³HLWKHUV\VWHPDWLFRUODUJH-VFDOH´WKHGHJUHHRIVRFLDO
alarm caused by the conduct, and if the accused is one of the most senior leaders most 
responsible for the crime.99 While important for determining jurisdiction in individual 
cases, gravity is nevertheless not instructive of the seriousness of the crimes itself.100 
In this regard, the severity and intent of the breach will be less instructive than the 
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 Although the ICJ confirmed the obligation to either prosecute or extradite alleged perpetrators under 
the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, it is 
only addressed at state parties to the convention. Spain then notably amended its domestic laws in 
March 2014 to curb the use of universal jurisdiction, inter alia because China stressed that 
investigations into former Chinese leaders for alleged genocide in Tibet could damage relations. This 
follows the decision of Belgium, under US pressure, to repeal its laws on universal jurisdiction in 
August 2003. See Questions Concerning the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite, Judgement of 20 
July 2012: ICJ Rep 2012, at 422. 
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 See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Dissenting 
opinion of Judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert, para.3. 
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 Document A/CN.4/404, in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1987, vol. II (Part One), 
at 2.  
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 The relative seriousness are evaluated in light of all factual circumstances including the nature of the 
act or omission, the context in which it occurred, the circumstances of the victim, and the effect on the 
victim. See 3URVHFXWRU Y 0DUWLü, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 12 June 2007, at 
para.84; Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 7 June 2001, 
para.92; and Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-2004-16-T, Trial Chamber, Judgement, 20 
June 2007, at para.699. 
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 6HH $UWLFOH G ,&& 6WDWXWH  DQG 6XVDQD 6D&RXWR DQG .DWKHULQH &OHDU\ ³7KH *UDYLW\
7KUHVKROG RI WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &ULPLQDO &RXUW´ American University International Law Review 23 
(2007):807-854. 
99
 The ICC judges have however concluded that a strict interpretation of the gravity threshold could 
exclude certain crimes or defendants from the jurisdiction of the Court. A flexible approach on 
admissibility has then developed within ICC case law, based on mix of quantitative and qualitative 
IDFWRUV6HH0DUJDUHW'HJX]PDQ³7KH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&ULPLQDO&RXUW¶V*UDYLW\-XULVSUXGHQFHDW7HQ´
Washington University Global Studies Law Review 12 (2013):475-486; Situation in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, ICC-01/04-169, Judgment on the Prosecutor's Appeal Against the Decision of Pre-
Trial Chamber I Entitled 'Decision on the Prosecutor's Application for Warrants of Arrest, Article 58', 
13 July 2006; Prosecutor v Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, ICC-02/05-02/09, Decision on the Confirmation 
of Charges, 8 February 2010; and Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09, Decision Pursuant to 
Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the 
Republic of Kenya, 31 March 2010. 
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 In the Ntaganda Arrest Warrant Appeal Judgement, the ICC Appeals Chamber held the subjective 
FULWHULRQRI³VRFLDODODUP´LVQRWQHFHVVDULO\DSSURSULDWHIRUWKHGHWHUPLQDWLRQRIWKHDGPLVVLELOLW\RID
case. See ICC-01/04-169, supra n.99, paras.69-72. 
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nature of the obligation breached.101  7KH,/&WKHUHIRUHKHOGWKDW³>W@KH more 
important the subject-matter (of special importance to the international community), 
the more serious the transgression´102  
7KHVHULRXVQHVVRIDQDFWFRXOGDOVREH³JDXJHGDFFRUGLQJWRWKHSXEOLF
FRQVFLHQFH´DVUHIOHFWHGLQWKHGHJUHHRIVKRFNDQGKRUURULWSURYRNHVZLWKLQWKH
international community.103 ,QGHHGWKHµFRQVFLHQFHRIPDQNLQG¶KDVRIWHQVLJQDOOHG
the serious nature of an act and played a significant role in developing the law relating 
WRLQWHUQDWLRQDOFULPHV)RUH[DPSOHWKH8'+5VWDWHVWKDW³disregard and contempt 
for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience 
of mankind´104 The UNGA also declares in Resolution 96(I) on the crime of genocide 
WKDW³GHQLDORIWKHULJKWRIH[LVWHQFHVKRFNVWKH conscience of mankind´105 The 1977 
Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions further refers to ³WKHSURWHFWLRQDQG
authority of the principles of international law derived from ... dictates of public 
conscience´106 Last but not least, the Preamble to the ICC Rome Statute harks to 
³DWURFLWLHVWKDWGHHSO\VKRFNWKH conscience of humanity´107  This is also understood 
as the conFHSWRIµVRFLDODODUP¶LQWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\108 
It is therefore conceivable that the seriousness of an act in the regional context 
may be similarly determined by the threat it poses to fundamental interests of the 
regional community or the extent that it outrages regional sensitivities. The next 
question is then what terms of reference should be used to decide the regional interests 
that are to be protected, or acts that will provoke shock and arouse horror within the 
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 Although the severity of the breach (perhaps identified by its magnitude and savagery, large number, 
or the fact that a similar pattern was applied at different times and places) is important, the mass nature 
of the act in itself is perhaps not an accurate gauge of the seriousness of an act. Indeed, it is for example 
no longer a constituent element of a crime against humanity, which can now be committed against a 
single individual provided it is by reason of his race, nationality, religion, or political opinions. On the 
other hand, intent is often difficult to prove and therefore not always a conclusive indicator of 
seriousness. 
102
 See Third Report on the Draft Code, supra n.83, para.61. 
103
 Ibid, para.47; and Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No.: ICC-01/04-01/06, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision 
RQWKH3URVHFXWRU¶V$SSOLFDWLRQIRUDZDUUDQWRIDUUHVW)HEUXDU\SDUD 
104
 See Preamble, UDHR [Emphasis added]. 
105
 See General Assembly resolution 96 (I) of 11 December 1946 (The Crime of Genocide).  
106
 See Article 1(2), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977 [Emphasis added].  
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 See Preamble, ICC Statute [Emphasis added].  
108 See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, supra n.103, para.46; Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
supra n.99 SDUD :LOOLDP 6FKDEDV ³3URVHFXWRULDO 'LVFUHWLRQ DQG *UDYLW\´ LQ Carsten Stahn and 
Göran Sluiter, eds., The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (Leiden: Martinus 
1LMKRIIDWDQG.HYLQ-RQ+HOOHUµ6LWXDWLRQDO*UDYLW\8QGHUWKH5RPH6WDWXWH¶LQ&DUVWHQ
Stahn and Larissa van den Herik, eds., Future Perspectives on International Criminal Justice (The 
Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2010). 
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regional community. The twin goals of ICrimJ proffer some indication of what make 
certain acts intrinsically criminal from an international perspective. Ensuring 
(regional) peace and security, as well as humanitarian considerations of protecting 
people against atrocities may therefore also constitute good indicia of seriousness for 
regional crimes. 
 
5.2.2.1 Peace and Security 
After WWII, an unsurprising predilection to construe international crimes as threats to 
the collective security interests of the international community consequently emerged. 
This is reflected largely by the ILC commission efforts to create a draft Code of 
Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind.109 From the early stages, it was 
GHFLGHGWKDWWKHGUDIW&RGHZRXOG³EHOLPLWHGWRRIIHQFHVZKLFKFRQWDLQDSROLWLFDO
element and which endanger or disturb the maintenance of international peace and 
VHFXULW\´110 The ILC noted that offences against the peace and security of mankind 
ZRXOGFRYHU³WUDQVJUHVVLRQVDULVLQJIURPWKHEUHDFKRIDQREOLJDWLRQWKHVXEMHFW-
matter of which is RIVSHFLDOLPSRUWDQFHWRWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\´111 The ILC 
DOVRHODERUDWHGWKDWWKHH[SUHVVLRQµSHDFHDQGVHFXULW\RIPDQNLQG¶KDG³DFHUWDLQ
XQLW\DFHUWDLQFRPSUHKHQVLYHQHVVOLQNLQJWKHYDULRXVRIIHQFHV´HYHQWKRXJKHDFK
offence had its own special characteristics.112 Spiropoulos posited that these acts could 
EHGHILQHGE\WKHLUFKDUDFWHUZKLFK³QRUPDOO\ZRXOGDIIHFWWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOUHODWLRQV
LQDZD\GDQJHURXVIRUWKHPDLQWHQDQFHRISHDFH´113 Thiam similarly suggested that 
international crimes wHUHILUVWO\WKHUHVXOWRI³DVHULRXVEUHDFKRIDQLQWHUQDWLRQDO
obligation of essential importance for the maintenance of international peace and 
VHFXULW\´114  
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 The ICL was first tasked by the UNGA to prepare a draft Code of Offences against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind in 1947. See General Assembly resolution 177 (II) of 21 November 1947 
(Formulation of the principles recognized in the Charter of the Nurnberg Tribunal and in the judgment 
of the Tribunal). 
110
 The ILC therefore decided to omit other crimes such as piracy, trafficking of dangerous drugs, 
trafficking of women and children, slavery, counterfeiting of currency, and damage to submarine 
cables. See Document A/1858, at para.52(a), in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1951, 
vol. II, at 134. 
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 Third Report on the Draft Code, supra n.83, para.61. 
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 Ibid, para.38. 
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 6SLURSRXORVVWDWHGWKDW WKH³PDLQFKDUDFWHULVWLFRIWKHRIIHQFHV LQTXHVWLRQLVWKHLUKLJKO\SROLWLcal 
QDWXUH´6HH'RFXPHQW$&1SDUDLQYearbook of the International Law Commission, 1950, 
vol. II, at 259. 
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 See Third Report on the Draft Code, supra n.83, para.63. 
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Given that maintaining peace and security would also reflect regional interests, 
its violation shRXOGDOVRVHUYHDVDQLQGLFDWRURIWKHµVHULRXVQHVV¶IRUUHJLRQDOFULPHV
An important distinction had nevertheless been stressed between the two concepts of 
µLQWHUQDWLRQDOSHDFHDQGVHFXULW\¶DQGµSHDFHDQGVHFXULW\RIPDQNLQG¶115 While the 
IRUPHU ZDV ³V\Qonymous with non-EHOOLJHUHQFH´ DQG SHJJHG WR SHDFHIXO UHODWLRQV
between States,116 the latter encompassed acts committed against peoples.117 Hence, 
protecting people against atrocities that shock the conscience of humanity may be 
another indicium of seriousness for international crimes.118 
 
5.2.2.2 Protecting People against Atrocities 
$VµVHULRXVQHVV¶LVUHODWLYHDQGWKHQDWXUHRIWKHDFWLVVHHQDVDGHWHUPLQDQWRIDQ
international crime, humanitarian considerations of safeguarding the human being are 
a useful indicium of seriousness for international crimes.119  The ICJ accordingly held 
in its Reservations to the Genocide Convention advisory opinion120 that the 
&RQYHQWLRQZDV³PDQLIHVWO\DGRSWHGIRUDSXUHO\KXPDQLWDULDQDQGFLYLOL]LQJSXUSRVH
... since its object on the one hand is to safeguard the very existence of certain human 
groups and on the other to confirm and endorse the most elementary principles of 
PRUDOLW\´121  The ICJ is noted to have said in the South-West Africa cases122 that 
humanitarian considerations are insufficient in themselves to generate legal rights and 
obligations even though all States have a vested interest in such matters.123 The Court 
DGGHGWKDWWKHUHPXVWEHPRUHWKDQDPRUDORUKXPDQLWDULDQLGHDOZKLFKKDG³QR
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 In the third report on the Draft Code, the Special Rapporteur noted that the two expressions 
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UHVLGXDOMXULGLFDOFRQWHQW´124 In the Case Concerning Military And Paramilitary 
Activities In And Against Nicaragua,125 the ICJ nevertheless acknowledged the 
fundamental principles of humanity encapsulated in IHL, and referred to them as a 
basis for responsibility.126 In its advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use 
of Nuclear Weapons,127 WKH,&-VLPLODUO\QRWHGWKDW³WKHPRVWXQLYHUVDOO\UHFRJQL]HG
KXPDQLWDULDQSULQFLSOHV´ZHUHUHIOHFWHGE\WKHH[WHQVLYHFRGLILFDWLRQRIKXPDQLWDULDQ
law, the extent of the accession of these treaties, and the fact that the denunciation 
clauses within these instruments had never been used.128  
This link between international crimes and humanitarian considerations of 
safeguarding the human being was confirmed in 3URVHFXWRUY7DGLü (Jurisdiction),129 
where the ICTY found that ³>S@ULQFLSOHVDQGUXOHVRIKXPDQLWDULDQODZUHIOHFW
³HOHPHQWDU\FRQVLGHUDWLRQVRIKXPDQLW\´ZLGHO\UHFRJQL]HGDVWKHPDQGDWRU\
minimum for conduct in armed conflicts of any kind. No one can doubt the gravity of 
the acts at issue, nor the interest of the international community in their 
SURKLELWLRQ´130 In Prosecutor v. Strugar,131 the ICTY reiterated that the prohibition of 
attacks on civilians was an elementary rule governing the conduct of war, and added 
WKDW³WKHSXUSRVHRIWKLVSURKLELWLRQLVnot only to save lives of civilians, but also to 
VSDUHWKHPIURPWKHULVNRIEHLQJVXEMHFWHGWRZDUDWURFLWLHV´132 Hence, humanitarian 
considerations of protecting people against atrocities is not just a useful indicator, but 
in fact an expanding marker of seriousness for international crimes. 
On that note, although atrocities perpetrated during civil war and crimes 
against humanity that occur within State borders are clearly not international in 
character, the commission of acts committed by a State against its own citizens has 
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also been increasingly deemed to be a matter of international and regional concern.133 
Partly due to political-legal considerations, however, emphasis is placed less on the 
nature of these acts and more on how they threaten international peace and security.134 
For example, a conflict within a State may be considered as a direct threat to 
international (and regional) peace and security, not least by spreading to neighbouring 
countries or leading to massive refugee flows across national borders.135 Where a 
situation is clearly contained within State borders and classified strictly as an internal 
conflict, intervention by the international community may be justified on the basis that 
the humanitarian crisis within the State constitutes a threat to international peace and 
security.136 This was supported by the ICTY in the case of 3URVHFXWRUY7DGLü 
(Jurisdiction)ZKHUHLWKHOGWKDWDQLQWHUQDODUPHGFRQIOLFWZRXOGFRQVWLWXWHDµWKUHDW
WRWKHSHDFH¶EDVHGRQ³WKHVHWWOHGSUDFWLFHRIWKH6HFXULW\&RXQFLODQGWKHFRPPRQ
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQVPHPEHUVKLSLQJHQHUDO´137 In this connection, it 
may be said that a threat to peace and security not only shores up claims but 
potentially drives and underlies arguments for protecting people against atrocities. 
Indeed, the first time the UNSC applied the Responsibility to Protect doctrine was in 
respect of the situation in Libya, where it authorised enforcement action under 
Chapter VII after determining that the situation constituted a threat to international 
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peace and security.138 As noted in Chapter 3, the linkage with ICrimJ is underscored 
by the earlier adoption by the UNSC of resolution 1970, which referred the Libyan 
situation to the Prosecutor of the ICC.139 
This evident interrelationship between the twin ICrimJ goals of protecting 
people against atrocities and ensuring peace and security therefore further attests that 
both are significant indicia of seriousness for international crimes, and accordingly 
relevant for regional crimes. Separately, it restates that the criteria of seriousness (in 
terms of either maintaining peace and security or protecting people against atrocities) 
is itself something to be determined and accepted in each instance by the international 
community as a whole.140  The positivist nature of the international legal system and 
the opinio juris of States must then not be forgotten during the application of both the 
µVHULRXVQHVV¶FULWHULRQDQGLWVLQGLFLDWRWKHQRWLRQRIUHJLRQDOFULPHV141 In this regard, 
it is worth considering if the interlinked notions of jus cogens and obligations erga 
omnes may also be appropriate terms of reference and potential indicia of seriousness.  
 
5.2.2.3 Jus Cogens  
The jus cogens concept was discussed in the ILC drafts142 and subsequently 
crystallised in Articles 53 and 64 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.143 
This signalled a normative differentiation between two kinds of rules and legal 
obligations within the international legal system.144 The content of jus cogens rules are 
deemed so imperative to the entire community of States that derogation is prohibited, 
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and the relationship of responsibility is not restricted only to the State(s) that 
committed the breach and injured State(s).145 Despite their theoretical similarities, 
various scholars stress that jus cogens and international crimes are nevertheless 
different concepts and not necessarily connected.146 Although both seek to protect 
certain imperatives and higher values, they serve different purposes at dissimilar 
levels in disparate areas of public international law. Indeed, the ILC states in its 
commentary on Article 19 of the Draft AUWLFOHVRQ6WDWH5HVSRQVLELOLW\WKDW³WKH
category of international obligations admitting of no derogation is much broader than 
WKHFDWHJRU\RIREOLJDWLRQVZKRVHEUHDFKLVQHFHVVDULO\DQLQWHUQDWLRQDOFULPH´147 
The overlap between the broad category of international crimes and jus cogens 
that sometimes appear is partly because both concepts are yet to be clearly defined and 
delimited.148 In fact, the ILC intentionally avoided creating an authoritative list of jus 
cogens QRUPVDVLWIRXQG³QRVLPSOHFULWHULRQEy which to identify a general rule of 
international law as having the character of jus cogens´149 and there remained no 
consensus on the criteria for inclusion on such a list.150 This permitted the belief that 
jus cogens can serve the aspiration of holding the positivist system of international 
law controlled by sovereign States accountable to a global society, whose fundamental 
interests are instead the security and well-being of all mankind.151  
This view was undoubtedly supported by early ICJ pronouncements that such 
obligations of States can be founded on general and well-recognised principles 
LQFOXGLQJ³HOHPHQWDU\FRQVLGHUDWLRQVRIKXPDQLW\´152 DQGDUHELQGLQJRQ6WDWHV³HYHQ
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ZLWKRXWDQ\FRQYHQWLRQDOREOLJDWLRQ´153 In this vein, Bassiouni argues that if a crime 
threatens the peace and security of humankind and shocks the conscience of humanity, 
³LWFDQEHFRQFOXGHGWKDWLWLVSDUWRIjus cogens´154 This broader stance that jus 
cogens is not just about rules or principles required for the international legal system 
to exist and function but also about the substance of rules appears to have gained 
traction.155 Indeed, the ILC has since noted that jus cogens LV³UHFRJQL]HGLQ
international practice, in the jurisprudence of international and national courts and 
tribunaOVDQGLQOHJDOGRFWULQH´156 which includes the ICJ reference to fundamental 
KXPDQLWDULDQODZUXOHVFRQVWLWXWLQJ³LQWUDQVJUHVVLEOHSULQFLSOHVRILQWHUQDWLRQDO
FXVWRPDU\ODZ´157  
That said, acceptance and recognition of a jus cogens rule ultimately remains 
and reflects the will of States.158 In this regard, a regional application of the jus cogens 
principles then becomes relevant. Grounded in legal positivism, the concept is not 
simply jus cogens norms within a regional setting. Rather, regional jus cogens are 
pHUHPSWRU\QRUPVEDVHGRQDUHJLRQDOVHWRIµKLJKHUODZV¶RIRYHUULGLQJLPSRUWDQFH
which are intentionally and overtly deemed acceptable within a specific time-period 
by a group of regional States to serve certain social and political tasks.159 Hence, while 
it is debatable whether jus cogens can constitute an indicia (or even criteria) for 
international crimes, such a politically amenable and practical conceptualisation of 
regional jus cogens can function as a term of reference of seriousness for regional 
crimes. It not only specifies a set of norms that are of fundamental interest to a 
regional community, but also highlights the underlying objectives of those States in 
proscribing certain acts. 
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5.2.2.4 Obligations Erga Omnes  
The ICTY defined obligations erga omnes160 DV³REOLJDWLRQVRZHGWRZDUGVDOOWKH
other members of the international community ... the violation of such an obligation 
simultaneously constitutes a breach of the correlative right of all members of the 
international community and gives rise to a claim for compliance accruing to each and 
every member, which then has the right to insist on fulfilment of the obligation or in 
DQ\FDVHWRFDOOIRUWKHEUHDFKWREHGLVFRQWLQXHG´161 This was corroborated by the 
ILC in Article 48 of the 2001 Articles on Responsibility of States for International 
:URQJIXO$FWVZKLFKSURYLGHGIRUµLQYRFDWLRQRIUHVSRQVLELOLW\E\D6WDWHRWKHUWKDQ
DQLQMXUHG6WDWH¶162  
In this vein, the focus of this discussion is not obligations erga omnes for 
ZKLFK³WKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\DV DZKROH´KDVDOHJDOLQWHUHVW5DWKHUWKHPRUH
relevant concept is obligations erga omnes partes163 that are essentially created in 
treaties and owed by State parties to each other in reciprocal relationships.164 This 
more limited version of the concept is highlighted by the ILC in Article 48(1)(a) of the 
ILC Articles on State Responsibility, which entitles non-injured States to invoke the 
responsibility of another treaty party if the specific obligation breached meets two 
conditions.165 Firstly, the obligation is owed to a group of States that includes the 
invoking State.166 Secondly, the obligation is established WRSURWHFWD³FROOHFWLYH
LQWHUHVWRIWKHJURXS´ZKLFKLVDERYHWKHLQGLYLGXDOLQWHUHVWVRIDQ\6WDWH
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concerned.167 As no distinction is made between the sources of international law,168 
obligations erga omnes partes can be derived from multilateral treaties and customary 
international law.169 6XFK³FROOHFWLYHREOLJDWLRQV´PD\WKHQFRQFHUQWKHVHFXULW\RID
region or protection of human rights.170  
With regards to obligations stemming from international criminal law 
conventions, they will have erga omnes partes effect towards other States parties, and 
erga omnes effect to the extent that they are recognised as customary international 
law.171 Institutionalising international criminal responsibility in international 
instruments like the ICC Statute may only marginally improve the enforcement of 
erga omnes obligations.172 Nevertheless, treaties creating obligations erga omnes 
partes undoubtedly provide State parties with a stronger entitlement to claim 
responsibility of another State in a breach than States acting erga omnes.173 This 
means that a multilateral agreement on regional crimes stands a better chance of being 
legally enforced than a demand between neighbouring States based purely on 
customary international law.  
In sum, obligations erga omnes partes should feature in considerations of 
UHJLRQDOFULPHVDQGPD\VHUYHDVDIXUWKHULQGLFLXPRIµVHULRXVQHVV¶SDUWLFXODUO\LI
they promote and protect the collective interest of a regional grouping of States. This 
builds on the argument that the emphasis and efforts by AMS to tackle selected illegal 
acts help identify a regional crime through community recognition, and by stressing 
KRZµVHULRXV¶DWKUHDWWKHUHJLRQDOFRPPXQLty deems they pose. For example, 
convinced that the global fight against several specific transnational crimes, which 
were of particular relevance in Southeast Asia, rested on consolidated regional action 
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in both the institutional and operational spheres, AMS have resolved to adopt 
various measures.174 These inter alia included: (1) strengthening AMS 
commitment to regional cooperation in combating the identified transnational crimes; 
(2) holding discussions with a view to signing mutual legal assistance agreements, 
bilateral treaties, memorandum of understanding or other arrangements among 
member States; (3) expanding the scope of efforts against the specified crimes and 
including them in the work of the ASEAN Secretariat; (4) greater cooperation and 
coordination with other ASEAN bodies in the investigations, prosecution and 
rehabilitation of perpetrators of such crimes; and (5) bolstering the capacity of the 
ASEAN Secretariat to assist AMS in initiating, planning, and coordinating activities, 
strategies, programmes and projects to combat these crimes. 
 
5.3 Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia 
 
As noted above, ASEAN already has a list of crimes that are seen to pose a threat to 
peace, security and stability of the region also exists,175 and for which practical 
collaboration has since been developed by AMS.176 There has in fact been a stepping 
up of efforts and cooperation in the prevention and eradication of these crimes.177 For 
the period of 2013-2015, ASEAN has identified eight areas of focus, namely: counter-
terrorism, trafficking in persons, illicit drug trafficking, money laundering, sea piracy, 
arms smuggling, international economic crime, and cybercrime.178 It is possible that 
some of these prohibited activities can be elevated to the level of a regional crime 
since there is regional community recognition, and they are considered to be 
extremely serious problems within the context of Southeast Asia. They are all already 
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emphatically deemed by AMS to be threats to regional peace and security, while some 
may attract obligations erga omnes partes or even fall under regional jus cogens.  
 Maritime piracy is the leading contender to be considered a regional crime in 
Southeast Asia.179 Not only has it been recognised as an international crime for several 
centuries, it is a potential example of regional jus cogens that reflects the fundamental 
interest of AMS and highlight their underlying objectives for proscribing regional 
crimes. 6RXWKHDVW $VLD LV ³GLVWLQFWLYHO\ PDULWLPH´ GXH WR LWV JHRJUDSK\ DQG UHODWLYH
lack of land-based transport infrastructure, and shipping is unquestionably important 
to the region.180 As a corollary, maritime piracy has been a perennial problem for 
seafarers,181 and remains a serious threat to international shipping and commerce due 
to the many small islands and narrow waterways that form its archipelagic nature.182 
According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), out of 264 attacks reported 
globally, 128 occurred in Southeast Asia in 2013.183 Given that the Straits of Malacca 
is the shortest sea route between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, the importance of the 
free flow of ships and goods through regional waters cannot be overstated. It is 
estimated that over 60,000 vessels transit the Malacca Straits annually, carrying about 
one-third of global trade, including one-third of global crude oil and over half of 
global liquefied natural gas.184 )RUH[DPSOH RI&KLQD¶V LPSRUWV IORZV WKURXJK
Southeast Asian waters, including 80% of its energy imports.185 Frequent attacks on 
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ships passing through the region would thus not only hamper international trade and 
affect the world economy, but could also cause billions of dollars in economic loss.186 
Given the harm that maritime piracy can inflict on the trading interests and 
economic wellbeing of all States, as noted earlier, the international community has 
long treated piracy as a universal crime whose perpetrators are subject to punishment 
by any nation that apprehends them.187 Piracy was defined in the Geneva Convention 
of the High Seas in 1958,188 and replicated in the UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS) that was signed in 1982 and entered into force in 1994.189 The 
GHILQLWLRQDOUHTXLUHPHQWIRUSLUDWLFDODWWDFNVWRVHUYH³SULYDWH HQGV´UHVWULFWVLWWRDFWV
committed with the intent to rob, and underscores the unwillingness by States to 
permit universal jurisdiction over politically motivated acts.190 In 1988, the 
Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation191 established a legal basis for prosecuting various maritime crimes that 
did not fall within the UNCLOS piracy framework,192 including acts of terrorism.193 
However, such crimes are clearly distinct from the universal crime of piracy, and 
entail no real aut dedere aut judicare obligations.194 It is thus clear that while treaties 
against maritime crime increasingly require State parties to cooperate in line with 
suppression objectives, territorial sovereignty continues to be the overriding 
fundamental principle.195  
All AMS except Cambodia are parties to UNCLOS, but three countries along 
the Malacca Straits (Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand) are not parties to the Rome 
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Convention.196 Besides sovereignty issues, shortcomings of international law 
regarding piracy and maritime crimes with respect to Southeast Asia exist,197 
including the fact that SLUDF\FDQRQO\RFFXURQWKHKLJKVHDVRULQDVWDWH¶VH[FOXVLYH
economic zone.198 Various regional treaties like the 2004 Treaty on Mutual Legal 
Assistance in Criminal Matters and 2007 ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism 
have then been adopted to allow AMS to assist in cross-border investigations and have 
enforcement capabilities to address terrorism.199 As opposed to exclusive reliance on 
UNCLOS, Beckman highlights that regional States can work towards a regional 
agreement,200 while Goodman notes that regional initiatives allow a smaller grouping 
of States to create and enforce anti-piracy measures tailored to the unique situations of 
a given region.201 The Malaysia-Singapore-Indonesia (MALSINDO) coordinated 
patrols in the Malacca Straits is an example of such initiatives to address piracy in 
regional waters.202 In September 2005, maritime air patrols codenamed Eyes in the 
Sky (EiS) were launched to increase the coverage and effectiveness of 
MALSINDO.203 The coordinated sea patrols and EiS were subsequently unified under 
the Malacca Straits Patrols (MSP) in April 2006.204 
These cooperative efforts have however been noted to reflect the desire of 
$06 ³to be seen to be doing someWKLQJ LQ WKH IDFH RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO SUHVVXUH´ DQG
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avoid external interference, rather than to tackle maritime piracy within Southeast 
Asia.205 For example, the perceived threat of US intervention in Southeast Asian 
waters played a vital role in establishing cooperation among regional countries.206 
Malaysia and Indonesia protested after the Commander of US Pacific Command, 
Admiral Thomas Fargo, identified the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) 
as a way to tackle maritime security threats.207 Both countries not only viewed RMSI 
as an erosion of sovereignty, but also as belittling their ability to secure their territorial 
waters.208 Besides concerns that US military presence might fuel Islamic radicalism in 
the region, then-Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar also stressed that 
IRUHLJQHFRQRPLFLQWHUHVWLQWKH0DODFFD6WUDLWV³GRHVQRWFRQYHUWWKHVRYHUHLJQW\DQG
WHUULWRULDO LQWHJULW\RI WKHDUHD´209 Ultimately, the RMSI controversy spurred greater 
cooperation among the littoral states to defend against the risk of foreign intervention 
and led to the MSP. This is akin to the present contention that the resistance of AMS 
towards the ICC can be beneficially re-focused into a regional ICrimJ initiative. 
In line with the efforts to create an ASEAN Political, Economic and Security 
Community, there have also been various regional initiatives to strengthen 
cooperation to prevent and combat transnational crimes, including piracy.210 In this 
vein, the issue of maritime crimes has been addressed at the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF) for over a decade.211 During the last ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-
Terrorism and Transnational Crime in 2013, tKH$06QRWHG³WKHVXFFHVVIXOHIIRUWVLQ
addressing maritime security, particularly piracy at sea in South-East Asia, through 
VWUHQJWKHQHG FRRSHUDWLRQ DQG LQIRUPDWLRQ H[FKDQJH WR DGGUHVV LWV URRW FDXVHV´212 
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While police and enforcement measures are important, regional countries understand 
that they must also deal with the political and socio-economic conditions promoting 
maritime crime in order to make real improvements to regional maritime security.213 
Hence, it is likely that an ASEAN ICrimJ initiative will similarly not only focus on 
formal legal mechanisms, but also consider informal alternative approaches to address 
regional crimes. 
That said, sensitivity over national sovereignty and competing views on the 
piracy threat continue to impact cooperation in Southeast Asia.214 The unwillingness 
of some of AMS to collaborate fully and commit resources then constrains the scope 
and effectiveness of cooperative endeavours. For example, the 2004 Regional 
Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in 
Asia (ReCAAP) has been greatly hampered by the continued reluctance of both 
Malaysia and Indonesia to sign the agreement.215 ReCAAP is the first anti-piracy 
measure implemented at the government-to-government level, and establishes a 
framework for cooperation in three areas: (1) information exchange; (2) capacity 
building; and (3) operational cooperation.216 An Information Sharing Center (ISC) has 
since also been set up in Singapore to facilitate communication and information 
sharing.217 Apart from sovereignty concerns, Indonesia and Malaysia however also 
refused to ratify ReCAAP in protest against the decision to establish the ISC in 
Singapore.218  
Nevertheless, as the creation of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission 
on Human Rights (AICHR) has shown, it is not impossible that AMS may at some 
point agree to greater cooperation in the form of a regional ICrimJ mechanism to 
tackle international crimes, and defend against the risk of intervention by the ICC. 
Based on their efforts and emphasis to tackle selected illegal acts, AMS may also take 
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the opportunity to create a list of regional crimes that will likely include maritime 
piracy. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
$ UHJLRQDO FULPH LV HQYLVDJHG WR EH D VXEVHW RI WUDQVQDWLRQDO µWUHDW\ FULPHV¶
subscribed to within a specific region, as well as any international crime that is part of 
customary international law and of particular importance to the regional community of 
States. They can be set apart from other transnational acts criminalised by an 
international/regional treaty by two criteria: (1) regional community recognition; and 
 µH[WUHPH VHULRXVQHVV¶ ZLWKLQ D UHJLRQDO FRQWH[W *iven the importance of 
maintaining peace and security as a fundamental interest of the international 
community and to the notion of international crimes, it will also be reflective of 
collective regional interests and its breach an indicium of seriousness for regional 
crimes. The humanitarian consideration of protecting people against atrocity is 
similarly not just an expanding marker of seriousness for international crimes, but also 
a useful indicator for regional crimes. A politically amenable and practical 
conceptualisation of regional jus cogens, which specifies norms of fundamental 
interest to a regional community and highlights the underlying State objectives in 
proscribing certain acts, may be another term of reference for regional crimes. 
Obligations erga omnes partes that detail the obligations and procedural consequences 
of a breach of a treaty promoting and protecting the collective interest of a regional 
grouping of States may be a further indicium of seriousness for regional crimes. 
The 1997 ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime identified six 
WUDQVQDWLRQDOFULPHVWKDWDIIHFWHGUHJLRQDOSHDFHDQGVWDELOLW\DVZHOODV³WKHZHOIDUH
RI WKH UHJLRQ
V SHRSOHV´ ,I YLHZHG WRJHWKHU ZLWK VXEVHTXHQW UHJLRQDO LQLWLDWLYHV D
basis for regional crimes in Southeast Asia may exist. Indeed, it is theoretically 
possible that some of the eight crimes currently identified by AMS as areas of focus 
can constitute regional crimes. Terrorism, human trafficking, drug trafficking, arms 
smuggling, sea piracy, money laundering, international economic crime, and 
cybercrime are already considered to be extremely serious regional problems and 
addressed in various regional conventions. Such erga omnes partes obligations may 
possibly indicate regional customary law or eventually evolve into regional jus cogens 
norms. 
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While regional sensitivities on the issues of territorial integrity and State 
sovereignty cannot be ignored, maritime piracy is then most likely to be elevated as a 
regional crime in Southeast Asia because it has long been recognised as an 
international crime and may be an example of regional jus cogens amongst AMS. It is 
also of concern to other geographical regions and stands a high chance of acceptance 
in these parts of the world. This raises the possibility of initiatives in one region 
spurring development or serving as a template for other regions.219. By expanding the 
list of crimes to address specific regional priorities, regionalising ICrimJ thus opens 
opportunities for additional crimes to later be selectively adopted in other regions or 
perhaps even accepted at the international level.220 
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regional court, and whether: (1) a regional ICrimJ mechanism is more cost effective, while addressing 
concerQV DERXW VHOHFWLYH MXVWLFH DQG µIRUHLJQ¶ LQWHUIHUHQFH  SUR[LPLW\ WR WKH YLFWLPV LQFUHDVHV LWV
legitimacy and acceptance; and (3) the incorporation of alternative/informal justice mechanisms, as 
well as infusion of local values and customs, makes a regional initiative more responsive and credible 
WRORFDOVWKDQWKH,&&)RUDGLVFXVVLRQVHH0D[GX3OHVVLV7L\DQMDQD0DOXZDDQG$QQLH2¶5HLOO\
³$IULFDDQG WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO&ULPLQDO&RXUW´ Chatham House Programme Paper International Law 
2013/01, July 2013, at www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/International%20 
Law/0713pp_iccafrica.pdf.  
220
 It is noteworthy that thH $8 LV UHTXLUHG WR IRUPXODWH D FULPH RI ³XQFRQVWLWXWLRQDO FKDQJH RI
JRYHUQPHQW´ WR JLYH HIIHFW WR $UWLFOH  RI WKH African Charter on Democracy, Elections and 
Governance. In this regard, it has been suggested as a crime that should be added to the jurisdiction of 
an African criminal court, together several other pan-African problems like drug trafficking, piracy and 
corruption. See ibid, at 9-DQG,5,1³$QDO\VLV+RZ&ORVHLVDQ$IULFDQ&ULPLQDO&RXUW"´ IRIN, 13 
June 2012,  at http://www.irinnews.org/report/95633/analysis-how-close-is-an-african-criminal-court. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The research has argued that furthering ICrimJ through regional initiatives not only 
helps in the effective enforcement of ICL, but can also serve the interests of sovereign 
States. It showed that regional ICrimJ mechanisms can be an alternative aligned with 
the political calculations of States, including those not convinced by arguments of 
morality and preventing impunity, as well as able to promote the goals of ICrimJ 
according to the needs of their unique regional situation. In this regard, the research 
has explained the theoretical appeal and utility of regionalism to self-interested States 
through the lens of both neo-liberalism and neo-realism. As regional initiatives can 
achieve greater legitimacy, support and compliance from both the concerned State(s) 
and regional neighbours, the regionalisation of ICrimJ is posited as a theoretically 
possible, practically viable and politically acceptable approach to promote and 
advance ICL. Regionalism therefore clearly provides both normative and practical 
contributions to the study and advancement of ICrimJ. 
Support and cooperation on enforcement activities can be further expected 
when regional initiatives additionally function as an effective monitor of agreed 
standards or measures. As a corollary, regardless of whether it is accepted that ICL is 
culturally specific and not inherently universal or value-neutral, it is important to 
recognise the different norms, values, and legal precepts that exist in various parts of 
the world. By excluding them, there is a greater possibility that ICrimJ may not be 
well-received. Even worse, claims that ICL is a new form of Western political and 
legal imperialism could strengthen resistance and unleash a regional backlash against 
the pursuit of ICrimJ, especially if indigenous justice mechanisms and goals are 
irreverently swept aside. This could also manifest if the normalisation of ICL leads to 
a stringent and uncompromising focus on specific core international crimes, at the 
expense of other crimes that may be of particular relevance and concern to some 
regions of the world.  
Regional initiatives thus have political allure as they not only allow for and 
reflect local legal norms and political considerations, but also crucially place 
enforcement of ICL in each geographic area primarily in the hands of the regional 
countries. This has become important with the establishment of the ICC, which has 
challenged the absolute sovereignty of States over the prosecution of international 
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crimes that previously existed. Notably, some countries have closed ranks to 
circumvent action by the Court or simply refuse to accept its indictments. 
While occupying the same space and proffering some of the same benefits 
discussed, internationalised domestic tribunals are recognised as being ad hoc and 
importantly also post hoc. Hence, they will not be institutions with long-term 
objectives and plans. Compared to a permanent regional mechanism, hybrid courts are 
less likely to stop international crimes from being perpetrated, let alone leave a legacy 
beyond a narrow prosecutorial function. Their shortcomings are clear from the 
H[SHULHQFHVRIWKHERWK636&LQ(DVW7LPRUWKDWZDVXQDEOHWRSURVHFXWHWKHµELJILVK¶
and engage the locals, as well as the ECCC in Cambodia that has been criticised for 
political interference, corruption, bias, and not meeting international fair trial 
standards. As such, it is questionable whether hybrid tribunals have improved the 
situation or attitudes towards ICrimJ in Southeast Asia. 
The research has also highlighted that ASEAN countries remain highly 
reluctant to relinquish sovereignty, redistribute their power, and interfere in the 
domestic affairs of neighbouring States. Given that intra-regional development of ICL 
is controlled by AMS, it is important to provide real political and strategic incentives 
for collective action by this regional grouping to advance ICrimJ. By being politically 
sensitive to inter-State relations, internally promulgated regional initiatives can 
arguably serve the interests of individual AMS and provide an alternative route for the 
consistent enforcement of ICL. The likelihood of an ASEAN response to a violation 
of ICL by a member State is increased if the results of its collective action are more 
tangible and easily achieved, and the costs can be shared amongst the AMS.  
Fears about the circumscription of State sovereignty and immunity can then be 
addressed by drawing reference to the twin ICrimJ goals of preserving peace and 
security, as well as protecting people against atrocities. Viewed with a state-centric 
lens, the principles behind ICrimJ and its enforcement may be linked to the conflict 
management and resolution that herald plurilateral security cooperation in Southeast 
Asia. In this regard, AMS will be incentivised to uphold ICrimJ if a destabilising 
situation significantly affects their collective and national interests. Motivations 
include maintaining a safe and stable regional environment, preventing the spread of 
conflict and atrocities, and addressing the flow of refugees across borders. A further 
impetus for response by third-party AMS will be the humanitarian consideration of 
protecting people against atrocities, which may arise from internal domestic pressures.  
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It is clear that AMS are not unaffected by the international normative 
HQYLURQPHQW )RU H[DPSOH .DWVXPDWD SRLQWV RXW WKDW WKH\ KDYH µPLPHWLFDOO\¶ EHHQ
adopting human rights norms advanced by the Western industrialised democracies.1 
Recognising that upholding human rights are increasingly deemed to be an element of 
international legitimacy, the underlying intent of a regional human rights body has 
EHHQ WR VHFXUH $6($1¶V LGHQWLW\ DV D OHJLWLPDWH LQVWLWXWLRQ LQ WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO
community.2 Besides building up an image more aligned with international norms, 
ASEAN countries have also stopped saying that such norms can be curtailed for 
economic development to shore up domestic political credibility,3 as well as to 
address increasingly assertive public demands for accountability.4  
However, it is unclear if AMS can be similarly compelled to enforce ICL, let 
alone genuinely embrace the norms that underpin the ICrimJ system. ASEAN 
countries are in particular critical of the infringement of their sovereign rights by the 
SUHURJDWLYHRIWKH,&&WRWU\DFDVHDVORQJDVLWIDOOVZLWKLQWKHFRXUW¶VMXULVGLFWLRQ
During the 1998 UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries, for example, 
Malaysia stated that while perpetrators of very serious crimes abhorred by the 
international community must be dealt with, the national sovereignty of all nations 
must always be upheld.5 Vietnam similarly declared that any activity of the Court 
without prior consent of the states concerned constitutes an encroachment of state 
sovereignty.6 Fifteen years later, the attitudes of the Southeast Asian countries towards 
the ICC have not changed. Indonesia thus maintains that it will not accede to the 
Rome Statute as the ICC may be a potential tool to interfere in domestic politics.7 
                                          
1
 Conversely, the Western strategy of applying material leverage to pressure AMS to change their 
policies and undertake liberal reform increasingly suffers from diminishing utility. Hiro Katsumata, 
³ASEAN and human rights: resisting Western pressure or emulating the West?´The Pacific Review 22 
(2009): 619±637, at 630. 
2 Ibid, at 619. 
3
 For example, ASEAN participation in human rights treaties has been a signal to the citizenry that the 
JRYHUQPHQWVDUH³QRWRXWRIVWHSZLWKLQWHUQDWLRQDOPRUHV´DQGDUH³LQIDFW
OLEHUDOL]LQJ
DQGDQVZHULQJ
WKHFDOOWRDFFRXQWDELOLW\´7KLR/L-DQQ³,PSOHPHQWLQJHuman Rights in ASEAN Countries: Promises 
to Keep and Miles to Go Before I Sleep", Yale Human Rights & Development Journal 2 (1999):1-86, at 
28.  
4 Maznah Mohamad, ³Towards a Human Rights Regime in Southeast Asia: Charting the Course of State 
Commitment´Contemporary Southeast Asia 24 (2002): 230-251, at 230-231. 
5
 Statement by Ramanathan Vengadesan, Ambassador of Malaysia to Italy, at the UN Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, 18 
June 1998. See UN doc. A/CONF.183/13 (Vol.II), at 109. 
6 See Statement by Nguyen Ba Son, delegation of Vietnam, at the UN Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, 18 June 1998. See 
UN doc. A/CONF.183/13 (Vol.II), at 111. 
7 While Article 11 of the Rome Statute clearly states that jurisdiction only applies to crimes committed 
after a country becomes a State Party, Indonesian politicians now argue that ratification could affect 
or even be used to block the bids of candidates in the 2014 Indonesian Presidential elections, in 
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Any attempt to advance and promote ICrimJ in Southeast Asia through 
regional initiatives must then recognise that it is counterproductive to use any form of 
pressure to alter quickly the stance taken by AMS on the enforcement of ICL. Indeed, 
changes to the form and substance of the ASEAN position must be evolutionary and 
self-driven, rather than revolutionary and the result of external forces. While the 
inclusive and consensual approach adopted by ASEAN can be problematic if core 
international crimes are committed in an AMS, the presence of a regional ICrimJ 
initiative within Southeast Asia is more likely to help deter and prevent mass atrocities 
from occurring than the absence of one.8 This is not a trivial point since political and 
military leaders will be under scrutiny and pressure to avoid deeds that would not be 
legally justifiable or morally condoned by their immediate neighbours. Hathaway 
points out that the regional context can be very influential in making States commit to 
QRUPDWLYHYDOXHVEHFDXVH³UHJLRQDOSROLWLFal and economic interdependence generates 
JUHDWHUH[WHUQDOSUHVVXUH´9  
Within Southeast Asia, the goal and practical effects of ICrimJ may ultimately 
be more about deterrence and reconciliation, rather than punishment. This is 
consistent with the understanding that the informal and consultative approach adopted 
by AMS will favour non-penal forms of regional accountability and a restorative 
justice approach. Compared to retributive justice, they are more responsive to the 
spill-over effects and contextual complexities of egregious international crimes, as 
well as better tools for societal reconciliation. Indeed, it is recalled that the 
prosecutorial process does not translate into reconciliation in a divided society, let 
alone bring about national reconstruction and societal reintegration. Truth 
commissions and conditional amnesties could therefore be more appropriate amongst 
AMS and face less opposition when the conflict has cross-border elements or effects. 
Nevertheless, criminal trials are still recognised as a necessary component of the 
regional ICrimJ process if ASEAN countries envision a credible regional alternative 
to the ICC, especially one that can justifiably claim jurisdiction over an international 
crime.  
                                                                                                                         
particular Gen (retired) Wiranto and Lt. Gen (retired) Prabowo who have been deemed by the National 
Commission on Human Rights to be responsible for serious human rights violations during the 1998 
May riots. 
8
 It is noteworthy that a key goal of the ICC at its establishment was to deter future crimes rather than to 
punish perpetrators of crimes that occurred before the Rome Statute entered into force. 
9
 2RQD+DWKDZD\ ³'R+XPDQ5LJKWV 7UHDWLHV0DNH D 'LIIHUHQFH"´ Yale Law Journal 111 (2001): 
1935-2042, at 2020. 
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 It is likely that an institution capable of issuing authoritative and binding 
judgments against AMS or their nationals who commit serious regional crimes will 
develop in tandem or be aligned with the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on 
Human Rights (AICHR). Obligations erga omnes partes can then be derived from an 
ASEAN treaty, which will provide AMS with a strong entitlement to claim 
responsibility of another AMS following a breach of obligations to ensure that ICrimJ 
is served.10 In this regard, an ASEAN ICrimJ mechanism will probably be composed 
of nominated representatives from each AMS, and have its jurisdiction limited to the 
confines of Southeast Asia.11 Given that criminal accountability and punishment 
would be the better approach to deal with higher-level offenders, they should be the 
focus of such a regional body. Restorative justice and non-penal sanctions could 
accordingly be used as the viable alternatives to formal prosecution for the masses of 
lower-level offenders. The creation of a formal regional judicial organ will then also 
be an opportunity for the ICC to engage ASEAN and influence the development of 
regional ICrimJ norms and procedures. As previously highlighted, Kenya already 
suggested, inter alia, an amendment to the Preamble of the ICC Statute with regards 
to its complementarity.12 This will set the stage for the relationship between the Court 
and other regional mechanisms, such as in Southeast Asia. It is noteworthy that the 
AU will still continue work on expanding the African Court of Human DQG3HRSOHV¶
Rights (AfCHPR) mandate to prosecute international crimes committed on the 
continent, potentially disregarding the ICC and ignoring possible overlaps between the 
two judicial bodies.13 It is therefore vital for the ICC to accommodate and engage such 
initiatives to avoid being shut out from the regional process. On the other hand, in line 
with its strategy to limit the impunity gap by using all appropriate means to bring 
perpetrators of international crimes to justice, the Court can benefit from engaging 
with regional initiatives that may develop. This will be crucial in assuaging State 
Parties to the Rome Statute not to eschew compliance or completely withdraw their 
                                          
10
 Regional ICrimJ mechanisms established under regional treaties will therefore have greater chances 
of having their decisions enforced than a demand between States based purely on customary 
international law.  
11
 The creation of a proposed Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) coordination centre 
amongst AMS may also have some bearing on the composition and jurisdiction of a regional ICrimJ 
court, especially if humanitarian considerations and the prevention of atrocities gain importance within 
ASEAN. 
12
 As Chapter 3 notes, there are no arguments or indications within the ICC Statute that regional courts 
need be carved out from the complementarity regime. 
13
 Max du PlesVLV ³,PSOLFDWLRQV RI WKH $8 GHFLVLRQ WR JLYH WKH $IULFDQ &RXUW MXULVGLFWLRQ RYHU
LQWHUQDWLRQDOFULPHV´Institute for Security Studies Paper 235, June 2012, at 3. 
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support for the ICC, especially if States face conflicting obligations to the Court and 
regional organisations. It will also help address concerns about the reach of foreign 
powers and the fear of neo-colonialist threats by existing non-State Parties. 
The realisation of a regional criminal court in Southeast Asia will however 
ultimately rely on a high level of political acquiescence, as well as the availability of 
resources and institutional infrastructure. As such, it is currently premature to press for 
the creation of a permanent regional court with a strong enforcement regime capable 
of issuing authoritative and binding judgments against member States or their 
nationals. To maintain regional peace and security, the reality is that some trade-offs 
are required when attempting to prevent impunity for core international/regional 
crimes. Maintaining a permanent legal institution will also be extremely onerous for 
the developing countries in the region, and difficult in terms of applying consistent 
procedures and standards for arrests, detentions and investigations across all ten AMS. 
Hence, ASEAN is unlikely to undertake any immediate or great degree of institutional 
change and development for both political and practical reasons. The more likely 
collective response involving a formal judicial institution in the short to medium term 
will probably be on an ad hoc basis, with jurisdictional preference granted to the 
State(s) in which the crimes occurred. Thus, it would more likely resemble the 
Indonesian domestic trials for crimes against humanity committed in 1999 under its 
Ad Hoc Human Rights Tribunal for East Timor, than the ECCC in Cambodia. 
However, if such ad hoc tribunals are established under an ASEAN treaty framework, 
there will be added regional pressure on the concerned AMS to prevent the disregard 
of concrete evidence of violations due to obligations erga omnes partes that arise. 
Regional oversight may be further bolstered if they are created along with ASEAN 
appointed commissions of inquiry to provide independent reports. To complement the 
criminal prosecutions performed by the affected AMS, these regional commission 
may potentially help manage any truth and reconciliation functions,14 which can 
include fact-finding and recording history, as well as strengthening the rule of law by 
providing education about the wrongfulness of the acts and deterring future 
misconduct. In this vein, the regional commissions could also assist in overseeing any 
                                          
14 TRCs can effectively complement criminal trials by compelling individuals to incriminate 
themselves, morally condemn and discredit the perpetrators of abuses, and prepare the ground for future 
prosecutions or other sanctions. Indeed, while most TRCs do not interfere with or duplicate any tasks of 
DIXQFWLRQLQJMXGLFLDU\WKH\³KDYHKDGHYHU\LQWHQWLRQRIVWUHQJWKHQLQJSURVHFXWLRQV´3ULVFLOOD+D\QHU
Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions 2nd ed. (New York: 
Routledge, 2011), at 13. 
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accompanying conditional and individualised amnesties that are offered to lower-level 
offenders.15  
Given the 'ASEAN way' of making decisions through consultation and 
consensus, a practical first step towards regionalising ICrimJ would be the internally 
initiated promotion of ICL-related conventions and instruments, as well as the 
incorporation of regional norms and practices. This could be followed by the creation 
of a consultative mechanism to discuss ICL within the context of Southeast Asia, and 
subsequently regional monitoring procedures that lead to or support the 
abovementioned commissions of inquiry. Such a regional initiative would minimally 
reaffirm the ICL treaty commitments of AMS and encourage compatibility with 
international standards. Regional monitoring of such commitments could then increase 
awareness, entail greater respect, and facilitate public education of ICrimJ issues 
within individual ASEAN countries. As a result, it may potentially act as a catalyst for 
increased domestic scrutiny and an avenue for change, as well as encourage 
acceptance and promote implementation at the domestic level. 
If required, situations could be referred to the regional monitoring group or 
commissions of inquiry created within an ASEAN treaty framework to investigate 
crimes that occurred within member States. Such mechanisms could be established in 
relation to the maintenance of regional peace and security, but their structures allowed 
to vary according to the situational needs.16 As mentioned earlier, regional 
commissions could help oversee conditional amnesty processes, as well as truth and 
reconciliation activities that may precede criminal trials. Their mandates should thus 
also be allowed to differ, based on requirements ± from investigation, mediation, or 
administering compensation. With regards to any investigative and fact-finding 
powers, it would be prudent to ensure that they also accommodate instances where an 
AMS has demanded or suggested that a fact-finding mission be dispatched or an 
                                          
15
 It is recognised that amnesties do not however deprive other States of universal jurisdiction to 
prosecute persons accused of core international crimes, and that cases can still be brought before the 
ICC (or State Parties) if other jurisdictional requirements are met. 
16
 This could be and function like the Commissions and Investigative Bodies created by the UN 
Security Council to handle the range of tasks related to maintaining international peace and security. 
Examples include the International Commission of Inquiry for Darfur, which investigated violations of 
international humanitarian and human rights law, to determine whether acts of genocide occurred and 
to identify and hold the perpetrators accountable; and the Commission of Experts established pursuant 
to resolution 935 (1994) concerning Rwanda, which was tasked to examine and analyse information 
derived from investigations, and report on violations of international humanitarian law, including 
JHQRFLGH 6HH 81 ³&RPPLVVLRQV DQG ,QYHVWLJDWLYH %RGLHV´ DW
www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/subsidiary_organs/commissions_and_investigations.shtml. 
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investigation be carried out. The AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan provides 
a reference on the possible mandates, terms of reference, and expected 
recommendations.17 
One way to mitigate and avoid the consensual approach adopted by ASEAN 
from becoming an obstacle to ICrimJ is to ensure that the intergovernmental 
commission on regional crimes makes its annual reports and minutes of meetings 
publicly available. Once ASEAN stakeholders become convinced of the political 
prudency of upholding ICrimJ, the regional monitoring and non-judicial mechanisms 
may eventually lead to the acceptance for and establishment of a regional criminal 
court, which could potentially also consider situations put forward by the AICHR. 
Amongst the list of crimes that are considered by AMS to be serious threats to 
regional SHDFHDQGVHFXULW\DSODXVLEOHµUHJLRQDOFULPH¶WKDWFDQDOVREHFRQVLGHUHGE\
an ASEAN ICrimJ initiative is sea piracy. As it is also a serious crime of concern in 
other parts of the world, it can lead to the expansion of the list of crimes recognised in 
other regions. The regionalisation of ICrimJ can then have a further value-added effect 
by organically adding to the basket of international crimes recognised at the global 
level. 
In this connection, besides the focus on advancing ICrimJ in Southeast Asia, a 
further objective of this research has also been to develop some general conclusions 
about the theoretical viability and practical appeal of a regional approach. While it is 
tempting to paint the possibility of regionalising ICrimJ with a broad brush, it is 
recognised that there is immense diversity both in terms of what justice means in 
different geographic areas, as well as the nature of the threats and types of crimes that 
plague various parts of the world. For example, the political and strategic incentives 
for collective action by regional groupings of States to advance ICrimJ and enforce 
ICL may differ greatly, while problems like the illicit drug trade and piracy may be 
particularly serious in one region but possibly even non-existent in another. 
Nevertheless, identifying generalisations about the regionalisation of ICrimJ are 
valuable for two reasons: (1) it uncovers various incentives and favourable conditions 
for shifting some burden of upholding ICL to the regional level; and (2) it provides a 
                                          
17
 These include the investigation of human rights violations and other abuses committed, as well as the 
causes underlying the violations; and to make recommendations on the best ways and means to ensure 
accountability and reconciliation with a view to deterring and preventing a recurrence of the conflict 
and future violations. 6HH$80HGLD$GYLVRU\´6HFRQG)LHOG0LVVLRQRIWKH$IULFDQ8QLRQ
CRPPLVVLRQRI,QTXLU\RQ6RXWK6XGDQWR-XED6RXWK6XGDQ´$SULO$YDLODEOHDW
http://au.int/en/node/4465.  
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starting platform for States to determine the relative costs and benefits of various 
(domestic, regional, or international) options to address each set of unique situation 
and circumstances. 
 Firstly, the regionalisation of ICrimJ has political appeal as it puts States 
ILUPO\ EDFN LQ WKH GULYHU¶V VHDW SDUWLFXODUO\ RQ VLWXDWLRQV LQ WKHLU RZQ EDFN\DUG 
Regional initiatives on ICrimJ proffer a way for States to avoid appearing supportive 
of impunity for international crimes, while retaining control over the development and 
enforcement of ICL in their immediate region. In this regard, they provide States with 
both a credible alternative and extra layer between the ICC and themselves. Secondly, 
they provide an opportunity to target crimes that may be unique but pertinent to their 
region, and more importantly reflect local value systems and notions of justice. 
Thirdly, a regional approach may then be better able to understand and prioritise the 
needs of the situation because it will be more politically attuned and culturally 
sensitive to the needs both sets of victims. By providing a geographic nexus to the 
crimes being investigated, regionalising ICrimJ not only deals with the problem of 
disconnect from the situation and the victims, but also addresses some concerns 
regarding selectivity and bias that allegedly exists at the international level. 
Fourthly, in terms of enforcement, a neutral regional initiative may be better 
able to secure the cooperation of the affected State as well as ensure that neighbouring 
States apprehend and prosecute or extradite suspects that have fled across the border 
into their territory. Not only does it reduce concerns of exposure to external 
(particularly Western liberal) political influences and lessen the sovereignty costs for 
the concerned State, regional pressures from neighbouring countries to comply are 
less likely to be ignored. Indeed, a regional approach may be more successful than 
international initiatives at upholding ICrimJ because neighbouring regional States will 
clearly be more (directly and indirectly) affected and more incentivised to act, not 
least to prevent the harmful effects from recurring and spilling over their borders. 
Fifthly, joint collective action by all the regional countries then curtails criticisms by 
acting as a check-and-balance against self-interested political motivations, and 
increases the legitimacy and credibility of the solution and its outcomes. Sixthly, the 
onerous and costly exercise can be shared amongst the various regional neighbours, 
and would be amply justified by the maintenance of regional peace and economic 
stability. Burden-sharing will definitely help consolidate and strengthen cooperation 
on ICrimJ between international, regional and State actors.  
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Last but not least, a regional approach would also prove more effective and 
efficient at punishing perpetrators of international crimes than national solutions, 
particularly when the atrocities have been perpetrated by the State or when local 
accountability mechanisms may be abused for intimidation and revenge. Indeed, the 
likelihood of impartial and proper proceedings within States afflicted by international 
crimes are low as their domestic legal systems will have inherent biases regarding the 
guilt or innocence of an individual. Alternatively, piercing the veil of impunity may be 
less important than securing peace and reconciliation. In post-conflict societies, 
problems may be further compounded by the lack of necessary infrastructure, 
resources and properly trained personnel to pursue accountability under ICL. In this 
connection, regional ICrimJ initiatives should take into account transitional justice 
issues, such as national reconstruction and societal reintegration. Depending on the 
context and nature of the crime(s), restorative justice and non-penal forms of 
accountability may be more appropriate than retributive justice and criminal trials. 
While criminal prosecution of high-level offenders should be a facet of regional 
ICrimJ initiatives, truth commissions and limited amnesties may then also be 
considered as valid tools for dealing with the masses of low-level offenders. 
It is however also acknowledged that regional initiatives are not perfect or 
without shortcomings, and certainly no panacea for the political and practical 
difficulties of pursuing ICrimJ. There will be disadvantages and disincentives to 
regional efforts, particularly when: (1) a regional hegemon is involved; (2) there are 
few commitments to regional norms; (3) the political risks and financial costs are 
high; and (4) the burden of action is only shared by a few States. Indeed, roadblocks 
can develop due to the presence of a regional hegemon and the absence of a country 
willing to take the lead. Inter-States rivalries and political cleavages can further 
obviate that advantage of regional collective action. In this regard, regional 
organisations may be prevented from taking action that may compromise member 
State sovereignty, or be caught in between two or more conflicting members. Some 
regional bodies may also not have the mandate to tackle ICrimJ issues and enforce 
ICL, let alone have the necessary infrastructure, resources and processes in place. 
Specific conclusions about the prospect of regionalising ICrimJ in different 
geographic regions can therefore be attained only from individualised examination. 
7KLV ZLOO LQFOXGH ZKDW PD\ EH GHHPHG DV µUHJLRQDO FULPHV¶ EDVHG RQ: (1) regional 
community recognition; and ( µH[WUHPH VHULRXVQHVV¶ ZLWKLQ D UHJLRQDO FRQWH[W
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Indicators of seriousness include threats to regional peace and security, atrocities that 
UDLVHV µVRFLDO DODUP¶ZLWKLQ WKH UHJLRQDOFRPPXQLW\DVZHOODVEUHDFKHVRI regional 
jus cogens norms and obligations erga omnes partes. 
The efficacy of a regional solution will depend on the region in question, the 
capabilities of the States (or regional associations) undertaking such efforts, as well as 
the nature of the crime(s) committed. A natural and suggested follow-up to this 
research is an analysis of the viability of a regional ICrimJ mechanism in other parts 
of Asia, including the possibility of opening the proposed ASEAN ICrimJ to non-
AMS. This may be developed as an expansion of the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) 
cooperation, consisting of the 10 AMS, China, Japan and South Korea.18 
Developments in Africa will however remain important for the notion of regionalising 
ICrimJ, not least because of the failure by AU Member States to cooperate with the 
ICC. Allegations by African countries that the Court unfairly targets them, 
compounded by the AU requests for the ICC trials against current Kenyan President 
Kenyatta and Vice President Ruto to be suspended until they complete their terms of 
office,19 have already led the process of expanding the AfCHPR  mandate to be fast-
tracked.20 It is noteworthy that an amendment to the Preamble of the ICC Statute, 
UHJDUGLQJ WKH&RXUW¶VFRPSOHPHQWDULW\ UHJLPH WR UHFRJQLVHUHJLRQDOFRXUWVKDV WKHQ
been suggested by Kenya.21 Undoubtedly, the ability of the Extraordinary African 
Chambers to conduct a fair trial of former Chadian President Hissène Habré will then 
strengthen the argument and resolve of the AU for international crimes committed in 
Africa to be tried within the region.22  
                                          
18
 For more on APT, see www.asean.org/asean/external-relations/asean-3/item/asean-plus-three-
cooperation. 
19
 The Kenyatta trial at the ICC has been postponed four times, with the start date now set for October 
2014. 
20
 At its 23rd Summit in June 2014, the AU adopted the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the 
Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. It thereby created an International Criminal 
Law Section with jurisdiction over: (1) genocide;(2) crimes against humanity; (3) war crimes; (4) the 
crime of unconstitutional change of government; (5) piracy; (6) terrorism; (7) mercenarism; (8) 
corruption; (9) money laundering; (10) trafficking in persons; (11) trafficking in drugs; (12) trafficking 
in hazardous wastes; (13) illicit exploitation of natural resources; and (14) the crime of aggression. 
Significantly, the African Court cannot commence or continue charges against serving AU Heads of 
State or Government, and other senior state officials based on their functions, during their tenure of 
office. See discussion in Chapter 2. 
21
 The amendment proposals by Kenya were received by the Secretary-General of the UN, acting in his 
capacity as depository, in March 2014. 
22
 The expanded African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples Rights (AfCJHPR) will however 
have jurisdiction only over crimes committed after the entry into force of the Protocol on Amendments 
and its Statute ± 30 days after the ratification by 15 AU Member States. 
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In addition to an expanded study on the broader Asian region, an analysis of 
the regionalisation of ICrimJ in Africa will therefore also prove to be highly 
worthwhile. It can provide greater insights on the future relationship and interaction 
between the ICC, regional courts, as well as both States Parties to the Rome Statute 
and non-party States.23 Together, both regional studies will help further elucidate how 
ICrimJ can be best promoted and protected by recognising theoretical variants in 
different regions, and through the regionalisation of ICL in terms of regional 
enforcement mechanisms or lists of crimes.24 
                                          
23
 It is significant that, in terms of complementary jurisdiction, the AfCJHPR Statute adopted by the AU 
in June 2014 does not mention the ICC, and only refers to National Courts and Courts of the Regional 
Economic Communities. 
24
 The list of crimes under the AfCJHPR jurisdiction clearly signals the importance placed by the AU in 
combating the various illicit activities affecting the region ± beyond the core international crimes. 
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